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**CRIME PREVENTION AND
COMMUNITY SAFETY:**
TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES

2010

INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES, 2010

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Message from the ICPC President

Over the past several years, the ICPC has gathered together experts and practitioners in a number of fora and has built a global network of considerable significance. In so doing, it has gained exposure to an impressive and widely varying array of crime prevention strategies. Across the world, the striving for safe families, safe communities, safe societies and safe countries continues, in circumstances as different as the symptoms of unsafety that bedevil policy makers and ordinary citizens alike. The International Report provides a platform for learning and exchange, comparison and for the seeds of partnerships.

This year three important themes are covered in the Report; organized crime, trends in migration and drug and alcohol abuse. Sadly, these themes link many communities reflecting the links between oppression and poverty, depression and substance abuse. In documenting these themes, the Report shifts our thinking towards action in the mitigation of problems that extend beyond the daily experience of crime and violence and into issues of quality of life; the way in which individuals and communities are targeted by power hungry and greedy others.


The report moves on to interrogate the governance of security. "Security" is understood in different parts of the world to mean different things; for well resourced communities, security is often about the ability to protect against known risks, the application of technology and manpower against criminal intent. In this instance, security is used to encompass "safety"; the prevention, reduction or removal of these risks for an environment in which ordinary citizens live and move free of fear. This section applies a safety lens to working towards safe communities, understanding the mandates of the social sector, health, education, sports, arts and culture in terms of their potential contribution to safety and makes the link to training and capacity building, beyond the security sector.

The ICPC has often led debate about evidence based or evidence led practices. In exploring the issues of evaluation, the Report guides practitioners to a better understanding of the need for evaluation and methodologies that work in this context, without restricting creativity and innovation essential to the development of new and better interventions.

In December 2009, ICPC celebrated its Fifteenth Anniversary with an international colloquium that sparked with energy and crackled with new learning. Despite the warmth of the reunion as old friends met and reconnected, there was also the constant challenge and hunger for newness and for better, faster, more cost effective, more inclusive, more sustainable practices. This Report too combines a sense of continuation and new information, new actors, new actions and participants.

The *Second International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety* has primarily been the work of a small team at the ICPC in Montreal, led with extraordinary energy and dedication by the out-going Director General, Valérie Sagant. Each member of the team deserves recognition for the work done, and I would like to express my pride in association with both the ICPC and the Report, as well as my gratitude and respect for those who have produced the report. The editorial committee had the wonderful task of coming together to discuss and dissect, debate, prod and prompt as a part of the process. I hope they share the sense of a job well done.

We are sadly not close to solving the global problems of unsafety; yet with this Report we take another small collective step towards improving the quality of lives of many, in many communities, across our world.



Barbara Holtmann



The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, a unique international forum and resource center dedicated to crime prevention and community safety, was founded in 1994 to promote the exchange of ideas and knowledge on crime prevention and community safety and share the knowledge between all prevention stakeholders.

The members of the Centre include national and regional governments and cities, international organizations, non-government organizations, research centres and professional organizations all involved in prevention, and brings together crime prevention stakeholders from across the world. It was founded in close partnership with the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

The Centre has developed its activities around three principal axes. It acts as a centre of knowledge and information on crime prevention developments and tools. It undertakes and publishes comparative analysis of strategies, practices and topics in prevention, including this International Report, and compiles compendia of promising practices, and in its capacity as expert, it works with United Nations agencies to promote the integration of preventive approaches within international and government programmes and policy. Finally, it undertakes technical assistance to support the work of practitioners and policy makers on the ground, including through the dissemination of tools and educational resources, and exchanges between prevention stakeholders.

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We wish to thank in particular ICPC's Members who provided us with assistance in identifying promising practices and policies.

Our Editorial Advisory Committee composed of international experts and four members of the Executive Committee of ICPC, was expanded with an additional 9 members to increase the range of geographic, institutional and disciplinary backgrounds.

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Synthesis and recommendations

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime was created in 1994 to promote international exchange in the field of crime prevention. One of its goals is to report, every two years, on the evolution of prevention and community safety around the world: the evolution and outcomes of public policies, strategies and practice. This 2010 International Report is the second edition in this series.

On the basis of this analysis, two key findings emerge:

- In 2010, crime prevention policies are no longer limited to reducing rates of crime, but also aim to improve the quality of community life and our ability to live together;
- Although there has been considerable progress in the development of prevention policies, they are still marginalized within the broader scope of public safety policies.

While our analyses is based on broad international comparisons, it should be recognized that **crime is very unevenly distributed throughout the world**. Certain countries, such as Guatemala, have homicide rates which are higher than 30 per 100,000 population, whereas in many other countries, such as those in Western Europe or Southeast Asia, homicide rates are more than 10 times lower. Important disparities are also observed between and within regions: Africa, Egypt, Morocco, or Mauritius have homicide rates lower than 3 per 100,000 population, far lower than those in South Africa. Within the same country, discrepancies can be significant: for example in Colombia, the city of Tunja (population 150,000) has a rate of 7 homicides compared with 128 in the city of San José del Guaviare (population 50,000). Finally, within the same city, homicide rates can vary significantly from one neighbourhood to another. In neighbourhoods of Rio de Janeiro, for example, rates vary from 2 to 12 homicides per 100,000 population.

1. In 2010, public policies in prevention go beyond reducing crime but also aim to improve the quality of community life.

Approaches to crime prevention has developed over time and are reflected in different United Nations resolutions and in practices and policies implemented around the world. The emphasis is not only on how crime can be reduced but also on how this can be **used to maintain and reinforce social cohesion** of communities themselves to collectively act and to improve their quality of life.

The most recent UN guidelines, the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime—2002, outline four types of approach to crime prevention:

- Crime prevention through social development
- Locally based crime prevention, or “community prevention”
- Situational crime prevention
- Reduction of recidivism

These approaches and their implementation, both at the policy level and on the ground, have progressively integrated the notion of community safety, or the safety of communities (in the sense of living spaces, neighbourhoods, schools, etc.) or *sécurité quotidienne, seguridad ciudadana*.

This conceptual framework of a **shared culture of prevention** has been strengthened over the years and can be seen through some of the following developments:

- International organizations such as UNODC have supported the production of a number of **tools intended to facilitate the implementation of international standards**.

One of the main themes of the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is ensuring that international standards are implemented more effectively. ICPC has drafted two guides for UNODC: the Crime Prevention Assessment Tool and the Handbook on the UN Crime Prevention Guidelines: Making Them Work. UN-HABITAT has also published a report on the use of safety audit guides for women’s safety: Women’s Safety: What Works and Where?

- † Training and tools for strengthening capacities have multiplied and emphasize the acquisition of **professional know-how** which is specific to crime prevention. ICPC has identified some 115 tools—guides to support local governments, manuals, kits, etc.—intended for actors in the field of prevention, and the police or practitioners in schools.

Numerous “tool kits” have been developed. Innovative forms of training and capacity building, such as peer training or practice communities, have been piloted in order to assess and disseminate techniques and knowledge. Specialized university courses have been developed, particularly in Latin America and Europe, and a few doctoral level courses are now offered. A number of supranational training courses are being offered or developed eg. by Beccaria, by EFUS, which well understand the need for cross-border exchange.
- † **Evaluation techniques are becoming more diversified and specialized.** Some progression can be observed; evaluation has tended to be limited to examining changes in crime rates; victimization surveys are now more widely used to complete the picture of crime, and to provide measures of insecurity. Today, researchers and practitioners also seek to evaluate the impact of prevention on a broader range of social and economic factors and on social cohesion.

Evaluation indicators are now more diverse in the field of drugs, the impact of prevention policies on public health is also assessed (Australia); in the field of social mediation, France has implemented a tool (CITER) to assess improvements in social cohesion, cost benefits and satisfaction with the mediation process. The *5Is* method, developed by Paul Ekblom (intelligence, intervention, implementation, involvement, impact) incorporates an awareness of the different stages of design, implementation, and evaluation of prevention programmes.
- † **Public policies increasingly respond to the needs of populations and communities.** One of the main concerns of prevention strategies centres on adapting to the needs and resources of each community or group.

We have emphasized the importance of local safety audits, with a broad assessment of data not restricted to police and justice statistics. The number of safety observatories—ICPC enumerated 17 in the world—speaks to this evolution in the collection, analysis, and contextualization of information from varied sources.

In this 2010 edition of the International Report, ICPC chose to examine three issues in particular that pose a growing problem for the safety of communities, and we observe some change—albeit sometimes modest—in public policies in terms of a greater willingness to take account of the needs of individuals and groups, and not restrict policy to the application of criminal law:

- † **The relationship between migration and safety includes victimization, marginalization, and discrimination against many migrants**—both internalⁱ and internationalⁱⁱ migrants—and particularly in the context of clandestine migrationⁱⁱⁱ or displaced persons^{iv}. Beyond the criminalization of irregular migration, a number of initiatives try to build awareness among vulnerable populations about the risks involved, promote development in countries of origin, reduce racism, and promote the integration of migrants in their host regions.
- † **Countering organized crime has long been dominated by tough approaches against transnational trafficking**, as well as the reinforcement of international cooperation. Here again, some initiatives now aim to evaluate the impact of organized crime on local communities and **strengthen the mobilization and resilience of communities**, in order to impede the supply of arms or drugs to neighbourhoods, the recruitment of young people into criminal networks, or corruption. The prevention of human trafficking also requires building awareness among vulnerable groups to the potential dangers.
- † Finally, some evolution in strategies aimed at drug and alcohol abuse can be observed: **purely repressive approaches are being questioned—notably the criminalization of addicted people**. Measures for reducing drug-related risks, for the non criminal treatment of consumption, as well as different initiatives for managing the consequences of alcohol consumption in public places are now more widely used.

i 740 million persons according to the 2009 UNDP report.

ii 200 million persons according to UNDP.

iii Estimated at 2.5 to 4 million persons annually by the Global Commission on International Migration, 2005.

iv Estimated at 26 million persons according to the Commissariat for Refugees.

2. Crime Prevention strategies are more widespread, but often remain marginalized within broader public safety policies.

More and more countries are adopting broad public safety policies that include a component devoted to prevention. In 2008, the first ICPC International Report—using the findings of the 2006 UN questionnaire, and our own assessment—identified 37 countries in this category. In 2010, our research identified 57 countries. However, these policies encompass different fields of public safety.

The number of strategies specifically devoted to prevention is limited, but continues to increase. In 1999, ICPC noted 9 countries that had adopted a comprehensive prevention strategy. In 2010, 24 countries^v have such a strategy, and 21 countries have instituted a national coordinating or developmental body for these specific strategies.

While information is limited, the priorities of these different policies—whether comprehensive or sectoral—mainly address such concerns as drugs, women, youth, and trafficking in persons. Important differences can be observed from one region of the world to another:

- On the African continent, analysis of the policies in 10 countries indicates an emphasis on protection and education of children and youth, and eradicating poverty.
- Similar approaches are identified in numerous Latin American and Caribbean countries (15 countries studied), where entrenching a culture of peace and respect for human rights seems to be a priority for many countries which have experienced authoritarian regimes. By the same token, restoring trust between citizens and institutions, particularly the police, is frequently included in prevention plans.
- In Asia, our research was limited to 7 countries and policies appear more sectoral, and notably focus on trafficking in persons, drugs, and providing support for youth.
- In Europe, as well as Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand, information is more readily accessible. Priorities are youth crime, school-based violence, the eradication of racism and discrimination, and to a lesser degree, corruption.

At the local level, the results of crime prevention policies can be very positive but resources are limited. Examples of local successes are numerous and almost always involve integrated strategies with strong leadership by the mayor, multisector partnerships, the participation of the population and local actors, and the **institutionalization of the prevention policy**. Decentralization of decision-making powers (e.g. allowing the regulation of drinking establishments), decentralization of fiscal resources, and the creation of permanent fiscal bodies to implement the policy, are all important factors.

The Colombian cities of Bogota and Medellin are clear examples demonstrating this process, with drastic reductions in their homicide rates. In Bogota, the rate was reduced by a factor of four in ten years; in Medellin, the rate went from 381 homicides per 100,000 population in 1991, to 29 homicides per 100,000 population in 2007. Similarly, in Durban, South Africa, the neighbourhood of Warwick Junction was the focus of a coordinated plan that contributed to reducing the rate of homicides per 100,000 population from 50 in 1997, to 6 in 2002.

Many key elements of successful prevention strategies have been identified and appear to be corroborated in all regions around the world:

- **A sense of trust between the population and institutions**, particularly the police, justice, and the educational sector, **contributes directly to the success of safety and prevention action.** The legitimacy of criminal justice institutions, the integrity of authorities, and the equitable treatment of citizens notably by the police (absence of racial profiling) are conditions that appear indispensable to the effectiveness of public policies on issues of safety and prevention. This factor is not linked to the extent of corruption or violence committed by public agents. In Guatemala, the re-establishment of trust in the police appears to be a significant factor following 35 years of civil conflict and human rights violations by law enforcement. In Canada, while the police are judged positively by 80% of the population, police services are also confronted with the same need to develop and maintain positive community relations.
- **Methods of peaceful conflict resolution have demonstrated their effectiveness.** Implemented in public places, within the family, on public transport, or within the justice system, conflict resolution approaches including mediation, legal disputes settlements, education in peaceful relationships, and citizenship, and conciliation, have multiplied in all regions, and have been the object of rigorous evaluation. A few examples: 11,000 people, mostly women, have been trained in conflict mediation

^v South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, Mexico, New-Zealand, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Dominican Republic, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Sweden, Slovenia.

in Brazilian favelas in the context of the PRONASCI programme. In Kingston, Jamaica, or in Chile, mediators intervene in those neighbourhoods where the most problems occur. In the United States, the use of “violence interrupters”, initiated in Chicago and replicated in other cities, has helped reduce by half the number of retaliation shootings by street gangs. In France, social mediation has helped reduce conflicts by 90% and resulted in a 60% reduction in costs related to the destruction of public property.

- **The active participation of the population involved in prevention strategies is a guarantor of success.** Over and above consultation, projects which have demonstrated clear results have used participatory approaches and engage with the communities with whom they are working. For example, in Canada, the Yukon Healthy Families programme involves the active participation of Aboriginal communities for programme implementation. In Brazil, many local programmes use participatory budgeting techniques which engage youth and local populations. In Québec, Canada, the use of multimedia as a tool to motivate youth at risk, and engage their commitment and creativity, have obtained very positive results (61% of youths have been reintegrated into the education system or the workforce).

Analyses of these trends leads us the following recommendation: **greater priority must be given to crime prevention in public safety policies:**

- Safety and prevention strategies, as defined by the United Nations, must **constitute public policies in and of themselves, and not be annexed to other policies.** They must benefit from adequate and specific resources both in terms of funding and governance, management capacities, follow-up, and evaluation.
- **The evaluation** of prevention programmes and strategies, when adapted to specific prevention issues, **contributes to the improvement and adaptation of implemented projects and strategies and helps identify the most effective and promising practices.**
- **Regional and local agencies** that are directly connected to the needs of communities and the resources which can be mobilised **need sustainable and institutionalized financial resources, and real powers of management.**
- **Professional cultures must evolve in order to integrate methodologies and knowledge which are prevention specific.**

In this context, ICPC intends to pursue its work to build awareness and to disseminate inspiring practices. It calls upon the member states of the United Nations to seize the opportunities offered by UN forums for the continued advancement of prevention and community safety, in each of their countries, and at the international level.

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

AIC	Australian Institute of Criminology	HALDE	<i>Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et de promotion de l'égalité</i> (France)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	HBSC	Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (Study)
CAVAC	Crime Victims Assistance Center (Centre d'aide aux victimes d'actes criminels) (Quebec, Canada)	HEUNI	European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control
CCPCJ	United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council (Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, South Africa)
CCSA	Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse	IADCC	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
CDPC	European Committee on Crime Problems (Council of Europe)	IAHCCJ	International Association for the History of Crime and Criminal Justice
CECI	Center for International Studies and Cooperation (Centre d'étude et de coopération internationale) (Canada)	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
CHRC	Canadian Human Rights Commission	ICCLR & CJP	International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy
CICC	International Centre for Comparative Criminology (Centre international de criminologie comparée) (Quebec, Canada)	ICVS	International Crime Victim Survey
CISC	Criminal Intelligence Service Canada	ICPC	International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
CNRS	<i>Centre national de la recherche scientifique</i> (National Center for Scientific Research) (France)	IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
CRRF	Canadian Race Relations Foundation	ILANUD	United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
DIV	<i>Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville</i> (France)	ILSED	<i>Instituto Latinoamericano de Seguridad y Democracia</i> (Latin-American Institute for Security and Democracy) (Buenos Aires, Argentina)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	IOM	International Organization for Migration
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council	INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	INSTRAW	United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance	IPC	Institute for the Prevention of Crime (Ottawa, Canada)
EFUS	European Forum for Urban Safety	ISISC	International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (Syracuse, Italy)
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction	ISPAC	International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice programme
EU	European Union	ISRD	International Self-Reported Delinquency Study
EUCPN	European Crime Prevention Network	ISS	Institute for Security Studies (South Africa)
EU ICS	European Crime and Safety Survey	IVAWS	International Violence Against Women Survey
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football	KICJP	Korean Institute of Criminal Justice Policy (Seoul, Republic of Korea)
FLACSO	<i>Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales</i> (Latin American School of Social Sciences)	MERCOSUR	Southern cone Common Market
GA	General Assembly (United Nations)		
GERN	<i>Groupe européen de recherche sur les normativités</i>		
GSHS	Global School-based Student Health Survey (WHO)		

MILDT	<i>Mission interministérielle de lutte contre les drogues et les toxicomanies</i> (France)	UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
NAASS	Naif Arab Academy for Security Sciences (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia)	UNAFEI	United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
NCC	National Coordinating Committee on Organized Crime (Canada)	UNAFRI	United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
NICRO	National Institute for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation of Offenders (Cape Town, South Africa)	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
NIDA	National Institute on Drug Abuse (United States)	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
NIJ	National Institute of Justice (Washington, United States)	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
NGO	Non-governmental Organization	UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
NNAPF	National Native Addiction Partnership Foundation (Canada)	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
OAS	Organization of American States	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
OCAVI	<i>Observatorio Centroamericano sobre Violencia</i> (Central American Observatory on Violence)	UNDP	United Nations Development Program
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development	UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Program
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States	VAW	Violence against women
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	WB	World Bank
OIF	<i>Organization internationale de la francophonie</i> (International Organization of the Francophonie)	WHO	World Health Organization
OND	<i>Observatoire national de la délinquance</i> (National Observatory of Delinquency) (France)	WICI	Women in Cities International
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe		
OSI	Open Society Institute (Washington DC, United States)		
PNI	United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network		
SAPS	South African Police Service		
SPVM	<i>Service de police de la Ville de Montréal</i> (City of Montreal Police Service, Quebec, Canada)		

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime has established the goal of publishing, every two years, an international overview of crime prevention. This 2010 edition of the *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives* not only continues the work begun with the first report in 2008, but also reflects the Centre's other activities and publications, which help to complete and enrich it¹.

The development and drafting of this Report are the fruit of the unique approach to crime prevention developed by ICPC. It is, therefore, important to outline the objectives of this report and the concepts it uses.

1. Conceptual Framework

Crime prevention is a living concept whose boundaries vary depending on the institutional framework in which it is used, and on the geographical regions, languages, and time periods in which it takes place. As we underlined in our first International Report, the Centre bases all its activities on the **definition of "prevention" outlined in the 2002 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime**,² that prevention: **"comprises strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes."** These Guidelines were preceded by the "Guidelines for the Prevention of Urban Crime"³ adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council in 1995. Drawing on these internationally adopted definitions – as well as the numerous clarifications included in the guidelines and other UN resolutions – and the work and exchanges organized by ICPC, we describe more fully below our concept of "crime prevention" and "community safety".

1.1. Defining ICPC's field of analysis: "crime prevention"

Several elements of the UN definition need to be considered.

The concept of **"risk of offending"** is the first element⁴. Many academics and policy makers consider the activities of the penal system "preventive" on the basis of its assumed **deterrent** effect on potential offenders. On this basis, all activities by the police, justice and correctional (penitentiary) system are seen as preventive since they aim to deter would-be offenders or re-offenders, as well as containing and reducing the risk of offending through incapacitation while in prison.

ICPC does not view prevention in narrow deterrent or repressive terms, but rather places a greater emphasis on an approach that emphasizes the actions which can be taken either before a crime occurs, or after it, in assisting the social reintegration of an offender. Penal measures, and their impact on the commission of offending, are already the subject of numerous studies, and are far more systematically monitored by governments than prevention measures, and ICPC is not in a position to contribute in a substantive way to that knowledge. Further, a narrow deterrent understanding of prevention is incompatible with the **Principles** underlying the UN Guidelines (articles 7 to 14),⁵ and the Centre's humanist and progressive approach which draws from them, and which focuses rather on the wider notion of ways of improving the sense of community among citizens."⁶

1 Capobianco, Laura. (2010). *Crime Prevention: An Effective Component of Multi-Dimensional Security*. Montreal: ICPC

See in particular: Jean-Paul Brodeur, Massimiliano Mulone, Frédéric Ocqueteau, Valérie Sagant (2008). *Brève analyse comparée internationale des violences urbaines*. Montreal: ICPC.

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2 UN Economic and Social Council, resolution 2002/13 of 24 July 2002, Annex.

3 UN Economic and Social Council, resolution 1995/9 of 24 July 1995.

4 Numerous definitions of crime prevention can be found in the field of criminology, eg. that by Maurice Cusson: "Crime prevention consists of all non-coercive actions on the causes of crimes with the specific goal of reducing their likelihood or severity." In Cusson 2002, p. 10.

5 The eight principles in the 2002 UN Guidelines (art. 7- 14) are as follows: government leadership; socio-economic development and inclusion; cooperation/partnerships; sustainability/accountability; knowledge base; human rights/rule of law/culture of lawfulness; interdependency; and differentiation.

6 It should be recalled that the 2002 UN Guidelines state: "the enforcement of laws, sentences and corrections, while also performing preventive functions, falls outside the scope of the Guidelines, given the comprehensive coverage of the subject in other United Nations instruments."

Similarly, ICPC does not restrict its range to measures of “**crime reduction**”⁷ or “**crime control**” since the objective of crime prevention extends beyond the absence of crime to the improvement of the quality of life, as discussed below.

Four types of crime prevention approaches are outlined in the 2002 UN guidelines and correspond to ICPC’s activities:

- **Crime prevention through social development** (or social crime prevention) includes the range of social, educational, health, cultural and environmental measures which can help to reduce the risks of offending and victimization, and reinforce protective factors. Social approaches are based on policies which offer support to the most vulnerable populations or areas, and have been integrated into nearly all prevention programmes implemented.
- **Situational crime prevention**⁸ includes a range of approaches which aim to reduce the opportunities for and benefits of offending, as well as increasing the risks of being caught, primarily through the design of the built environment.
- **Community or locally-based crime prevention** includes all those actions that help to “change the conditions in neighbourhoods that influence crime, victimization, and the resulting insecurity.”⁹
- **“Prevention of recidivism”** is concerned with the prevention of recidivism through the social reintegration of offenders.

Community crime prevention emphasizes community mobilization, using the notion of “community” in the sense of either a social group or a living environment, and includes the aim of improving the quality of life of residents.

Situational approaches tend to be more specifically targeted, within a broader policy of crime reduction or prevention. In this context, many municipalities or police forces have, for example, developed programmes targeting residential burglary reduction and prevention through the use of home reinforcements. In Belgium, this approach was institutionalized with the creation in 1992 of the position of “techno-prevention counsellor.”¹⁰

As mentioned in our previous report, ICPC makes less use of the common typology “**primary,**” “**secondary,**” and “**tertiary prevention**” also used in the public health field. This focuses more on the stage at which actions are initiated, preventing “entry” into the justice system among the general population (primary prevention), preventing the offending or re-offending of “at-risk” groups (secondary prevention), or reducing the risk of recidivism (tertiary prevention). These concepts are commonly used in the field of addiction prevention. They allow a clear distinction between broad and general actions relating to the population as a whole; before a fairly minor problem worsens; and to prevent the reoccurrence of serious offences¹¹.

Nevertheless, the approaches to prevention outlined in the UN Guidelines more clearly reflect the range and types of action implemented by a wide variety of partners in crime prevention.

The 2002 UN guidelines refers not only to the risk of offending, but also to its “**harmful effects on individuals and society.**” It should be emphasized that this definition, like that used by numerous governments, also includes action to support **victims** of crime, as well as at **those at risk of offending or already involved in crime.** It is well recognized that the same risk and protective factors influence victimization and offending: living conditions, education, individual and family situations are very widely identified as determining factors in both cases. In common with many actors in the field of prevention, we emphasize the importance of “living together” (see below). In this context, issues concerning relations between victims and offenders, the reparation of damage, and conflict resolution approaches are priorities for many crime prevention policies. It should be emphasized that this distinction is not absolute, and the boundaries between victims and offenders are not always clear-cut. Prevention policies face the challenges of proposing interventions for dealing with situations and individuals who do not fit into such neat “typologies.”

On the basis of our approach, therefore, and drawing on the Principles in the 2002 UN Guidelines which guide crime prevention intervention, ICPC has progressively included in its field of prevention analysis a number of factors which derive from crime and its harmful effects:

- The exclusion and marginalization of individuals or groups which can be created or aggravated by victimization, offending or recidivism;
- racism and other types of discrimination affecting certain people or groups and associated with crime;
- prison overcrowding and more generally overloaded penal systems, including the activities of police, courts, and social workers who deal with people in the justice system;
- the deterioration of social capital and the interpersonal links and trust between people and institutions that can be exacerbated by crime;
- the development of informal and criminal networks in communities that contribute to the reduction in social capital, helping to isolate or alienate people, especially women, young people, and disadvantaged populations;
- crime-related economic losses and barriers to social development and personal growth; and
- fear of crime and the sense of insecurity.

These phenomena are not only generated by crime, but may also contribute to its occurrence, acting as aggravating factors.

7 The concept of “crime reduction” has been used notably, along with those of prevention and “community safety” in the United Kingdom. See: Home Office (2007). *Cutting Crime: A new partnership 2008-2011*. UK: Home Office.

8 This includes the notion of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).

9 See for example Prairies Research Associates (1996) for a *safes Canada Guide* on community crime Prevention. The term also used is community-based crime prevention.

10 See for example: ICPC (2006). *La prévention des cambriolages résidentiels: quelques enseignements tirés d’une approche comparée*. Prepared by Olivier Barchechat.

11 Institut de la santé publique du Québec: <http://www.inspq.qc.ca/>

1.2. Concepts of “community safety”, “seguridad ciudadana”, “sécurité quotidienne”

The English-language notion of “community safety” forms a major aspect of the work of ICPC, and this International Report. It corresponds to the Spanish term *seguridad ciudadana* and the French concept of *sécurité quotidienne*, and all three refer to one of the goals of preventive action as we understand it in terms of **improving the quality of life of communities**. The term places a greater emphasis on community interaction, rather than just individual (criminal) behaviour, and on **social cohesion** and the ways in which it can be maintained and reinforced. Evidently, the community is not a homogeneous whole, therefore, our approach focuses on the modalities of dialogue, diverse viewpoints and building a consensus that respects such diversity (see the chapter on Good Governance).

In this sense, community safety deals with the various impacts and “harmful effects” of crime discussed above, and the ability of communities and individuals to act and react. The connection between crime prevention and social cohesion is, for example, very marked in France, and was emphasized from the start of the creation of public policy in this regard¹². That connection remains the basis for the powers given to the *Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances*¹³, and its accompanying interministerial structure dedicated exclusively to crime prevention¹⁴.

This notion is reinforced in the term *convivencia ciudadana*, widely used in Latin America, which has been described as the “ideal for coexistence of very diverse cultural, social, or political groups, a viable life together, stable and potentially permanent living together, agreeable in itself and not just for the advantages it brings.”¹⁵ Derived from the term *convivere*, meaning to live together¹⁶, this concept emphasizes the values of tolerance and peaceful relations.

It is evident, therefore, that the term “community safety” includes elements common to the terms used in French and Spanish. In England, the *National Community Safety Plan 2008-2011* emphasizes that it goes beyond notions of crime reduction or crime prevention, to include improving the qual-

ity of life of residents¹⁷. A similar notion is used by the UK Design Against Crime Research Centre¹⁸, whose definition among other things includes promoting trusting relationships between residents, the police and other public services.

1.3. Related concepts

The term “crime prevention” is not used uniformly throughout the world. A cursory comparative analysis of usage in Europe and Latin America shows that the term *prevención del delito* is little used in Argentina, Chile, Peru, or elsewhere in Latin America, in the sense of a general policy for all kinds of crime. The term tends to be reserved for action plans targeting a specific type of crime (for example human trafficking or corruption) and using a more legislative approach to prevention. However, government plans and programmes with the same characteristics as those outlined in the UN definition of crime prevention do exist.

In Latin America, the term *seguridad pública*, or public safety (*sécurité publique*) is often used to refer to concerted prevention plans, although they may often include a specific component relating to *seguridad ciudadana*. This concept of public security goes beyond ICPC’s range of interest in including a wider set of government activities and services such as border controls and transnational organized crime or terrorism. Nevertheless, many of these “public safety” policies include initiatives directed at the most vulnerable groups, the safety of communities, victim support, and peaceful coexistence¹⁹.

A number of countries use notions of **public peace** or **tranquillité publique** in terms of promoting the peaceful use of public places²⁰ in their community safety and prevention policies.

Finally, the relatively recent term “**human security**” widely used by, for example, UN-HABITAT, places a focus on individuals rather than states, and sees the notion of security as an essential public good and a fundamental right of the individual. This security, however, extends well beyond the “right to live without fear of crime” to include security of tenure, or from disasters and other social, or economic factors that affect the security of individuals.

12 See the report of the Commission des Maires, called the “Rapport Bonnemaison,” 1982.

13 Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances, ACSE, <http://www.lacse.fr>

14 The nuances between the English terms *security*, referring specifically to action against threats, and *safety*, which suggests a “safe” or “secure” environment, are difficult to transpose into common language in French, despite attempts in France to distinguish between *sécurité* and *sûreté*. See notably the use of the term *sûreté* in reference to the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du Citoyen, as used by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of the Interior, in his introductory speech to the Villepinte symposium (1997): *Des villes sûres pour des citoyens libres: actes du colloque de Villepinte, 24-25 octobre 1997*, La documentation française, Paris.

15 Our translation. Mockus, A. (2002), “Convivencia como armonización de ley, moral y cultura.” In *Perspectivas*, vol. XXXII, No. 121, pp. 19-37.

16 Illera, M (2005), “Convivencia y cultura ciudadana: Dos pilares fundamentales del Derecho Político,” in *Revista de Derecho Universidad del Norte*, vol. 23, pp. 249-250.

17 www.communitysafetyni.gov.uk

18 www.designagainstcrime.com

19 For Chile’s *carabineros*, *seguridad ciudadana* is included in public safety. See *La Seguridad pública en Chile: Visión de Carabineros. 2do. Curso internacional de diseño de políticas y evaluación de proyectos de seguridad ciudadana*. Santiago de Chile, 2000. See also the Brazilian Public Security National Plan (SENASP) and PRONASCI, and the Mexican Programa sectorial de seguridad pública 2007-2012.

20 *Ley del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana*, Law 27933 of 11 February 2003, Peru.

In its 2003 report, the United Nations Commission on Human Security states that “human security’s ambition is to free the human person from fear and want and to permit his or her development.”²¹ The last element of the definition refers to the reinforcement of the individual’s ability to “resist adversity and realize his or her potential,”²² reflecting the English-language concept of empowerment, frequently used in relation to prevention and safety objectives.

Overall, therefore, the concept of crime prevention and community safety used by ICPC emphasizes the role of residents – or communities – in developing and implementing these policies. Likewise, the development of personal capacities, whether by education, professional skills development, leadership, etc., promotes good social integration and the building of peaceful living environments.

1.4. The elements of a strategic approach

Having defined the notion of crime prevention and community safety used by ICPC, the kinds of policies and practices utilized need to be outlined. Many types of prevention action are included in our range of vision, from permanent or time-limited public policies, to specific programmes, agreements, and generalized or isolated practices. While the key role of public authorities is emphasized, numerous actors contribute to preventive action, including local authorities, NGOs, the private sector, and others.

The 2002 UN guidelines refer to “**strategies and measures**” which meet three important criteria of transversality, partnership, and knowledge-based action. A **transversal or multi-sector approach** responds to the multiple causes of crime. Prevention cannot be based on police or judicial assessment alone, but needs to be multidisciplinary and integrate information from a range of sources and disciplines, including social, health, education, urban and other sectors. This diversity allows for a richer and more complete understanding of the causes of crime. However, multi-sector approaches have been criticized, on the one hand for allowing policy to become ‘diluted’ and to lack specific objectives, and on the other hand because they seem to link everything to the topic of crime.

For example, some governments²³ have argued that improving working conditions and reducing unemployment will reduce crime. However, public health, education, and social service stakeholders are often concerned about being subjected to prevention and security objectives that do not fully match the goals and ethics of their own sectors. Some of these issues were discussed in the 2008 International Report, in the discussion on

“early intervention”.²⁴ The challenges of the “criminalization of social policies” are broached by Bill Dixon in Chapter 5.

Vertical and horizontal **partnerships** form a second “pillar” of prevention policies. Vertical partnership includes the importance of links between the **different territorial levels**. As the UN Guidelines, and specialized prevention networks all stress, there needs to be concerted action across local, regional (or provincial or federate), national, and supranational levels. The important role of cities has often been highlighted because of their closeness to citizens and their everyday problems, and for originating many prevention approaches that have since become international standards²⁵. However, the capacity of local governments for action remains limited, and must be supported and facilitated by sub-regional or national governments.

Horizontal partnerships refer to collaboration between a wide variety of institutional actors and stakeholders. This forms a core part of ICPC’s work. Not only is it necessary to mobilize professionals in various fields – police, justice, education, health, social services, urban planning and management, transportation – but it is also important to work with community groups and NGOs. They often have deep roots in the community and with the business sector which may be victims of crime, but can also contribute to positive and creative environments. Finally, it is important to partner with academic research centres which can assist with monitoring and evaluating initiatives.

The importance and complexity of these various partnerships justify the attention paid to questions of governance, especially since, as has been suggested, a trusting relationship between people and institutions is clearly identified as an essential condition for safe and healthy communities. Finally, the direct participation of citizens, including specific groups such as cultural minorities, Indigenous peoples, young people or women, is seen as crucial for many prevention practices and a contributor to their success. Such participation, developed alongside, or in place of, political decision-making mechanisms, merits considerable attention and reflection on methods of governance.

Finally, the notion of **knowledge-based policies and practices** draws on the results of an extensive and wide range of scientific research on crime problems, their causes, and the impacts of preventive interventions. Knowledge-based prevention practice can be extended into, and allows for a simple model of action that is both pragmatic and rigorous: diagnosis, action plan, implementation and evaluation. Each step can be realized using methodological tools specifically adapted to the context and resources available for intervention.

21 *Rapport de la Commission sur la sécurité humaine, un aperçu*, Commission on Human Security, 2003, final report. www.humansecurity-chs.org. (Unofficial translation of French quotation.)

22 Ibid.

23 For example the governments of L.I. Lula da Silva in Brazil or L. Jospin in France (1998-2002).

24 ICPC, 2008 Op. cit., p. 89.

25 ICPC 2008 Op. cit., pp. 226-243.

Briefly summarized, this strategic approach accords with the recommendations of the United Nations and the approach used by other international organizations, governments, and specialized crime prevention centres. These are the basic components of the approach to prevention and community safety used by ICPC and which inform this biennial publication.

2. Objectives of the Report

The publication of a regular international report was envisaged since the creation of ICPC, and formed one of the objectives of its 2006-2010 Strategic Development Plan. The report shares both the strengths and weaknesses of the Centre. It is not a United Nations report, even though UN agencies have supported and participated in its development; nor is it an academic report, even though it has enjoyed the contribution and expert advice of a number of respected scholars. It does not set out to provide an international ranking of countries in terms of their prevention policies, even though it highlights the initiatives we consider to be of particular interest and value. Above all, the report aims to **meet the needs and answer the questions of those who develop and implement prevention across the world**. This is why we accept the notion of evolution in our conceptual framework and field of analysis. This framework does not correspond to predefined categories, but rather to changing ideas and practice on the ground. Only the values on which the Centre's activities are founded guide our analyses of this evolution.

The ICPC was created 15 years ago, mainly by governments and organizations from North America and Europe. Its ability to take account of action in all regions of the world is still limited, but progressively expanding. Today, every continent is represented within ICPC's governance structures, and exchanges with Central America, the Caribbean, South America, Australia, and South Africa, as well as Europe and North America, are deeply rooted. However, knowledge of certain regions is still limited, a weakness that is compounded for the purposes of this report by the very unequal distribution of pertinent data. Relevant data is nonexistent in certain countries, and unreliable in others; language often presents a formidable barrier; academic traditions in criminology and other social sciences differ widely; and the presence of specialized structures and the ability of civil society to take part in public debate on prevention and safety also vary widely between countries. **These limitations affect our analysis**. We are attempting to compensate for them by broadening our editorial committee, soliciting diverse contributions and partnerships, and systematically seeking information from countries and regions where there is a dearth of information, in contrast to the "overabundance" from Western countries. This makes the development of this Report a long-term project which aims to progressively correct this imbalance, within the limits of the Centre's capacities.

The International Report had three principal objectives.

2.1. Creating an international overview of prevention

There is an abundance of research and publication in the justice and penal fields, and data collection on the criminal justice system is relatively systematic at the state level. Homicide rates, conviction and incarceration rates, police capacities etc. are routinely documented, even if such data may present problems of interpretation and methodology. There is a preoccupation, understandably, at the international and state level with the criminal justice system. However, information relating to prevention is more fragmentary, and the systematic collection and analysis of such information is not yet seen as indispensable. This is why we considered it necessary to undertake the long-term task of creating a global overview of prevention policies and practices.

Despite being incomplete, this overview should **help countries and prevention actors to situate themselves internationally**. Thus, for example, it is striking to note that European countries, whose crime rates are among the lowest in the world, and who have extensive resources, often adopt measures which are far removed from internationally adopted standards, especially with regard to responsibility and the penal treatment of minors. Conversely, European experiments in social mediation have proved to be effective and have been replicated in many other parts of the world.

By providing summarized "situation tables," the International Report **provides prevention stakeholders with arguments** to help them promote practices which conform to international standards. In this respect, the 2002 UN Guidelines provide a starting point for the promotion of effective crime prevention. This report helps to illustrate them with national and regional policies, in turn making them better known.

2.2. Providing prevention resources

The 2008 International Report was accompanied by a compendium of **good and promising practices including interventions** with young people, street gangs, partnerships, citizen participation, victim support, and with Indigenous peoples. For this Edition, examples have been integrated directly into the report itself. The many citations, including several to ICPC publications, point the reader to more complete information sources on these practices.

The Report also highlights the work of some of the **main international stakeholders and networks** that undertake initiatives closely related to prevention and community safety. This includes intergovernmental agencies, political or thematic organizations, development banks, etc. who provide more specialized information on, for example, urban development, youth justice, organized crime, or small arms. They offer rich knowledge bases, as do many universities and specialized research centres.

This year, we have also examined the issue of **training** specific to the field of prevention. Chapter 8 analyzes various resources including international university programmes, inter-regional centres, and guides and manuals to support capacity building. ICPC hopes to reinforce its role by systematically collating information on these resources, and making the information more routinely available internationally through its Web site.

2.3. Fostering an integrated approach to prevention

The first International Report brought together knowledge and practice in relation to the key topics of young people's victimization and offending, women's safety, and the safety of schools and of public places. Some major prevention trends were also examined: knowledge-based approaches, the role of institutional actors, 'new' community safety professions, and the role of local actors. This second edition deals with new themes and trends. By doing so, we hope not only to continue to build the knowledge-base, but also to provide more concrete illustrations of the value of an **integrated approach to prevention**. According to ICPC's mission, *integrated prevention policies and actions are necessary for the safety of communities*. As discussed above, this comprehensive and integrated approach outlined in the UN guidelines, has inspired government policies such as those of Quebec, adopted in 2001²⁶, and the City of Bogotá²⁷. A similar approach is enshrined in the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines), adopted in 1990, which refers to "comprehensive prevention plans"²⁸.

Crime prevention is relatively new as a public policy and academic subject. It is still frequently seen as an objective or programme requiring coordination by various public policies, but rarely as a public policy in itself. To our knowledge, although there are many consultative or coordinating bodies responsible for crime prevention²⁹, no country has a ministry entirely devoted to crime prevention. As was noted above, in some regions, prevention forms only a subset of broader public safety policies.

The Report, therefore, aims to reinforce and define the **professional and political culture of prevention** that is progressively being built through discussion and experiment, and every two years, will address progress and challenges in the field.

This analysis will help to build the "prevention archives," and clarify the essential components of the prevention approach, beyond changes in language and passing fashions. The Report

also aims to highlight **innovations** which are creative and adapted to the new realities that societies must often face.

To date, the **values at the base of this integrated approach to prevention** as promoted by the ICPC have remained largely **implicit**. Through ICPC's activities and recommendations, and the functioning of its governing bodies, its values are centred around three axes:

- democratic governance that aims to encourage initiatives that assist populations and the most vulnerable individuals and groups in expressing their needs and having them taken into account;
- responses to crime that are grounded in a belief in an individual's ability to grow and change;
- social inclusion and the promotion of "living together," emphasizing solutions that focus on tolerance, the integration of the various components of society, and the inclusion of the most marginalized people.

The construction of this conceptual base, grounded in effective practice, will enable ICPC to achieve its goal of promoting prevention as an effective and sustainable response to issues of crime and community safety.

3. Report structure and outline

As part of the ICPC's general mission to collect, analyze and disseminate international knowledge on prevention, the International Report examines the current status and trends in:

- crime and safety problems that concern stakeholders;
- methods and tools used to respond to them; and
- some of the results obtained.

3.1. Thematic analysis

The first part of the report contains a thematic analysis of some major prevention and safety concerns across the world.

The choice of subjects dealt with is the result of internal discussion among ICPC members³⁰ from a variety of institutional and professional backgrounds and from all regions of the world, as well as with our Editorial Committee³¹. It is also influenced by the desire to report on current and relevant concerns across diverse regions and countries.

26 *Pour des milieux de vie plus sécuritaires*, Politique ministérielle en prévention de la criminalité, 2001

27 *Plan Integral de Seguridad para Bogotá 2007-2017*

28 United Nations, *United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency*, Resolution 45/112 of 14 December 1990.

29 See chapter 5.

30 See the list of members on our Web site: www.crime-prevention-intl.org

31 See list in appendix. The Editorial Committee meeting for the 2010 report was held in Montreal on June 25-26, 2009.

Given its importance in almost all countries in the world, for this report it was felt that the issue of **migration** should be examined, including its links to safety and security. This is not to imply that migration is in itself criminogenic. Rather, the scale of migration – with 740 million internal migrants and 200 million international migrants in 2009 according to the UNDP³² – has numerous impacts on the lives of cities and on the personal safety of migrants themselves. This relates to their vulnerability in transit, and the discrimination that they and their descendants may suffer after relocating. In Chapter 2 we examine the risks associated with clandestine migration³³, which increases vulnerability for certain groups of people and can involve organized crime. We also examine the integration challenges facing migrants in their destination countries or regions, as well as the discrimination and racism that they may suffer along with all other persons belonging to a “visible” minority regardless of nationality.

In Chapter 3, we discuss issues of **organized crime** in relation to prevention and community safety. The term “organized crime” covers a great many acts³⁴ of varying intensity and severity. At the international and national levels, action against organized crime tends to be quite separate from that relating to “street,” “volume,” or everyday crime. However, the impacts of organized crime on the safety of communities (residents) is significant, and of increasing concern for actors on the ground. It can attract vulnerable youth, affect fragile populations, and result in the influx of drugs or weapons into neighbourhoods. More generally, organized crime can lead to the corruption of local institutions and the confidence of the population in those institutions.

In Chapter 4, we examine the **impacts of alcohol and drugs on community safety**. Both of these have frequently been identified as crime-related problems³⁵, despite the differences in their legal status. Since ICPC is committed to **emphasizing preventive responses** to these problems, the use of strictly repressive laws and regulations, and criminal conviction and incarceration is not examined here.

Chapter 5 touches on some types of **social and educational approaches to prevention** which, as discussed above, includes a very wide range of interventions. Those included range from general or targeted public education campaigns on the risks associated with gang involvement, consumption of illicit substances, or human trafficking, for example; measures providing social, educational, economic, or psychological assistance to individuals and families; and those offering jobs or recreational activities to provide alternative life choices and reinforce individual capacities.

3.2. Transversal analysis

As discussed above, effective prevention needs to be built on a multi-sector or transversal approach, on partnerships, and knowledge-based action. These form aspects of the “**prevention culture**” which has been progressively built up through international dialogue, notably in successive UN debates and resolutions³⁶, as well as international conferences³⁷, and through adopted policies and implemented action.

The issue of **governance** is central to effective prevention and was touched on briefly in the 2008 Report. This Report considers governance concepts in more detail, including that of nodal governance, and provides further discussion of partnership methods such as contracts between various levels of government, and the role of civil society and community organizations.

The kinds of **tools** which are available to actors are again examined in this report, including **diagnostic tools** for understanding and monitoring crime and feelings of insecurity: institutional statistics, victimization studies, participatory audits, specialized questionnaires for vulnerable groups, analytical frameworks for professionals, crime observatories, among others. Two criteria influence the choice of tools: the need to base information about prevention and safety needs on a variety of information sources – not just on police statistics – and the need to analyze such data in context, whether geographical, institutional, temporal, or other.

As indicated, Chapter 8 examines needs for and the availability of **training** in prevention, **since it is evident** that professional skills, partnership practices, and knowledge of prevention remain fragile and incomplete, as the 2008 report identified.

The final two chapters of the report examine the practice of **evaluation in crime prevention**. As in most public policy fields, the evaluation of prevention programmes and practices has become a strong international and national requirement, with which actors sometimes have difficulty complying. The kinds of methodologies entailed can often be expensive, unrealistic, or burdensome. Skills remain fairly limited. The use to which evaluation findings are put is still often dominated by management or political concerns, whereas evaluation which enables programmes and initiatives to be improved and supported tends to be less valued.

32 UN Development Programme (2009). Human development report 2009: Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development. New York: UNDP.

33 2.5 to 4 million people each year cross borders without authorization, according to the 2005 report of the Global Commission on International Migration, and 50 million people in the world are living with an irregular status, including 10 million in the USA alone, according to UNDP.

34 See definitions in Chapter 3.

35 See in particular the works cited in our 2008 Report, p. 38.

36 Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Congresses on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, held every five years, and by the Commission of the same name, which meets every year in Vienna at the UNODC headquarters.

37 See in particular the discussion of the principal conferences from 1986 to 1993 in ICPC (2009), *Le Centre international pour la prévention de la criminalité* ICPC celebrates its 15th anniversary: *Retrospective of 15 years of activities*. Montreal.

3.3. Analysis of the outcomes

The outcomes of prevention policies and practices are often assessed in terms of three criteria: their effectiveness, efficacy and efficiency. This presents perhaps the most challenges, and constitutes the biggest limitation of our Report in its current form. In a general sense, information on the outcome of prevention policy and practice is again limited and very heterogeneous: few countries or organizations systematically monitor and evaluate their prevention programs and strategies. Existing studies are based on a variety of methodologies, and the findings are not systematically accessible.

The **effectiveness of prevention policies or practice** relates to their ability to produce the desired outcomes, usually in terms of reductions in crime, and can be difficult to measure. Governments routinely mobilize more resources for developing and launching public policies than in reporting on their implementation, regardless of whether or not they appear effective. The **efficacy of policies and practices** concerns their ability to meet the targets they have set. Analysis of the **efficiency** of programmes in terms of their capacity to achieve good results at a reasonable cost are rarely undertaken, in spite of the strong demand for the cost effectiveness of public policies to be assessed. Some of the problems entailed in the evaluation of prevention are discussed in Chapter 9 and 10.

So far, it has been difficult to find evaluations of public policies which have been adopted and implemented, even at the initial phases. Chapter 5 of the Report is, therefore, based on an analysis of **government policies** in terms of stated *intentions*. This usually provides a sense of the philosophy underlying their actions and goals, trends in terms of emphasis and approaches, the types of crime which are priorities, and whether or not international standards are taken into account etc. When initiatives corresponded closely with the UN Guidelines, these strategies were included in the Report as **good or inspiring examples**.

It has been our intention to lay the foundation for a broad analysis of evaluation in crime prevention and community safety, beyond more strictly academic debates, since it is a topic of considerable importance and difference of opinion. Through our Reports and other publications, we highlight case studies which have produced some clear reductions in crime and violence, and improved the quality of life of communities. They include the City of Bogota, Colombia, where levels of homicide have been reduced by three quarters over a period of 10 years, through the implementation of an integrated municipal policy; Birmingham, in the U.K., where the Safer Neighbourhood Programme reduced youth offending by almost one third; Durban, South Africa, where the urban renewal project in

Warwick Junction reduced the rate of violent deaths from 50 in 1997 to six in 2002, and brought many other social and economic advantages; and France, where social mediation programmes have reduced 'repeat' conflict by some 90%, and reduced public expenditures on damage by more than 60%.

In this Report, we note the progress made in the more systematic implementation of policy evaluations and the diversification of methodologies, which can benefit other actors on the ground.

All types of evaluation are difficult when the initial objectives of interventions are too vague or unclear, when data collection systems are insufficient, the necessary skills limited, or there is a lack of consensus on indicators of success to be used. For this reason, ICPC places a particular stress on the importance of diagnostic and monitoring tools, as well as the importance of developing prevention objectives in a collaborative manner.

3.4. Methodology

As with the previous report, the 2010 Report draws on research and policy literature, and consultation with international experts, ICPC member countries, organizations and partners. Information was gathered from published or translated material in English, Spanish and French for the most part dating from 2002 or after, the year of the adoption of the 2002 United Nations Guidelines for the prevention of crime. Apart from work undertaken by ICPC since its inception, four additional sources of information were used: publications of international intergovernmental organizations, information distributed by regional and global networks and organizations specialized in crime prevention and security, and available data on prevention and safety practices and policies in cities, provinces/states and countries.

It is important to note that all websites were consulted prior to March 15, 2010.

The knowledge base established by ICPC staff was a significant source of information in the preparation of this Report. It comprises information relating to policies and strategies in this field developed by various levels of government, as well as practices and tools³⁸.

To analyze the national prevention strategies that are currently in place around the world, we structured our research around an **analysis grid** comprised of 11 elements:

- The general context of crime prevention: competent authorities at the different territorial levels, the approaches used, and national, regional and local policies that are directly related to crime prevention, or in some way associated with it;

38 The records by country are established from publicly available information and provide regularly revised descriptions of crime prevention policies and initiatives, action plans and strategies. The "good practice" files provide information on prevention practices implemented in various countries, as well as the name and contact information of the people or organizations responsible for the projects. The knowledge base tools section contains numerous descriptions and links to specialized sites, tool kits, manuals, guides, contact networks, CD-ROMs, etc.

- The legal and regulatory framework;
- Existing prevention tools;
- Evaluation practices for crime prevention strategies and policies as well as their dissemination;
- Indicators of safety and sustainable development;
- The involvement of other crime prevention actors;
- The development of skills in crime prevention;
- The budget allocated to prevention;
- The most significant practices in crime prevention;
- The priority themes; and
- The main challenges experienced.

As in the first Report, the Centre also invited selected universities and research centres to contribute papers on specific geographic regions and research themes. In 2009, the ICPC benefitted from the expertise of the following organizations (in alphabetical order of the country of origin):

- In Australia: the National Secretary and Public Officer, Empower Justice Service and the Australian Crime Prevention Council, Happy Valley;
- In Bangladesh, the Department of Criminology and Political Science, Mawlana Bhashani Science and Technology University, Santosh;
- In Chile: Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago;
- In the United States: The Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts;
- In France: the Arab World Institute, Paris;
- In Morocco: Université Mohammed V-Agdal, Rabat;
- In Singapore: the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore;
- In Slovenia: the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor.

However, many policies, practices and initiatives remain insufficiently studied or recognized. Existing information continues to be difficult to access. **ICPC has, therefore, developed a series of information gathering tools** in collaboration with its members and other governments.

In 2009, a **questionnaire on crime observatories** was distributed to our main partners and through our website to collect more systematic and international information. Over 100 responses from 32 countries were received in the following months. Of these 17 met the definition of a crime observatory³⁹, drawn from two international meetings on crime observatories held in December 2007 and March 2009.

A first **questionnaire for local governments** was also developed and distributed in three languages in October 2009, with the aim of gathering information on crime prevention action and the commitment of cities. It is designed to facilitate comparative analysis of local initiatives, taking into account the diversity of the contexts, whether legal, demographic, financial etc. This tool will be developed and used more fully for the next edition of our Report.

These new tools, along with the partnerships established with a growing number of organizations worldwide have without a doubt strengthened this edition of the International Report.

39 The three criteria retained were: a systematic recording of crime data at regular intervals over a given territory; analysis of the data; and public dissemination of the results.

PART 1
THEMATIC ANALYSIS

CHAPTER

CRIME AND INSECURITY: CONTEXT AND TRENDS

Crime and insecurity: context and trends

Since the publication of the 2008 Report, only a small number of international studies relating to crime rates have been produced. Nevertheless, this chapter considers some of the main trends in violent and other kinds of crime, as well as the possible impacts of the current recession on crime levels globally.

The limitations of existing data on violence and acquisitive crime are still evident, limiting comparisons and hampering theory and policy development. There remain substantial problems in obtaining information in terms of data which is disaggregated by gender and age, and ethno-cultural background. As outlined in the previous Report, these problems need to be addressed to assist policy development both internationally and locally.

1. Global Trends in Crime

1.1 Unequal Distribution of Crime

Internationally, it is difficult to make comparisons between countries in terms of official statistics on crime and victimization. There are wide variations in recording and reporting practices, for certain offences and social groups, and in the classification of offences. This is compounded in many countries by corruption, lack of resources and training for police officers, and lack of public confidence in, if not fear of, the police. In some cases, there is substantial under-reporting of certain offences. The UN Crime Trends Surveys have had particular difficulties obtaining information from African countries, prompting projects to improve data collection in the region⁴⁰.

Homicide tends to be more reliably reported than other offences, although not defined in the same way everywhere, and is used as a proxy measure for levels of violence internationally. This can create a data-driven focus on homicide rates at the expense of other measures of victimization.

The most important source of comparative data to date has been the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) based on households, which has been conducted five times between 1998 and 2005⁴¹, during the course of which it has covered

73 countries⁴². It covers all regions except the Caribbean (though strongly weighted to Europe), and with a focus on urban areas in developing countries⁴³. The limited numbers of countries surveyed, and changes in countries surveyed in each phase, reduce the validity of comparisons over time⁴⁴. There are also limitations in measuring violent and sexual offences⁴⁵.

Some researchers have begun to question the value of victimization surveys as sources of data, particularly as measures of fear of crime⁴⁶. On a practical level, concerns have been raised that a shift to mobile phones has resulted in reduced validity of samples taken only from those with land lines. More importantly, however, such surveys have been criticized for using 'taken for granted' concepts of crime and fear and tend to reflect their development in richer countries. It has been argued that a **more accurate picture of fear and insecurity can be obtained by using more qualitative methods**⁴⁷.

Nevertheless, the ICVS provides some information on victimization from acquisitive crime and non-lethal violence internationally, and some limited data on trends in developed countries, and forms the basis for much of this chapter.

40 The UN initiative Data for Africa aims to improve knowledge on drugs and crime in Africa. UNODC has also, in collaboration with UN-HABITAT, conducted country-wide victimization surveys in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.

41 The next ICVS will be published in 2010, unfortunately after publication of this report.

42 See ICPC International Report 2008 for a summary of countries participating.

43 The mix of urban and rural correspondents arguably also limits the comparability of the ICVS. However, analysis between cities in developed and developing countries is possible.


44 The data on 2005 relates 30 countries and 33 main cities, presenting data from 38 countries.

45 For a more detailed discussion on comparing crime statistics see Van Dijk, J. (2009) *Approximating the Truth about Crime: Comparing crime data based on general population surveys with police figures of recorded crimes*. CRIM PREV. www.crimprev.eu.

46 Sessar, K. and Kury, H. (2009) *Risk and Insecurity as Broader Concepts Behind Fear of Crime and Punitiveness*. Assessing Deviance, Crime and Prevention in Europe, Project CRIMPREV, brochure No 4.

47 *Ibid.* This was also the conclusion of the Second International Crime Observatories Meeting 2009 (see Box on Crime Observatories) p. 24.

Intentional homicide (conflict/non-conflict), rate per 100,000 population, by sub-region, 2004⁵⁰



Recent analysis of homicide data by the Geneva Declaration Secretariat has shown that there are twice as many homicides in countries which are not in conflict situations, as there are, directly or indirectly, in armed conflicts⁴⁸. As outlined in the previous International Report, the **burden of such violence is predominantly felt by countries in the South, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and South America**. Intentional homicide⁴⁹ rates per 100,000 population for sub-regions are shown in the map above.

While there were few sustained increases in homicide levels over ten per cent between 1998 and 2006, the majority of countries with an increasing rate are in Central and South America, contributing to their high sub-regional homicide level in 2004. Similarly those regions with low rates, such as Europe and North America experienced steady declines over the long term and within the decade⁵¹. West and Central Europe, East Asia and South-East Europe are the three sub-regions with the lowest rates of homicide, the latter having seen a fifty percent reduction in absolute numbers of homicides between 1998 and 2006⁵². Eastern Europe seems to have reached a turning point in 2001, since then homicides have been declining.

This underlines the importance of developing a nuanced understanding of political, social, cultural and economic factors that

contribute to the levels of homicide in different countries and contexts, and to developing appropriate intervention strategies.

Regional rates of homicide also mask differences at national, provincial, and local levels. Further, the homicide rate varies considerably between different Latin American countries – from 3 homicides per 100,000 people in Chile, to more than 40 in El Salvador⁵³. The trends are also disparate. Some countries in the region have experienced a continuous rise (as in the case of Venezuela, where homicide rates were 11.7 per 100,000 in the early 1980s, 15.2 in the early 1990s, and 33 in the early 2000s⁵⁴).

Within countries there can also be wide variations in homicide rates, as in cities in Colombia, for example (see graph).

Thus it is important to examine trends at municipal levels, and in major urban areas such as mega-cities and city-regions, in looking at national rates of homicide.

48 Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva : Geneva Declaration Secretariat. The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence was adopted in 2007. This report was coordinated by the Small Arms Survey.

49 Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Page 68 for the definition of homicide used.

50 Ibid. Page 4. Sub-regional figures are calculated from 201 individual country or territory homicide level estimates, derived from available national level administrative data.


51 See, for example, Eisner, M. (2001) *Modernisation, Self-Control and Lethal Violence: The Long-term Dynamics of European Homicide Rates in Theoretical Perspective*. British Journal of Criminology vol. 41. Pp 618-38.

52 See also Aebi, M.(2004) *Crime Trends in Western Europe from 1990 to 2000*. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research vol. 10, nos. 2-3. Pp.163-86.

53 Tiré de Guarjardo García C. (ed.) (2008). *Seguridad y Prevención: La situación en Argentina, Chile y Uruguay durante 2007*. CIPC et Universidad Alberto Hurtado.

54 (2003) Inter-American Development Bank.

Rates of Homicide in Colombian Cities, per 100,000 pop. 2007



Source: Acerco Velásquez, H & Cardona, S. (2009)⁵⁵


1.2. The Prevalence and Impact of Small Arms

Data from 45 countries reported in the Tenth UN Crime Trends Survey⁵⁶ suggests that around 60 per cent of homicides are committed with firearms, ranging from 77% in Central America, to 19% in Western Europe.

An overview of a sub-set of countries illustrates the considerable impact of gun-related incidents on homicide rates, particularly in the Americas⁵⁷.

The prevalence of small arms presents a particular challenge for the prevention of violence. A key concern highlighted by the Small Arms Survey 2008⁵⁹ is theft and diversion of small arms, particularly from Eastern Europe, South America and the US, to Africa and South America. While there has been a reduction in the number of civilian firearms reported lost/stolen or recovered/confiscated, limited data from ten selected countries suggested that around 1 in 1,000 weapons in civilian hands may have been diverted. Furthermore, light weapons are becoming more lethal, more accessible, less expensive, and more durable, which increases the prospect of their proliferation among non-state armed groups.

Proportion of National Homicide Rate in 2006 Committed with Firearms⁵⁸



55 Acerco Velásquez, H. and Cardona, S. (2009) *Medellín, Bogotá: Del autoritarismo y anarquía a la garantía civilista de los derechos ciudadanos. Mejoría de la seguridad ciudadana.*

(Web version <http://www.convivenciayseguridadciudadana.com/contenido/images/stories/medell%EDn%2C%20bogota%2C%20seguridad.pdf>). Page 4.

56 The Tenth UN Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (2005-2006) covers 86 countries, and provides information for that period.

57 Figures for Africa were unavailable.

58 Based on data for a selection of country/city data from the Tenth UN Crime Trends Survey (2008) *Intentional homicide (2005-2006)*.

59 Small Arms Survey (2008) *Small Arms Survey: Risk and Resilience*.

Apart from the impact on developing countries, there is also concern in a number of developed countries about increasing gun-related violence. This affects particular groups, especially young men of black or Hispanic origin in the US, and young black men in the UK, for example. Thus while the US experienced a decline in overall reported violent crime in 1993 – 2005, homicide was the second leading cause of death for young people aged 10-24. In 81 per cent of cases, firearms were used⁶⁰.

1.3. The Costs of Lethal Violence

Violence is very costly to societies, and an increasing variety of methods attempt to measure such costs. They provide strong arguments for the benefits of investing in violence reduction and prevention.

Some estimates include direct costs such as public spending on the criminal justice system. In developing countries, for example, expenditure on law enforcement consumes 10-15% of GDP compared to 5% in developed countries⁶¹. Other estimates include welfare and indirect or hidden costs.

The World Health Organization, Centers for Disease Control and Small Arms Survey, have developed **guidelines for estimating both direct and indirect economic costs of violence**⁶². In Jamaica direct and indirect costs were estimated to be equivalent to 4% of GDP. The costs of direct and indirect firearms injuries in Brazil and Colombia have been estimated at USD 10 billion, and USD 4 billion, per year respectively (0.5 and 1 percent of respective GDP)⁶³. Accumulated direct and indirect costs of violence rose to 14% of GDP in El Salvador⁶⁴.

Other approaches measure the **long-term losses arising from higher rates of mortality** (welfare loss). The results of such studies parallel homicide rates: countries with the highest welfare loss as a share of GDP are found in Latin America, the Caribbean and the former Communist regions, while Western Europe and Japan have the lowest rates of welfare loss.

The welfare cost of violence in Colombia and the US in 1995 was estimated as 9.7% and 0.9% of GDP respectively⁶⁵.

In Colombia, the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC) recently estimated **lost productivity due to violent deaths** (LPVD) for over 90 countries⁶⁷. According to these estimates, regionally North America has the highest loss of life expectancy and lost economic productivity in the world. The US experienced USD 45.1 billion of lost productivity. For Latin America and Africa, the largest share of lost productivity was due to homicide.

Such measures evaluating the cost of violence provide an **indication of the level of spending against which to assess the cost of public policies on violence prevention**. The cost-benefits of prevention approaches are considered in more detail in Chapter 9 and 10 of this report.

1.4. Non-lethal violence

Violence which does not result in death is often overlooked in the focus on homicide. The World Health Organization estimates that individuals are approximately **ten times more likely to be injured than to be killed by violence**⁶⁸. Lethal and non-lethal violence rates are not necessarily related. In South

Measuring the Costs of Violence

There are three ways in which costs of violence have been measured:

- ✦ an accounting approach (calculating accumulated direct and indirect costs of factors to the economy and social multipliers, such as loss of social capital and political participation) - favoured by public health economists;
- ✦ a modeling approach (determining the difference between expected and actual economic growth) - more frequently used to cost the impact of conflict and;
- ✦ a contingent valuation (calculated on the basis of the market, or willingness to pay to improve security).

They each have certain advantages and disadvantages for calculating costs of violence⁶⁵. Some studies have used combinations of these approaches to develop more comprehensive costing of the impact of violence.

60 Centre for Disease Control 2007 cited in Small Arms Survey (2008) *Small Arms Survey: Risk and Resilience*.

61 IADB (Inter American Development Bank (2006) *Preventing Violence*. Technical Note, no.5. Washington DC: IADB; Londoño, J. L. and Guerrero, R (1999) *Violencia en America Latina: Epidemiologica y Costos*. Washington D.C: IADB.

62 Butchart, A. et al (2008) *Manual for Estimating the Economic Costs of Injuries due to Interpersonal and Self-Directed Violence*. Geneva: WHO.

63 Small Arms Survey (2006) *Small Arms Survey: Unfinished Business*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

64 Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva; Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Page 94; Costs have also been calculated for Guatemala see UNDP (2006) *El costo económica de la violencia en Guatemala*. Guatemala: UNDP.


65 See Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva; Geneva Declaration Secretariat. For full discussion of these methods. Chapter 5.

66 See also Soares, R. (2006) *The Welfare Cost of Violence across Countries*. Journal of Health Economics. vol. 25 :821-46. He estimates one year of life expectancy lost is associated with 3.8 % of GDP.

67 Restrepo, J., Ferguson, B., Jukliana M. Z. and Villamarin, A. (2008). *Estimating Lost Product Due to Violent Deaths in 2004*. Unpublished background paper cited in *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2008* op. cit. Pp.99-101.

68 WHO (2008) *Preventing Violence and Reducing its Impact: How Development Agencies Can Help*. Geneva: World Health Organisation.

Global lost product due to violent deaths, 2004⁶⁹



Africa, for example, there is little correlation between homicide rates and other forms of violence, while Barbados has a lower assault rate than Western Europe, but a homicide rate four times higher ⁷⁰.

New sources of data are increasingly being used to measure non-lethal injury, especially in Latin America, the Caribbean and Southern Africa. Health-related Injury Surveillance Systems, for example, (see Box) provide standardized data on violence, although it is not yet internationally comparable.

Injury Surveillance Systems⁷¹

Injury Surveillance Systems collate hospital information on injuries. They have been piloted and/or established in a number of countries in the South (Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua⁷², Honduras, Jamaica⁷³ and South Africa) to help obtain statistics on levels of violence and its causes, to identify high-risk areas, and target prevention programmes⁷⁴.

Such systems depend on the support of national Ministries of Health, especially to encourage decentralized local authorities to maintain them (as in Colombia). In El Salvador the Ministry of Health has begun to include injury data in a new national integrated health information system, the *Sistema de Información Morbilidad-Mortalidad vía Web* (National Mortality Morbidity Health Information System).

These systems provide important national and local sources of information for prevention planning. In terms of non-lethal injury, for example, in 2005, in Jamaica, it was found that young adults aged 10-29 accounted for 50% of those injured, with a higher proportion of males to females injured who were under 19. Seventy-six per cent of violence-related injuries were a result of an argument, 5% of a robbery/burglary, 2% gang/drug related, 5% related to sexual assault, 1% child abuse and 11% other (riot, police shooting)⁷⁵.

Lessons from such developments and from public health approaches have begun to be translated to developed countries with above average rates of violence. The Violence Reduction Unit in Scotland, for example, introduced an Injury Surveillance pilot in Glasgow in 2006, to measure the extent of violence in the city.

69 Reproduced from Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva; Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Map 5.2.

70 UNODC (2008) *Handbook on planning and action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean Regions*. New York: United Nations.

71 Training tools have been created to assist those wishing to establish similar systems: CDC's *Injury Surveillance Training Manual* (English and Spanish) and WHO's *Training, Educating and Advancing Collaboration in Health on Violence and Injury Prevention (TEACH-VIP) Manual*.

72 The projects in Colombia, El Salvador and Nicaragua were funded by the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).


73 Ashley, D., Holder Y. (2002) *The Jamaican Injury Surveillance System: lessons learned in Injury Control and Safety Promotion* (4). Pp 263-4. Richman, M. et al. *Injury control in Honduras: a survey of injury mortality*. *Annals of Emergency Medicine* 2000 36 (4). Pp. 333-9; Butchart, A. et al. (2001) *The South African National Non-Natural Mortality Surveillance System – rationale, pilot results and evaluation* in *South African Medical Journal* 91 (5). Pp. 408-17

74 Sklaver, B. A. et al (2008) *Establecimiento de sistemas de vigilancia de lesiones en Colombia, El Salvador y Nicaragua (200-2006)* ' (The establishment of injury surveillance systems in Colombia, El Salvador and Nicaragua (2000-2006))' *Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública* vol. 24 no.6; Nevertheless public health data remains problematic as a measure of homicide as there may be a number of reasons why medical staff may not be entitled to classify a death by violence as homicide, nor willing to do so.

75 Jamaica Injury Surveillance System report; UNODC (2008) *Handbook on planning and action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean Regions*. New York: United Nations.

1.5. Trends in Acquisitive Crime

As outlined in the previous International Report there appears to have been an increase in reported assaults and robberies in Latin America, Southern Africa and Eastern Europe between 1980 and 2000, with rates of reported robbery considerably higher than richer countries⁷⁶. Nevertheless there remains considerable variation in rates of robbery between countries. A comparison of available rates of victimization for robbery in Africa shows wide variation within the region, and with Europe and Barbados (the only Caribbean country included in the ICVS).



Other differences in context were also evident. For example, of those who were robbed in Europe only 12% knew the robber by sight or name, compared with 20% in African countries, and 42% of victims in Barbados, with the lowest rate of robbery.

Data from the ICVS suggests that rich countries in Europe, North America and Australia/New Zealand have seen a downward trend in victimization roughly since the early nineties, largely driven by falls in burglary, theft from vehicles and vehicle theft. This has varied, Belgium and Northern Ireland, for example, have seen no significant changes in levels of victimization⁷⁸.

Explanations vary, but situational crime prevention measures may have had a significant impact in reducing these rates of acquisitive crime⁷⁹. Punitive sentencing policies do not appear to have had an impact, and show no relationship with declining acquisitive crime in the US or Europe⁸⁰.

Developing countries may also have seen some falls in burglary even though they experience much higher rates globally. Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa have higher rates of reported victimization from robbery, burglary and (as a proportion of vehicle ownership) vehicle theft, than other regions⁸¹. Africa still has the highest reported rate of burglary in surveys of cities, despite an assumed under-reporting (estimated at 55% reporting rate in Africa and 72% in Europe)⁸². This contradicts assumptions that high consumption countries, with more portable consumer products, will have higher rates of acquisitive crime. Victimization surveys designed for developing countries have also highlighted the impact of livestock theft⁸³ where a substantial proportion of a family's capital and livelihood may be invested in their animals.

Other types of offences which are both violent and intentional, such as kidnapping, appear to be a major concern in some cities and regions (see Box).

76 Although an acquisitive crime, robbery is classified as involving violence, and appears to follow increasing violence trends rather than those for acquisitive crime. See data presented from the ICVS (2005) and UNODC Crime Trends Survey 2005 in UN Habitat (2007) *Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security*. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT

77 Reproduced from UNODC (2008) *Handbook on planning and action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean Regions*. New York: United Nations. Annex 1.

78 Van Dijk, J., van Kestrel, J. and Smite, P. (2007) *Criminal Victimization in International Perspective: Key findings from the 2004-5 ICVS and EU ICS*. Vienna: UNICRI

79 Crawford, A (2009) Situating crime prevention policies in comparative perspective: policy travels, transfer and translation In Crawford, A. (ed.) *Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective*. Cullompton: Willan

80 Van Dijk, J., van Kesteren, J. and Smit, P. (2007) *Criminal Victimization in International Perspective: Key findings from the 2004-5 ICVS and EU ICS*. Vienna: UNICRI. Pp. 103-4.

81 See ICPC (2008) *International Report: Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives*, for further details. See also data presented from the ICVS (2005) and UNODC Crime Trends Survey 2005 in UN Habitat (2007) *Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security*. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT.

82 See also data presented from the ICVS (2005) and UNODC Crime Trends Survey 2005 in UN Habitat (2007) *Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security*. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT.

83 UNODC (2008) *Victimization Survey in Rwanda*. Vienna: UNODC; UNODC (2008) *Victimization Survey in Uganda*. Vienna: UNODC; UNODC (2009) *Victimization Survey in Tanzania*. Vienna: UNODC.

Trends in Kidnapping

Kidnapping for ransom is difficult to monitor internationally, but is a major concern in some regions and cities. Control Risks, a private sector risk monitoring firm, has collated a database on kidnapping (since 1975) based on daily searches for cases. Although these figures are undoubtedly an underestimate, and are of limited validity, the database records a slight increase from 1,350 per year between 1998 and 2002 to 1,425 in 2007. Between 1998 and 2002 74% of the kidnappings recorded by Control Risks took place in Latin America, 14% in Asia and 7% in Europe and the Former Soviet Union. More recently there appears to be an increase in Asia and Africa (particularly Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iraq and Nigeria), a decline in Colombia, but increases in Venezuela and Mexico⁸⁴.

2. Background and Explanatory Factors for Crime

The previous report examined some of the risk factors for crime and victimization. This report highlights two phenomena – income inequalities – which affect the sense of security in a population, and corruption and abuses committed by institutional authorities.

2.1. Cities, urbanization and crime: Uncertain correlations


National crime rates often mask wide variations across regions and cities. It is often assumed that large cities are likely to have higher levels of crime and victimization, but this is not necessarily the case. For example, there is no clear correlation between the size of a city population and levels of urban homicide⁸⁵. The UN Survey on Crime Trends (2008)⁸⁶ examined a number of large cities, and found considerable variations. Homicide rates are higher than the rest of the country in larger

cities in North America, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, West, Central and South East Europe, but lower in Eastern Europe, South and Central America and East Asia.

In Latin America and Central America, higher homicide rates are found in smaller towns and cities, which are growing at a faster rate than larger urban communities.

The growth of urban areas in the world varies significantly from one continent to another, and within a region or a country. However, the UN estimates that a third of the world's urban population live in slums (see box). While slums vary greatly in terms of the level of poverty, quality of health, education, and environmental conditions, their lack of services and infrastructure is a major factor increasing the vulnerability of their inhabitants to crime and victimization.

Ratio of homicide rates in major cities and rest of country, 2005⁸⁷




Source : UNODC estimates

84 Cited in Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Pp. 136-7.

85 Small Arms Survey (2007) *Small Arms Survey: Guns and the City*. There are problems in definition of city size since shanty towns or urban-regions may not be included in city statistics.

86 UNODC (2008) *Tenth UN Crime Trends Survey Intentional homicide (2005-2006)*

87 Reproduced from Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva; Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Page 86.



UN-HABITAT's publication "State of the World's Cities 2008-2009: Harmonious Cities" reports that "within two decades, nearly 60% of the world population will be urban dwellers." The increase in urban population is putting pressure on governments and municipalities, and forcing them to create infrastructure and sufficient services to incorporate new residents. Slums are often built without approval and are characterized by poor sanitation, overcrowding, inadequate housing and lack of security. UN-HABITAT reports that "one in three people living in cities in the developing world live in a slum." Newly arrived migrants are often low-income earners, and end up living in unsafe settlements in marginalized urban areas, which lack basic services such as health care. This situation tends to increase the level of insecurity in their lives and can cause urban segregation⁸⁸.

Violence, including gang violence and racist attacks on inhabitants, occurs in slums for many reasons, including protests against failed policies of public housing, poor living conditions, rising food prices or an influx of external migrants⁸⁹.

2.2. The link between levels of inequality and crime

The level of inequality, rather than poverty itself, is one of the most important factors associated with crime rates in urban areas. Most studies have stressed **a strong relationship between measures of income inequality and property crime**, both across time and when comparing countries⁹⁰. Recent research uses wider indicators of economic conditions (wage levels, total economic output (GDP), and collective *perceptions* of current or anticipated economic conditions), as indicators of economic conditions. The results suggest that acquisitive crime increases during economic downturns, and falls with improvements in the economy⁹¹.

The degree of inequality in a country can be assessed using the "Gini coefficient" presented on the next page. Thus, it appears that Latin American and Caribbean countries and cities are among the most unequal in the world, as illustrated below.

Global patterns of inequality broadly mirror rates of crime and violence. In Africa, urban inequalities are highest in Southern Africa, whereby South Africa in particular still exhibits patterns that extend back to the period of Apartheid. UN Habitat has developed an 'international alert' to highlight levels of inequality likely to produce negative social, economic and political consequences.

Asian cities tend to be more equal than other cities in the developing world, with some exceptions (Ho Chi Minh City, Hong Kong and cities in Thailand and the Philippines). In the US, levels of income inequality have risen above the international alert line, particularly in larger cities. New Orleans, Atlanta, Washington D.C. Miami and New York are now comparable in levels of inequality to Abidjan, Nairobi, Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile. Rising levels of inequality are also observed in Canada, and as in the US and Australia, reflect racial inequalities (between white and black, Hispanic and mixed race, and Indigenous groups).

This analysis in urban trends and inequality levels, illustrates the importance of undertaking careful contextualized studies of urban growth and social, economic and cultural patterns in cities, to provide a better understanding of crime trends. Local authorities need information which examines local contexts and problems of crime and violence, something which observatories on crime and social problems seek to provide (see box).

88 UN HABITAT (2009). *The State of the World's Cities: Harmonious Cities*. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT


89 UN HABITAT (2004). *The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003*. Nairobi: UN HABITAT. Page 11.

90 Box, S. (1987) *Recession, Crime and Punishment*. New York: Barnes and Noble; Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D. and Loayza, N. (2002) *Journal of Law and Economics* vol. 45; Bourguignon, F. (1999) *Crime, Violence and Inequitable Development*, Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C. April 28-30 1999.

91 Arvanites, T. M. and Defina, R.H. (2006) *Business cycles and street crime* *Criminology* 44. Pp. 139-164; Gould E.D., Weinberg, B. A. and Mustard, D. B. (2002) *Crime rates and local labor market opportunities in the United States: 1979-1997* *Rev Econ Stat* 84. Pp. 45-61; Grogger, J. T. (1998) *Market wages and youth crime* *Journal of Labour Economics* 16. Pp. 756-791; Rosenfeld, R. and Fornango, R. (2007) *The impact of economic conditions on robbery and property crime: the role of consumer sentiment* *Criminology* 45. Pp. 735-769.


Urban Inequalities in Latin America and the Caribbean⁹²

Urban Gini coefficient City Gini coefficient



Gini coefficient value	What it means
0.6 or above	Extremely high levels of inequality, not only among individuals, but also among social groups (known as "horizontal inequality"). Wealth concentrated among certain groups at the exclusion of the majority. High risk of social unrest or civil conflict.
0.5-0.59	Relatively high levels of inequality, reflecting institutional and structural failures in income distribution.
0.45-0.49	Inequality approaching dangerously high levels. If no remedial actions are taken, could discourage investment and lead to sporadic protests and riots. Often denotes weak functioning of labour markets or inadequate investment in public services and lack of pro-poor social programmes.
0.3-0.39	Moderate levels of inequality. Healthy economic expansion accompanied by political stability and civil society participation. However, could also mean that society is relatively homogenous - that all groups are generally rich or poor - and, therefore, disparities are not reflected in income or consumption levels.
0.25-0.29	Low levels of inequality. Egalitarian society often characterized by universal access to public goods and services, alongside political stability and social cohesion.

Source : UN-Habitat *Monitoring and Research Division*, 2008



92 Reproduced from UN Habitat (2009) *The State of the World's Cities: Harmonious Cities*. Page 67; Explanation of Gini Coefficient from page 51

Crime Observatories

Numerous countries, regions, and cities have developed crime observatories to improve information and understanding about crime in order to better target resources to reduce crime and insecurity and build safety. The territory covered by observatories varies. It can be local (*Observatorio de la seguridad de Madrid*, or Observatory of Bogota), regional (Regional Observatory on Security Policies, Italy), national (*l'Observatoire national de la delinquance en France*), or supranational (Observatorio Centroamericano sobre la violencia (OCAVI). In addition, observatories' may be concerned with overall safety (Crime Observatory in Trinidad and Tobago), or specialized (Canadian Observatory on School Violence and *l'Observatoire francais des drogues et toxicomanies* (OFDT) in France).⁹³

Crime observatories primarily aim to inform policy decisions based on information beyond police data. They build on partnerships between public, quasi-public and/or private actors (municipal services, transport services, social housing, landlords, business, traders etc) to access data from each. Observatories also develop and use geographic information systems (GIS), victimization and fear of crime surveys, self-report surveys as well as qualitative interviews and focus groups in order to develop a fine-grained understanding of local issues around crime and violence.

ICPC organized two International Meetings on Crime Observatories in partnership with the National Observatory of Delinquency in France (OND), the Delegation Interministerielle a la Ville, France (1st Meeting) and The Public Security Division of the Ministry of the Interior, Chile (2nd Meeting), to encourage international cooperation.⁹⁴


2.3. Lack of confidence in authority and institutions

We have already noted the impact of a lack of confidence in public authorities and institutions on insecurity, and the issue is examined more closely below.

The Global Corruption Barometer 2009 is based on an international household survey commissioned by Transparency International. It provides a picture of perceptions of corruption and experiences of bribery across 69 countries and territories (particularly in urban areas) between October 2008 and February 2009, and of trends since 2006. The report provides a picture of rates of petty bribery in some parts of the world, with the police and the judiciary as the most likely recipients of bribes worldwide.

In all regions the police were the most frequently reported to have received bribes⁹⁵. Experience of petty bribery was most common in the Middle East and North Africa, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Amongst the countries surveyed, those most affected by petty bribery were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

Percentage of People Who Reported Paying Bribes (2006-2009), By Service




Source : Global Corruption Barometer (2009) Transparency International, P. 11 www.transparency.org

93 For further information on Crime Observatory Developments in Latin America see IACPVI/ PAHO/ CISALVA (2008) *Systematization of Experiences on Surveillance systems, Observatories or Information Systems on Violence in Latin America* (Spanish Only) and accompanying tools.

94 Proceedings available on ICPC's website www.crime-prevention-intl.org/menu_item.php?code=other_icpc_events; See ICPC (2009) *Crime Observatories: Report of International Experiences* and the first preliminary review. Montreal: ICPC.

95 In North America though rates of corruption were low, incidents of bribery were reported in interactions with the judiciary In the Middle East and North Africa the most bribe-prone institutions were reported to be those related to buying, selling, inheriting or renting land, In Europe, land services and healthcare were the most vulnerable to bribery.

Percentage of People Who Reported Paying Bribes in the Previous 12 Months, By Region



Respondents from low income households were more likely to pay bribes than those from high income households when dealing with the police, the judiciary, land services and education services. This highlights inequality in vulnerability to corruption and extortion, mirroring vulnerability to other forms of criminal victimization.


Victimization surveys⁹⁶ in the developing world have begun to include questions about corruption in addition to other forms of criminal victimization. Together with the use of more qualitative research, this goes some way towards assessing a wider

sense of security and confidence in public services. Such surveys also need to include perceptions and experiences of levels of police brutality, and extra-judicial killings, to further understand lack of trust in public police, especially in ex-colonial, post-apartheid and ex-regime policing contexts.

Data on “extra-judicial” killings presents particular problems, since there may be strong motivations for concealing or underestimating their extent. The militarization of police may also be implicitly sanctioned by politicians and public authorities in post conflict situations, as in Guatemala, Mozambique or Angola. Activists, Human Rights organizations and trade unionists tend to have information only on individual cases and often cannot release information for legal and ethical reasons. Police services tend to under-report, contest or classify such deaths ambiguously. A recent report on Brazil by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, for example, found that police were recording such cases as ‘acts of resistance’ or ‘resistance followed by death’. In Rio de Janeiro, the police recorded 1,330 resistance killings in 2008, accounting for 18% of killings in the city.⁹⁷ Families of victims also tend to under-report due to lack of confidence in the institution involved, fear of reprisal, or lack of awareness of reporting practices. Improving reporting and supporting families of victims, as well as holding security services to account, and instituting training and reform are key to monitoring and addressing such practices.

Some broadly comparable data on extra-judicial killings, based on US State Department and Amnesty International data, show that in 2006 there were at least 31 countries in which extra-judicial killings occurred frequently (more than 50 deaths per annum) (see Map).

Global “extrajudicial” killings, 2006⁹⁸



96 See, for example, Victimization surveys conducted to contribute to UN Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme in Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania published by UNODC Data for Africa Project. Though these have weaknesses they are a step forward in collecting data on victimization in the region.

97 Human Rights Council (2008) *Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political Economic and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development : Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitraru Executions* : Addendum : preliminary Note on Mission to Brazil November. A/HRC/8/3/ Add.4 of 14 May. Geneva : United Nations. Cited in Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) à. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Chapter 7.

98 Reproduced from Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Page 131. Based on data from Cingranelli, D. L. and Richards, D. L., (2008) *The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset v.20008.03.12*. web edition.accessed April 2008

It is important to note that **the pattern of these killings do not follow the patterns of homicide or crime rates.**

Although developed countries do not have such high levels of corruption, there is a similar need to stress the impact of perceptions of justice and equality, as well as efficiency, on confidence in justice, particularly (but not exclusively) amongst migrant, minority and indigenous groups (see Box on Criminalization of migration). This lack of confidence, trust and lack of legitimacy of police forces has important implications for their effectiveness, contributing to a sense of impunity from prosecution and exposing those most vulnerable to further victimization.

3. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Crime and Violence

An increasing concern, during the period of writing this report, has been the impact of the economic recession on levels of crime and violence. Having outlined some of the complex issues impacting rates of crime and violence, we approach this issue with considerable caution.

3.1. The Global Impact of the Recession

Although financial collapse has been avoided, barriers to accessing credit and a downturn in consumer confidence have resulted in the deepest global economic recession since World War II, according to the International Labour Organization⁹⁹.

Initially it was thought that developing countries were likely to be less affected since they are less exposed to global financial markets. However, problems in accessing credit, slow down in consumption, production and trade, and reduced commodity prices (on the back of fuel and food price crises prior to 2008), have begun to affect developing countries to the extent that international organizations have warned of the potential for a development emergency¹⁰⁰. Predictions of the recession are continually revised in the light of new information.

On the basis of these predicted trends in economic contraction, international organizations have warned of increases in rates

of infant mortality,¹⁰¹ higher unemployment rates and increased numbers trapped in poverty and chronic hunger¹⁰². At the time of writing this section, there is still considerable uncertainty about the depth of the recession or the prospects for recovery in 2010. In previous recessions, employment returned to pre-crisis levels only four to five years after economic recovery and workers who lost their formal jobs tended to stay in the informal economy¹⁰³.

3.2. A Disproportionate Impact on Vulnerable Groups

The impact of the recession is likely to be unequal, with women, migrant workers and young people being hardest hit by redundancies, vulnerability of employment, and difficulty in entering a more competitive employment market.

UNICEF has stressed the impact on the health and well-being of **children** as a result of the economic downturn. The crisis, they warn, could plunge millions more children into poverty and exacerbate existing deprivation, harming children today and succeeding generations. Concerns are also being raised that the economic crisis could result in an increase in child labour as low income households struggle to cope¹⁰⁴. This situation may be compounded by the poor quality and coverage of basic social services, education and insufficient social protection mechanisms. This increase may expose many more children to hazardous conditions and abuse, and limit their opportunities in later life, trapping more in poverty.

On the basis of victimization studies, it is likely that marginalized groups, such as those living in high crime areas, particularly young people, women (especially single-parents) and (minority) ethno-cultural groups and migrants will be more vulnerable to increased victimization when recessions continue¹⁰⁵.

Moreover, the recession may increase the risk of exposure to domestic violence, especially if women become more economically dependent on their male partners¹⁰⁶. There is, however, little evidence of the relationship between economic cycles and violence in general (excluding theft), implying a causal difference between violence and acquisitive crime.

99 International Labour Organisation (May 2009) *Global Employment Trends Update*

100 World Bank (2009) *Global Development Finance, Charting a Global Recovery*.

101 World Bank (2009) *Global Development Finance, Charting a Global Recovery*. World Bank; UNESCO (2009) *Education for All; Global Monitoring Report*

102 World Bank (2009) *Global Development Finance, Charting a Global Recovery*. World Bank; International Labour Organisation (January 2009)

Global Employment Trends; International Labour Organisation (May 2009) *Global Employment Trends Update*

103 Torres, R. (2009) *The financial and economic crisis: a decent work response*. Geneva: ILO

104 See reports of *Understanding Children's Work: An Inter-Agency Research Co-Operation Project On Child Labour*. International Labour Organisation (ILO), UNICEF and the World Bank.

105 Nilsson, A. and Estrada, F. (2001) *Crime as a Welfare Problem* in Bergmark, A. (ed.) *Oförd i välfärden (Disadvantage in the Welfare Society)* SOU 2001:54. Pp. 223-63. Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.

106 Massachusetts, for example, saw a three-fold increase in domestic violence-related homicides between 2005-2007, partly explained by the National Network to End Domestic Violence, as a response to the recession. Mary R. Lauby and Sue Else (December 25, 2008), *Recession can be deadly for domestic abuse victims*, Boston Globe. The UK government has produced a booklet offering advice to women on recession-related domestic violence and discrimination in the workplace: *Real Help Now for Women* (Government Equalities Office, UK); voir aussi *Are women bearing the brunt of the recession?* (Fawcett Society, UK). Figures from the UK Metropolitan police issued in January 2009 also suggested that there had been a slight increase in domestic violence in the past year.

A further consideration is the **strong positive relationship between unemployment rates and imprisonment**¹⁰⁷. This relates in part to criminal justice processes which tend to treat the unemployed differently from the employed. An increase in unemployment could have significant implications for increasing criminalization, particularly in countries which rely heavily on criminal justice responses to social problems and unrest, and make little use of alternatives to imprisonment. Groups already over-represented in prison systems are similarly likely to be affected.

3.3. Risks Associated with Rising Inequality

We have seen a correlation between levels of inequality and crime. The recession may hinder efforts to reduce levels of inequality and high rates of homicide in countries in the South, especially if it has lasting effects on development aid. A further factor is a reduction in spending, cut backs in services, and reduced provision of aid, which will especially affect countries in Africa that are dependent on aid.

Liberia, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Eritrea are particularly vulnerable, with high ratios of overseas development aid to gross national income¹⁰⁸. Many other countries, in Africa and parts of Asia, are vulnerable to reductions in remittances from those living and working abroad¹⁰⁹.

Research findings based on past economic downturns allow some cautious speculation that if this recession results in an increase in income inequality, and if wage levels, GDP, and public confidence in economic conditions and opportunities decline, **the recession may result in an increase in property offences**. If this is true, the consequences could be significant for countries and regions affected by a significant decline in GDP with already high levels of inequality, such

as the United States, the Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Nevertheless **such predictions must be approached with caution** as they are based on recessions in developed countries and do not take account of other economic, social and cultural variables. In addition, analysis of past recessions have tended to be focused on the period since the 1970s which have seen rises in crime rates, whereas this recession comes during a downward trend in acquisitive crime,¹¹⁰ which may mean lower rises and a faster return to pre-recession rates.

3.4 Particular crimes of concern?

There has been some **speculation that the economic crisis may open up more opportunities for organized crime**¹¹¹. A key concern is the potential for increased exploitation of migrant workers and undocumented migrants, and sexual exploitation, especially of women and children, through human trafficking. If a larger proportion of the work force (including more children) is forced into vulnerable employment, they will also be at risk.

Cyber crime is also expected to rise during the recession. This affects countries where large numbers of internet transactions takes place. A March 2009 report by the FBI's Internet Fraud Complaint Center, suggests that internet fraud in the US increased by 33 per cent in 2008, rising for the first time in three years. February to March 2009 also showed a 50 per cent increase in reported internet fraud complaints¹¹². In India, it has been suggested that in addition to fraudulent internet schemes promising quick money, there could be a ten-fold increase in identity theft in 2009-10 (using malware software to steal identity information)¹¹³. Unfortunately, it is not necessarily easy to separate general increases in identity theft and cybercrime due to technological advances, from recession-related effects.

If the recession leads to higher crime rates in certain areas, it is essential to highlight any risks affecting individuals vulnerable to the victimization of crime. International organizations have advocated increasing social protection mechanisms and job creation and employment skills-training¹¹⁴. Strengthening crime prevention and social protection would seem to be particularly important in a period of recession. **Targeted support to vulnerable groups** might include, for example, measures to assist them financially, or through microcredit schemes¹¹⁵, and to gain or stay in secure employment, as well as undertaking a variety of crime prevention measures in high crime areas, to increase the resilience of communities and individuals.

107 Box, S. (1987) *Recession, Crime and Punishment*. New York: Barnes and Noble.

108 ECOSOC, Economic Commission for Africa and African Union Commission (June 2009) *The Global Financial Crisis: Impact, responses and way forward*.

109 World Bank (2009) *Global Development Finance, Charting a Global Recovery*.

110 Evidence on acquisitive crime in developing countries is, however, weaker and where rising recession may exacerbate trends post recovery.

111 *Tackling organized crime: assessing the impact of the Economic Crisis: Report on the Wilton Park Conference WPS09/5 in association with the UK Home Office*

112 *Cyber-crime surges with deepening recession*, CPI Financial, May 11 2009 <http://www.cpifinancial.net/v2/news.aspx?v=1&aid=2310&sec=Technology>

113 *Recession fuels cyber crime The Hindu*, Dec 26, 2008. <http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/26/stories/2008122655370700.htm>.

114 ILO (2009) *Tackling the Global Jobs Crisis: Recovery through Decent Work Policies*, International Labour Conference 98th session 2009; ECOSOC, Economic Commission for Africa and African Union Commission (June 2009) *The Global Financial Crisis: Impact, responses and way forward*; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (30 June 2009) *UN Official says Economic Crisis an Opportunity to Nations to Develop Social Safety Nets*.

115 Microfinance as a tool to reduce vulnerability to domestic violence in Limpopo South Africa, for example, indicated a capacity to reduce partner violence by 55% as well as shifts in attitude, capacity to confront abusive behaviour and economic stability. See Kim, J.C. et al (2007) *Understanding the Impact of a Microfinance-based Intervention on Women's Empowerment and the Reduction of Intimate Partner Violence in South Africa* American Journal of Public Health vol. 97, no.10. Pp. 1794-1802.

Female criminality: New and old challenges

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The first prisons, hospitals, correctional houses and asylums of the XVII century Developed to contain unruly members of society who were seen to represent a threat to the social order. They housed both men and women, though early studies, such as those by Lombroso and Ferrero, hardly mentioned the presence of women. Their conception of 'atavistic man' and the "natural inferiority" of women, nevertheless, continue to permeate criminal justice responses to women who come into contact with the law (Torres, 2005).

Women, tend to be excluded from the dominant discourse of criminology, law and penology (Facio, 1993; Zaffaroni, 1993). The invisibility of women has been a key factor within the criminal justice system in hindering fair treatment of female offenders.

Building on feminist critiques of traditional criminological theories (Smart 1989, Carlen 1992, Facio 1993, Rafter and Heidensohn 1995), recent gendered approaches to the study of women's criminal behaviour have had considerable influence on contemporary criminological thought (Larrauri 1994, del Olmo 1998).

Studies in many countries over the last four decades, have increased the visibility of women as subjects of criminal law, although the discipline has not abandoned its paternalistic logic.

Early commentators, such as Freda Adler (*Sisters in Crime*) and Rita Simon (*Women and Crime*)-both published in 1975 postulated that as the participation of women in public life increase so would their participation in crime, predicting that men and women would be equally represented in crime statistics in the future. Their predictions have not been born out to date.

According to the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Vienna in 2000, women represent only 5% of the world's prison population. Moreover, as many studies have demonstrated, most crime is committed by men, in all nations, in all communities, among all age groups, throughout recorded history (as far as we have information) and for all crimes (with the exception of those specifically related to being a woman, such as abortion, infanticide and prostitution (Janeksela 1997)).

This proportion is echoed in the United States (in 2004, the number of women in state prisons represented 5.2% of the prison population (Núñez, 2007)), the European Union, (women represented between 4 and 8% of the prison population in 2006) and Latin America (see table below):

Percentage of Women in Prison in Latin America, 2006					
Argentina	5 %	Ecuador	9.5 %	Panama	6.6 %
Bolivia	7 %	El Salvador	5.4 %	Peru	7 %
Brazil	6.3 %	Guatemala	5.3 %	Dominican Rep.	3.3 %
Chile	8 %	Honduras	3.4 %	Uruguay	5 %
Colombia	6.4 %	Mexico	5 %	Venezuela	6.6 %
Costa Rica	8.1 %	Nicaragua	6.4 %		

Source: Official records from the different countries, collected by Denia Núñez, ILANUD, 2007.

These figures pose several questions: How can we explain the low numbers of female offenders? Are informal control mechanisms more effective in containing women's transgressions (Larrauri, 1994)? Does the different way that women are socialised explain their underrepresentation in crime? Are transcultural elements present in male/female relations that explain this phenomenon? What are they?

A number of studies have attempted to answer these questions cross-nationally. The joint project between Germany, France, England, Spain, Italy and Hungary - "Women, integration and prison: analysis of the processes of the socio-labor integration of women prisoners in Europe"¹¹⁶ (also known as the MIP study) is worth exploring in depth.

The similarities in the proportions of women in prison in different countries, whether in contexts as different as Latin America and Europe, are surprising. It suggests that explanations for these parallels lie outside ethnic, cultural or socio-economic differences, and are intrinsic to gender relationships.

The results of the European MIP study agree with many studies of women offenders in Latin America, as well as India and Egypt (Azaola and Yacamán 1996; Azaola 2001; del Olmo 1998; Núñez 2007; Badr-Eldin 1997; Hartjen 1997).

In the EU, as in Latin America, the female prison population has increased over the last decade at a much faster rate than the male. The MIP study highlights the social risk factors for women who come into contact with the criminal justice system. These include: growing unemployment, disproportionately affecting young people, women and the most socially excluded, job insecurity, an absence of institutional support, low educational attainment, housing problems, low income, family breakdown and being a single parent, a lack of social networks, migration, links to drug trafficking, prostitution, and being from a minority ethnic group, as well as individual factors such as age, sex, health, drug dependency, and experience of violence and abuse.

The MIP study suggests that prison sentences are frequently and disproportionately imposed on people who are already socially excluded. Social exclusion refers to the numerous and changing factors that hinder individuals from fully participating in everyday interactions, activities and enjoying the rights that others enjoy in modern societies. These factors particularly affect people, in urban and rural areas, who have been subjected to discrimination or segregation, exacerbating failings in the social system and compounding social inequalities.

The European study emphasizes that studies of social exclusion should include a gender perspective, taking into account social differentiation as a fundamental variable. Gender is a vital factor in the re-production of forms of exclusion.

The MIP study hoped to improve understanding of factors contributing to the exclusion of women, resulting in prison sentences and preventing successful resettlement. It also explored the distinct impacts of prison sentences on women in relation to their degree of social exclusion.

The study outlines the key indicators of social exclusion amongst women prisoners: poverty, unemployment, being single mothers and having suffered domestic violence. These are echoed in Latin American studies. Also apparent were the links between starting drug consumption at an early age, poverty, violence, self-harm and a lack of resources. The women at greatest risk of starting to consume drugs at an early age were those who had fathers who were addicts, who had been abandoned or who had suffered sexual abuse. On average about 60 to 80% of women prisoners in European countries are drug misusers. The study also suggests that some women's relationships with criminal partners could push them into contact with the criminal justice system, as more or less voluntary accomplices, and when covering for them.

In conclusion, the situation of women prisoners is a reflection of social inequalities (Torres 2005); inequalities in access to education, gender inequality, and segregation in societies which prohibit women from participating fully in public life. Prisons compound the existing exclusion of women offenders.

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¹¹⁶ The results were published in April 2005 and can be seen at: www.surt.org/mip

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Contribution

Arms control strategies for the prevention of violence and crime

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Armed violence is the most lethal expression of any form of violence. According to the World Report on Violence and Health (WHO, 2003), it is an epidemic. Victims are mainly children and youths (70 to 100 thousand victims per year, 50% of all victims are between 15 and 29 years of age). Worldwide there are about 650 million arms in the hands of civilians, representing 75% of the total number of arms estimated as being in existence (SAS, 2007). The country with the largest number of arms in the world is the United States, where 90% of all people are in possession of a firearm.

Firearms are used for 40% of all homicides committed throughout the world. The distribution of deaths is irregular. Latin America and the Caribbean is the region most affected by armed violence, with 40% of all cases worldwide, and an estimated rate of 15.5 deaths per 100 thousand inhabitants. Africa follows with 20% of all homicides being committed with firearms and a rate of 5.9 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants through use of firearms (SAS, 2004).

Firearms are relatively important in crimes not resulting in deaths. According to data processed by International Crime Victim Surveys, firearms are frequently used for thefts, robberies or attempted robberies and other violations: in Latin America they are used for 24.84% of all thefts and in Africa for 12.92% of all thefts. Armed robberies or attempted armed robberies are also a serious problem in Latin America and Africa: firearms are used in almost 9 of every 100 robberies or attempted robberies. In the European Union firearms are used in 6.25% of all robberies. They are also used frequently for sexual crimes in Africa (Van Kersteren, 2003).

Armed violence as a criminal phenomenon is particularly concentrated in cities. In Latin America, Africa and some regions of Asia, these levels of violence are more worrying in large urban areas where population growth is uncontrolled, inequality is pronounced and impoverished communities proliferate. In these areas youth gangs have extended into illegal markets. In contrast, in Canada the armed violence victim rate in Toronto (the largest city) is lower than the national average. In the United States, however, the rate is higher in medium-sized cities with high firearms concentration levels. But globally, aggravated criminal violence with firearms tends to be concentrated in the larger cities (SAS, 2007).

Arms and prevention

From an epidemiological perspective the presence of firearms is a risk factor. Highly armed communities are at greater risk of suffering the consequences of armed violence.

Easy access to arms may result in the multiplication of armed violence, always associated with social and institutional causes of violence as well as factors which come into play directly when violent actions are being committed.

Arms control measures and disarmament are not frequently used as crime prevention practices. The frequent risk, as in any preventive practice, is the demand for direct, short-term impact on crime reduction. Evaluation of the impact of disarmament programmes is in itself a methodological challenge (Rosenfeld, 1996), particularly if we understand that the factors associated with an increase in armed violence in urban areas are related to social disintegration and anomie in larger cities, opportunities for crime, the inefficiency of criminal prosecution systems and effects associated with social interaction, especially in vulnerable communities (SAS, 2007).

If we understand prevention in the terms proposed by Van Dijk (1990:205) as non-penal measures which seek to reduce those acts of violence considered to be crimes, it is possible to identify preventive actions which focus on firearms. They will vary depending on the target population: whether they are general (primary), whether they are aimed at possible offenders (secondary) or whether they are for people who have already perpetrated violence (tertiary); as well as whether the type of tactics are environmental and situational in nature or social and community related (Crawford, 1998; Sozzo, 2000). The combination of interventions for target populations and tactics allows us to classify different areas of work for prevention. In urban areas, municipal governments can establish arms control practices and disarmament strategies to prevent armed violence. Some examples which take into account preventive measures and tactics are listed below:

	Social	Community	Situational
Primary	Awareness raising, media and civil programmes. Amnesties.	Local mediation.	Arms free zones. Private security.
Secondary	Confiscation.	Public and private health interventions. Community controls. Collection and destruction of arms.	Roadblocks. Inspections with consent.
Tertiary	Education and awareness programmes. Notification of parents of firearm possession.	Community courts.	

Source: prepared by the author based on Crawford, 1998; Sozzo, 2000; SAS, 2007; Dammert, 2008.

In the chart we have not included the legal path of criminal prosecution because we are considering prevention. However, actions to facilitate disarmament have been considered, as well as community authorities that could issue warnings and control possession by making agreements which would aim to prohibit arms in certain places.

It is not appropriate here to describe in detail each of these frequent lines of action, but it is important to say that the municipalities can and should intervene in crime prevention through arms control, promoting direct disarmament measures through searches and confiscation; discouraging their use through situational surveillance tactics; resolving conflict and warning offenders through community channels which aim to develop citizenship in addition to education and awareness campaigns; and finally through a reduction in the circulation of arms by means of amnesties and collection and destruction campaigns.

In all cases these are actions that should be implemented by local governments, frequently in coordination with the security forces, with community participation and the commitment of other state agencies or social sectors. We will describe some examples below.

Case I: **Arms Free Municipalities, El Salvador.** El Salvador has one of the highest levels of armed violence in the world: 55 of every 100,000 deaths occur as a result of firearms. Shots from firearms cause 80% of all deaths. Legislation is permissive and the country has a long tradition of firearms.

The municipalities of San Martín and Ilopango have been promoting the Arms Free Municipalities Programme since 2005, with the intervention of national public security agencies, the police and the UNDP. The measures applied have been: municipal prohibition of bearing arms (not a penal measure); confiscation of illegal arms by police; coordination between agencies; awareness raising through communication and cultural actions to include youth in vulnerable situations; voluntary surrender of arms. It has resulted in a reduction by over 40% of murders in general and of murders using fire arms in San Martín; and in Ilopango a reduction of about 50% in other crimes using firearms, such as theft and assault (Cano, 2006).

Case II: **Gun Free Zones Programme, South Africa.** It is not directly a crime prevention programme, but aims to reduce the number of wounded and dead as a result of crime. South Africa has the third highest rate of murders with firearms: 26.8 per 100 thousand, which represents about 40% of all murders (Lamb, 2008). Gun Free Zones started to be implemented in 1994 to reduce the availability of arms and thus improve citizen security. Activities seek to generate support for the idea of a reduction in the numbers of arms, restrictive legislation, social support for control, and awareness in vulnerable communities and among groups of young people. The communities declared themselves to be gun free zones voluntarily, prohibiting the entry of revolvers or guns. These are citizen agreements without state intervention: the community is in charge of implementation as well as people responsible in these zones (for example restaurants, bars, shops) who provide information and facilitate the elimination of arms. Recent legislation in South Africa has created gun free zones. These projects are also being implemented in Malawi, Namibia and Lesotho.

Case III: **Luta Pela Paz (Fight for Peace) Project, Brazil.** The use of children and youths by drug traffickers, exposing them to armed confrontations and incorporating them into militarised organisations, led to the definition of this particular phenomenon as Children in Organized Armed Violence (COAV). It can also be applied to other similar situations, such as gangs, throughout the world. The Luta Pela Paz programme emerged as an initiative of the organisation Viva Rio, but it is now independent. It works with children affected by organised armed violence and in vulnerable situations, strengthening their capacities in sports, information technology, education and citizenship and providing schooling, supporting them with containment networks, preparing them for the labour market and encouraging leadership projects. Children and youths also participate in project management. The initiative has gained respect from the state of Rio de Janeiro, participants are recognised by their communities as being exemplary in sports, and criminal organisations that dominate the slums where the project is being implemented do not interfere (Dowdney, 2005). Luta Pela Paz has progressed with initiatives to involve children affected by COAV in the planning of preventive strategies together with the civil society and municipal governments in the cities of Zacatecoluca (El Salvador), Medellín (Colombia), Niteroi (Brazil) and Cape Town (South Africa).

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CHAPTER 2

THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON COMMUNITY SAFETY

The impact of migration on community safety

Migration is a growing trend at international, regional and national levels. In search of better work and living conditions, fleeing conflicts, persecution as well as environmental degradation, people are increasingly moving across and within national borders, both on a temporary and permanent basis. The benefits of migration are undeniable, and are typically channelled through the economic and cultural contribution of migrant workers in the new country, region or city, and the remittances they send back to their families and countries of origin. However, migrants are frequently the object of suspicion, discrimination and blame in their new place of residence. In its 2009 Human Development Report, the United Nations Development Programme notes that “Most migrants, internal and international, reap gains in the form of higher incomes, better access to education and health, and improved prospects for their children”¹¹⁷.

However, migrants are also vulnerable to crime due to their unstable situation: economic frailty, risks of becoming a victim of trafficking or exploitation, as well as personal frailty linked to distance. Furthermore, migrants can be perceived by their country of destination as “foreigners” – regardless of their nationality – and victims of suspicion, discrimination or blame. These manifestations of intolerance or racism transcend into discrimination that targets minorities in general.

Migrants are often identified through their legal status: legal, irregular, temporary migrants or permanent settlers, asylum seekers and refugees. At national and regional levels, issues of irregular migration and the integration of migrants are at the forefront of political discussion. Their vulnerability to violence and abuse, and to discrimination and marginalization are being increasingly recognized.

This chapter focuses on the implications of global trends in migration for community safety. The chapter explores trends in migration; the marginalization of migrants and ethno-cultural minorities and the challenges they face during relocation. The final section examines the responses of international organizations, governments, and civil society to ensure the protection of migrants and promote social cohesion.

1. Main migration trends

1.1. Migrations are mostly internal

According to its 2009 Human Development Report, the UNDP estimates the number of migrants in the world to be approxi-

mately one billion, of which 740 million are internal migrants and 214 million are international migrants¹¹⁸.

Internal Migration is defined as a movement of people from one area of a country to another for the purpose, or with the effect of, establishing new residence¹¹⁹. Internal migration is becoming more significant than international migration. As discussed in Chapter 1, migration to or between urban areas is a major factor in urban growth in developing countries.

The IOM has identified **four types of internal migration flows**: Rural to urban, urban to rural, urban to urban, and rural to urban to international. India and China have recently experienced large scale rural to rural, and urban to rural movements, stimulated by temporary labour contracts. Internal migration has also increased in Africa with both rural to urban and urban to rural trends¹²⁰. These movements are mostly due to the increasing disparities in the distribution of wealth within countries, as well as the lack of employment opportunities in some regions. Many are choosing internal migration over international migration since crossing borders and obtaining legal status in other countries is becoming increasingly difficult, especially for un-skilled workers.

Internal migration also occurs for other than economic reasons: forced migration is becoming more prevalent, with millions of people to be displaced from their homes because of conflicts (see below) or climate change¹²¹. **Environmental migrants** are becoming more common. A report from the Institute for Environment and Human Security of the United Nations University highlights the impact of natural disasters on short-term displacement.

117 United Nations Development Fund (2009). *Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*. New York: UNDP. Page 2.

118 United Nations Development Fund (2009) *Human Development Report 2009: overcoming barriers – Human Mobility and Development*. New York: UNDP. Pp. 1-2.

119 International Organization for Migration (2008) *World Migration 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy*. Geneva: IOM
120 Ibid.

121 UNU-EHS (2009) *In Search of Shelter: Mapping the effects of climate change on human migration and displacement*. Canada: FSC

“Environmentally induced migration” is increasing in the wake of climate change with more flooding, storms and droughts¹²². The IOM has estimated that there will be 200 million environmentally-induced migrants by 2050¹²³.

Contrary to popular belief, the majority of population movements do not occur from developing to developed countries. There has been a significant shift in migration flows with intra-regional movements now the dominant pattern¹²⁴. Due to an increase in intra-regional economic migration, Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Africa have become new destinations as well as the Gulf countries, South Africa, and Central Asia. For example, Asia is characterized by the largest intra-regional circulation of migrants, and accounts for 20% of international migration¹²⁵. On the African continent, South Africa, North Africa and some countries in West Africa have become the main destinations for people from other parts of Africa seeking better work opportunities. The Americas still experience predominantly South to North migration, with Mexico remaining a transit country, or a final destination for those who do not succeed in reaching their preferred destination. The Middle East has the highest number of contractual workers, since migration policies in the region favour temporary work¹²⁶. Thus most migration occurs within countries of the same category of development.

Migration flows

- ↪ 60% of population movements are amongst countries of the same level of development: within developing, and within developed countries.
- ↪ 37% of migration is from developing countries to developed ones.
- ↪ Only 3% are migrants moving from developed to other developed countries.

Source: United Nations Development Fund (2009) *Human Development Report 2009: overcoming barriers – Human Mobility and Development*. New York: UNDP

Some intra-regional migration has been encouraged by regional pacts, for example, through the creation of the European Union, and other economic integration areas in Africa through The Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and in Latin America through the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR).

1.2. Refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people (IDPs)

According to UNHCR, **in 2008, 42 million people were forced to move from their homes**, of which 15.2 million

Some Definitions

Asylum seeker: A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than her/his own and awaits a decision on an application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments.

Refugee: A person, who “owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (Article 1 A(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol).

“**Internally displaced persons** are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border”. The IOM states that this latter definition is only descriptive as being displaced does not confer a legal status.

Source: International Organization for Migration (2008), *World Migration 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy*. Geneva: IOM

Source: OCHA (2004). *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*. See: <http://www.idpguidingprinciples.org/>

were classified as refugees, 827,000 asylum-seekers and 26 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Some 47% of all refugees and asylum seekers are women. Although most refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs live in difficult conditions, and face violence and abuse, women and children are especially vulnerable to exploitation and violence¹²⁷.

Most refugees, IDP's and asylum seekers are found in developing countries. They are relocated in camps, settlements in or near urban areas. UNHCR has estimated that 50% of the world's refugee population lives in urban areas, and 30% in camps.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 26 million people were internally displaced by conflict or violence in December 2008¹²⁸. Colombia, Iraq and Sudan account for 45% of the total IDP population.

122 UNU-EHS (2009) *In Search of Shelter: Mapping the effects of climate change on human migration and displacement*. Canada: FSC

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Numbers

- ↪ 839,000 people submitted an application for asylum or refugee status in 2008
- ↪ Developing countries host four fifths of the world's refugee population
- ↪ Pakistan is host to the largest number of refugees worldwide (1.8 million)
- ↪ 34.4 million is the total population under UNHCR's responsibility

Source: UNHCR (2009), 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, asylum seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless persons. Geneva: UNHCR

Refugees and IDPs living in camps often face similar challenges: displacement and the precariousness of their living conditions as well as their status, marginalizes them from the rest of the population. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre found a majority of IDPs lacking access to all basic necessities including food, clean water, shelter, clothing and health services¹²⁹. This is the case in Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Darfur, Yemen, and Zimbabwe¹³⁰.

Such conditions are all factors which place refugees and migrants at risk of crime and victimization or recruitment into gangs and organized crime.

1.3 Women more often migrating alone

According to the IOM, approximately **50% of working migrants are women**. Although women have always constituted a significant proportion of the migrant population with their families (**47% in 1960**), the trend is now for women to migrate on their own. In recent years, many international organizations have noted the shift with women entering low-skilled work, such as domestic work or as caregivers, for which there is demand¹³¹.

Working abroad has allowed many women to provide for their families back home, and has enabled them to gain independence and autonomy.

However, women migrants face high risks of abuse and violence. According to the ILO, migrant women have the worst working conditions: they often work long hours, are underpaid and risk sexual abuse. They may be more exposed to human rights violations, and frequently have to deal with difficult living conditions. One of the obstacles faced by women asylum seekers is the non-recognition of gender-related persecution by some states. Many women are refused asylum or refugee status in some states, due to the failure to integrate gender in immigration policies. Consequently, they lose access to welfare and their social rights, and risk being deported.

1.4 Unaccompanied minors

A recent trend in migration is the increase in **unaccompanied minors**, defined as children under the age of 18 not in the care of an adult. A significant number of unaccompanied minors migrate from their country of origin each year. Although, there are limited statistics on their movements, UNHCR estimates that there are over 100,000 unaccompanied minors in Western Europe at any given time¹³². The United States receives over 130,000 undocumented minors annually from Latin American countries¹³³. In South Africa, some 10 to 15% of migrants from Zimbabwe are unaccompanied minors¹³⁴.

Unaccompanied minors migrate to look for work opportunities, or to escape conflict and abuse. They constitute an easy target for networks of organized criminals, and exploitation through smuggling and trafficking for labour, sexual exploitation and sex-tourism purposes¹³⁵. Many international legal instruments for the protection of children exist with provisions on the rights of children of migrant workers¹³⁶. However, as the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights of migrants underlines, children looking for asylum often face the risk of deportation and are treated like adult irregular migrants, lacking protection¹³⁷. He recommends that States treat unaccompanied minors as victims and not as criminals.

1.5. Irregular migration: greater exposure to exploitation

By definition, irregular migration, also referred to as illegal migration, takes place outside the regulations of countries of origin, transit and destination¹³⁸.

129 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2009) *Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2008*. Geneva: IDMC. Page 21.
130 Ibid. Page 21.

131 In straw (2007) *Gender, Remittances and Development: Feminization of Migration 2007*. Santo Domingo: In straw.

132 See UNHCR (2001). *The World of Children at a Glance*. Amnesty International. Italy: *Invisible children - The human rights of migrant and asylum-seeking minors detained upon arrival at the maritime border in Italy*.

133 UNICEF (2008) *Unaccompanied Minors in Mexico*. Retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/media/media_42880.html

134 IOM (2009) *Zimbabwe / IOM and UNICEF Campaign Promotes Safe Migration and Child Protection*. Retrieved from <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/JBRN-7RUCS5?OpenDocument>

135 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (2009) *Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development*.

136 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: Arts. 4, 12.4, 17.6, 29, 30, 44.2, 45.2-4.

137 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (2009) *Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development*.

138 Ibid.

There are millions of irregular migrants for whom it is difficult to account, since most of them remain under the radar, and beyond the reach of official policy. While the number of asylum seekers has decreased in recent years, the number of migrants entering countries illegally remains high, with eg. an estimate of 12 million in the United States, and 5 to 7 million within the European Union¹³⁹. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that at least 200,000 irregular migrants enter Europe from Africa annually¹⁴⁰. Spain and Italy have also become important transit countries for irregular migrants due to their location and coastal access.

Irregular migrants

- Approximately 2.5 to 4 million migrants cross international borders with no authorization each year
- 500,000 undocumented migrants are estimated to arrive in Europe each year
- An estimated 10 million migrants live in the USA with irregular status.

Source: Global Commission on International Migration (2005), *Migration in an interconnected world: new directions for action*. Geneva: GCIM

2. The marginalization of migrants: an impediment to community safety

2.1 International Legal Frameworks of Protection

Several UN conventions ensure the protection and human rights of documented and undocumented migrants, and the responsibilities of sending and receiving states have been ratified. There is now a significant international legal framework for migrants' rights, with around 20 conventions (see table below), resolutions and recommendations. However, the rights of irregular migrants, in particular, remain unrecognized in most national legislation.

Several key human rights issues underpin the Conventions. Many conventions recall that migrants, regardless of their status, should not be deprived of their fundamental rights such as: the right to medical care and social services, education, freedom of expression, religion and opinion. In addition, migrants need to be protected from specific risks such as discrimination, racism, arbitrary arrest or detention, xenophobia, forced labour and torture. Freedom of movement, the right to citizenship, and to return or leave one's country of origin, are all rights underlined in several conventions. As the above list of Conventions and recommendations demonstrates, the issue of migrants

International Legal Framework for Migrants' Rights

- 1949, ILO, Convention No. 97 concerning Migration for Employment (revised),
- 1949, ILO, Recommendation No. 86 concerning Migration for Employment (Revised)
- 1965, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December
- 1975, ILO, Recommendation No. 151 concerning Migrant Workers
- 1984, Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading treatment or Punishment
- 1985, Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live
- 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child
- 1990, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
- 2000, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child
- 2000, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts
- 2001, Durban Declaration and Programme of Action
- 2002, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking- Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council- E/2002/68/Add.1
- 2004, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols
- 2004, Resolution of the UN General Assembly on Protection of Migrants- A/RES/59/1
- 2005, Resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the human rights of migrants, E/CN.4/RES/2005/47

came to the fore of the international agenda in the 1990's, with the development of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

2.2 Criminalization of Migrants

States determine the conditions for granting citizenship or for the expulsion of individuals, and it is the responsibility of States, by international standards, to ensure the protection and respect of the rights of all persons within their territories, regardless

139 De Wenden, Catherine W. (2009) *Atlas Mondial des Migrations : réguler ou réprimer... gouverner*. Paris : Éditions Autrement.

140 UNODC (2006) *Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe*. Vienna: UNODC.

of their status and nationality. Many States, wishing to curb irregular migration, have increased border controls, implemented more restrictive immigration policies, and sanctioned employers using undocumented migrants¹⁴¹. These measures do not necessarily lead to the results desired: neither migrants nor employers are necessarily deterred by sanctions and restrictive policies; many migrants look for other routes to enter countries, facing a higher risk of being exploited or abused.

Increases in migration have led to considerable political discussion, especially in destination countries in the 'North' – although as we have observed the greater part of migratory movement does not pertain to them – where it has become linked to issues of national security. The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants underlines this trend in **the increasing criminalization of migrant populations**,¹⁴² the result of restrictive national policies and the persistence of anti-immigrant sentiments in numerous countries.

Many governments have chosen to combat irregular migration by treating it as a criminal offence, thus labeling undocumented migrants as criminals. Illegal migrants in particular, are likely to be regarded as a threat to national security, and problems of their vulnerability and rights have been overlooked¹⁴³.

Irregular migration is facilitated by a growing number of criminalized networks, which offer transit, but often force illegal migrants to work in organized criminal markets in the country of destination. Migrants also face abuse from employers evading legal wages, health and security payments.

Criminalization is also facilitated through discriminatory policing practices, such as 'racial profiling' in stop and search practices, and in risk assessment once in contact with the criminal justice system¹⁴⁴. Most research on racial profiling has been undertaken in developed countries, especially the US and UK, and more recently Sweden, Canada, Russia, and The Netherlands¹⁴⁵.

The term 'racial profiling' describes police officers' use of generalizations about ethnicity, religion, or national origin, as the basis for making enforcement or investigative decisions¹⁴⁶.

Different studies have shown that racial profiling is routinely used across the EU and has increased since 9/11. In France, racial profiling was increased in 2007 after the creation of a Ministry of Immigration which prioritized the search of undocumented migrants, leading police officers to target ethnic minorities¹⁴⁷. A study by the Open Society Institute (OSI) in Paris in 2007, found that "police stops and identity checks were based on appearance rather than on their behaviour or actions"¹⁴⁸. In Sweden, similar findings were reported by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention in a study of the criminal justice system. Stereotypes linking specific crimes with a ethnic minorities, as well as stop-and-search based on the individual's background were common¹⁴⁹. Maintaining ethnic data on police practices is essential for monitoring the extent of racial profiling, but rarely collected¹⁵⁰. The Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation (CRRF) have urged policing and security agencies to systematically collect human rights-based data to help prevent discrimination. The UK is the only country in Europe to collect systematic data on policing practices by ethnicity.

2.3 Discrimination and racist crimes against migrants and and ethno-cultural minorities

Although certain events have been widely mediated, such as the assaults on Zimbabwean workers in 2009 in South Africa, most data and studies available on this topic focus on the situation in developed countries. The contribution of Kalyani Menon-Sen in the box below on the policy of expulsion and resettlement in Delhi, demonstrates how internal movements can cause tensions in India, linked to ethno-cultural identity and cast.

141 UNODC (2006) *Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe*. Vienna: UNODC.

142 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (2008) *Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development*.

143 Goodey, Jo (2008) *Migration, crime and victimhood: responses to sex trafficking in the EU*. London: Sage Publication.

144 Gelsthorpe, L. (2003) *Accountability: Difference and Diversity in the Delivery of Community Penalties* in Bottoms, A., Gelsthorpe, L. and Rex, S. (eds.) *Community Penalties: Change And Challenges*. Cullompton: Willan.

145 Harcourt, B. (2004) *Rethinking racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal profiling More Generally in The University of Chicago Law review* vol. 71, no.4 ; van der Torre, E.J. and Ferwerda, H. B. (2005) *Preventive Searching, an analysis of the process and the external effects in Ten Municipalities*. The Hague: Beke, Arnhem , Politie & Wetenschap : Zeist; Lernestedt, C., Diesen, C., Pettersson, T. and Lindholm, T. (2005) *Equal Before the Law: Nature or Culture in The Blue and Yellow Glasshouse: Structural Discrimination in Sweden*. Stockholm: Swedish Government Official Reports. Page 56; Quinton, P., Bland, N. et al,(2000) *Police Stops, Decision-Making and Practice*. London: Home Office; Tator, C. and Henry, F. (2006) *Racial Profiling in Canada*. Toronto : University of Toronto Press

146 Open Society (2009) *Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: pervasive, Ineffective and Discriminatory*. New York: Open Society Institute.

147 Laurent Mucchielli, Sophie Nevanen, *Delinquency, victimisation, criminalisation and penal treatment of foreigners in France* In *Criminalisation and Victimization of Migrants in Europe* (2009). Crimprev

148 Open Society Institute (2009) *Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-search practices in Paris*. New York: OSI. Page 10.

149 Bra (2008) *English Summary: Discrimination in the criminal justice system process in Sweden*. Stockholm: Bra.

150 See Bourque, et al. (2009) *The Effectiveness of Profiling from a National Security Perspective*, (Canadian Human Rights Commission) available online at http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/research_program_recherche/profiling_profilage/toc_tdm-en.asp

The policy of Eviction and Resettlement in Delhi

JAGORI, a feminist resource centre in Delhi has tracked the impact of eviction and resettlement on lives of nearly 3000 working-class households evicted from their original settlements on the banks of the river Yamuna in 2004 and relocated nearly 50 kilometres away on the margins of the city. Around 35,000 working class families - more than 150,000 people – were evicted from Yamuna Pushta. The majority of these people were daily wage workers - head loaders, rickshaw pullers, domestic workers, hand-cart pullers and rag pickers who had migrated to Delhi from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Bengal. A significant proportion were construction workers who had been brought to Delhi by labour contractors during the Asian Games in 1982 and had settled in Delhi subsequently.

The lead-up to the evictions saw a crystallization of opinion among the middle and affluent classes in the city, the result of a focused campaign to demonise migrants as “outsiders”. The residents of Pushta were painted as illegal migrants from Bangladesh (despite the fact that the majority were registered as voters and had ration cards), as beggars and petty criminals (despite the fact that they were almost all entrepreneurs or workers in the informal sector), or as people who made the city dirty (despite the fact that many were municipal sweepers, rag-pickers and garbage recyclers and thus actively involved in keeping the city clean). Caste and communal prejudices were stoked to justify the labelling of migrants as “lazy freeloaders or petty criminals, parasites clinging to the city who needed to be picked off as soon as possible”.

Kalyani Menon-Sen

Also see: Kaylani Meynon-Sen, Gautam Bhan (2008) *Swept off the Map: Surviving Eviction and Resettlement in Dehli*. New Delhi: Yoda Press


In its 2007 Annual Report, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance concluded that **racism and intolerance has increased in Europe**¹⁵¹. This is despite governments' efforts to develop anti-discrimination and anti-racism policies. Since September 11th 2001, ECRI recorded an increase in Islamophobia, including targeted acts of violence. ECRI suggest that discriminatory political discourse and the media have amplified the negative image attributed to the Muslim Community. They also noted racial prejudice against the Jewish and Roma Communities¹⁵².

In Germany, there has been an increase in recorded incidents of right-wing violent crimes, from 759 in 2003, to 1,047 in 2006, with a slight decrease in 2007¹⁵³. In Los Angeles in the US, a 28% increase in recorded hate crime in the last five years, has been recorded, the majority racial or ethnic. Violence also occurs between migrant or ethnic groups: 71% of suspects in anti-black crimes were Latinos, and 56% of suspects in crimes against Latinos were African Americans¹⁵⁴.

A 2009 survey of minority discrimination conducted by the European Fundamental Rights Agency, found that across Europe 6 out of 10 North Africans, 4 out of 10 Central/East Europeans¹⁵⁵, and half of the Roma interviewed, said they believed they had been stopped by the police within the last 12 months because of their ethnic origin.

Percentage of respondents who considered that police stopped them because of their immigrant or ethnic minority background

Out of all those stopped in the past 12 months



Source : European Agency for fundamental rights (2009)
EU-MIDIS at glance : introduction to the FRA'S-EU-wide discrimination survey. Vienna : FRA.

151 The European Commission against racism and intolerance (ECRI), part of the Council of Europe, is an independent human rights monitoring mechanism .

152 European Commission against racism and intolerance (2008) *Annual Report 2007*. Strasbourg: ECRI

153 Human Rights First, See: <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/discrimination/pages.aspx?id=111>

154 Los Angeles county Commission on Human Relations. (2007) *Hate Crime Report*. Los Angeles: LACCHR

155 Largely due to a high number of stops of ethnic Albanians in Italy and Greece, and Romanians in Italy.

EU-MIDIS: A European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey

The European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey is **the first EU-wide survey of immigrant and ethnic minorities' experiences of discrimination and victimization**¹⁵⁶. The results of the survey, published in 2009, aim to support policymakers and other stakeholders in the development of evidence-based policies to reduce discrimination and xenophobia, and decrease the victimization of migrants. The data provides indicators of marginalization and social inclusion¹⁵⁷. Some of the findings so far include¹⁵⁸ :

- ♦ A high percentage of individuals believe that discrimination based on ethnicity is prevalent in the country they live in (94% of North African living in Italy, 90 % of Romas living in Hungary, 88% of North Africans and 87% of Sub-Saharan Africans living in France, 75% of Somalis living in Sweden and 74% of Brazilians living in Portugal). The levels of perception of discrimination are linked not only to the ethnicity of the individual interviewed, but also of the country in which they live. For example, Roma living in Poland and Hungary considered discrimination was more widespread than those living in Romania or Bulgaria.
- ♦ The majority of those experiencing discrimination had no knowledge about where to get support and advice. For example, 94% of Roma living in Portugal, 93% of Africans living in Malta, and 91 % of Albanian living in Greece has no knowledge of organizations who might offer support.
- ♦ The highest levels of discrimination were reported by the Roma (47%), Sub-Saharan Africans (41%), and North Africans (36%).
- ♦ The majority of discrimination experienced in the daily life of migrants is unreported. The most prevalent reason for not reporting incidents was the belief that this would not change anything (63%).
- ♦ Similarly, victims of crimes¹⁵⁹ rarely lodged complaints: "1 in 2 respondents, who were victims of racist assault and threat, and serious harassment, did not report the most recent incident because they were not confident that the police would be able to do anything".

All these elements lead to the marginalization and exclusion of migrants from the rest of the society. **The contribution on The criminalization of migration: a view from the North** by Barbara Hudson, at the end of this chapter, provides further discussion of this issue.

Apart from hate crime, discrimination and racism against migrants also persist in areas of housing, education, employment and health. There is an absence of data on discrimination in these areas, and generally, migrants do not file complaints or know their rights. In some cases, the normative and policy frameworks in countries do not provide for assistance in the case of violation of human rights. In countries with immigration policies functioning on a work contract sponsorship basis, very few migrant workers have access to the social service and justice system in the host country. In Middle East countries, for example, immigration-sponsorship policies tie the worker to the employer, and provide no supports or services in the case of abuse or violence.

3. Responses to migration challenges

In its previously cited 2009 Human Development Report, the UNDP states that "large gains to human development can be achieved by lowering the barriers to movement and improving the treatment of movers" and puts forward a "comprehensive set of reforms" aiming to facilitate migration and to safeguard the fundamental rights of migrants.

3.1 Measures aiming to improve the regulation of migration

There has been an increase in cooperation and bilateral agreements between countries of origin and countries of destination designed to reduce illegal migration, and encourage potential migrants to stay in their own countries.

156 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009) *EU-MIDIS at a glance: introduction to the FRA's EU-wide discrimination survey*. Vienna: FRA

157 23, 500 individuals were interviewed face to face in all 27 Member States of the EU. The interviews focused on experiences of discriminatory treatment, racist crime victimization, awareness of rights, and reporting of complaints. An additional 5000 individuals from the majority population, and living in the same areas as minorities in 10 Member States, were also interviewed.

158 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009) *EU-MIDIS at a glance: introduction to the FRA's EU-wide discrimination survey*. Vienna: FRA. Page 7.

159 Criminal victimization included theft of or from a vehicle, burglary of attempted burglary, theft of personal property not involving force or threat, assault and threat, and harassment of a serious nature.

An Action Plan was agreed between participating countries in 2006, following the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development. They included 26 African and 30 European countries, and the European Commission¹⁶⁰. The plan outlines a number of concrete measures on legal and illegal migration. The first measure **concerns the promotion of development within countries of origin**. Creating job opportunities and better living conditions through economic growth and social development in countries of origin, is seen as the key way to prevent illegal migration. This includes a number of educational initiatives, such as greater access to western universities for African students; incentive policies to encourage students to return home, stemming the loss of intellectual capital; encouraging short-term professional experiences abroad; and developing partnerships between scientific institutions. Other initiatives include measures to reinforce services offered to potential migrants and several countries - such as France, Senegal, Spain and Morocco - have signed bilateral agreements to provide assistance to returnees.

The Rabat Plan appears to have resulted in some progress towards a more comprehensive treatment of migration¹⁶¹. A second Euro-African Conference in 2008 resulted in a cooperation programme for 2009-2011¹⁶². It identifies the need for better data, and recommends the creation of Observatories, as well as creating institutions in countries of origin to provide information, support and legal assistance to potential migrants.

In the Americas, the ILO's Migrant Worker Programme has made recommendations to the Organization of American States on a **labour migration policy agenda** which would benefit both host and origin countries¹⁶³. The recommendations have eight components seen as essential. They include the development of a plan of action against discrimination and xenophobia, and "*Gender sensitive labour migration measures*".

3.2 Measures aiming to improve the integration of migrants

Destination countries usually implement two types of policies: policies on integration and social inclusion, and on anti-discrimination & anti-racism.

Policies to promote inclusion include the Norwegian Social Inclusion Action Plan, under the Ministry of Labour. This aims to help newly arrived immigrants contribute to and participate in society, and covers employment, education, language, gender-equality and participation issues. In Finland, a National Strategy on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (2008-2010),

Assimilation: Adaptation of one ethnic or social group – usually a minority – to another, involving the subsuming of language, traditions, values and behaviour or even fundamental vital interests.

Discrimination: A failure to treat all persons equally where no objective and reasonable distinction can be found between those favoured and those not favoured. Discrimination is prohibited in respect of "race, sex, language or religion" (Art. 1(3), United Nations Charter, 1945) or "of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" (Art. 2, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948).

Integration: While the term is used and understood differently in different countries and contexts, "integration" can be defined as the process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. It generally refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies, while the particular requirements for acceptance by a host society vary from country to country. Integration does not necessarily imply permanent settlement. It does, however, imply consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labour market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose.

Source: International Organization for Migration (2008), *World Migration 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy*. Geneva: IOM

under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, aims to ensure employment for as many individuals as possible; assist them in avoiding social problems; and prevent social exclusion and poverty¹⁶⁴.

Strategies to **promote diversity, tolerance and combat racism** are also becoming more common. These different programmes include education, information and awareness measures.

160 Conférence Ministérielle Euro-Africaine sur la Migration et le Développement(2007). Plan d'action

161 Euro-african conference on migration & development. *Conclusions of the follow-up meeting*

See: http://www.maec.gov.ma/migration/Doc/359_07_Comit__de_Seguimiento_ACTA_DE_CONCLUSIONES_EN1.pdf

162 Second Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development.

See : http://www.ue2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-11_2008/PFUE-25.11.2008/conference_de_paris_sur_la_migration_et_le_developpement.html

163 Permanent Council of the Organization of American States - Special Committee on Migration Issues (2008) *Migrant Workers: Elements for a Policy Agenda and Related Recommendation of the International Labour Organization*.

164 National Strategy on Social Protection and Social Inclusion. See: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/docs/social_inclusion/2008/nap/finland_en.pdf

In the Netherlands, the 2003 National Action Plan against Racism is based on the general principle of full and shared citizenship and aims to bring together a wide range of sectors integrate planning and protections especially in the housing and labour markets, and to raise awareness¹⁶⁵. In Denmark, the government is currently considering a National Action Plan for the prevention of extremism and radicalization amongst young people¹⁶⁶. The Federal German programme "Competence for democracy: Counselling networks against right-wing extremism" offers local counselling in crisis or conflict situations involving right-wing extremism, xenophobia or anti-Semitism¹⁶⁷. Each federal state has a range of professional experts (police, justice, psychology, social work etc.) who can be consulted. The Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship has implemented the Diverse Australia Programme, to promote tolerance and inclusion within communities¹⁶⁸. It provides funding for community organizations and non-governmental organizations implementing activities promoting racial and religious tolerance and respect.

An example of social inclusion:

Femmes-relais is a service developed by immigrant women in the 1980's in France. The *Femmes-relais* act as social and cultural mediators, usually in disadvantaged neighbourhoods with many diverse ethno-cultural communities. They work with non-profit associations and have an *adultes-relais* status, which gives them access to some funding. They aim to facilitate relationships between families living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and public agencies; to address many of the challenges faced in these neighbourhoods (eg. poverty, discrimination, and access to basic rights, culture, or education); to break down the isolation felt by newcomers; and promote the social and professional integration of women.

See: http://www.lacse.fr/dispatch.do?sid=site/politique_de_la_ville/actions

To fight against discrimination, many countries have established anti-discrimination commissions to monitor progress in promoting diversity and tolerance and respect for human rights.

In the UK, the Equality and Human Rights Commission was established in 2007. It combines the work of existing Commissions for Racial Equality (CRE), Disability Rights (DRC) and Equal Opportunities (EOC) to improve responses to discrimination based on sexual orientation, age, religion and belief¹⁶⁹. Among other things, the Commission provides advice and guidance to employers and service providers, to help them promote equal opportunities and to prevent discrimination. The Commission for Racial Equality has previously published testimonials and stories to promote the Race Relations Act¹⁷⁰.

The Belgium *Centre Pour L'Égalité des Chances et la Lutte Contre le Racisme*, created in 1993, monitors migrants' access to basic social services and their overall integration. In Canada, the *Canada Human Rights Commission*, established in 1977, includes a focus on eliminating discrimination against minorities in the workplace¹⁷¹. It promotes information on human rights through local organizations, employers, and media. In France, the *Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et de promotion de l'égalité* (HALDE), has issued a number of decisions regarding the elimination of discriminatory practices in rental and employment processes including against migrant workers¹⁷². Laws on the legal rights of non-residents in France have been improved, as well as those concerning the treatment of "gens du voyage"¹⁷³.

The U.S. *Commission on Civil Rights*, created by the Civil Rights Act in 1957, receives and investigates complaints about discrimination, and collects data. The Commission also reviews and modifies policies, and issues reports on discrimination for the President and Congress. This has included a 2003 report relating to the deaths of illegal migrants trying to cross the border from Mexico. It recommended that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) border policies should include international norms, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹⁷⁴.

165 National Action Plan Against Racism

See : <http://english.justitie.nl/currenttopics/pressreleases/archives2003/Dutch-council-of-Ministers-national-action-plan-against-racism.aspx>

166 The Danish Government appointed a working group in 2008 to make proposals for an action plan to prevent extremist views and the radicalization of young people. The Government expects to present its National Action Plan following public consultations.

167 Federal programme *Kompetent für Demokratie - Beratungsnetzwerke gegen Rechtsextremismus*. See : <http://www.kompetent-fuer-demokratie.de/>

168 Diverse Australia Programme. See : <http://www.harmony.gov.au/>

169 The Equality and Human Rights Commission. See: <http://www.equalityhumanrights.com>

170 Commission for Racial Equality (2007) *A Lot Done, A Lot to Do: A Vision for an Integrated Britain*. London : Belmont Press. Retrieved May 21, 2009 from [http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/Documents/Race/General%20advice%20and%20information/A%20lot%20done,%20a%20lot%20to%20do%20-%20Our%20vision%20for%20an%](http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/Documents/Race/General%20advice%20and%20information/A%20lot%20done,%20a%20lot%20to%20do%20-%20Our%20vision%20for%20an%20)

171 Canadian Human Rights Commission. See: <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/about/default-en.asp>

172 HALDE (2009) *Rapport Annual 2008*. Page 21. It has also produced a National Police Force Guide to reduce discriminatory practices in the field. The guide includes procedures for dealing with specific situations like complaints or investigations, as well as an overview of discriminatory behaviour.

173 Term used to describe nomadic groups, usually used to talk about Gypsies and/or Roma.

174 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2003) *Migrant Civil Rights Issues Along the Southwest Border*. Retrieved May 26, 2009 from <http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/pubsndx.htm> .

An example of training at the local level: Community mediation in Nagybörzsöny, Hungary

Hungary suffers from a large number of ethnic-based conflicts, mostly involving Roma people. The Hungarian Crime Prevention Board funded a three-month project developed by Foresee Research Group and other partners.

The project was implemented in a small rural Hungarian village, where training was provided for the local inhabitants. It combined community building and mediation. Local people were trained in tolerance and mediation, and given implementation methods. The training included organized group activities for children, mothers and volunteers, and included alternative dispute resolution.

The outcomes of the project showed successful mediation and an improved community cohesion between the inhabitants of the village and the Roma people, and underlined the strong link between social cohesion and mediation. Indeed, the latter will not be successful if the former is not strong.

See: Community mediation in Nagybörzsöny: www.foresee.hu, <http://vagyunkmiis.foresee.hu>

This chapter has explored the impact of population movements on both host countries and the migrants themselves. A significant proportion of population movements now takes place within countries and regions, rather than from South to North. The benefits of population movements have been acknowledged, with economic, social and cultural benefits for both destination and countries of origin. Nevertheless, whether migration is voluntary and legal, illegal or forced, for economic, political or environmental reasons, the process can be a difficult one for the migrants themselves.

The impact of migration on community safety is complex. The opposing victims and criminals does not always provide a pertinent framework for analysis. The responses provided may seem distant from crime prevention – such as support for economic and social development in the countries of origin – however they often included familiar approaches and practices, such as awareness campaigns on the risks of victimization or measures favouring dialogue between the various constituents in a community.

Contribution

The criminalization of migration: A view from the North

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Though migration is not a new phenomenon, it is only relatively recently that there has been extensive classification of migrants into legal and the illegal, desirable and the undesirable. Migrants fleeing both persecution and poverty have become less welcome in rich western nations (Melossi, 2003). Destination countries of the rich West seek to gain the benefits of migration - filling shortages of skilled labour; caring for the sick and elderly; attracting investment - but to avoid the social and political costs of admitting migrants who do not bring economic benefits, or need welfare services on arrival.

Wars, famines, natural disasters and other drivers of migration have the potential to increase as climate change and global recession worsen conditions in the poorest parts of the world. As the numbers of persons displaced by these natural and human-made difficulties and disasters grow, the controls on entry and settlement put in place by the affluent states grow stronger. A triple strategy of criminalisation has developed: criminalisation of immigration, criminalisation of emigration, and the construction of migrant populations as criminal communities.

Affluent nations have strengthened barriers to immigration through selection policies such as points systems to allow in the economically desirable and keep out the economically undesirable. In many countries admission procedures for would-be immigrants have become more onerous, including, for example, tests of language proficiency, current political and cultural knowledge, and sharing common values prior to any opportunities to acquire these through living in the destination country.

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Interpretation of asylum conditions are narrow and do not reflect forms of persecution, while access to benefits, legal employment and state protection is restricted or unavailable to many categories of immigrants. Processing applications in source countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia are barriers to migration for those seeking to move to Britain and Australia. While processing in departure countries is presented as making selection processes more efficient in times of toughening of criteria for legal immigration, such outsourcing or 'externalization' means that entry is refused at the point of departure, so that more persons wishing to leave are faced with the choice of either remaining, or travelling as illegal/undocumented migrants.

As well as being embodied in Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that 'Everyone has a right to leave any country, including his own....' the right to emigrate has long been acknowledged in the West. Opinion in the West was highly critical of countries such as Russia and East Germany which prevented citizens from emigrating. Demolition of the Berlin Wall and opening of the borders in Hungary and other East European countries was greeted with rejoicing, and any easing of restrictions on leaving China, North Korea and other repressive states is welcomed. Nevertheless, new barriers to leaving are being erected in richer countries, put in place to restrict emigration as well as immigration. Actual physical walls, such as that between Mexico and the USA, may be rare, but there are other physical barriers to leaving such as sea patrols in the Mediterranean to prevent migrants crossing from Africa into southern Europe, and in the waters around Indonesia and other South Asian countries to prevent crossing into Australia (Gewcock, 2007). Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco to prevent movement of migrants, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, into Europe are surrounded by six-metre walls.

Policies of processing and control appear to be crossing the line between management of immigration and criminalization of emigration. In a report to the European Parliament, Rodier notes the arrest by Senegalese authorities of 1,500 potential emigrants and quotes an EU Interior Ministers press release which welcomes 'the efforts of the countries of the southern Mediterranean to contain illegal emigration to Europe' (Rodier, 2006: 20). A recent BBC television report on migrants in Libya showed the detention of migrants in harsh conditions, not only unable to continue their journeys towards Europe, but also prevented from returning to their countries of origin elsewhere in Africa (BBC, 2009). These detention policies are part of the rapprochement between Europe and Libya. In other African, Asian and Central American countries prevention of migration is a condition of trade and aid agreements with Europe, Australia and other nations of the rich West/North.

Classification of migrants into categories of legality and illegality means that the unwanted and rejected become criminalized. If they try to cross borders they become guilty of 'status offences', that is, acts which would not be offences were they not in a country where they had no legal right to enter or remain. Such migration crimes as unauthorized entry, visa-overstaying, working without a work permit, are examples of status offences deriving directly from the creation of categories such as 'illegal' immigrant and 'bogus' asylum seeker. Offences such as claiming benefits to which they are not entitled, begging and vagrancy are not strictly status offences, but are survival offences to which lack of legitimate sources of subsistence makes unauthorized migrants susceptible. The criminalization of migration and the increasing use of detention identify migrants as criminal for simple activities of daily life.

As employment opportunities are reduced in the affluent countries through recession, increased hostility to migrant workers is seen. Insecurity about jobs and fears of excessive pressure on resources such as housing and health care combine with the 'always and already' criminalization of migrant groups through status and survival offences to enhance popular hostility and prompt political responses of ever toughening policies. Emphasis on the illegality or false status of immigrants construct them as despised groups: they are 'suspect communities', membership of which makes them readily thought to be responsible for increases in crime, and for crimes which are newly in the focus of public/political concern, such as people trafficking.

Discovery of a crime committed by an individual or associates makes the whole group of which they are members thought to be likely perpetrators of the same class of offence. In Australia, sexual attacks by a small number young men of Lebanese and Pakistani backgrounds led to moral outrage at 'lack of respect for white women' supposedly general among Muslims (Daglistanli, 2007). In the UK, Pakistanis, already thought to be responsible for much drug importation, have become a suspect community in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, and many western countries' anti-terrorism legislation results in disproportionate surveillance, arrest and harassment of Muslims. In Greece, Albanians and Bulgarians are the 'usual suspects', thought responsible for most kinds of offences from theft to armed robbery and murder; in Italy and in Eastern Europe, the Roma are labelled as criminal and undesirable, suffering persecution and lack of protection. In France and Spain it is North Africans who are similarly criminalized. Throughout the

affluent world, immigrants are widely thought to be in control of most prostitution, especially prostitution of trafficked women and children.

Migrants are vulnerable to being victims as well as perpetrators of crimes. Fear of deportation persuades many migrants to work for exploitative wages and in abusive conditions. Victims of sex-trafficking fear (not unrealistically) being treated as offenders, liable to deportation or punishment for immigration offences even if they are not prosecuted for prostitution. They are discouraged from seeking help because of fear of reprisals, not only from the pimps and traffickers but also from the agents of the state. Criminalization and repressive management of migration means that in most destination countries there is more emphasis on preventing illegal immigration and deporting unwanted immigrants than there is on providing safe haven for migrants who are victims of crime and exploitation.

Calavita (2003) remarks that as globalization brings together affluent citizens of first-world countries into the same economic and cultural community, the category of immigrant/outsider is increasingly limited to impoverished people from third-world countries. The fluctuations of first-world economies make many of them come to be defined as illegal, and to be seen as suspect communities.

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CHAPTER 3

THE CHALLENGES OF ORGANIZED CRIME

The challenges of organized crime

Organized crime is another phenomenon that has been a priority for most governments in recent years, and is seen as presenting a major threat to human security. It is multi-faceted, large in scope and constantly changing, making it hard for authorities to keep up. Traditionally, organized crime was largely synonymous with criminal associations, societies and mafias, which combine illegal and legal economic activities, and possess a strong notion of group identity. However, with the expansion of international trade, free markets, and technology and travel, organized criminal activities now cover a very wide range of actions and networks from drug, arms and human trafficking, migrant smuggling, money laundering, and cybercrime, to trafficking in cultural or natural products.

Organized crime affects societies economically, socially, and politically, since the corruption of institutions by criminal groups impacts the rule of law in many countries where organized crime is prevalent, and political institutions are weak. Due to the large scale of activities undertaken by criminal groups, the impact of organized crime is experienced at international, national and local levels. Not all activities of such groups are solely criminal; many invest in legal businesses and money laundering, making it much more complex for law enforcement agencies.

Most attention focuses on the transnational character of organized crime, including reactive measures and border security. Organized crime also has a significant impact on community safety at the local level, and plays a significant role in crime levels, yet preventive measures at the local level are generally less well documented and largely undeveloped, even though local conditions facilitate and feed transnational activities.

The topic is an enormous one, and this chapter is only intended to begin the process of a more in depth consideration of the impacts of organized crime on everyday security, beginning with some of the main concepts and trends. It explores the complexity of organized crime and recent trends and shifts in organized criminal activities. Some of the preventive responses developed to respond to organized crime at different levels are also considered.

1. Definitions: the challenge of capturing diversity

There is a range of definitions of organized crime, and while some legal definitions are used fairly consistently nationally and internationally, others are contested.

1.1. Common features of legal definitions of organized crime

Legal definitions tend to define organized crime in terms of four characteristics:

- ✦ The crimes are committed by a group;
 - ✦ Some definitions specify the minimum number of people constituting a group. The United Nations (UN) sets a minimum number of three,¹⁷⁶ as does the European Union¹⁷⁷ and some countries such as Canada¹⁷⁸.
 - ✦ Other definitions, such as those used by the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) in the United States¹⁷⁹ and Australian law enforcement,¹⁸⁰ emphasize the organized nature of the group, rather than the number of members.
- ✦ The criminal organization is **long-lasting**. The United Nations and European Union emphasize the length of time an organization has existed, although no precise period is specified. Canada, notes that a group "that has formed randomly for the immediate commission of a single offence" cannot be classified as an organized criminal group¹⁸¹;

176 **United Nations** (2000) *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Art.2*: "Organized criminal group' shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit". United Nations (2000) *United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime*.

177 **European Union** (1999). The Vienna Action Plan on Organised Crime. *Official Journal*, No.C Vol 019, 23/01/99: "(1) A collaboration between two or more persons; (2) specific tasks assigned to each one of them; (3) over a relatively long or indeterminate period of time; (4) exercising a form or control or discipline; (5) suspected to have committed serious crimes ; (6) operating on an international level; (7) employing violence or other forms of intimidation; (8) using commercial or similar structures; (9) performing money laundering; (10) exerting an influence in political, media, public administration, legal or economic spheres; (11) acting to achieve power or profit." (**our translation**).

178 Section 467.1(1) of the *Criminal Code of Canada*.

179 "The **FBI** defines organized crime as any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole." <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/glossary.htm>

180 In **Australia** the Victoria Police defines organized crime as: "crime committed in an organised and systematic manner by a number of persons in an ongoing association or group whose primary motivation for association is to gain profit and/or influence". Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) http://www.aic.gov.au/crime_types/transnational.aspx. and http://www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?Document_ID=252

181 In Canada a "criminal organization" is a group, however organized that: (a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and (b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences, that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any one of the persons who constitute the group." The definition further specifies that it excludes "a group of three or more persons that has formed randomly for the immediate commission of a single offence." Section 467.1(1) of the *Criminal Code of Canada*.

- The **group commits crimes intentionally**. The notion of criminal intent is present in all definitions. The UN stipulates that a criminal organizations' principal aim is to "commit one or more serious crimes or offences¹⁸²";
- Offences are committed for **gain**. The European Union notes that the gain need not be material, but could also be political, legal or some other type of influence.

The additional characteristic of **transnational activity** is included by the European Union and Interpol¹⁸³ but not by the UN, or some national definitions such as that in Mexico¹⁸⁴.

1.2 Disagreements among academics

While definitions of organized crime have evolved over time, as criminologist, Jean-Paul Brodeur has emphasized, "not only is there no current consensus on the definition of organized crime, but many doubt that such a consensus is possible. The complexity of the phenomenon is such that it does not lend itself to concise formulation¹⁸⁵." (See Carlo Morselli's contribution below).

Many researchers emphasize the organized character of the activity rather than the types of actions committed. South Africa's Institute for Security Studies (ISS), for example, uses the

term "criminal networks involved in organized crime" since an emphasis on long-standing "organized criminal groups" does not reflect the reality of contemporary South Africa¹⁸⁶.

The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention distinguishes between the size of an organization's activities, for example, in relation trafficking¹⁸⁷:

- **Small scale organizations:** associated with one key person who leads and organizes all trafficking activities. These are family-based or developed among a tight circle of friends. Both the services provided and the clientele come from the same immediate sphere of relationships. There is typically a single type of criminal activity engaged in, which is usually developed as an ancillary business. It is not practised with a high degree of professionalism, and tends to be opportunistic.
- **Medium scale organizations** are characterized by a diversification of criminal activities and the existence of several people directing the activities. These organizations are durable and have a stable and professional structure. Strategies are developed to maintain and expand the organized criminal activities. But the decision makers are the ones principally involved in carrying out operations.

In Canada, 71% of criminal groups have more than 15 members

In 2006, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) identified close to 800 organized crime groups in Canada, 71% of which consisted of more than 15 members¹⁸⁸.

Large organizations are known for their economic involvement, the diversity of their activities and their violence, and any organization of more than three people is considered a criminal organization. This includes both "sub-contractors" of the large criminal groups (e.g. gangs and bands involved in drug trafficking) and "family businesses" with control over micro-territories.

182 **France** does not have an official definition of organized crime, but the *Office central de lutte contre le crime organisé* (formerly the *Office central de la répression du banditisme*) is one of the divisions of the *Direction centrale de la police judiciaire*. The *Office central pour la répression de la traite des êtres humains (OCRTEH)* is also responsible for fighting trafficking relating to the exploitation of persons within the *Direction centrale de la police judiciaire*, thus implying the illegal nature of these activities.

183 **Interpol:** "Organized groups are typically involved in many different types of criminal activity spanning several countries. These activities may include trafficking in humans, weapons and drugs, armed robbery, counterfeiting and money laundering." <http://www.interpol.int/Public/OrganisedCrime/default.asp>

184 **Mexico.** *Ley federal contra la delincuencia organizada*, art. 2 : « Cuando tres o más personas se organicen de hecho para realizar, en forma permanente o reiterada, conductas que por sí o unidas a otras, tienen como fin o resultado cometer alguno o algunos de los delitos siguientes, serán sancionadas por ese solo hecho, como miembros de la delincuencia organizada: Terrorismo (...), acopio y tráfico de armas (...), tráfico de indocumentados (...), Tráfico de órganos (...), Corrupción (...), Trata de personas (...) » <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/101.pdf>

185 Brodeur JP. (2002) *Crime et sécurité. L'état des savoirs*. Under the direction of Laurent Mucchielli and Philippe Robert, pp. 242-251. Paris: Les Éditions la Découverte, 439 pp.

186 **Institute for Security Studies (ISS):** "understand organised crime to be 'any kind of co-operation for the rational, i.e. non-impulsive, commission of illegal acts, regardless of the social status or the motives of the perpetrators.' (Klaus von Lampe 2002). (...) Conventional definitions of organised crime, which stress only that it is about market driven activities committed using violence and corruption tend to be narrowly descriptive. Organized crime is often attributed to organized criminal groups, even though not all of it is committed by organised groups. In fact, it is more accurate to speak of criminal networks involved in organized crime than organized criminal groups. The concept of group implies a structure and longevity, which do not always exist." http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=&link_type=&tmpl_id=1?link_id=68&link_type=13&tmpl_id=1

187 Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (2008). The organisation of Human Trafficking. A study of Criminal Involvement in Sexual Exploitation in Sweden, Finland and Estonia. Report: 21. 190 pages. pp. 131-138.

Other models could have been presented, such as Petter Gottschalk's model, whereby criminal organizations evolve through four stages over time: Gottschalk, Petter (2008). Maturity levels for criminal organizations. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice*. Vol. 36, 106-114.

188 <http://www.sq.gouv.qc.ca/prevenir-la-criminalite/la-surete-vous-conseille/protegez-vous-crime-organise-sq.jsp#definition>

- **Large scale organizations** possess a precise hierarchical structure, with tasks assigned among the members of the organization, they rely on intermediaries to complement the workforce. To develop its business, the organization works to increase the reach of its clan within its territory. Regional managers are assigned to run operating zones. The activity is diversified.

The notion of criminal clans, united by a strong cultural identity, and engaged in relatively specialized, localized activity, is also challenged by the contemporary use of information and communication technologies. It has been suggested that the move away from “traditional” forms of localized organized crime to the “virtual” global world of organized crime, requires a reassessment, not only of the kinds of crimes committed, and the manner in which they are committed, but also the nature of the ties that bind the participants together¹⁸⁹.

The concept of partnership is a feature of contemporary research on organized crime. Comparative research between organized crime and terrorism in particular has highlighted the parallels in the structure of relationships (in loosely connected cells), despite the contrast in goals (economic versus ideological)¹⁹⁰. The convergence of operational and scientific definitions has resulted in a move away from understandings of *criminal enterprise* towards one of *criminal networks*¹⁹¹.

1.3. Criminal organizations active in all regions

Criminal organizations that meet the definitions outlined above are identified throughout the world. Some such as the Italian Mafia¹⁹², is very well known, and it remains among the most deeply rooted in economic and political life¹⁹³.

Organized crime has grown rapidly in the former Soviet countries following the collapse of the USSR¹⁹⁴. Without under-

estimating the criminal activities related to racketeering and robbery, it is suggested, however, that they are no match for the “Mafiya’s” involvement in the underground economy and political corruption¹⁹⁵.

The transformation of China’s economy in the past 15 years (which has opened doors to many commercial opportunities)¹⁹⁶ has provided fertile ground for the Triads. In Japan, 184,000 ‘Yakuza’ were identified in 1963, but only 85,000 remained by 1993. The economic collapse in 1990 appeared to have had a devastating impact on financial capacities, and the anti-gang laws of 1992, as well as legislation against money laundering in 1993, have both helped to restrict the development of the Yakuza¹⁹⁷.

The American¹⁹⁸ mafia was first recognized in the 1890s. Since then, North American mafias have developed a reputation for their connections with Colombian Cartels, Jamaican Posses, Chinese Triads and Russian Mafiyas¹⁹⁹. They have been principally involved in human and drug trafficking. Connections are often made in this context between North American mafias and youth²⁰⁰ and motorcycle gangs²⁰¹.

The instability of some South American countries, coupled with international demand for illegal drugs, has fueled regional criminal organizations²⁰². In 2008, 80,111 hectares of coca were cultivated in Colombia, 56,100 ha in Peru and 30,500 ha in Bolivia²⁰³. Colombia has become the primary processor and exporter of cocaine, constituting 70% of that imported into the U.S²⁰⁴. UNESCO estimates that the cartels profit by between \$10 billion and \$30 billion annually²⁰⁵.

UNODC also suggests that the rise of organized crime in Africa during the 1970s was associated with rising oil prices, a falling U.S. dollar, inflation and increasing national debt²⁰⁶.

189 Grabosky, Peter (2007). The Internet, Technology, and Organized Crime. *Asian Journal of Criminology*, 2(2), 145-161.

190 Findlay, Mark James (2008). Global Terror and Organised Crime: Symbiotic or Synonymous? *Asian Criminology* Vol. 3, 75–89.

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2. A wide range of highly lucrative activities

The FBI estimates that **the profits of organized crime** are as high as US\$1 trillion each year. This can be contrasted to Canada's GDP which was US\$1.3 trillion in 2008, and that in France US\$2.1 trillion.

Criminal networks engaged in organized crime are involved in a wide range of activities, for example, some generate significant gains by trafficking works of art or antiquities. The value of such illegal trade is estimated at between 6 and 8 billion U.S. dollars per year²⁰⁷. However, the focus here is on criminal activities that directly affect communities and local authorities.

2.1. Direct harm to people

The previous chapter discussed some of the risks faced by migrants. In terms of illegal migration, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has estimated that illegal immigration represents between 1% and 3% of the total population of its member countries²⁰⁸. This is roughly equivalent to 10% to 15% of the 56 million immigrants living in Europe, and over 10 million in the U.S, many of whom have probably been trafficked illegally.

The U.S. State Department has estimated that between 600,000 and 800,000 migrants are trafficked each year. The International Centre on Migration Policy Development estimates that some 2,000 individuals die yearly crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Africa to Europe. Close to 400 people are estimated to lose their lives each year while trying to cross the border from Mexico into the United States²⁰⁹.

Other harmful impacts of organized crime include prostitution and sexual exploitation and trafficking in organs.

The exploitation of migrant women is a growing concern. It is estimated that in 2002, 4 million people, largely women,²¹¹ were involved in prostitution, which represented €60 billion in sales worldwide²¹². **Prostitution** linked to organized crime has grown considerably in Europe since the removal of border controls between countries²¹³. In Italy, prostitutes from Albania numbered around 100 in 1991 and 4,800 only five years later. The Albanian Ministry of the Interior suggests that the number of Albanian prostitutes in Italy grew by a factor of 48 over five years.

In France's in 1999, 55% of the prostitutes in Paris were recorded as immigrants, a rise from 38% the previous year. The number of prostitutes in Vienna (Austria) at the beginning of 2000 was estimated as between 6000 and 8000, of whom only 600 were legally registered. 80% of illegal female prostitutes are from another country. Some 92% of Spanish prostitutes are thought to be foreign. In recent years, twenty-six international sex trafficking networks have been dismantled in Europe, 15 of which originated in Eastern Europe.

Trafficking in organs has similarly developed with²¹⁴ a consenting supply market which consists of very poor populations who donate organs in exchange for money, coupled with a non-consenting market of individuals who are killed for the purpose of organ removal²¹⁵. Among the countries most affected by these practices are India, China, Romania and countries in Latin American. Since between 15% and 30% of Western patients awaiting organ transplant die because there is a shortage of donors,²¹⁶ the pressure of

The United Nations defines **trafficking in persons** as *"the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs"*²¹⁰.

207 International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme. ISPC (2009). Organized crime in Art and Antiquities. Selected Papers from the international conference held at Courtmayeur, Italy 12-14th December 2008. Milan : ISPC.

208 OECD (2009). *International Migration: The Human Face of Globalisation*. 188 pages. pp.45-55 http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,3343,en_21571361_37705603_43441358_1_1_1_1,00.html#TOC - <http://www.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/index.asp?CID=&LANG=FR>

209 See Chapter 2 of this report.

210 United Nations (2000). Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Article 3.

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213 The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, an extension of the Schengen Agreement of 1985.

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215 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (2004). *Coercion in the Kidney Trade? A background study on trafficking in human organs worldwide*. 40pages, p.9.

216 <http://www.unos.org/> - consulted January 8, 2010.

demand²¹⁷ helps perpetuate the trafficking of organs, despite measures taken by international organizations and governments²¹⁸.

“Conflict diamonds”: combating organized crime

The UN defines conflict diamonds as, “diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and which are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.”

It is estimated that the unregulated trade in such diamonds represented close to 4% of the world’s diamond production during the conflicts that took place in the late 1990s, such as in Sierra Leone. Conflict diamonds have been used to fund more recent conflicts in Angola, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville²¹⁹. Controlling the trafficking of diamonds helps control the funding of conflicts in Africa.

Over 99% of diamonds are now believed to come from conflict-free countries and are traded through the Kimberley Process Certification System. Recommended by the UN and instituted by the diamond industry in 2000, this programme enables the tracking of the stones from mine to end buyer and is applied by 71 diamond producing countries. Organizations such as the Diamond Development Initiative²²⁰ also work at the grass roots level to ensure that miners living below the poverty line obtain a portion of the profits.

2.2. Criminal activities are profitable and affect many sectors of society

The growth of arms trafficking and its impact on everyday security was discussed in Chapter 1. Other trafficking activities also have a direct impact on communities, and have become well integrated into crime prevention strategies.

Drug trafficking involves between 172 million and 250 million consumers globally, 13 million to 38 million of whom have developed an addiction.²²¹ Sales are estimated to be valued at between \$300 and \$500 billion, making it the most profitable international trade after arms trafficking, and ahead of the petroleum industry. Profits are as high as \$200 billion, compared to money laundering which is thought to bring in a profit of \$150 billion annually²²².

Sales in counterfeit goods are also estimated at between 5% and 6% of international trade, which translates to close to US\$250 billion. All of these activities foster crime at the local level, through the recruitment of local dealers and smugglers. The lucrative trade and fast profits can be difficult for some vulnerable populations to refuse.

Overall, one of the major difficulties encountered in the prevention of organized crime is that these organizations tend to be well integrated into both **legal** and **illegal spheres of economic activity**. Corruption in the area of public utilities, for example, is a prime example, (roads, sanitation, waste management, etc.).

Another feature of organized crime which hinders prevention and prosecution is its **capacity to adapt**. This not only pertains to the new and emerging markets (such as the Triads’ adjustment to the diversification of the Chinese economy, or the involvement of the Neapolitan Mafia in waste management), but also to new forms of criminal acts. The growth of **cybercrime** is a clear example of such adaptation by organized criminal groups²²³.

3. Progress at the international level

The link between organized crime and crime at the local level is highlighted in the 2002 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, and in the recommended strategies, which focus on measures to prevent the infiltration of legal activities by organized crime, and the protection of vulnerable groups to the risks of human trafficking. International conventions on organized crime have placed particular emphasis on the need for States to acquire the necessary legislative and operational tools.

217 In 1999, a Florida citizen put his kidney up for sale on the highly popular online auction site Ebay: “Fully functional human kidney for sale. You may choose any one of the two. Buyer will assume all medical and transplantation costs ... Serious offers only.” By the time Ebay put a stop to it, bidding for the kidney had reached US\$5.7 million. <http://www.droit-technologie.org/actuality-249/trafic-d-organes-sur-le-net-jusqu-ou-aller-trop-loin.html>

218 WHO (2004). *Ethics, Trade, Human Rights, and Health Law*. 56 pages.

219 <http://www.diamondfacts.org/french/conflict/index.html>

220 <http://www.ddiglobal.org/>

221 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2009) World Drug Report, p. 14-18 – 2007-2008 numbers.

222 UNODC (2009) Annual Report, pp. 25-27.

223 Grabosky Peter (2007) *The Internet, Technology, and Organized Crime*. Asian Journal of Criminology Volume 2, Number 2 / décembre 2007 pp145-161.

Peter Grabosky (2004) *The Global Dimension of Cybercrime*. Global Crime, Volume 6, Issue 1 February 2004 , pp 146 – 157.

3.1. Significant application of International Standards

Internationally, activity has been directed to achieving two main objectives: countries have been encouraged to pay greater attention to organized crime, and to develop specific policies to respond to it.

The adoption of United Nations international conventions and norms has provided the frame of reference on how to tackle the issue. They outline a significant number of measures to control and reduce criminal activities including: **legislative measures to criminalize offences, strengthening law enforcement agencies to better respond to organized criminal groups, and international and regional collaboration.** Other measures are concerned with provisions for actual or potential victims of organized criminal activities:

public awareness campaigns, victim assistance and protection, and data collection.

At the regional level, the **Organization of American States**, through its Special Committee on Transnational Organized Crime, has developed a **Hemispheric Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime**²²⁷. This plan urges Member States to adopt the TOC Convention, enhance cooperation in the areas of prevention, investigation and prosecution, and strengthen their capacities to fight organized crime at the national level. The focus is on international cooperation, strengthening of law enforcement agencies, an increase in information sharing, and the development of national strategies against organized crime. However, specific measures on the prevention of organized crime are quite limited.

The Main International Conventions

The main international instrument is the **United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime**²²⁴ (2000). Three supplementary protocols deal with the specific issues of human trafficking, trafficking in firearms and smuggling of migrants, to be applied in conjunction with the Convention. To date, **147 countries** have ratified the Convention.

The Convention emphasizes the **links between corruption, money-laundering and other main organized criminal activities**, with articles covering:

- The criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group, the laundering of proceeds of crime and corruption
- Measures to combat money-laundering, against corruption, enhance cooperation with law enforcement authorities, and the implementation of the convention through economic development and technical assistance, and protection of witnesses and victims.

The United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted in 2004 is seen as a strong complement to the TOC²²⁵. This Convention recognizes the facilitating links between corruption and organized criminal activities, and the ways in which corruption undermines a government's ability to provide basic services to its citizens.

*The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2003)*²²⁶, urges States to ratify the convention and to criminalize trafficking through the implementation of legislative measures which would establish criminal offences (Article 5). As the first global legally-binding instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in persons, it aims to facilitate convergence in national approaches, through the establishment of domestic criminal offences that support efficient international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons' cases. An additional objective of the Protocol is to protect and assist the victims of trafficking in persons with full respect for their human rights.

224 The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.

225 This convention aims to: promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively; promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery; promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property. The convention brings forward prevention measures, to be implemented by all Member States ratifying the convention, such as: the establishment of anti-corruption policies and practices, the evaluation of instrument and administrative measures, increased international collaboration between Member States in order to establish measures for detection of proceeds of crime, and similar investigation techniques, technical assistance and information exchange.

226 United Nations (2000) *Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish Trafficking in persons, especially women And children, supplementing the united Nations convention against Transnational organized crime.*

227 OAS (2006), *Draft Resolution – Hemispheric plan of action against transnational organized crime.* OAS.

The **Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)** has also developed the “**Plan of action to combat transnational crime**”²²⁸. The objective of the Action Plan is to strengthen regional commitment and capacity to combat transnational crime. It seeks to encourage ASEAN member countries to collaborate on information exchange and law enforcement, and to strengthen law enforcement and institutional capacity.

3.2. Exploring more effective international cooperation

A major objective at the international level is to **overcome legislative discrepancies and inefficient cooperation** through information sharing and joint investigations, and in the provision of assistance in legal procedures. While organized criminal activity also takes place at the local level, most international instruments focus on transnational organized crime rather than domestic organized crime. This has led to the development of **legal harmonization measures to enable cooperation between governments**.

Regional agreements and strategies have been developed to strengthen law enforcement agencies, with the creation of specialized bodies and data sharing.

Cooperation between police forces and justice systems has been harmonized through the adoption of common definitions of offences, and agreed processes of investigation and trials.

In Europe, **The Hague Programme**²²⁹ was endorsed by the European Union in 2004, followed by a European Commission Communication, and the development of a **strategic approach to tackling organized crime** in June 2005. The Commission has emphasized **the establishment of a common method of data collection** for all Member States, and the importance of **harmonizing law enforcement policies and legislation on organized crime**. The Commission recommended greater police cooperation and anti-corruption criminal law measures.

Additionally, the European Union has developed a specific programme: **Preventing and combating organized crime (2007-2013)**²³⁰, as part of the General Programme on Security and Safeguarding Liberties. The programme is composed of four main components: crime prevention and criminology, law enforcement, protection of witnesses and protection of victims. Its primary purpose is to encourage co-operation between law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities.

The Merida Initiative: a collaborative measure to fight organized crime

The Merida Initiative was established in 2008 by the United States to provide support to the government of Mexico, Central America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the fight against organized crime, particularly drug trafficking and money laundering which are prevalent in this region. The initiative seeks to provide training, equipment, support to law enforcement agencies, and funding.

“In 2008, Congress approved an initial \$400 million for Mexico and \$65 million for Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. In 2009, Congress approved \$300 million for Mexico and \$110 million for Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. In 2010, \$450 million for Mexico and \$100 million for Central America has been requested from Congress²³¹.”

While the Merida Initiative mainly provides funding for intelligence technology and equipment, and data collection, it also aims to strengthen human rights and accountability, through the promotion of citizen participation to oversee the work of law enforcement agencies, the establishment of offices of accountability, the provision of training to strengthen the institutions of justice, and the provision of human rights training within law enforcement agencies. It assists with the development of community action programmes within Central America which aim to implement anti-gang measures.

Source: US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/122397.htm>

228 ASEAN, *Plan of action to combat organized crime*. See: <http://www.aseansec.org/16133.htm>

229 The Hague Programme is a five-year programme in the area of justice and home affairs; it outlines the EU's strategic and development orientations and challenges it faces in that area. It includes the key priorities of all policies related to the establishment of freedom, security and justice (i.e. asylum, immigration, integration of legal immigrants, border policy, visas, information exchange, the fight against terrorism and organized crime, police cooperation, and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters), including their external dimension.

230 Preventing and combating crime (2007-2013)

See: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_criminal_matters/l33263_en.htm

231 The Merida Initiative, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. See: <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/122397.htm>, (Retrieved in November 2009)

3.3 Strengthening repressive and preventive national measures

At the national level, States ratifying the TOC are required to **include organized crime in their criminal code** as well as strengthen law enforcement measures to prevent the development of organized criminal groups and activities. This requires them to include offences such as participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice in their domestic criminal code; they also have to adopt new and sweeping frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation; and promote training and technical assistance for building or upgrading the capacity of national authorities²³².

Progress in countering the specific case of human trafficking illustrates the significant difficulties entailed in obtaining uniform data and inputs across regions and countries. The 2009 **Global Report on Trafficking in Persons**²³³ is part of the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, and is the first attempt to provide a global assessment of the issue of human trafficking, based on data collected from criminal justice systems and victims' assistance programmes in 155 countries. The scarcity of data makes it difficult to obtain a clear picture of the extent of trafficking. However, 111 countries provided data on the number of victims officially identified in 2006, which totalled 21,400. The main findings indicate that:

- As of November 2008, **63% of the 155 countries and territories included in this report had passed laws against trafficking in persons** addressing the major forms of trafficking. Another 16% had passed anti-trafficking laws that cover only certain elements of the Protocol.
- The number of countries with anti-trafficking legislation more than doubled between 2003 and 2008 in response to the passage of the Protocol. In addition, 54% of responding countries have established a special anti-human-trafficking police unit, and more than half have developed a national action plan to deal with this issue.

This demonstrates the growing commitment of countries to respond to international conventions and protocols in relation

to human trafficking. However, although criminalizing organized crime and adopting adequate legislation is an important step, further preventive measures have to be developed and implemented at the national and local level.

Article 31 of the TOC convention outlines preventive measures states should take to counter organized criminal activities within their country, such as the development and evaluation of national strategies and action plans, the promotion of best practices and policies, the strengthening of cooperation between law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders, the promotion of the reintegration of convicted individuals considered part of an organized criminal group, the promotion of public awareness to alert potential victims to the dangers of organized crime. The Convention encourages Member States to include these measures in their national strategies and action plans to combat organized crime.

However, nationally, few countries appear so far to have established specific strategies, and responsibilities relating to organized crime are largely delegated to police services, with specific departments in charge of establishing measures to combat organized crime at the domestic and international level. Police initiatives focus mostly on information gathering, improving methods of investigation, collaborating with other stakeholders, strengthening intelligence services and developing international collaboration.

Examples of countries which have established a specific body or adopted a specific policy on organized crime include the National Agenda to Combat Organized Crime²³⁴ (Canada, 2000), and the National Coordinating Committee on Organized Crime (NCC); the Australian Crime Commission²³⁵, and Sweden through its policy Mobilization to Combat Organized Crime²³⁶. Common elements include:

- Multi-agency coordination: national and regional coordination in Canada²³⁷; strengthening of collaboration between law enforcement agencies, the government, and the community in Australia. The Australian Commission has established specialized law enforcement agencies that can develop specific measures against organized crime;

232 UNODC (2004), *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*. Vienna: UNODC

See: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>

233 UNODC (2008), *The Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*. Vienna: UNODC

234 Public Safety Canada (2007) *Working together to Combat Organized Crime: A public Report on actions under the National agenda to Combat Organized Crime*. Canada: Public Safety Canada

235 Australian Crime Commission (2009) *Organized Crime in Australia*.

See: http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/oca/_files/2009/2009_oca_complete.pdf

236 Government Offices of Sweden. *Mobilisation to combat organised crime*. See : <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2708/a/117705>

237 Canada has a National Coordinating Committee on Organized Crime (NCC) which seeks to link law enforcement agencies and public policy makers to combat organized crime. The NCC works at the federal level, and collaborates with the Regional/Provincial Coordinating Committees (RCCs) who have a regional and operational focus. The NCC is responsible for assisting in the development and implementation of the *National Agenda* in order to better combat organized crime. In 2000, FPT Ministers responsible for Justice endorsed the *National Agenda to Combat Organized Crime*. The *National Agenda* recognizes that the fight against organized crime is a national priority that requires all levels of government, the law enforcement community and other partners to work together. The *National Agenda* identifies four main pillars to be addressed: national and regional coordination; legislative and regulatory tools; research and analysis; and, communications and public education.

- Raising awareness and promoting public education, and education of industry on organized crime issues;
- Prevention of the illegal influence or corruption of public officials and politicians by organized criminals (Australia and Sweden);
- Improving the collection of data, and, in Australia, identifying indicators of organized criminal activity.

3.4 Emergence of more initiatives with a local focus

Although policies to prevent organized crime at the local level are limited, some countries have adopted **prevention policies targeting the local level**. For example, the Organized Crime Strategy implemented in New Zealand²³⁸ in 2008, aims to identify emerging organized crime risks, build community resilience through engagement, and strengthen collaborative approaches to prevention. In particular, the strategy aims to **deprive organized criminal groups of the opportunity to recruit at the local level**. It differentiates between street-level gangs (which are labelled as “disorganized”), and organized criminal groups, and recognizes that in some instances, gangs conduct criminal activities on behalf of such groups. Among other activities, the strategy includes working closely with communities, improving risk assessment, creating employment opportunities, and strengthening family linkages.

Local level approaches have also been developed in Sweden. The National Council for Crime Prevention, responsible for establishing prevention programmes and initiatives at the local level, has developed local prevention initiatives and a more effective model to encourage cooperation between municipalities, the police services and other relevant agencies.

3.5 Decreasing the vulnerability of potential victims

This section, for the most part, concerns human trafficking. Decreasing the vulnerability of potential victims and perpetrators of organized crime forms an important aspect of prevention, given the rapid expansion of such trafficking. The majority of victims of human trafficking would appear to be women and girls. Of the victims identified by state authorities in 61 countries in 2006, 66% were women, 13% girls, 12% men, and 9% boys²³⁹.

Article 9 of the TOC Convention outlines measures which governments can use to **prevent trafficking in persons**. Apart from developing comprehensive policies and programmes

Mobilization to Combat Organized Crime

The Mobilization to Combat Organized Crime programme was established in July 2008. It aims to combat various forms of organized crime at the local and national level. It divides responsibility of the prevention and control of organized crime between different bodies. Those relating to prevention include:

1. The Swedish Secret Service which is responsible for the prevention of the illegal influence of public officials and politicians by organized criminals.
2. The Swedish National Crime Prevention Council has the responsibility of establishing prevention programmes and initiatives at the local level, through close collaboration with municipalities and local police services and to offer assistance whenever it is necessary.

Source: <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2708/a/117705>

to prevent trafficking, the protection of victims is emphasised through:

- Research, information campaigns, as well as social and economic initiatives.
- Cooperation with NGOs, and other relevant organizations.
- Bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
- Strengthen educational, social or cultural measures.

Implementation of these approaches varies between countries. Most preventive measures have centred on **awareness campaigns** to alert the general population to the risks of organized crime and trafficking, and to support victims. For example, Switzerland launched the “EURO 08 Campaign against the Trafficking of Women” in 2008, to inform the public, prior to the European football championship, of the risks of human trafficking associated with such big sporting events. Each year, the Swiss Confederation invests some CHF 2-3 million in prevention campaigns and victim protection programmes in the countries of origin of trafficking victims. The Swedish Action Plan against Prostitution and Human Trafficking for Sexual Purposes established in 2008, similarly gives priority to five areas of action recommended in the TOC²⁴⁰.

In relation to the prosecution of trafficking offenders, however, a major problem, and one recognized in the Swiss Action

238 New-Zealand Ministry of Justice. Organised Crime Strategy 2008-2009.

<http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy-and-consultation/crime/organised-crime/organised-crime-strategy-2008-2009>

239 UNODC (2008), *The Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*. Vienna: UNODC

240 Greater protection for people at risk, higher emphasis on preventive work, higher standards and greater efficiency in the justice system, increased national and international cooperation and a higher level of knowledge and awareness.

Plan, is the difficulty of persuading victims to participate in the prosecution process. This is a challenge since most victims have unclear immigration status, and are afraid of judicial and law enforcement institutions.

In this context, the role of the NGOs is crucial for preventing human trafficking because of their capacity to reach and gain the trust of victims, and support them in the long term. Numerous NGOs now focus their activities on preventing human trafficking through the provision of protection and support to victims of trafficking²⁴¹.

Care International – Bulgaria: Prevention of human trafficking in Bulgaria through empowerment and awareness-raising

Bulgaria is a source, transit and destination country for human trafficking. This anti-trafficking project, now in its second phase, is being implemented by Care Bulgaria. The project aims to increase public awareness of the issue of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and to provide support for governmental institutions.

Care International Bulgaria has developed a nationwide prevention campaign on the dangers of human trafficking with the use of audiovisuals, exhibitions and TV campaign spots. They have also initiated a series of workshops and discussions with the Ministry of Interior, the media and police services, to provide training in applying human trafficking prevention measures. Advocacy for anti-trafficking legislation has also been undertaken to support the National Anti-trafficking Commission of Bulgaria.

Source: Care International Bulgaria (2007) Prevention of human trafficking in Bulgaria through empowerment and awareness-raising.

La Strada: an NGO working on the prevention of human trafficking

La Strada, founded in 1995, develops activities to combat human trafficking in the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Belarus, Moldova, Macedonia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Ukraine²⁴². La Strada has developed a series of prevention and educational programmes on human trafficking. They have developed a series of tools, interactive seminars and information materials for each of the target group they have identified. They offer practical assistance to trafficking victims, including the provision of accommodation, food and clothing, social and legal assistance, and psychological help. They also offer assistance if victims wish to return to their countries of origin.

A number of initiatives, such as the IOM project implemented in 2008 in collaboration with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, aim to support the **reintegration of victims back into their country of origin**²⁴³. This project provides assistance to strengthen the anti-trafficking infrastructure in the Russian Federation. It includes measures such as the establishment of a Safe House, the provision of reintegration and rehabilitation services, and a reintegration fund for victims. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation has also supported projects in the Russian Federation, providing prevention courses on human trafficking for the visa section in the Swiss Embassy, and creating a free Russian language help-line in Switzerland and Russia.

A major element in the prevention of human trafficking, as with all forms of organized crime, lies in **decreasing the vulnerability of potential victims (or perpetrators) of trafficking**. However, efforts are mainly devoted to developing public awareness campaigns to inform potential victims of trafficking and the dangers associated with organized crime. The factors motivating the migration of these people must be better addressed in the context of local development policies and policies on social exclusion.

In conclusion, it appears that some of the major issues of organized crime are well identified, and strategies to prevent it are being developed. The issue of street gangs and the potential links with more structured groups is the subject of current studies and initiatives that aim to prevent and discourage recruitment. Other issues need further exploration in order to counter the benefits of being involved in a criminal organization. This may be not only for individuals, but also for entire communities which benefit from the material goods, security, and bonds of solidarity with criminal organizations, that the State does not provide. Again, the issue of governance, and building links between citizens and institutions is crucial.

241 Swiss Coordination Unit against the Trafficking of Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (KSMM).

242 La Strada Czech Republic: See: <http://www.strada.cz/en/>

243 International Organization for Migration. Reintegration Assistance to Victims of Trafficking in the Russian Federation.

See: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnEU/cache/offonce/lang/en?entryId=11250>

Contribution

Defining Organized Crime

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There is a reason why the term “organized crime” is not explicitly mentioned in most criminal codes and legislations. The absence of the term is due to the failure to arrive at a uniform definition in policy and legislative circles. The *Canadian Criminal Code*, like most criminal codes, refers to a general pattern of co-offending: “a group, however organized, that is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada and has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit” (Canadian Criminal Code, Article 467.11-13). Such a legal definition is typical of the ‘enterprise crime’ and conspiracy depictions that are often formulated to counter organized crime and which have been put into practice since the American *Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act* (RICO) was drafted in 1970.

The purpose of the Canadian approach, RICO, and similar legislation was to provide law enforcement officials and prosecutors with more powerful tools and resources to confront organized offenders. Traditionally, criminal justice officials faced obstacles ranging from difficulties in obtaining proof, lack of coordination, limits in gathering strategic intelligence, failure to use available sanctions, and lack of political commitment. Such broad definitions were justified by the threat of organized crime and, indeed, such legal formulations have offered criminal justice officials in several countries an extensive amount of flexibility on how they control organized crime at the police, judicial, and correctional levels. In many ways, organized crime control has been helped by such conceptual ambiguity, leaving officials with greater leeway on how they approach a variety of problems that may or may not fall under the organized crime repertoire.

Legal definitions of organized crime have taken on an ‘all-encompassing’ crime category. The group or co-offending depiction described above is typically associated with a long set of predicate crimes. The problem with bounding organized crime in a overly extensive co-offending construct and as an extension of an overly long list of predicate crimes is that any attempt to arrive at a more precise legal definition of the phenomenon was pretty much pushed aside within the shadows of the more effective and inclusive approach.

Variants of Organized Crime

Any attempt to deal with organized crime and its control is faced with a persistent dilemma: defining the problem at hand. Probably the most general and accurate definition of organized crime was offered by past criminologists, such as Sellin (1963) or Vold and Bernard (1986). These authors maintain that, in its most general form, organized crime represents a public and prohibited service of some sort. Unlike many of the predicate crimes found in various criminal codes, organized crime encompasses acts which are largely committed for public service. Demand for this service is generally extensive enough to guarantee long-term continuity and low-risk involvement for most participants taking part in its supply. Of course, continuity and risk-assessment by participants depends on the extent to which the public service is perceived as a threat within the corpus of official reactions. This could vary from one region/country to the next and within a historical context: what is frowned upon here or now was/is tolerated then or there.

Threat perception is at the root of the control of organized crime and, within this context, two distinctive variants of organized crime emerge: the criminogenic interstice and the criminal market setting. The criminogenic interstice represents the illegal supply of goods and services to a specific legitimate subpopulation, while the criminal market represents the supply of illegal goods and services to the general public sector. These two variants have been too often intermingled within the all-inclusive conceptualizations of organized crime.

The Criminogenic Interstice

It has been consistently argued that organized crime will emerge when and where basic governmental services of citizen protection are lacking. The idea is generally associated with groups falling under the generic *mafias*. Although used quite liberally in popular circles, a mafia is above all a group in the business of private protection. This service could be provided to underworld members, who cannot conceivably turn to the police in times of conflict and strife, but also to the general population in certain legitimate

contexts. While the provision of such service to underworld participants is indeed a problem in its own, it is only when the service is also in demand by the general public that the criminogenic interstice is at its most significant for organized crime controls.

The criminogenic interstice variant is present in frameworks that present organized crime as a form of parallel governance structure or alternative protector (Anderson 1979; Tilly 1985; Jamieson 2000; Paoli 2003). Factors such as corruption, ineffective policing, a poor court system, lack of lawyers, and a slow bureaucratic process for commercial requisitions have been correlated with the extent of organized crime in a society (Milhaupt and West 2000; Buscaglia and van Dijk 2003). This framework illustrates how criminal groups fit in where state agents are absent or lacking. This is applicable in criminal milieus across all societies and in legitimate spheres within societies experiencing a transition toward or fallacy within a liberal economic structure.

The most recent and clearest weak-state approach within a general public context is Gambetta's (1993) understanding of the Sicilian Mafia as a private protection industry. Historically, the Sicilian Mafioso filled a political broker role (see also Blok 1974). Systematically isolated before and after a unified Italy, Sicily was an optimal breeding ground for entrepreneurs of private protection and such entrepreneurs thrived as governmental protection of citizen rights continued to dwindle well into the 1970s. Applications of this particularly theory were also conducted to address the 'Russian Mafia during the 1990s (Varese 2001) and the 'Japanese Mafia' during the post-WWII era (Hill 2003).

Overall, what the criminogenic interstice problem identifies is a legitimate context that lacks an effective and efficient apparatus for ordering interpersonal relationships and conflict dispute. In such settings, mafia groups find a function within general society. In some cases, the weakness of the state is important enough to warrant the rise of organized crime that is akin to the very cultural basis of that society. Such a context is significantly different than the typical organized crime problems found in most Western nations.

The Criminal Market

One perspective that was designed as an alternative to the traditional organized crime image of mafia-like hierarchical and bureaucratic-like organizations is the illegal enterprise framework. While often taken as the antithesis of the mafia framework, the idea of illegal enterprise is actually tapping into an altogether different problem. Whereas the criminogenic interstice context captures the criminal organization that prospers from societal and structural weaknesses, the illegal enterprise framework accounts for the place of criminal organizations or groups within the scope of prohibited settings established by the state. In this framework, organized crime emerges as the gradual outcome of the arrival and endurance of criminal markets for prohibited goods and services (e.g. drugs, prostitution, gambling, vehicles, and human beings).

In this and later appraisals, groups and organizations taking part in the supply of prohibited goods and services are more like conventional merchants and enterprises than power brokers. In many ways, such criminal markets resemble luxury markets in the type of product offered (leisure products) and in price fluctuations (prices are initially high, and fluctuation is quite rare thereon; see Reuter and Kleiman 1986).

Overlap

Criminogenic interstice and criminal market contexts are not necessarily independent from one another. Many national or regional settings are faced with an overlapping problem. Nations with notoriously weak governmental infrastructures could also be marked by a number of criminal markets. Nations with flourishing criminal markets could also have their own criminogenic interstices in various sectors of their political and economic infrastructure.

Also, formal reactions to organized crime may be implemented when problems within the criminal market become important enough that a lack of formal reaction is perceived as a limit in the state's capacity to contain the problem. In such contexts, the criminal market also becomes a criminogenic interstice problem (e.g., high levels of violence between organized crime entrepreneurs).

Differential Responses to Distinct Problems

While the dual nature of organized crime is largely overlooked by policy and legislative makers, the legal response to organized crime does reflect, to some extent, the two variants. The most typical response to organized crime, which may relate to both criminal market and criminogenic interstice contexts, targets the patterns most commonly attested in the organization of the (illegal) supply for (illegal) services or commodities. Such prohibition of criminal patterns may target the formation of groups, the movement of the illegal product, or supplementary activities (not necessarily crimes) that are associated to the supply of the predicate crimes (electoral manipulation, violence, or money laundering, for example). The enterprise crime and co-offending formulations presented above are examples of this.

The second and most explicit form of legislative targeting involves a ban on specific organizations (or franchise), such as the Mafia. Such a ban usually emerges when an interstice problem is considered serious enough to warrant the criminalization of a once "tolerated" group; no cases of group bans are documented within an exclusive criminal market context. Such criminal organization bans have been in place for quite some time in both Italy and Japan for Mafia and Bōryokudan members.

Problems Extending from Definitional Ambiguity

Most law-enforcement officials and policy makers would argue that the threat presented by organized crime (in any form) is important enough to warrant laws that are built on slippery constructs. But there is a problem that persists because of such conceptual ambiguity. Legislative controls that are aimed to control or contain organized crime are generally short-term in their impact, often resulting in the disruption of a given network or organization, but rarely able to have any impact on subsequent adaptations that emerge from the voids left open from such disruption. Because the formal reaction to organized crime is limited in scope, several problems persist and, over the long-run, hamper the development of any form of long-term control. The main consequences are the following:

- an overuse of such legislation (RICO is a good example);
- an all-encompassing law will lead to all-encompassing applications;
- law-enforcement's overreliance on criminal informants;
- a lack of development in expertise on organized crime
- poor adaptation to control the organized crime problem

These and other problems are typical in most settings and are direct extensions of what happens when a threat is largely misconceived (and often exaggerated) and reacted to with an 'anything goes' outlook and in which the means are justified by the ends. In the area of organized crime, the legislative and policy response to the problem has been a classic demonstration of such misdirected controls.

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CHAPTER

**DRUGS, ALCOHOL AND
COMMUNITY SAFETY**

4

Drugs, alcohol and community safety

The consumption, sale or traffic of alcohol and drugs²⁴⁴ have long been central to issues of crime prevention and community safety. They involve a wide range of legal, public health, educational and customary practices, as well as moral values. While the legal and cultural status of drugs and alcohol usually differ considerably, their impact on community safety and public health can be quite similar.

Two of the main consequences of drug and alcohol consumption for the community are the direct impacts resulting from substance abuse, and the indirect impacts associated with the regulation of alcohol consumption, and illegal activities related to drugs. Thus the social and economic impacts of substance abuse can include crime and deviant behaviour, with increased trade in illegal substances in the underground economy; increases in the sense of insecurity in neighbourhoods as a consequence of alcoholism, drug addiction and evident trafficking activities; the impact on levels of corruption; social exclusion and prostitution; problems in school, in family relationships, in employment and job-security; and in the incidence of accidents at work, home, public places and on the road²⁴⁵.

Research and information available on the impact of substance abuse and trafficking of illicit substances is very uneven geographically. The image of a world divided between production and consumer countries does not match reality. Some consumer countries such as Canada also produce drugs such as cannabis, and numerous production and transit countries, such as Mexico, have experienced recent increases in drug use.

Consumption of alcohol and drugs appears to have stabilized in the past 10 and 20 years. The UNODC 2009 World Report on Drugs notes that world drug markets have stabilized since the latter part of the 1990s²⁴⁶. This relates in particular to reduction in the production of heroin and cocaine, and an increase in seizures of illicit drugs, but also to stabilizing and declining consumption patterns. While there are regional variations, there appears to have been a decline in the use of cannabis, opiates and cocaine in the major drug markets, although some increase in the use of amphetamines globally. Overall, UNODC estimates that **less than 5% of the world's population uses drugs, and only 0.6% has a consumption problem.**

The type of drugs used differs significantly from one geographic area to another. The largest market for cocaine is North America, followed by Western and Central Europe and South America, whereas opiates are predominantly used in Europe and Asia. The highest levels of use of cannabis are in North America and Western Europe. The use of amphetamines, while difficult to track, appears to be evident in East and South-East Asia, Europe and North America.

According to WHO, 91 million individuals in the world suffer from alcohol-related disorders²⁴⁷. If levels of consumption are stable overall²⁴⁸, patterns of **alcohol consumption vary considerably between and within regions**. There appears to be a decline in Europe but an increase in West-Pacific zones. However, in Western countries, the phenomenon of "binge drinking" especially among young people, and the disorderly conduct associated with it has become a particular concern of national and local governments. Binge drinking is defined as the consumption of a significant amount of alcohol in order to rapidly provoke intoxication. A study of the Institute of Alcohol Studies evaluated that 80 million Europeans of age 15 and up have declared binge drinking once a week, and 25 million Europeans of age 15 and up have reported that binge drinking is their common pattern of alcohol consumption²⁴⁹.

244 In this chapter, the terms alcohol and drugs will be used, rather than illegal psychoactive substances. The four types of drugs included are : Cannabis, Cocaine, Opiates and Amphetamines. (See box on page 67).

245 Lopez D. and Sansfacon D. (2005) *Dommages sociaux liés à l'usage de drogues: focus sur les relations et difficultés familiales*. Revue Toxibase No 20 4e trimestre. Voir www.toxibase.org

246 UNODC (2009) *World Drug Report 2009*. Vienna: UNODC

247 World Health Organization (2004) *Global Status Report on Alcohol*. Geneva: WHO.

See: http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/globalstatusreportalcohol2004_alconsumpt.pdf

248 World Health Organization (2004) *Global Status Report on Alcohol*. Geneva: WHO.

See: http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_status_report_2004_overview.pdf, Page 10.

249 Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen e.V. (DHS) (2008) *Binge Drinking and Europe*. Hamm:DHS. Page 10.

See : <http://www.ias.org.uk/resources/papers/europe/phproject/bingedrinking-report.pdf>

1. Similar links with crime and violence despite their different status

1.1 The impact of drugs and alcohol on crime and violence have been widely documented

The consequences of alcohol and drug use are not equal, since the former is largely legalized and regulated in most countries, while the latter is primarily prohibited. The relationship between these substances and crime and violent behaviour varies. Apart from the negative impacts on health, **the consumption of alcohol is a major factor associated with criminal violence and abuse.** This includes assaults, homicide and dangerous driving, as well as domestic and family violence. [See Contribution by Alexander Butchart at the end of this chapter.] According to the European Commission²⁵⁰, alcohol is related to 16% of incidents of abuse perpetrated against children and young people, underscoring the fact that young people, who are often stigmatized as offenders, are also victimized. According to a 2006 study of the Swiss Institute for Prevention of Alcoholism and other addictions, almost 20 % of teenagers have a drinking problem, defined as two cases of intoxication during the month preceding the survey, in addition to the monthly consumption of alcohol. Fifty to 60% of acts of violence among teenagers are committed by this restricted group²⁵¹.

The impact of alcohol consumption on domestic violence cannot be assessed at the international level due to lack of data, even though it is considered as an important factor by the World Health Organization²⁵². A number of countries have conducted studies which confirm that alcohol constitutes a significant risk factor. For instance, an Australia study demonstrates that "36% of intimate partner homicide offenders were under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident"²⁵³; in France, 25% of 113 homicides between partners involved alcohol consumption²⁵⁴.

Conversely, offences associated with the consumption of drugs are often non-violent and relatively minor. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) reporting on the micro-level impact of drug abuse, concluded that crime linked to consumption *'is mostly non-violent and often petty, it is economically motivated and is usually viewed as minor crime.'*²⁵⁵ The link is more complex than it appears, however, since drug abuse can result in violent crimes such as robbery. Nevertheless, the

INCB argue *"it is very difficult, and misleading, to suggest a direct causal link between violence and illicit drug ingestion without reference to culturally and socially situated factors that, in turn, influence an individual's behaviour"*. Much more serious violence relates to the trafficking in drugs, and disputes over territorial control (turf wars and settling of debts between rival gangs).

These explanations are supported by the scientific literature which has identified three major causal links:

- ♦ the *psychopharmacological* effects of the different substances (cannabis, opiates, cocaine, methamphetamines and alcohol) on behaviour;
- ♦ the *economic-compulsive* effects relating to the need to obtain more substances;
- ♦ the *systemic* links explaining the violence associated with trafficking, as well as the lifestyles of drug users and traffickers and their impacts on a neighbourhood or community²⁵⁶.

In all countries, the types of responses to substance abuse are related to definitions of legality and cultural practices as well as economic factors.

1.2 Alcohol is regulated, drugs are prohibited

While the World Health Organization (WHO), amongst other international organizations, is working on the development and adoption of a first international agreement on the sale and consumption of alcohol, the year 2009 was marked by the centenary of the first international agreement on illicit psychoactive substances, the *Shanghai Opium Commission*. Both types of substances are treated very differently by international organizations and to date, **normative activity has only been developed for products classified as "drugs"**.

Drugs are the subject of numerous international conventions aimed at eliminating their manufacture, distribution, and consumption:

- ♦ Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961
- ♦ Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 1971
- ♦ United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1988

All three conventions have been ratified by the great majority of Members States of the United Nations.

250 Commission of the European Community (2006) *Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An EU strategy to support Member States in reducing alcohol related harm*. Page 8.

251 L'Institut suisse de prévention de l'alcoolisme et autres toxicomanies (ISPA). See : www.ispa.ch

252 WHO, *Intimate Partner Violence and Alcohol Fact Sheet*.

253 *Ibid*. Page 2.

254 OFDT (Juillet 2007) *Violence conjugale et alcool : quel traitement judiciaire ?* Tendances No 55 St Denis la Plaine : Observatoires français des drogues et des toxicomanies . Page 1.

255 OICS, *Drogues, criminalité et violence : impact au micro-niveau*.

256 Pouillot P., Lafortune D., Brochu S. (2008) *Mental health problems, substance abuse and violent criminal behavior. An adaptation of Goldstein's tripartite model - Santé mentale, alcool/drogues et violence. Adaptation du modèle tripartite de Goldstein Psychotropes*. 2008/3-4, Vol. 14. Pp. 157-178.

Illicit Drugs : The Four Major Categories

Cannabis: Can be consumed through the leaves (marijuana), the resin (hashish), or the oil (honey oil or red oil) of the cannabis plant. It is most frequently smoked, often with tobacco but may also be cooked in foods and eaten²⁵⁷.

Cocaine: Is a stimulant originating from coca leaves that may be sniffed or injected in its powdered form (cocaine hydrochloride) or smoked in its crystallized form (freebase/crack cocaine). Cocaine hydrochloride is derived through a complex chemical process in which cocaine paste is treated with kerosene, methyl alcohol and sulphuric acid. Freebase or crack cocaine comes from the treatment of cocaine hydrochloride with ammonia or baking soda²⁵⁸.

Opiates: Are narcotics derived from opium, which is extracted from the seed pod of the papaver somniferum flower. The most common opiate is heroin which can be injected, snorted, smoked or inhaled²⁵⁹.

Amphetamines: Are laboratory-made stimulants that may be consumed in both powder or pill form. They may be swallowed, snorted, injected or smoked²⁶⁰.

Synthetic drugs

The term "synthetic drugs" covers substances produced only by a chemical process conducted in a laboratory. In 2007, between 230,000 and 460,000 tonnes of amphetamines were produced for between 16 and 51 million users throughout the world. Between 72,000 and 137,000 tonnes of ecstasy were produced for between 12 and 24 million users. UNODC estimates that there are more synthetic drug users than cocaine and heroin users combined²⁶¹.

UNODC has developed the SMART program (*Synthetic Monitoring: Analysis, Reporting and Trends*) to help governments generate, organize, analyze, and disseminate information regarding synthetic drugs. This information is regularly published and updated on the Global SMART Update²⁶².

Alcohol is not presently the subject of any comparable international convention. However, in the past few years, there have been increasing calls for an international convention on alcohol regulation notably from the health sector (similar to that on tobacco which was the subject of a 2005 Convention). WHO for example, adopted a Resolution at its 61st World Health Assembly recommending the development of a global strategy by 2010, based on an evidence-based public health approach, which is preventive, reducing the risks and health impacts of alcohol use, particularly among children and young people, rather than the repression of consumption. Similarly, the European Union also supports the development of a European strategy for reducing alcohol-related harm.

2. Balancing criminal law with prevention

2.1 Rethinking the international "War on Drugs"

While international agencies such as UNODC and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) continue to uphold the Conventions against the manufacture, sale and consumption of drugs, they clearly acknowledge that prohibition has had damaging consequences. They cite five such consequences:

- "The first and most significant of these is the creation of a lucrative and violent black market.
- Secondly, the focus on law enforcement may have drawn away resources from health approaches to what, ultimately, is a public health problem.
- Thirdly, enforcement efforts in one geographic area have often resulted in diversion of the problem into other areas.
- Fourthly, pressure on the market for one particular substance has, on occasion, inadvertently promoted the use of an alternate drug.
- Finally, use of the criminal justice system against drug consumers, who often come from marginal groups, has in many instances increased their marginalization, diminishing capacity to offer treatment to those who need it most"²⁶³

257 UNODC. Handbook : What are drugs ? Chapter 2 - Understanding substance abuse. See: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/youthnet/handbook_what_are_drugs.pdf

258 UNODC. Handbook : What are drugs ? Chapter 2 - Understanding substance abuse . See : http://www.unodc.org/pdf/youthnet/handbook_what_are_drugs.pdf , UNODC (2008) World Drug Report. Vienna: UNODC. See: http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf, See: <http://www.cocaine.org/process.html>

259 See : http://www.unodc.org/pdf/youthnet/handbook_what_are_drugs.pdf , <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/heroin/transform/> , http://www.unodc.org/pdf/youthnet/handbook_what_are_drugs.pdf

260 See: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/youthnet/handbook_what_are_drugs.pdf , http://www.unodc.org/pdf/youthnet/handbook_what_are_drugs.pdf

261 UNODC (2009) *World Drug Report*. 314 p.

262 UNODC (2009) *Global SMART Update*. Vol 2. 16 p.

263 UNODC (2008) *World Drug Report 2008*. Vienna: UNODC. Page 21.

The United Nations recently acknowledged that its 1988²⁶⁴ objective of achieving a “world without drugs” through “the war against drugs” which aimed at significantly curbing drug production, trafficking, and consumption by 2008 “was, in fact, nowhere close to having been accomplished, despite the efforts and measures that were implemented”. Similarly, revision of the prohibition strategy and the war against drugs has also been urged by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy who have argued that prohibitionist policies have not produced the expected results.

In March 2009, the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) acknowledged the failure of a purely repressive approach, and the need, internationally, to redirect strategies toward prevention, treatment, and the rehabilitation of addicted persons. The INCB now advocates an integrated approach to counter drug-related violence that takes the following elements into account: socioeconomic development; urban regeneration; multi-institutional partnerships; locally-based work; community-based restorative justice; gender-, age-, and minority-specific interventions; and sustainable interventions.

Similarly, the *National Institute on Drug Abuse* (NIDA) in the United States supports the adoption of prevention measures on cost benefit grounds, arguing that “for each dollar invested in prevention, a savings of up to \$10 in treatment for alcohol or other substance abuse can be seen²⁶⁵”. The reduction of the supply of illicit drugs remains an international goal, nevertheless, with reducing poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and coca cultivation in South America, as priorities. At the national level, drug consumers continue to be widely criminalized.

2.2 The negative impact of the criminalization of drugs

Most national legislation differentiates simple possession from trafficking depending on the quantity of drugs found. Quantity also influences the type and severity of sentence. In some European countries such as Latvia, for example, administrative sanctions may be applied in cases involving a small quantity of drugs, but criminal prosecution for larger amounts. Generally, trafficking receives the most serious sentences, but in all types of drug prosecution there are wide variations between countries in the severity of the penalties. Trafficking in Saudi Arabia, for example (and some Asian countries), can result in capital punishment even for small quantities²⁶⁶, although, UNODC notes that the number of drug-related executions is declining.

Criminalization of drug users has led to a range of negative impacts that have been well documented, and include the disproportionate impact of drug legislation on certain groups, particularly ethnic minorities; the high costs of dealing with drug addiction through the criminal justice system; the negative impact of criminal convictions on post-sentence employment and reintegration, the revolving door phenomenon of re-offending and repeat custodial sentences; and the criminalization of mules from producer countries, who are often women, and vulnerable and exploited groups. In producer countries, and some destination countries, a by-product of the illegal status of drugs are youth and adult gang violence, the loss of social cohesion and disintegration of neighbourhoods and communities, the high levels of violence linked to organized crime and trafficking, corruption among the authorities, and in some cases political instability.

Some depenalization of drug use and possession has taken place. The depenalization of drug use is now a reality in the Czech Republic, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, although administrative sanctions are still in place, such as fines or revoking a driver’s license. Belgium has introduced the concept of **public nuisance** and **problem consumption** which characterizes the type of consumption punishable. This concept was redefined in 2005 to specify the prohibition of drug consumption near schools, and too openly in public spaces²⁶⁷. This relaxing of laws also includes the acceptance of therapeutic drug use, notably cannabis by some American States for instance. Finally, much drug legislation now allows for sentences to be reduced if the accused “voluntarily” chooses to pursue **treatment**.

2.3 Integrated crime prevention policies respond to alcohol abuse

The production, trade and consumption of alcohol although not generally criminalized, is still strictly controlled in most countries. National legislation generally defines age limits for sale and consumption, pricing to deter sales, restricting the locations and hours of sale and consumption, as well as defining prohibited activities and places (for example, certain public places, when driving, and in relation to professional codes of conduct).

However, the **criminalization of alcohol-related behaviour** has been reinforced in countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and Canada, particularly in the case of driving under the influence.

264 United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Concluded at Vienna on 20 December 1988.

265 NIDA, (2004) *Lessons from prevention research*.

Aos et al. (2001) *The comparative costs and benefits of programs to reduce crim.*, vol. 4, Washington State Institute for Public Policy.

Pentz (1998) *Costs, benefits, and cost-effectiveness of comprehensive drug abuse prevention*, in Bukoski, W.J., Evans, R.I. (eds): *Cost-Benefit/Cost-effectiveness research of drug abuse prevention: Implications for programming and policy*, NIDA Research Monograph No. 176, Washington, US Government Printing Office. Pp. 111-129.

266 January 24, 2010: Mohsen bin Mohammed bin Saleh al-Mokhles was beheaded in Dammam in the east of the kingdom for trafficking in hashish according to a Saudi Arabian Interior Ministry statement carried by the official SPA news agency. *Sources: Agence France Presse, 24/01/2010.*

267 *Directive commune de la Ministre de la Justice et du Collège des procureurs généraux relative à la constatation, l’enregistrement et la poursuite des infractions en matière de détention de cannabis* See : <http://www.trektuwplant.be/csc/Directive-Ministerielle-relative> (Retrieved on February 4th 2010)

An increasing range of crime prevention strategies and initiatives at national and local government levels are beginning to target alcohol consumption. For example, New Zealand has included the reduction of alcohol-related violence in its crime prevention strategy by increasing security in premises where consumption of alcohol is permitted²⁶⁸. In its national strategy against alcohol abuse, Poland has set the objective of reducing alcohol-related violence.

3. Awareness campaigns and harm reduction approaches

Awareness campaigns generally distinguish between consumption, abuse, and addiction, as well as different products²⁶⁹. The most efficient campaigns appear to be those which disseminate preventive messages relating to specific impacts, either broadly or to targeted populations.

3.1 Awareness Campaigns are widespread but rarely evaluated

Most alcohol and drug action strategies are now characterized by a range of initiatives and a multi-sector partnership approach. The majority of action plans involve education, health, and law enforcement sectors. In Europe, for example, the implementation of national strategies is largely undertaken by interdepartmental committees representing ministries of Health, Education and Youth where applicable, the Interior, and Justice. Similarly, in Cambodia, the national drug control plan is implemented by the interdepartmental *National Authority for Combating Drugs* (NACD). In relation to prevention and reduction of demand, it cooperates with the *Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports*. Such diversified and coordinated action is now common at national and local levels.

The majority of drug prevention programmes **target teenagers and children**, some through early intervention programmes or curriculum-based programmes in schools. Numerous measures consist of the delivery of interventions in schools on the impact of drug and alcohol abuse. They may target children of all ages. For example, in Chile in 2008, the government introduced a drug awareness campaign in day care centres²⁷⁰. In Wales, the *All Wales Schools Liaison Programme* is a substance abuse awareness programme in schools delivered by police officers in partnership with teachers, and targets

children and youth aged 5 to 16 years²⁷¹. It aims to build awareness of the dangers of the use of drugs, tobacco, and alcohol. However, evaluations of these types of programmes have not always been very encouraging — numerous evaluations of the DARE programme in the United States, on which many of them are modelled, have indicated that while schools, the police, pupils and parents may all like the programmes, they have no long-term impacts on attitudes to, or use of drugs²⁷².

Advertising campaigns aimed at raising awareness in the overall population on the dangers of substance abuse are frequent and widespread across the world. In Germany, the campaign *Impairment Goggles—A Tool for Addiction Prevention* and Practical Alcohol Prevention, aims to raise awareness among young people and adults about the effects of abusive alcohol consumption²⁷³, whereas in Vietnam, the *Comprehensive Drug Prevention through Communications and Community Mobilization* project, supported by UNODC, is increasing public information on drug use through mass media campaigns.

3.2 Restricting access to products and places of consumption

The control of substance abuse in **recreational settings** is another important area of prevention at the local level which includes targeting the availability, marketing and pricing of alcohol. This includes restrictions on licences, closing bars and restaurants, changing behaviours of those selling alcohol to take on responsibility for controlling sales to heavily inebriated customers, increasing prices and changing marketing strategies which encourage over-drinking, and initiatives to reduce alcohol-related violence in public spaces. Programmes such as *Rave against Drugs*, in Finland, or *Responsible Host in Bergen*, in Norway, aim to raise awareness among those attending youth 'raves' and raise the awareness of hosts about their responsibilities in serving alcohol at private events in their homes.

A major area of development has been in the use of regulations and initiatives to control drinking behaviours in entertainment areas in cities and around bars and restaurants. One of many examples is the *City Centre Bar Project* in Nyköping, Sweden, which trains bar employees in responsible service, encouraging them to stop serving alcohol to highly intoxicated customers. The main aim is to reduce the violence common in such locations. Evaluations undertaken in a pilot project in Stockholm have shown that violence both in the proximity of, and inside

268 National Drug Policy and Strategy New Zealand : <http://www.ndp.govt.nz/>

269 Mission interministérielle de lutte contre la drogue et la toxicomanie (MILDT) (2000) *Drogues : savoir plus, risquer moins*

270 Named *En busca del tesoro*, the initiative consisted in telling three- to six-year old children the story of a mushroom who says "no" to his friends who press him to drink a "magic potion" that will make him "happy forever".

271 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addictions . All Wales Schools Liaison Programme.

See: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index52035EN.html?project_id=2008&tab=overview

272 Blais É., Gagné M.-P., Flores J., Maurice P. (2008) *L'effet des programmes policiers sur la délinquance en milieu scolaire : une synthèse systématique des études évaluatives*. Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique et scientifique. Volume LXI, juillet-septembre 2008. Pp 321-344.

Rosenbaum D., Hanson G. (1998). *Assessing the Effects of School-Based Drug Education: A Six Year Multi-Level Analysis of Project DARE*. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency vol. 35 (4). Pp.381-412.

273 EMCDDA. Impairment goggles - a tool for addiction prevention and practical alcohol prevention.

See: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index52035EN.html?project_id=5656&tab=overview

bars has declined²⁷⁴. In the City of Leeds, England, apart from placing restrictions on the number of liquor licenses made available, the Safer Leeds project has instituted taxi-marshals to reduce violence when pubs and bars close down. The project has seen a considerable reduction in such fights. Placing restrictions on the opening hours of bars and restaurants has been a successful component – amongst others - of a number of safety strategies in Medellin, and Bogota in Colombia and Diadema in Brazil. The closure of restaurants and bars at night has been one of the factors contributing to lower homicide and violence rates in those cities.

Managing disorderly conduct resulting from alcohol consumption in urban neighbourhoods remains a general problem in many regions and countries. The battle against binge drinking is at the heart of many national strategies. Binge drinking is characterized by large amounts of alcohol consumed heavily over a short period of time. It is a widespread practice: 41 to 60 % of young Europeans are considered binge drinkers²⁷⁵. In France, for example, binge drinking is one of the priorities of the plan presented by the *Inter-ministerial Mission against Drugs and Drug Addiction* (Mildt), which has the objective to promote the prohibition of selling alcohol to minors, the end of the open bars concept, the organization of a communication campaign to fight against the trivialization of alcohol abuse and the prohibition of alcohol consumption in the vicinity of schools²⁷⁶.

Binge drinking or heavy drinking is also a problem significantly related to violence in small towns and rural areas in a number of countries. In the United Kingdom, the *Mentor UK Rural Youth Project* aims to reduce harms linked to alcohol and drug abuse among those aged 16 - 21 year-olds. Among other initiatives it supports the training of practitioners in the field.

In many developing countries, however, informal markets rather than corporations are the main sources of alcohol, making it much more difficult to enforce formal controls on sale and use. In South Africa, for example, many small towns house a high number of shebeens – selling alcohol illegally - which provide income for their owners, but are also directly linked to the high incidence of public and domestic violence in those communities. *The South African National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (SANCA) Nongoma Alcohol and Drug Help Centre*, has historically targeted rural residential zones

and townships. Nevertheless, beyond regulation and control measures, local community action appears to be necessary to begin to change attitudes and behaviour²⁷⁷.

Some responses to youth drug and alcohol consumption aim at “responsibilizing” parents. In certain countries they may be liable to fines for failing to control their children’s behaviour. In the city of Córdoba, in Argentina, municipal authorities are considering issuing fines (of 100 to 1000 pesos, US\$27 to US\$270) to parents of youths who are drunk in public. Accountability of parents is, however, more frequently undertaken through initiatives which provide parental education programmes.

Finally, road accidents resulting from driving under the influence form a prominent component of the national strategies studied. According to the French National Observatory of Road Safety, 26% of accidents are caused by driving under the influence²⁷⁸. In Thailand, 30% of fatal accidents are related to alcohol consumption²⁷⁹.

3.3 Harm reduction approaches take health risks into account

Harm reduction is sometimes referred to as risk or damage reduction, and aims to minimize the negative effects of drug use on the individual and on society. A shift toward a harm reduction approach for heavy substance abusers has been taking place over the past few decades²⁸⁰.

The analysis of national strategies or action plans against drugs in 96 countries, based on documents accessible on the Web and from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)²⁸¹ for Europe, and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (IADCC)²⁸² for the Americas and the Caribbean, indicates that **a considerable number of countries around the world have instituted a harm reduction strategy (or have had one in the recent past²⁸³)**. Of 96 countries, only 25 (26%) do not presently have any national strategy specifically dedicated to the abuse of psychotropic substances. However, many countries in this group have had action plans in the recent past (Saint Kitts and Nevis, for example); others are waiting the adoption of a strategy (Jamaica or Ukraine); and some have regional rather than

274 EUCPN. The City Centre Bar Project in Nyköping. See: <http://www.eucpn.org/goodpractice/showdoc.asp?docid=38>

275 Université Catholique de Louvain. La consommation excessive d'alcool a des effets néfastes et durables sur le cerveau humain. See: <http://www.uclouvain.be/274439.html>

276 Mission interministérielle de lutte contre la drogue et toxicomanie, circulaire n°DGS/MC2/MILDT/2009/63 du 23 février 2009

277 Action for a Safe South Africa. See: <http://www.safesouthafrica.org.za/>

278 *Sécurité Routière France. Observatoire National : statistiques des accidents*. See: <http://www2.securiteroutiere.gouv.fr/infos-ref/observatoire/index.html>

279 *Sécurité Routière France. La sécurité routière à l'ordre du jour de l'ONU*.

See: http://www2.securiteroutiere.gouv.fr/vos-infos/presse/communiques/1-2008/CP_01-04-08.html

280 In Europe it is suggested that this was partly fuelled by the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s to the 1990s Duprez, CRIMPREV, 2007

281 European Monitoring Centre for Drug and Drug Addictions. See: www.emcdda.europa.eu/

282 Inter-american Drug Abuse Control Commission. See: www.cicad.oas.org/

283 We consider as part of the “recent past” an action plan which would have ended in 2007. When action plans are completed, it is not always easy to determine the degree to which these will or will not be extended. The absence of information does not thereby indicate that nothing is anticipated for the future.

national strategies (eg. Austria). Countries in Asia and Africa appear to be less likely to have developed a harm reduction strategy. In some cases, this is because drug abuse is not seen as a serious enough problem (for example, in Korea or Saudi Arabia). Finally, some countries have different strategies for different types of drugs.

Numerous policies aim to reduce the health dangers incurred by the consumption of psychotropic products. In Europe, the increase in the number of overdose deaths, and the spread of HIV/AIDS through the use of infected needles, led to the development of a number of new practices. For example, in 1987, France authorized the free distribution of syringes and encouraged the development of needle exchange programmes. Similarly, the use of medically prescribed heroine in Germany and Switzerland has "reduced the number of deaths linked to drugs and crime linked to supply"²⁸⁴. This has occurred without an increase in the number of consumers. In Latin America, the notion of *mitigación*, as used in Colombia's national action plan, is close to the idea of harm reduction, since it aims to diminish the negative impacts of consumption on the lives and the health of addicts. Although these policies have widely demonstrated their effectiveness in terms of harm reduction, they are still avoided on moral grounds in some countries.

While there are **fewer specific national strategies to prevent alcohol abuse, harm reduction and risk management do form part of action plans**. In France, Malta, Ukraine, Norway, and Colombia, action plans which target both licit and illicit substances have been adopted. The European Union has also implemented an action plan against alcohol-related harm and reports that in 2005, 15 member countries had adopted alcohol-related action plans.

The European strategy for fighting alcohol-related harm was established in 2006. It has five priority themes for reducing harm linked to alcohol consumption: 1) protection of young people, children, and the unborn child; 2) reducing road accidents; 3) reducing the impact in the workplace; 4) to inform, educate, and train the public on the negative impacts of alcohol consumption; and 5) to develop, support, and maintain a common European knowledge and evidence base. **The European Commission also stress that national strategies are more effective if supported at the local level through multi-sector partnerships and community action**²⁸⁵.

4. Targeting vulnerable populations

Recognizing the complex issues stemming from colonization and the assimilation of indigenous peoples, and their vulnerability to substance abuse, several countries have developed substance abuse programmes²⁸⁶. In Canada, a number of alcoholism prevention programmes have been developed with Aboriginal peoples. A specific crime prevention fund for Aboriginal communities has been launched by the Federal Government, in collaboration with the Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse (CCSA) and the National Native Addictions Partnership Foundation (NNAPF). Some minorities such as the Roma population in Hungary, are regarded as particularly vulnerable to dependence given the number of risk factors associated with their offending, and are the focus of specific plans.

Substance abuse often leads to marginalization; drug addicts or alcoholics can be difficult to reach by social, health and judicial services. Several initiatives have demonstrated the value of working with peers to help establish ties with them. For example, in Uganda, under the responsibility of the *Uganda Youth Development Link* (UYDEL), the *Peer-to-Peer Drug Prevention Project* (PPPP) recruits youths living in the slums who are trained as "peer educators". Some forty young people have so far received training on issues of drug dependence, treatment, and rehabilitation, and they work with other youths in the slums who are difficult for NGOs and other groups to reach²⁸⁷.

The European Union has concluded that **a key element of the successful implementation of a substance abuse programmes is that they should be anchored in the community**²⁸⁸. This entails local community organizations, faith-based groups and NGO's as well as local services such as health and family and youth services. In developing countries, there may often be a lack of capacity beyond local NGO's to sustain support and treatment programmes for substance abusers. In Myanmar, the project *Community-based demand reduction for three key townships in the Northern Shan State*,²⁸⁹ supported by UNODC, seeks to enable communities to manage their own projects for reducing demand. This includes training of community agents and strengthening institutional capacity to ensure the sustainability of projects at the end of the period of external financial support.

284 Center for Security Studies (2007) *L'économie de la drogue sur l'angle de la politique de sécurité*, Zürich, ETH, n°13. Page 3.

285 Commission of the European Community (2006) *Communication from the commission of the council*. Page 15.

286 For example, in Australia, the National Drug Strategy: *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Peoples Complementary Action Plan 2003-2009* was launched for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.

See: [http://www.health.gov.au/internet/drugstrategy/publishing.nsf/Content/545C92F95DF8C76ACA257162000DA780/\\$File/indigenous-action.pdf](http://www.health.gov.au/internet/drugstrategy/publishing.nsf/Content/545C92F95DF8C76ACA257162000DA780/$File/indigenous-action.pdf)

287 Peer-to-Peer Drug Prevention Project (PPPP). See: <http://www.uydel.org/drug.html>

288 (REF : UE)

289 UNODC. *Community-Based Demand Reduction for Three Key Townships in the Northern Shan State* .

See: http://www.unodc.org/myanmar/projects_e76.html

The rehabilitation of drug addicts or alcoholics is a major concern in the countries examined, not only for public health reasons, but also in terms of preventing recidivism and crime. The development of specific legal procedures (such as drug courts) in the United States, Canada and Great Britain, illustrates a commitment to respond to this problem in a more supportive and constructive way. In Canada, a Drug Court programme was established in 1998 in Toronto, to ensure more suitable sentencing options. While the outcome of the

programme is not always easy to assess, it is estimated that the 28-day treatment programme reduced recidivism by 71%²⁹⁰.

This kind of court has also been established in other countries, notably Chile. First piloted in 2004²⁹¹, 18 drug treatment tribunals are currently in operation. The *Fundacion Paz Ciudadana* has published a methodological guide²⁹² supporting the expansion of the programme. An evaluation in 2008 found a high level of participant satisfaction.

In conclusion, it is important to underline the range and variety of ways in which the consumption, trafficking and sale of drugs and alcohol affects societies. International mobilization of the “War on Drugs” in the 1990’s supported by the United Nations and numerous countries, and the investment of considerable resources by countries such as the United States, Mexico, and Colombia, have not obtained commensurate results. The struggle to contain the transnational trafficking in narcotics would appear to have had some success and remains a priority, although preventive approaches are now more widely promoted.

Community-based approaches often take greater account of local environmental factors and try to reduce the public “nuisance” or disorder associated with substance abuse, as well as the consequences in terms of collective risk. Public health approaches have provided innovative responses more centred on the addicted individual, and seek to improve their health and facilitate their capacity to live independently and reintegrate into society. These approaches have also led to the development of data and tools for the identification and tracking of new substances and consumption patterns (such as the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction) which help to increase knowledge of this constantly-evolving phenomenon. Public health approaches have similarly facilitated longitudinal evaluation studies which allow the long-term effects of policies to be monitored and evaluated. These different contributions to the field of crime prevention and community safety deserve to be highlighted since they considerably enrich knowledge-based policy, practice and evaluation.

Contribution

World Health Organization efforts to address the harmful use of alcohol²⁹³

Alexander Butchart, Coordinator, Violence Prevention, WHO

Harmful use of alcohol has a major impact on public health. In 2002 the harmful use of alcohol was estimated to cause about 2.3 million premature deaths worldwide (3.7% of global mortality) and to be responsible for 4.4% of the global burden of disease. Harmful drinking is a major avoidable risk factor for neuropsychiatric disorders and other noncommunicable diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, cirrhosis of the liver and various cancers. A significant proportion of the disease burden attributable to harmful drinking is determined by violence and unintentional injuries, including those due to road traffic crashes, interpersonal violence and suicides.

Alcohol policies or action plans to reduce alcohol-related harm should take into account several major issues, such as the strength of evidence, cultural sensitivity, adaptation to local needs and contexts, ensuring a sustainable and intersectoral approach, and making provision for adequate monitoring and evaluation. Priority areas for action should focus on the prevention of harmful drinking and should be based on the best available evidence. They should address the levels, patterns and context of alcohol consumption through a combination of measures that target the population at large, vulnerable groups (e.g. young people and pregnant women), affected individuals, and particular problems such as drink-driving and alcohol-related violence.

Reducing the public health problems caused by the harmful use of alcohol at the international level requires coordination and appropriate participation of different international stakeholders. Following several World Health Assembly discussions and resolutions

290 Institute of Marriage and Family Canada. Peter Jon Mitchell, Do drug treatment courts help curb drug use and crime? May 6th 2009.

See : <http://www.imfcanada.org>

291 Fondation Paz Ciudadana. See: <http://www.pazciudadana.cl/>

292 Droppelmann Catalina R. (2008). Analisis del proceso de implementacion de los Tribunales de tratamiento de Drogas en Chile. Avanzando hacia una politica publica. Fundacion Paz Ciudadana. 50 pages.

293 This summary is extracted from: Strategies to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. Report by the Secretariat. Sixty-first World Health Assembly, A61/13, provisional agenda item 11.10, 20 March 2008.

over the past few years, the World Health Organization (WHO) is playing a significant role in developing and supporting a global framework to complement regional and national actions to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. The framework development process includes meetings and web-based public hearings at which individuals, civil society groups, WHO Member States and government institutions, academic and research institutions, economic operators and other interested parties are providing inputs on what they consider to be effective strategies to reduce alcohol-related harm, and on how they and their organizations may be able to contribute to reducing the harmful use of alcohol. Three components of this emerging framework that are of particular relevance to the alcohol industry include strategies for addressing the availability of alcohol; the marketing of alcoholic beverages, and pricing policies.

Regulating the production and distribution of alcoholic beverages is an effective strategy to reduce harmful use of alcohol and in particular to protect young people and other vulnerable groups. Many countries have some restrictions on the sale of alcohol that cover the age of consumers, the type of retail establishments that can sell alcoholic beverages, and licensing, with limits on hours and days of sale and regulations on vendors and the density of outlets. However, in some developing countries informal markets are the main source of alcohol and formal controls on sale may be of less relevance until a better system for controls and enforcement is in place.

Young people who have chosen to drink alcoholic beverages and who drink regularly are an important market segment for alcohol producers. It is difficult to target young adult consumers without exposing cohorts of adolescents under the legal age to the same marketing practices. Controls or partial bans on volume, placement and content of alcohol advertising are important parts of a strategy, and research results underline the need for such controls or bans, in particular to protect adolescents and young people from pressure to start drinking. Marketing practices that appeal to children and adolescents could be seen as particular policy concerns.

Price is an important determinant of alcohol consumption and, in many contexts, of the extent of alcohol-related problems. Considerable evidence has accumulated to support the use of tax changes as a means of influencing price. High tax rates may not be the first choice of policy in countries where alcohol-related problems are less important or there is a considerable informal market, and interventions directed at particular subpopulations may be more cost-effective. Even in such countries, decreases in prices of alcoholic beverages or an increase in disposable income without appropriate adjustment in those prices could counteract such policies. A particular concern emerges when alcoholic drinks are cheaper than non-alcoholic alternatives such as bottled water. Furthermore, tax is only one component of the price of alcoholic beverages and tax changes may not always be reflected in changes in the retail price. Similarly, vendors or manufacturers may attempt to encourage demand by price promotions.

Complementing strategies that address the alcohol industry and other stakeholders with an economic interest in alcohol and its sales, the WHO strategy includes community action to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. Community-based actions, with appropriate engagement of different stakeholders, can effectively reduce the harmful use of alcohol, and are particularly important in settings where unrecorded alcohol consumption is high and social consequences such as public drunkenness, child maltreatment, youth violence, intimate partner and sexual violence, and abuse of the elderly are prevalent. Community actions can increase recognition of alcohol-related harm at the community level, reduce the acceptability of public drunkenness, bolster other policy measures at the community level, enhance partnerships and networks of community agencies and nongovernmental organizations, provide care and support for affected individuals and their families, and mobilize the community against the selling and consumption of illicit and potentially contaminated alcohol. From a public health perspective, illicit and informally produced alcohol can create an additional negative health effect if the beverage contains methanol or other contaminants and its production and distribution are under less control than legally produced and sold alcohol. Evidence for the effectiveness of measures to counteract the public health impact of the consumption of illegally produced alcohol is weak, but points towards a combination of community mobilization and enforcement and control. The feasibility and effectiveness of countermeasures will be influenced by the fact that the purchasing power of those who buy informally produced alcohol often is extremely low.

Directly focusing on reducing the negative consequences of drinking and alcohol intoxication can also be an effective strategy in specific contexts. A range of interventions to reduce alcohol-related harm in and around licensed premises has been developed. Interventions that focus on changing the night-life environment can reduce the harmful consequences of drinking in and around these settings, without necessarily altering overall consumption levels. The impact of these measures is greatly enhanced when there is active and ongoing enforcement of laws and regulations prohibiting sale of alcohol to intoxicated customers and policing of the streets at night. The evidence base for harm-reduction approaches, however, is not yet as well established as that for regulating the availability and demand for alcohol beverages.

PART 2
TRANSVERSAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 5

MAJOR TRENDS IN CRIME PREVENTION

Major trends in crime prevention

The 2008 edition of the International Report highlighted the establishment of international norms and standards in the field of prevention, and the progressive acknowledgement by intergovernmental organizations of the importance of the rule of law, and safety and security, for social and economic development. At the national level, we noted that more and more countries are adopting crime prevention strategies that respond comprehensively or partially to these international standards. The report also noted that some countries were maintaining or reinforcing repressive approaches, certain “northern” countries in particular.

In 2010, we find that the number of international and regional agencies and organizations that are integrating prevention and safety issues into their programmes continues to increase. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on the development of tools that will facilitate the implementation of international standards more concretely.

In terms of the analysis of national trends, it is important to recall once again the difficulties encountered due to linguistic barriers and the absence of precise information in certain countries. In the introduction we have already highlighted the extent to which information on the effective implementation of national policies is patchy and often difficult to access. Nevertheless, **it is clear that more and more countries are developing balanced approaches** to security which encompass crime prevention.

1. At the International Level, Prevention is better integrated in Technical Assistance Programmes

Since the publication of our 2008 International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety, no new international norms or standards have been adopted. However, greater emphasis has been placed on the implementation of existing norms, and on more efficient integration of prevention and community safety issues into development and reconstruction programmes.

1.1 Implementation of Norms and Standards Concerning the Prevention of Crime

The resolutions adopted at the 17th Session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in April 2008 re-affirmed the need to strengthen crime prevention in urban areas, the role of citizens, and the need to achieve a greater balance between preventive and criminal justice measures. A number of concrete measures to strengthen prevention have been adopted, notably by UNODC and UN-HABITAT, to diffuse international standards in prevention and to support their

implementation by governments through technical assistance activities.

UNODC has developed a series of tools to support the implementation of norms and standards in crime prevention and criminal justice. The **Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit** which has been developed since 2006, aims to assist agencies, donors, governments, and other stakeholders to conduct assessments of technical assistance needs in a systematic way, and to ensure the integration of the UN Standards and Norms. This practical guide targets specific sectors of the justice system, such as policing, access to justice, custodial and non-custodial measures, and a series of cross-cutting issues: international cooperation, victims and witnesses, juvenile justice, criminal justice information, and crime prevention.



The **Crime Prevention Assessment Tool** has been developed in collaboration with the ICPC, as part of the Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit. This resource, designed to be used in conjunction with the other guides in the toolkit, emphasizes the importance of assessing crime prevention needs and outlines the challenges and issues which countries face in this field. Through a series of questions on the structures, institutions and capabilities existing at national, regional, and local levels, the guide helps to identify existing resources, and to prioritize sectors targeted for technical assistance.²⁹⁴ The toolkit also provides governments with guidelines for undertaking a self-assessment of their crime prevention capacities.

Two handbooks on crime prevention have also been published by UNODC. They include the Handbook on the United Nations on crime Prevention Guidelines. Making them work (2010) also in collaboration with ICPC, the Handbook on planning and action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean Regions (2008).

294 UNODC (2009). *Crime Prevention Assessment Tool – Cross-Cutting Issues 5*. UNODC UN-HABITAT New York : United Nations.

Police Platform for Urban Development Safer Cities Programme UN-HABITAT

In its Strategic Plan 2008-2013, UN-HABITAT's Safer Cities Programme³⁰¹ has clearly identified the relationship between the **police sector and its reform processes** as an important element for development, because of the key role police play in partnerships for achieving sustainable urbanisation.

In November 2009, UN-HABITAT launched a **Police Platform for Urban Development** (PPUD), which provides police and urban development specialists with a mechanism to exchange knowledge on urban development, on factors that increase the risk of crime, and the causes of crime which are particular to urban contexts. The focus is on different types of police interventions, partnerships with other urban services and institutions, and relationships with the public.

UN-HABITAT's medium-term strategic and institutional plan 2008-2013 (MTSIP) reiterated its mission of attaining "Sustainable Urbanization". There is a strong focus on **strengthening the capacities of local governments**, notably in post-conflict countries. The plan aims to assist states and cities to respond to the continuing growth of urban areas, particularly of slums, and to provide adequate infrastructure and basic services to all citizens.²⁹⁵

In 2007, **UNODC** implemented a regional project on *Crime prevention and improved access to justice in selected urban centres in Eastern Africa*.²⁹⁶ The project aims to reduce urban crime and to increase access to justice through the implementation of urban security policies and measures to support community-based organizations. Other projects such as *Strengthening the Integrity and the Capacity of the Courts in South Africa*²⁹⁷ and *Strengthening the Integrity and the Judicial System in Mozambique* are also being implemented to improve the functioning of criminal justice systems. UNODC also supports community-based projects aiming to increase public awareness of risks associated with drugs and to encourage grass-roots initiatives and community-based outreach. This kind of programme was seen in the framework of the project for the *Prevention of drug use and HIV among drug users, IDUs and vulnerable populations in Kenya (2005 - 2008)*²⁹⁸.

Members of UNODC's programme network institutes (PNI),²⁹⁹ including ICPC, HEUNI, UNICRI, UNODC, UNAFEI, and the AIC, have increased their training and capacity-building activities for police, judges, and other criminal justice professionals in the areas of organized crime, human trafficking, violence against women, cybercrime, and prison education. Most of these training activities include material on crime prevention. UNICRI, for instance, has established training

programmes in various countries, such as Albania and Ethiopia, on judicial cooperation for judges and prosecutors, and other criminal justice professionals.³⁰⁰ HEUNI is collaborating on the development of policy assessment tools, notably a pilot EU victimization survey and the JUSTIS programme designed to provide evidence-based indicators for evaluating the public's confidence in the criminal justice system and fear of crime. ICPC has developed targeted modules on police-community partnerships in prevention and women's safety with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACCP).

In the field of women's safety, the specialized non-governmental organization Women in Cities International published the report **Women's Safety Audits: What Works and Where?** in 2008.³⁰² It presents comparative international assessment of good practices in the use of women's safety audits in a range of cities in different regions of the world. The study evaluates the strengths of this kind of audit, which facilitates women's autonomy and engagement with local governments on issues of women's safety in urban environments.

The UN-HABITAT Safer Cities Programme also focuses on participatory and inclusive approaches for youth at risk. The **International Youth Crime Prevention and Cities Summit**, co-hosted with the government of KwaZulu-Natal in June 2008 in Durban, South Africa, aimed to encourage dialogue between youth and local authorities.³⁰³ One of the summit's outcomes has been the preparation, in collaboration with ICPC, of the **Youth Resource Guide** as a youth-friendly resource for young people and those working with them, focused on youth-led and youth-participatory initiatives. The launch of this guide will take place at the World Urban Forum in March 2010 (see box on next page).

295 UN-HABITAT (2007), *The Medium Strategic Plan And Institutional Plan (MTSIP) at a Glance: UN-Habitat's Institutional Response to Meeting the Urban Challenge*. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT

296 *Project Portfolio UNODC Regional Office for Eastern Africa*, See: <http://www.unodc.org/kenya/en/projects.html> (Retrieved June 2008).

297 *Strengthening the Integrity and Capacity of the Courts in South Africa*: http://www.unodc.org/southernafrica/en/cpac/strengthening_courts.html (Retrieved January 2009).

298 *Prevention of drug use and HIV among drug users, IDUs and vulnerable populations in Kenya (2005-2008)*.

299 *Programme Network Institutes, PNI*.

300 UNICRI (2007). *Report of Activities 2006-2007, Work Programme 2008-2009*. Turin: UNICRI.

301 The Safer Cities Programme of UN-HABITAT promotes of crime and violence prevention practices in urban settings using multi stakeholders strategies which address insecurity in a holistic way.

302 UN-HABITAT, Women in Cities International (2008), *Women's Safety Audits: What Works and Where?* Nairobi: UN-HABITAT Safer Cities Programme.

303 Safer Cities Programme, See: <http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=1433&catid=375&typeid=24&subMenuId=0> and UN-HABITAT, *International Youth Crime Prevention and Cities Summit* See: <http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=5601&catid=375&typeid=11&subMenuId=0>

The Youth Resource Guide



Produced by ICPC in collaboration with the UN-HABITAT Safer Cities Programme, the guide presents a range of resources for young people and those working with them on ways they can work to prevent violence and crime and have a voice in decision-making. It covers issues of concern to them, from health and employment to education and the environment, and includes links to specific information sources and to initiatives and projects especially around sports, culture and music and the use of the internet to effect change. There is a focus on projects run by or led by youth and on participation, so that they can improve their way of life and that of their communities. The Youth Resource Guide is intended for young people under 30 – especially those between 15 and 24 years old, for youth workers, for local governments, and for individuals, organizations, and groups working with youth. This first edition 2010 will be followed by interactive on-line versions.

1.2 Violence and crime prevention among the priorities of the main United Nations agencies

The Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations in 2000 are to eliminate poverty, reduce child mortality, promote gender equality, combat HIV/AIDS, improve education, health, and the environment, and to enhance global partnerships. Peace and security are not specific objectives, but most agencies recognize these as essential components for the achievement of sustainable development.

The millennium development goals³⁰⁴ To be achieved by 2015

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Improve maternal health
3. Achieve universal primary education
4. Combat HIV/AIDS. Malaria, other diseases
5. Promote gender equality & empower women
6. Ensure environmental sustainability
7. Reduce child mortality
8. Develop a global partnership for development

A cursory analysis of documents produced by United Nations agencies – and excluding development banks – allows a comparison of the occurrence of different terms linked to the fields of prevention and security. Without claiming to reflect the level of priority accorded by each organization to these fields, this analysis demonstrates that all of these agencies or programmes are concerned with prevention and security.

Key-word analysis³⁰⁵

	UNDP	UNODC	UN-HABITAT	WHO	ILO	IOM	UNICEF	Total number of hits
Human Rights	66.900	75	1.620	26.300	40.341	2.570	9.808	148.404
Governance and Good Governance	37.000	620	9.280	37.810	4.823	790	1.903	92.226
Violence & Violence Prevention	20.465	974	2.575	44.570	4.948	1.836	6.734	82.102
Sustainable Development	60.100	238	3.480	12.100	2.205	1.010	1.934	81.067
Gender Equality	24.300	75	761	3.530	3.286	283	1.752	33.987
Human Security & Human Safety	8.230	154	301	1.136	636	338	3.476	14.271
Crime Prevention	616	2690	1.170	462	93	129	604	5.764
Knowledge-Based Prevention & Evidence-Based Prevention	4	14	1	171	0	1	2.571	2.762
Community Safety	584	38	166	334	18	1	1.502	2.643

304 The UN MDG's were adopted in 2000 by all Member States of the United Nations. *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2008* documents progress so far in achieving the goals. See www.un.org/millenniumgoals

305 Using the search engine provided by the agencies' websites, the number of "hits" obtained for each keyword selected was recorded. The agencies vary in size and activities, so these numbers provide only a rough guide. The analysis was carried out in February 2009, and excluded the Development Banks.

Human rights and issues of **good governance** are clearly high-priority themes for all agencies, reflecting their key place in the principles underpinning the norms and standards adopted by the United Nations and their cross-cutting importance. **Gender equality** and **sustainable development** are similarly shared priorities.

The World Health Organization (WHO) developed a **health and human rights strategy**³⁰⁶ in 2000. This strategy aims to provide support to governments in integrating a human rights-based approach to health development as well as to advance the right to health in international law and international development processes³⁰⁷. UNICEF's approach to human rights is more specifically concerned with children's rights. All of UNICEF's activities are directly or indirectly related to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (see box below).

UNDP has focused on developing activities based on three strategic areas of intervention: the strengthening of national

human rights systems, the promotion and application of a human rights-based approach to development programming, and greater engagement with international human rights mechanisms.³⁰⁸

The link between these components is apparent in the agencies' activities. For instance, programmes developed to promote human rights include aspects such as the strengthening of civil society, the efficient functioning of the criminal justice system and of law enforcement agencies, and the promotion of accountable institutions with democratic and transparent decision making processes.

Additionally, violence and violence prevention are a major concern for all agencies, and notably in the work of UNDP, WHO, and UNICEF. The 2002 WHO *World Report on Violence and Health* promoted public health approaches to all forms of violence and launched a Violence Prevention Alliance. Since then, WHO has continued its work on the prevention of

The Convention on the Rights of the Child

In 1989, the United Nations first adopted the **Convention on the Rights of the Child**, the first legally binding international agreement for children to incorporate civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. The Convention includes 54 articles and two Optional Protocols. Its four core principles are non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of the child. All these rights are essential to their human dignity, to helping them to meet their basic needs, and to their opportunities to reach their full potential. To protect these rights, the Convention sets standards in health care, education, legal, civil and social services. By agreeing to these standards, national governments commit to protecting and ensuring children's rights, and to being accountable for them to the international community.

UN Marks 20 Years of Convention on Rights of the Child, BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8369706.stm>

THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD http://www.unicef.org/rightsite/237_416.htm

See also, at the end of this chapter, Guillaume Landry's contribution.

The Treaty of Lisbon: creation of a new legal basis for crime prevention activities

The Treaty of Lisbon, signed on December 13th 2007 and ratified by the 27 Member States of the European Union in June 2009, entered into force on December 1st 2009. It is the first EU treaty which mentions crime prevention as one of the fields of activities of the EU (article 69 C of the treaty on the functioning of the EU). Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council of Europe has adopted the Stockholm Programme - a new programme intended to follow The Hague and Tampere programmes. Under the Swedish presidency of the EU, crime prevention appeared to be an important topic on which the EU is required to strengthen its activities. Starting from the European Crime Prevention Network, the Stockholm Programme recommends the creation of a crime prevention observatory responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information and knowledge on crime, notably organized crime and the methods to prevent it. The Secretariat should be placed in one of the existing agencies of the EU.

See: European Commission (2008) Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

European Commission (2009) Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty. See: http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/others/84/index_en.htm

Council of European Union (2009) Stockholm Programme. See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/intro/doc/stockholm_program_en.pdf

306 WHO. (2000) *Health and Human Rights*. See: http://www.who.int/hhr/HHRETH_activities.pdf

307 For instance, in its 2008/2009 work plan, WHO developed a handbook on a human rights-based approach to health in the context of Poverty Reduction Strategies and also developed a project on Indigenous people's health and human rights.

308 UNDP(2005) *Human Rights in UNDP – Practice Note*, p. 11. See: http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/HRPN_English.pdf

armed violence and the integration of violence prevention into development programmes. UNICEF has concentrated its attention on violence against children³⁰⁹ and favours knowledge-

based preventative measures and evaluated practices. UNICEF also leads specialized groups for exchange on issues of juvenile justice (see box below).

Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice (IPJJ)

With the objective of facilitating and enhancing national and global level coordination on technical advice and assistance in juvenile justice, the Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice (IPJJ) was established in 1997 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1997/30. Its work is oriented by the existing international norms and guidelines in the field, notably the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

According to its strategic plan for 2009-2010, its priorities include:

- (i) Informing Panel members about technical assistance requests and ensuring coordinated follow-up actions;
- (ii) Enhancing the visibility of the Panel and raising the profile of juvenile justice issues internationally;
- (iii) Increasing the availability of existing technical assistance tools and resources on juvenile justice;
- (iv) Developing common tools and documenting good practices;
- (v) Developing common positions.

Currently, the Panel comprises fourteen members, UN agencies, and specialized NGOs.

Juvenile Justice Panel: <http://www.juvenilejusticepanel.org/>

1.3 Integrating Prevention in Development Programmes

In its 2009 report *“Preventing violence and reducing its impact: how development agencies can help”*, the World Health

Organization provides policy-makers and donors in the international development field with practical guidelines on the integration of effective violence prevention approaches.

The Violence Prevention Alliance

The Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA) was formed in January 2004, based on the principles and recommendations described in the World Health Organization (WHO)'s *World Report on Violence and Health* (WRVH) and its subsequent Global Campaign for Violence Prevention (GCVP). VPA members include WHO member state governments, non-governmental and community-based organizations, and private, international and intergovernmental organizations working on violence prevention, which together represent institutions from governmental, non-governmental and private agencies functioning at community, national, regional and international levels. This framework of various actors is linked by their voluntary adoption of common violence prevention principles and approaches originating from the WRVH and GCVP.

The VPA's three main aims are to:

- Increase capacity for information-gathering on the epidemiology of violence;
- Broaden the evidence base on what works and what does not work in violence prevention policy and programming by testing promising programmes in a variety of settings and evaluating intervention models that have not yet been tested;
- Encourage widespread implementation of programmes that are known to be effective and discontinuation of programmes that are not.”

The VPA approach revolves around three theoretical models: the typology of violence, the public health approach and the ecological framework. The typology of violence that is presented under the WRVH includes: self-directed, interpersonal, and collective violence. The VPA primarily targets interpersonal violence, which accounts for a significant proportion of global violent-related deaths and disabilities. This approach also tackles the link between interpersonal and other types of violence.

The VPA's public health approach views violence prevention through public health perspectives with a strong emphasis on primary prevention strategies and providing support for victims of violence. It recognizes that the impact of violence prevention goes well beyond the moment or person affected by a violent situation.

309 United Nations (2006). *World Report on Violence against Children*. New York: United Nations

The Violence Prevention Alliance ...suite

It can affect the community at large, and the whole course of an individual's life. In the short term, physical and psychological consequences of crime can permanently change the quality of life of those affected and their families and friends. These consequences can alter the community's social and economical health if such violent situations are particularly widespread. Violence is also both the cause and consequence of poverty, social inequality and economic inequity. Additionally, violence can negatively affect a person's whole life cycle. The experience of violence can have negative consequences for a child or adolescent's development and psychology that can lead to high-risk behaviours that increase their chance of suffering from other major causes of death or serious injury later in their lives. This approach to violent situations from a public health perspective leads the members of VPA to adopt primary prevention measures targeting four main sectors: the individual, relationships, the community and societal levels.

Source : WHO (2005) *Violence Prevention Alliance : Building global commitment for violence prevention*. Geneva : WHO

The Global Armed Violence Prevention Programme³¹⁰ was established by WHO in 2005, in collaboration with UNDP, to encourage the development of an international policy framework and to promote best practices.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) considers crime prevention and community safety in Latin America as one of its main priorities, since crime and insecurity inhibit development and the consolidation of democratic institutions and social capital. In 2008, the IDB launched the **Civic Coexistence and Public Safety Initiative** which renews its investment in prevention programmes and institution-building, and aims to create strategic partnerships with its client nations. These programmes focus on citizen security and the prevention of violence in communities, on vulnerable groups, youth violence and rehabilitation, violence against women, organized crime, and community policing. They also produce guides for safety management, and on the economic costs of violence.³¹¹

In 2008, **The World Bank** created a **new unit on Conflict, Crime and Violence** within its Social Development Department. Its objective is to focus on the prevention of violent conflicts as well as "everyday" violence in developing countries. A two-day conference on "*Violence Prevention: A Critical Dimension of Development*" in April 2009,³¹² hosted by the World Bank, examined the impact of violence on social and economic development and strategies for addressing violence in the development agenda. Three key conclusions emerged from this conference:

1. Effective and sustainable development requires active attention to conflict and violence as well as informed actions to prevent it and mitigate its impacts.
2. The need to build stronger connections between various ideas, people, institutions, and disciplines in order to improve approaches for violence reduction.
3. Violence prevention is an important area of engagement for the World Bank and needs to be integrated in sectors where the World Bank has experience and knowledge.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continues to integrate crime prevention and safety into its work.³¹³ They place a priority on **capacity development** at national and local levels, to strengthen institutions so that they provide adequate support and services to citizens. Several axes of intervention have developed: conflict prevention and peace building, small arms reduction, and disarmament and demobilization as well as recovery. Demand for support in crisis prevention is growing. UNDP undertook activities in 83 developing countries in 2008, and supported government capacity-building at the national and local level in 20 countries.³¹⁴ For example, it provided assistance in restoring community safety and social cohesion in Belize, the Dominican Republic, Georgia, Sudan, and China. It also supported return and reintegration processes in Mauritania, Turkey and Sri Lanka. Various programmes have likewise been developed to respond to the particular challenges of the disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-combatants in countries that have seen major civil conflicts (see Samuel Tanner's **Contribution** at the end of this chapter).

310 WHO, *The Global Armed Violence Prevention Programme*,

See: http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/activities/armed_violence/en/index.html

311 This includes publications such as *Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A framework for action* published in 1999; *Too Close to Home*, a report on the situation of domestic violence in Latin America; *Guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects*, and a review of programme outcomes *Emphasizing Prevention in Citizen Security* (2005). These demonstrate IDB's interest in promoting crime prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Social Development Division of the Sustainable Development Department of the IDB has also produced several technical notes addressing factors related to violence and violence prevention on: the causes of violence, the economic and social consequences of violence, violence control at the municipal level, domestic violence against women, and the role of the police in violence prevention.

312 The World Bank, *Violence Prevention: A Critical Dimension of Development*, April 6-7th 2009, Washington DC See : <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:22118835~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html>

313 The United Nations Development Fund's (UNDP) mandate is to assist countries in finding solutions for development challenges. The main areas of focus are: democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, poverty reduction, environment and sustainable development, HIV/AIDS and human rights.

314 UNDP (2009), Annual Report. New York: UNDP.

A new global programme on **strengthening the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict countries** was launched in 2008 which places special emphasis on women's access to justice, institution-building, and transitional justice, as well as on promoting reconciliation. **Gender equality is a major component of this work.** Their *Eight Point Agenda for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery*³¹⁵ initiated in 2006, aims to identify and respond to the needs of women and girls in times of crisis. Ensuing initiatives focus on the involvement of women in peacemaking processes, as well as the provision of adequate socio-economic and legal support. In 2007, UNDP provided assistance to train over 25,000 judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police, security, displaced persons, traditional leaders and civil society representatives on sexual gender-based violence.³¹⁶ In Northern Uganda, UNDP worked with national institutions to build capacity to prevent gender-based violence as an essential part of peace building and post-conflict recovery. A significant part of this work is on encouraging the participation of women in the peace building process as well as including them in community-level prevention initiatives.³¹⁷

The **reduction of small arms** forms another important component of UNDP's work. They provided technical assistance with the development of the National Disarmament Programme in Guatemala in 2007, stressing initiatives to reduce small-arms-related violence at the local level, and the development of the first municipal public policy on citizen's security "*La Política Municipal de Seguridad Ciudadana de Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa*".³¹⁸ A Municipal Commission on Safety (*Comisión Municipal de Seguridad*) was established to increase public awareness of the problem, and help identify the main citizen concerns on safety and security. Since the implementation of the programme, there has been a decrease in violent crimes within the municipality of Santa Lucia.

1.4 Public Safety and Crime Prevention as New Areas of Concern for Regional Political Organizations

A number of Regional Intergovernmental organizations are also encouraging the development of policies and programmes related to citizens' safety and security.

The **Organization of American States** (OAS) held its *First Meeting of Ministers of Public Security of the Americas* in October 2008 in Mexico. High-level public safety officials from 34 countries participated in the meeting, to underline the im-

portance of security, crime prevention and crime reduction. Most of the focus was on transnational crime, but local crime prevention was also emphasized. The *Second Meeting* in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in November 2009, specifically addressed the issue of public safety, violence and insecurity. The meeting emphasized the importance of the prevention of crime, violence and insecurity, establishing efficient police management, and community mobilization.³¹⁹

The **African Union** has a mandate to create a political, economic and social union to help African states with their development initiatives.³²⁰ The Conference of Ministers for Drug Control and Crime Prevention met for the third time in December 2007, to discuss security and harmonize drug control and crime prevention programmes in the continent. The use of drugs by soldiers and guerrillas in conflict situations has exacerbated violence and crime. The conference adopted a **Revised AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012)** and the Follow-up mechanism on its implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Key Priority Areas of the revised AU Action plan on drug control and crime prevention (2007-2012)³²¹

- Effective continental, regional and national policy formulation and coordination in the domains of drug control and crime prevention;
- Enhancing collaboration, shared responsibility and harmonized action to address drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, terrorism, gun-related violence and crimes within the community;
- Building institutional capacity for the law enforcement, criminal justice and forensic service systems on drug control and crime prevention;
- Mainstreaming drug and crime concerns into development strategies;
- Building regional and national capacity and training to enhance prevention and care of substance abuse and related HIV and AIDS;
- Enhancing understanding of the dynamics of drugs and crime for policymaking purposes;
- Broad based responsibility for the promotion of sport and culture in the service of social development to combat drugs and crime.

315 The Eight Point Agenda: Practical, positive outcomes for girls and women in crisis See: http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/8_pa.shtml

316 UNDP, Eight Point Agenda for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality, Country Examples.

See: http://www.undp.org/cpr/we_do/8_pa_country_examples.shtml

317 Ibid.

318 UNDP Guatemala (2006), Política pública municipal de seguridad ciudadana Municipalidad de santa lucía Cotzumalguapa, escuintla, Guatemala. Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa :UNDP. See : <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Security/citizenssecurity/guatemala/experiencias/2006913143850.politicafinal.pdf>

319 OEA (2009), Second meeting of ministers responsible for public security in the americas: consensus of santo domingo on public security.

320 The African Union. See: <http://www.africa-union.org/>

321 African Union (2007), Revised AU Action Plan on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012). Addis Ababa: African Union.

The growth of international networks facilitating the development and exchange of information on crime prevention were touched on in the previous International Report (2008). These networks allow for a better dissemination of existing information and reinforce the emphasis placed on prevention. They constitute valuable tools for areas and/or stakeholders encountering difficulties accessing specialized information, or for filtering information. ICPC is the only organization, with an international scope, which specializes in prevention. In order to promote existing networks and their activities more efficiently, the Centre undertook the renovation of its website in 2009³²² to include a *Directory* of organizations specialized in crime prevention and community safety. The Directory will include not only international organizations, but regional and national resource centres.

2. Prevention develops at the national level but is not yet a priority

As we emphasized in 2008, the most complete and widely distributed information on crime prevention strategies is from Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Central, South American and, to a lesser extent, Caribbean countries also produce numerous statistical studies, and research findings on prevention. Information from Africa and Asia is particularly difficult to access, though for very different reasons. Analysis of the information which is available is also limited to a review of **stated intentions** within policy documents. While strategies, policies, and action plans are fairly accessible, their implementation is more difficult to assess. The following review should be read with these limitations in mind.

Methodology of the review: A grid³²³ to guide the collection of information on national prevention strategies was created, using the following 11 elements:

- The broad crime prevention context, including responsible bodies for delivery (at all levels), the approach to prevention used, and national, regional, and local policies connected with or directly related to crime prevention
- The legal and regulatory framework
- Existing prevention tools
- Evaluation of crime prevention strategies and programmes and their dissemination

- Security and sustainable development indicators
- Involvement of other prevention stakeholders
- Development of prevention skills and budget allocated to prevention
- Most significant prevention interventions
- Priorities
- Main challenges

In addition, we contacted academic specialists in three regions covering: 12 countries in the Maghreb, the Balkans, and South-east Asia, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Bangladesh, India, and Singapore.³²⁴ ICPC collected information from a further 48 countries.³²⁵ The main sources of information used in 2008 and in this report have been: academic papers, information published by governments, international organizations, local governments, NGOs, etc., as well as ICPC's network comprising academics, policy makers and practitioners. This network was used both to collect and validate information. Information collection was to some extent hampered by linguistic barriers.

2.1 National prevention strategies are not always identified as such

The methodological limitations inherent in our review should be underlined. In 1999, ICPC identified 9 countries that had developed integrated crime prevention strategies. That analysis was a significant starting point, but information remained partial. The 2006 United Nations survey on crime prevention practice received information from 42 countries, but not all of those that had implemented a prevention strategy completed the survey. That survey suggested that 37 countries had implemented national strategies. **Our current review has identified 57 countries in 2009 that have adopted national crime prevention strategies, whether focussed on a particular issue, or a more wide-ranging strategy.**

Not surprisingly, high income countries have the most comprehensive strategies. In the Netherlands, we identified at least ten specific action plans for the prevention of a variety of activities, ranging from violence against women to corruption and racial discrimination, in addition to an overarching national crime prevention strategy.³²⁶ Similarly a Belgian strategy, adopted in 2008, identified 12 priority issues for prevention intervention.

322 www.crime-prevention-intl.org

323 For details of the evaluation grid, see the appendix.

324 In Australia, the National Secretary and Public Officer, Empower Justice Service, Australian Crime Prevention Council, Happy Valley; in Bangladesh, the Department of Criminology and Political Science, Mawlana Bhashani Science and Technology University, Santosh; in Chile, the *Universidad Alberto HURTADO*, Santiago de Chile; in France, *the Institut du monde arabe*, Paris; in Morocco, *The Université Mohammed V-Agdal*, Rabat; in Singapore, the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore; in Slovenia, the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor; in the United States, the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts.

325 Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, England & Wales, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Scotland, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, United States, Uruguay.

326 Safety Begins with Prevention, adopted in 2008.


However, only 23 countries³²⁷, from different regions of the world, have adopted overarching strategies, i.e. ones aimed at preventing the majority of types of crime. These strategies sometimes specify priorities, such as women's safety, young people or organized crime, and some identify working methods, such as interdepartmental coordination, local interventions, or community-based action. In Argentina, the national action programme³²⁸ on prevention stresses the need for partnership between the three levels of government (national, provincial, and municipal). Some also favour building participatory models of governance. Of course, statements of intent do not allow us to assess the extent to which local approaches are implemented on the ground, nor the resources allocated to lower tiers of government (or communities) for implementing a national crime prevention strategy. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the involvement of municipal authorities and a local approach within national security policies indicates widespread acceptance that delegated responsibility can contribute to the success of crime prevention policies.

As mentioned in the introduction, our analysis also suggests that **some countries are implementing public safety or crime-control strategies that include a prevention**

element, although prevention may not be the overarching principle. Some national policies, particularly from Latin America, outline "law enforcement" or repressive policies alongside preventative interventions. This plurality is particularly striking in approaches to illegal drugs policy, with nearly all policies addressing both prevention of addiction (and in certain cases harm reduction) and control of trafficking (at the local or international level).

Multi-sector approaches continue to be promoted. We have identified 22 countries out of 60, with a **central crime prevention body** responsible for coordination, implementation, and monitoring of crime prevention policy.³²⁹ Most of these had an overarching crime prevention strategy. However, while Germany, and Switzerland do not have such a national strategy, they have national organizations in charge of coordinating prevention interventions.³³⁰ As observed in 2008, responsibility for delivery of national strategies largely lies with ministries in charge of public safety, most often the Ministry of the Interior or Justice. For example, in the Netherlands and Portugal, both the Ministries of Justice and the Interior are responsible for crime prevention.

Number of action plans by theme



327 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden.

328 *Plan Nacional de Prevención del Delito*.

329 The following countries have such a central body: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

330 The German Forum for Crime Prevention (DFK), and Swiss Crime Prevention, respectively.

Recognition of the need for national coordination and a multi-sector approach appears to be increasing in all regions.

In 2008, we outlined the central coordinating structures developed in Chile, Mexico, and France. Others have been identified in Indonesia (*Indonesia Crime Prevention Foundation* (LCKI), a national coordinating body reporting to the Ministries of Justice and Human Rights, Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs and the Interior), Estonia (Crime Prevention Council, which brings together representatives of the Ministries of Justice, Internal Affairs, Social Affairs, Education and Research, Culture, and Finance), and the Czech Republic (Government Committee for Crime Prevention, an interdepartmental body administered by the Ministry of the Interior, alongside the Drug Coordination Council, the Government Council for Roma, and the Ministries of Defence, Education, Finance, Health, and Justice).

Multiple Priorities in National Strategies: Thematic priorities were identified from both overarching strategies and specific prevention strategies to address particular issues. The national crime prevention strategies and plans identified in the 60 countries reviewed target a wide variety of problems (see graph page 87). However, some **dominant themes emerge, including illicit drugs, women's safety, youth safety, human trafficking, and, to a lesser extent, domestic violence, child protection, and poverty and social exclusion.**

The boundaries between these categories are blurred. For example, programmes for family violence prevention could also be included under women's, children's, or youth safety. Some plans touch on several areas. The *Plan d'Action Nationale de Lutte contre le Trafic Interne et Transfrontalier des Enfants* from Burkina Faso (2004-2008), for example, is dedicated to both human trafficking and child protection. That said, there is a clear prioritization internationally of drug issues (consumption, trafficking, and associated crime). This may reflect both the "globalization of the impact of drug use and trafficking, and pressure from UN agencies, such as UNODC, or donor countries, such as the USA, to control the drug trade.

2.2 Regional differences in concerns

Beyond the identification of international trends in crime prevention, further analysis reveals some key regional differences within these worldwide trends.

Despite the dearth of information on African countries' policies, a review of 10 countries identified 30 national prevention and community safety plans. Of these, only South Africa, and Morocco have adopted an overarching national crime prevention strategy (*National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996), South Africa; Plan d'action sécuritaire (2008-2012), Morocco*). Other countries had adopted programmes on specific issues. Equally, only South Africa has established a central coordinating body,

the Justice Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS), under the aegis of the Ministry for Safety & Security.

Issues related to **children and young people** are prioritized by these African nations, with eight national strategies on these issues identified.³³¹ The emphasis is on child **protection, including** from trafficking (Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso) and on the need for **care and education** (e.g. Burkina Faso's *Action éducative en milieu ouvert, 2003-2007*, dedicated to youth at risk). These strategies often promote an integrated cross-departmental approach, including education, health, victim support, and law enforcement. In Morocco, the *Plan d'action national pour l'enfance (2006-2015)* focuses on four strategic goals: promotion of healthier living, provision of good quality education, protection from abuse, exploitation, and violence, and the fight against HIV/AIDS. In Côte d'Ivoire, at least four programmes and committees have been set up with a variety of broad aims; the *Comité National de Lutte Contre les Violences Faites aux Femmes et aux Enfants* and the *Comité National de Lutte Contre le Trafic et l'Exploitation des Enfants* address the aims of the *Plan d'Action Nationale Contre le Travail des Enfants* and the Ministry of the Family, Women, and Social Affairs (MFFAS)'s strategy on child protection. In Nigeria, the Crime Prevention Coalition of Nigeria (CPCN)'s principal objective is to attack the social causes of juvenile delinquency by offering young people alternative ways of life.

Another priority amongst a number of African countries is the improvement of living conditions, including improving safety, through **action plans to address poverty and for urban renewal**. Five action plans of this type were identified, such as Senegal's *Programme d'Appui à la Mise en Œuvre de la Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté*, created in 2008 in partnership with UNDP.

Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco have also adopted strategies for promoting women's safety, emphasizing awareness-raising and research around violence against women. Women's safety was also the principal aim of the bilateral Tunisian and Spanish project, *Équité de Genre et Prévention de la Violence à l'Égard des Femmes*, particularly aiming on working with the media. Morocco's *Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre la Violence à l'Égard des Femmes* (SNLCVF) is comprised of seven different components: campaigning; education, awareness-raising, and communication; professional development and training; management and monitoring; infrastructure development; judicial and legislative reform; and cross-disciplinary research and development.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, amongst the 15 countries reviewed, we identified seven global strategies for crime prevention in: Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. A strategy is also in development in Uruguay. In a further six countries, the national

331 The two countries on which we found no information on this subject were Angola and Algeria.

security policy includes a significant prevention element. Only in Guatemala and Suriname were we unable to identify any overarching prevention strategy. Within these Latin American and Caribbean strategies there is a tendency to blur the lines between prevention/community safety and security (public safety), both referred to under the term *seguridad ciudadana*. Brazil implemented an ambitious programme in 2007 (see box).

Central bodies in charge of coordinating crime prevention at the national level echo the blurring of prevention and control, with mandates going beyond prevention to include wider issues of security policy.

For example, the Brazilian National Secretariat of Public Security (SENASP) advises the Justice Ministry on questions of public security as well as driving the implementation of the *Plan Nacional de Segurança Pública* (2006). Other similarly broad coordinating bodies have been established in: Argentina (*Comisión de Seguridad y Derechos Humanos*), Chile (*División*

de Seguridad Ciudadana), El Salvador (*Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública*), Guatemala (*Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública*), and Honduras (*Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Interior*). These organizations are under the aegis of specific authorities: the Justice Ministry (in Argentina or Brazil, the Office of the President of the Republic (Guatemala and Honduras), or the Ministry of the Interior (Chile). Although they are mainly under the aegis of one ministry, these organizations are often adopting inter-ministerial approaches³³². The new national strategy proposed in El Salvador (August 2009), for example, has outlined the need for a multi-sector approach involving municipalities, which demonstrates a willingness to decentralize safety policy.

Strategies in the region prioritize **four major themes: violence prevention** (8 strategies), **young people** (7), **women's safety** (7), and **drugs policy** (7). Violence prevention policies are closely associated with protection of

PRONASCI: From a Government Programme towards a National Strategy

Within the context of a significant paradigm shift on matters of public safety, Brazil's Ministry of Justice launched the PRONASCI programme (National Program for Public Safety with Citizenship) in 2007. This programme rests on the articulation of public safety policies and social policies and recognizes the shared responsibility - and the need for coordination - between the federal government, States and municipalities, the forces of order, civil society organizations, and citizens.

This programme advocates for action at the local level and focuses on the protective factors and the risk factors present in each community, through partnerships between the different levels of government, the police, civil society, and the community. PRONASCI - for which the investment up to 2012 totals more the R\$6,700 billion (approximately 3.232 billion US dollars) - is composed of a series of projects such as Territories of Peace (projects for the prevention of youth violence, established in the municipalities with the highest levels of violence), Women of Peace (social mediation by women community leaders), or Training Exchange (ongoing training programmes for public safety professionals).

In 2009, the Ministry of Justice launched a vast national mobilization process designed to develop a national strategy on public safety, based on the principles established in PRONASCI. The National Public Safety Conference (CONSEG) was a participative movement that stretched over nine months and was made up of a thousand forums, as well as by conferences at the municipal level, then at the State level, in which representatives of different levels of government, public security professionals, civil society actors, and citizens could participate in order to make their proposals. More than 500,000 Brazilians took part in these debates. In August 2009, during the national stage of CONSEG, more than 3000 participants identified and prioritized a set of 10 principles and 40 guidelines which will serve as the foundation for the definition of public policies on security.

Among these principles and directives, the strengthening of the Unified Public Safety System (SUSP), PRONASCI, and the National Public Safety Council (CONASP) a body bringing together representatives from governments, police forces, and civil society was proposed, along with the establishment of a national system of autonomous safety councils and the creation of municipal councils in all of the country's municipalities. At the end of 2009, the Ministry of Justice was pursuing exchanges with its partners for the implementation of these principles and guidelines.

Further information available at www.mj.gov.br/pronasci and www.conseg.gov.br.

³³² For example, in El Salvador, the Ministry of Education in partnership with the *Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas* supervises the *Escuelas Efectivas y Solidarias* programme against school violence.

vulnerable groups, such as young people, women, and children. In addition, some countries have developed policies to reduce violence in high-risk urban areas. El Salvador's *Plan Nacional para la Prevención de la Violencia y la Promoción de la Paz Social 2007-2010* aims to prevent crime and violence in high-crime urban areas by building a "culture of social peace" (*convivencia*). Similarly, Panama's *Programa de Seguridad Integral* (PROSI) developed in 2006 in collaboration with IDB, also targets high crime municipalities³³³, with significant problems linked to delinquency. Several countries emphasize diversion of young people from crime, especially through training and employment programmes. Belize's safety policy, for example, stresses the need to counter the "social causes of crime", diversion of youth at risk and employment programmes. The Dominican Republic has also established the *Programa Centro de Capacitación Tecnológico* (centre for technology training 2004-2008) to increase skills in using technology and help young adults enter the job market.

A key characteristic of Caribbean and Latin American strategies is their **emphasis on human rights and the development of a culture of peace and respect for the rule of law**. This is an explicit priority in El Salvador³³⁴ and Mexico, where an aim of the *Programa Sectorial de Seguridad Pública, 2007-2012* is to create a "culture of legality" by guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens. In Ecuador, the main aim of the *Plan Nacional para la Erradicación de la Violencia de Género contra la Niñez, la Adolescencia y las Mujeres* is described as the "transformation of sociocultural patterns" (*transformación de patrones socioculturales*) and of the "social imagination" to eradicate gender-based violence and discrimination. In Brazil, the emphasis has been on citizenship, particularly through the *Reservista-Cidadão* (Citizen Reserves) programme, which is part of the *Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania* (PRONASCI), which encourages young people leaving military service to act as community leaders promoting citizenship amongst young people at risk of offending. PRONASCI also encourages disarmament by promoting a culture of peace.

Many such programmes complement others aiming to **increase confidence in public institutions**. In Colombia, a stated aim of the *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática* is to defend democratic values and institutions, while Brazil's PRONASCI programme includes a goal of countering police corruption. Mexico's police reform programme, *Programa sectorial de seguridad pública*, emphasizes the professionalization of the police in countering a sense of impunity.

In Asia, few national strategies were identified in the limited number of countries we reviewed.³³⁵ It is likely that community safety and urban crime are not a priority issue in terms of comprehensive policies. Nevertheless, sectorial policies exist. Accessing information in this region was hampered mainly by language barriers. However, some significant crime prevention initiatives, on specific issues, were identifiable.

Japan, uniquely amongst the countries reviewed, has adopted a wide-ranging crime prevention strategy (Action Plan to Create a Crime-Resistant Society). This focuses on youth offending and the need for local action and citizen/community participation. While there is no permanent body responsible for implementation of the plan, cross-departmental meetings, chaired by the Prime Minister, are held periodically. Indonesia has established a coordinating body, the Indonesia Crime Prevention Foundation (LCKI), jointly responsible to the Ministries of Justice and Human Rights, Social Services, Foreign Affairs, and Internal Affairs, although we could not access further details of its operation. Bangladesh has established shared responsibility for prevention between the Ministry of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Communication.

The chief priority for prevention activity in the region would appear to be countering **human trafficking**; all countries reviewed had adopted a national strategy on the issue. Thailand's related Plan of Action to Prevent, Protect, Prosecute and Reintegrate (1997-2006), for example, aims to prevent children entering the sex trade and imposes heavy sentences on anyone engaging in child prostitution. The strategy does not prohibit prostitution, but instead addresses the related violence and abuse within the sex industry. Other policies have also been developed in the region around **drugs** and **youth offending**, as well as specialist cybercrime policies (e.g. Philippine Anti-(software)-Piracy Team).

Europe, Canada, United States, Australia, and New Zealand

This section explores the 22 European countries³³⁶ included in this review together with Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand because of their comparable levels of income and economic development. Of these 26 countries, 14 have an over-arching national strategy on crime prevention,³³⁷ with little difference between Eastern and Western European countries (4 of 9 and 10 of 17 respectively). Some of these national strategies have been in place for many years, such as Canada's National Crime Prevention Strategy (1998),

333 The cities identified are Colón, David, Panama City, and San Miguelito.

334 *Plan Nacional de Prevención y Paz Social*.

335 Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Singapore.

336 Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Scotland, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

337 These countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden.

the numerous prevention of delinquency plans adopted in France, of which the most recent was adopted in 2007 and revised in 2009, Australia's National Community Crime Prevention Programme (2004), and Hungary's National Strategy for Social Prevention of Crime (2003). Other more recent policy developments have followed on from earlier action plans. In Finland, the Internal Security Programme (2008-2011) builds on the Working Together for a Safe Society plan adopted in 1999, emphasizing collaboration between government agencies on accident prevention and in addressing organized crime, domestic violence, illegal immigration, and human trafficking. New national strategies have also been adopted in Belgium (*Plan national de sécurité*, 2008-2011), the Netherlands (Safety Begins with Prevention, launched in 2008), and the Czech Republic (Crime Prevention Strategy, 2008-2011).

Many of these countries also have national coordinating bodies to implement national strategies, a total of 17 of the 26 countries reviewed.³³⁸ A number of federal states have also established a central coordinating body including: Switzerland (Swiss Crime Prevention), Germany (German Forum for the Prevention of Crime). In the USA, the National Crime Prevention Council is a non-government organization, and there is no national strategy on crime prevention although national research on prevention interventions is undertaken by the National Institute of Justice.

National strategies in these countries cover a variety of issues. Human trafficking, illegal immigration, integration strategies, racism, urban renewal, poverty and social exclusion, women's safety, child protection, youth offending, sexual exploitation, drugs, alcohol, corruption, economic crime, organized crime, cybercrime and identify theft, road safety, and safety within firms & businesses, are all included in action plans to varying degrees.

Youth offending and child protection tend to be prioritized. Some strategies cover wide-ranging issues around youth offending, as in: Estonia (Action Plan for Reduction of Juvenile Delinquency, 2007-2009), the Netherlands (Every Opportunity for Every Child - Youth and Family Program, 2007-2011), the Czech Republic (Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, 1999) and Switzerland (Young People and Violence Action Plan, 2008). Others specifically deal with **sexual exploitation and child sex offending**, as in: the Czech Republic (Combating the Sexual Exploitation of Children National Plan, 2008-2010), Macedonia (National Action Plan for Prevention of Sexual

Abuse of Children and Paedophilia), Switzerland (Campaign against Paedosexual Crime, 2005, and the 'Say It' programme adopted in 2007), and Germany (Action Plan to Protect Children and Young People Against Sexual Violence and Exploitation, 2003). **Violence in schools** is also prioritized in a number of countries, including: France (*Prévention de la violence au milieu scolaire*, 2006 - reviewed in 2009) and Spain (*Plan Director de Convivencia y Mejora de la Seguridad Escolar*).

A key concern amongst European countries is the **reduction of racial discrimination and the integration/acceptance of immigrants and minority ethnic groups**. While the emphasis varies between hate crime (Scotland), racial discrimination, xenophobia and intolerance (Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Denmark), the extreme right (Germany) and integration of recent migrants (Portugal), this issue is a common component of European policy. Denmark has also developed a strategy to prevent violent extremism and radicalization among young people (A Common and Safe Future: Action Plan for the Prevention of Extremism and Radicalisation Among Young People, 2009).

Like the UNESCO International Coalition of Cities Against Racism³³⁹ (whose European counterpart, the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, now includes 92 cities), the strategies listed above make an explicit **connection between racial discrimination and community safety**, ethnic and racial tensions, and the social exclusion and vulnerability of some minority ethnic groups. .

While young people are the focus of many of these strategies, **attention has also focussed on preventing violent extremism, both of the extreme right and religious fundamentalism, particularly Islamism**. Programmes such as Exit (created in Norway in 1996-1997 and transferred to Sweden, Germany, and other European countries³⁴⁰) support young members of extreme right groups who wish to leave them. The rise of religious radicalism advocating terrorist acts has become a growing concern, and the promotion of tolerance and support for youth at risk of radicalization is central to action plans and national programmes;³⁴¹ the Netherlands' Polarization and Radicalization Action Plan (2007-2011),³⁴² for example, aims to prevent violence and instability linked to the extreme right and religious fundamentalism, which has been described by the Dutch intelligence service as "the biggest threat to Dutch democratic order."³⁴³

338 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, USA.

339 For more information, see http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=3061&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed September 3.

340 Bjørge, Tore, Japp Van Donselaar, Sara Grunenberg (2009). *Exit from right-wing extremist groups: lessons from disengagement programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany*, Bjørge, Tore, John Horgan [eds.] *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*. Abingdon and New York, Routledge, p. 135-151.

341 See the first report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism, available at <http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf> (consulted 3 September 2009).

342 Available at <http://www.minbzk.nl/english/subjects/public-safety/publications/@108447/polarisation-and> (consulted 28 August 2009).

343 Reiterated in the *Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011*, p.4, available at <http://www.minbzk.nl/english/subjects/public-safety/publications/@108447/polarisation-and> .

National crime prevention strategies amongst these countries cover a wide variety of interventions. The Danish crime prevention strategy, for example, includes 22 initiatives developed around seven themes. Similarly, the recently adopted Dutch strategy has three strands: social prevention (reintegration through education, training, and employment), proactive intervention (mainly early intervention) and control/repression (through exclusion). There are **two main trends** throughout these strategies: an **emphasis on local approaches to youth inclusion**, through partnerships between local authorities and civil society; and **educational approaches**, particularly emphasising the role of schools³⁴⁴ in fostering a culture of tolerance and respect for cultural or religious differences. In Austria and the Netherlands, for example, teaching tolerance is a compulsory element of primary and secondary education.

Strategies to address corruption have been a particular feature of policy development in Eastern Europe.³⁴⁵ By contrast, policies in Western Europe tend to address the issues of organized crime (economic and financial crime), as in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. The difference in emphasis may be the result of pressure on countries wishing to join the EU to tackle corruption and meet EU standards. The Republic of Macedonia's National Programme for Adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire* (Revised 2009),³⁴⁶ for example, explicitly links its action plan to counter corruption³⁴⁷ to the recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).

This rapid overview of international and national trends in prevention suggests, firstly, that the amount of international normative activity focused *specifically* on prevention is relatively low, but is increasing. Crime prevention strategies,

as suggested in the introduction, are most effective when they are anchored in local realities, and use participative and knowledge-based approaches, including local security audits and evaluation of impact and outcomes. Nevertheless, the field of prevention benefits from the conceptual and normative support of standards developed in adjacent fields, as Guillaume Landry showed in his remarks on the twentieth anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see Contribution on page 95).

At the national level, we were able to analyze a greater number of strategies, and found a wide range of operational measures - enactment of new regulations, creation of specialised bodies, education and mobilization campaigns. However, the resources dedicated to attaining these objectives, as well as the extent to which power and resources are delegated to local levels and to civil society or communities, still remain relatively weak. The multiplicity of the causes of crime requires responses that engage very diverse actors. The links between social policies and crime prevention raise a number of important questions, as suggested in the introduction, and are explored by Bill Dixon in relation to the specific case of South Africa in his **Contribution** below.

Overall, we can conclude on the basis of this review that governments and international agencies are taking greater account of the need for a pluralist and interdisciplinary approach to safety. However, they are less often implementing truly integrated prevention strategies, which create binding and active interactions between different sectors and government levels.

Contribution

Criminalizing social policy and socializing crime prevention in post-apartheid South Africa

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The extraordinary pre-eminence of crime as a social problem has forced many governments around the world to make controlling it a priority, to see it as essential to their continued legitimacy and, in democratic societies, a recipe for electoral success.

In most cases this has meant investing vast resources in reacting to crime, in the agents and agencies of criminal justice. Where steps have also been taken to prevent it by less conventional means, controversy has arisen as social policy has been 'swallowed up in the maw of law-and-order discourse'.³⁴⁸ Instead of being accepted as ends in themselves, creating jobs, improving schools and building homes are seen as means of preventing crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour. As one critic has put it, '[T]he struggle against poverty inequality and repression' has become secondary to the "war against crime".³⁴⁹

344 See in particular the UK Children's Plan, <http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/childrensplan/> (consulted 25 August 2009).

345 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Macedonia, and Serbia.

346 Government of the Republic of Macedonia, National Programme For Adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire* (Revision 2009), Skopje, 29 May 2009.

347 Action Plan for Fight against Corruption 2007 – 2011.

348 Pearson, G. (1983) *Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears*. London: Macmillan, p. 239.

349 Cohen, S. (1988) 'Western crime control models in the Third World: Benign or Malignant?' in S. Cohen, *Against Criminology*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, p. 193.

At the same time advocates of situational crime prevention focused on criminal events and reducing opportunities to offend rather than people and their dispositions towards criminal behaviour complain that preventing crime is too often used to justify policies and interventions which may have other social benefits but are 'apt not to produce any crime prevention at all'.³⁵⁰

Thus, whether they are prompted by a desire to restrain the creeping criminalization of social policy or resist the unethical socialization of crime prevention, many contemporary observers agree that improvements in education, health, housing and support for employment should be made for their own sake leaving crime to be prevented either incidentally as a result of these initiatives, or by means of carefully designed situational measures aimed at making criminal offences more difficult and less rewarding to commit.

When South Africa's first democratic government came to power in 1994 it was faced with the task of reconstructing a society scarred by a long history of colonial and minority rule. It had to deal with the glaring, and racially skewed, inequalities in wealth, income and standards of living institutionalized under apartheid and heal the still open wounds left by the struggle to overthrow it. The way in which the African National Congress led Government of National Unity which took office in 1994 and its immediate successors have responded to these challenges provides an intriguing case study of how the relationship between social policy and crime prevention develops under the most demanding conditions.

The newly elected government's plan for the 'final eradication of apartheid' and the creation of a 'democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future' was a document known as the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* or RDP.³⁵¹ Based on the *Freedom Charter* adopted by the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies almost 40 years earlier in 1955, the RDP acknowledged that 'peace and security for all' was essential to the wider project of nation-building but marginal to the immediate task of meeting people's basic needs for land, housing, water, transport, health and social welfare. Controlling crime was a matter of bringing the police and other agencies responsible for safety and security under democratic control; preventing it required that remedies be found for the political, social and economic injustices of the past.

This early confidence in crime prevention through reconstruction and development did not take long to evaporate and, in 1996, the government published a *National Crime Prevention Strategy* (NCPS)³⁵². Over a decade later, the NCPS remains by far the most comprehensive statement of official policy on the subject. Unlike the RDP, the NCPS explicitly linked preventing crime to promoting economic growth and development. Safety was 'an essential pre-condition' for the 'development of a successful society'.³⁵³ But its authors were also convinced that meeting basic needs, creating jobs and expanding social welfare provision would 'eventually impact on crime prevention' even if this was not their '*primary motivation*'.³⁵⁴ Though the NCPS sought to balance the need for reactive crime control through the criminal justice system with 'preventing crime at an early stage',³⁵⁵ critics broadly sympathetic to the socialization of crime prevention have pointed to its lack of engagement with the structural causes of crime and been disappointed by the speed with which the government resorted to more familiar reactive measures to stem what was widely perceived as a rising tide of violent crime.³⁵⁶

Like the NCPS before it, a government *White Paper on Safety and Security* published in 1998 acknowledged the long term preventive effects of social policy initiatives in housing, education and health being undertaken largely for other reasons. But it went on to call for a range of 'developmental' interventions – including early learning, parenting and employment training – to be targeted at groups thought to be at risk of offending. In doing so the government laid itself open to the charge of either criminalizing social policy by making crime-proneness the trigger for programmes

350 Felson, M., and Clark, R. (1997) 'The ethics of situational crime prevention' in Newman, G., Clarke, R. and Soham, S. (eds) *Rational Choice and Situational Crime Prevention: Theoretical Foundations*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 205-6.

351 African National Congress (1994) *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*, <http://www.anc.org.za/rdp/rdp.html> (accessed 14 May 2009).

352 Department of Safety and Security (1996) *National Crime Prevention Strategy*. Pretoria: Department of Safety and Security.

353 Ibid. para. 1.3.1.4.

354 Ibid. para. 7.1.3, emphasis in original.

355 Ibid. paras. 1.2.1.1-2.

356 Simpson, G., and Rauch, J. (1999) 'Reflections on the National Crime Prevention Strategy' in Maharaj, G. *Between Unity and Diversity: Essays on Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Cape Town: Idasa/David Philip; Dixon, B. (2004) 'Cosmetic crime prevention' in Dixon, B. and Van Der Spuy, E. (eds) *Justice Gained? Crime and Crime Control in South Africa's Transition*. Cape Town: UCT Press; Du Plessis, A., and Louw, A. (2005) 'Crime and crime prevention in South Africa: 10 years after', *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice*, pp. 427-446.

which should be available to all citizens or (less plausibly) of attempting to socialize crime prevention by using spurious claims to preventive effectiveness in order to justify the introduction of policies which might (or might not) be desirable for other reasons.

When South Africa's second democratically elected President, Thabo Mbeki, announced an Urban Renewal Programme (URP) in 1999, the transformation of social policy into the handmaiden of crime prevention seemed to be complete as a range of social and welfare measures were targeted on areas selected because of their 'impermissible' levels of crime and violence.³⁵⁷ Less than two years later, however, the relationship appeared to have been reversed as strengthening the criminal justice system became just one element in a campaign against urban poverty and underdevelopment. In parallel with the URP a National Crime Combating Strategy was introduced by South African Police Service from April 2000. The second 'normalization' phase of this strategy called for the implementation of a range of social development projects to keep crime down in areas where police 'crackdowns' had succeeded in reducing rates of offending to tolerable levels. In recent years, conventional enforcement action by the police has supplanted earlier commitments to prevention in the NCPS and *White Paper*. This trend seems set to continue for some time to come as the ANC, victorious for a fourth time in elections held in April 2009, was elected on a manifesto which promises to 'establish a new modernised, efficient and transformed criminal justice system' capable of 'fighting and reducing crime in real terms'.³⁵⁸ Fighting the 'causes of crime' is mentioned in passing, but no indication is given as to how this will be done.

The twists and turns in the relationships between preventing and reacting to crime and other social policy initiatives in health, welfare, education and training evident in the early years of South Africa's new democracy reflect the difficulty of disentangling crime from other closely inter-connected, and often mutually reinforcing, social problems. Critical criminologists have long argued that crimes are no more and no less than that sub-set of social harms to which a given society chooses to respond by imposing penal sanctions on those responsible for causing them.³⁵⁹ That societies react to these harms in a distinctive way does not of itself say anything about their relative seriousness or the priority which should be given to preventing them. So it is entirely understandable that, faced with so many social problems - the HIV/AIDS epidemic, a chronic shortage of secure and affordable housing and widespread unemployment as well as high crime rates - successive South African governments have not responded to the urgings of lobby groups to make preventing or reacting to crime an overriding priority.³⁶⁰ There is little evidence to suggest that social policies which should have been judged on their own merits have been implemented on the strength of false promises that crime will be reduced but the temptation to criminalize social policy by directing welfare interventions towards high crime areas and at risk groups has not always been so easy to resist.

The broader question of when preventing crime genuinely is a priority - when reconstruction and development cannot take place without first taking action to improve safety and security - cannot be answered in the abstract.

And nor, for that matter, is running feeding programmes or providing basic incomes to those people if, and only if, they are robbing or rioting. If crime is not the pre-eminent social problem of our time, crime prevention cannot be the principal goal of social policy. But it may, under certain conditions, be an important one.

357 Rauch, J. (2002) *Thinking Big: The National Urban Renewal Programme and Crime Prevention in South Africa's Metropolitan Cities*. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

358 African National Congress (2009) *2009 Manifesto: Working Together We Can Do More*, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=elections/2009/manifesto/manifesto.html&title=2009+Election+Manifesto> (accessed 14 May 2009)

359 Christie, N. (2004) *A Suitable Amount of Crime*. London: Routledge; Hillyard, P. and Tombs, S. (2004) 'Beyond criminology?' in Hillyard, P., Pantazis, C., Tombs, S., and Gordon, D. (eds) *Beyond Criminology*. London: Pluto.

360 See for example: Nedcor (1996) *Nedcor Project on Crime, Violence and Investment*. Johannesburg: Nedcor Project.

Contribution

The twentieth anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: reinforcing civil society's monitoring and evaluation role

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The year 2009 marks the twentieth anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the world's most ratified human rights treaty, which for the first time treated children as having legal rights rather than being objects of law. Numerous advances in child rights have been made since the introduction of the Convention, notably the coming into force of the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, the UN Guidelines on Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime, the Stockholm Declaration on the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of children, the Statute of Rome, and the International Labour Organization's Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.

Still, the record on child rights over the last twenty years remains mixed. Most efforts undertaken to date have been reactions to the problems children face, with at base a repressive rather than preventive approach. The United Nations Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children, released in 2006 by a team led by Dr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, provided a clearer picture of the scope and manifestations of the various types of violence to which children are subjected throughout the world. The results of this innovative study are not encouraging. One need only think of systematic abuse and exploitation committed by institutions intended to protect children, or social acceptance and legal authorization of various forms of violence against children. In sum, children's rights remain in general the 'poor relation' of human rights, due in particular to underestimation of the scale and severity of problems and reticence on the part of governments to enter the familial and community spheres even though these are at the heart of the protection and promotion of children's rights.

However, civil society throughout the world has much to be proud of over the last two decades, as its continual and often thankless work has resulted in much awareness, sensitization, monitoring, and reporting of violations of children's rights. As guardians of sorts of the Convention, civil society organizations have played a key role in spreading information about, promoting, and defending children's rights against abuse, violence, exploitation, ignorance, and contempt.

In particular, this work has taken the form of a quantity of documents and publications regarding violations of children's rights, in order to denounce these abuses. Documentation, monitoring, and evaluation of the state of achievement of children's rights in a local as well as a national, regional, or international context are all essential steps taken by the international system, allowing the situation of children within the family and the community to be better understood. At the same time, this information and resulting appeals promote action, prevention of abuses, and treatment of abuses that have already happened. This research and sensitization work is therefore essential for impact analysis, policy and programme development, influencing decision-making processes, and ultimately the improvement of the situation of children.

It should however be noted that few **local** civil society organizations obtain such recognition from the international community for their competence in these areas. Too often, international organizations will call on local organizations, which are rooted in the reality on the ground and work directly with children afflicted by the problems under study, to obtain their data and analysis of the situation. The international organizations then produce reports that are considered credible and speak on behalf of these affected populations. Why is it not those who are working directly on these realities who get the chance to document the situation properly and become credible direct spokespeople to defend and promote children's rights in their communities?

The International Bureau of Children's Rights has found a way to answer this question. Based on its work in North Africa and the Middle East in recent years, the Bureau determined that civil society organizations above all served to denounce violations of children's rights, often in conflict with public authorities, and at the risk of suffering consequences. For example, in Lebanon, newspapers, UN agencies, and local and international organizations continually publicize the public sphere's failures to protect and promote its citizens' rights. Numerous examples are available on this subject.

Without denying the importance of this denunciation work, the Bureau suggested acting differently: continuing the denunciation, of course, but completing it by documenting successful initiatives. The objective is simple: to add another tool to the local NGOs' kit, helping them increase their credibility with public institutions by producing information that complements their denunciation work, in this case on the positive practices in their country for promoting and protecting children's rights. This gave rise to the national profiles initiative.

Whereas there is no shortage of reports on difficulties faced by developing countries – difficulties they are often all too aware of – little effort is put into spotlighting initiatives that are working. Starting from the principle that all countries want to look good in competition with their neighbours and that there are always sectors in which a country's experience in protecting and promoting the rights of children can be highlighted, national profiles aim to fill the void in the UN's surveillance system regarding the application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRE), notably in complement to the work of the UN's Committee on the Rights of the Child. Published in the form of national profiles, this analysis emphasizes progress made, innovative programs, and challenges to be faced at the national and regional levels.

Moreover, the regional perspective allows the achievements of all studied countries to be presented and their common challenges to be pointed out. These profiles are a basis for dialogue with decision-makers in the relevant countries to help them apply their conclusions and ensure that states fully implement the CRE. Naturally, each country is evolving in a unique context that does not admit hasty comparisons. However, the regional space brings together countries that are well acquainted, that often share similar cultural, linguistic, religious, historical, and socioeconomic traits, and that often have underused potential. It is precisely by sharing ideas and promoting successful initiatives that the rights of the child can be approached much more constructively by preventing problems rather than debating diagnoses.

For example, the African Great Lakes Region is better known for its violence and violations of children's rights than for the measures taken to deal with these problems. Numerous reports have been published on the multiple facets of the conflicts afflicting this region. Recent reports have underscored the weaknesses of Burundi's juvenile justice system, the discrimination and violence against women in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the failings of the education system in the Republic of Congo and the ravages of HIV/AIDS on children in Rwanda. There are many other reports as well, all basically convincing us how bad the situation is. The International Bureau for Children's Rights wanted to dig deeper in order to find out what actions have been taken to find solutions to the many problems besetting this region. So, backed by the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, the Bureau undertook a study that led to a series of national profiles on the situation of children's rights in Burundi, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. With the support of local and international NGOs, the Bureau was able to document a number of promising initiatives offering hope for the region. These initiatives include the Child Protection Code, enacted in January 2009, which offers a comprehensive legal framework providing protection for children in DRC, the national policy on orphans and other vulnerable children in Rwanda, the creation of the "Observatoire contre les violences sexuelles" (Observatory on Sexual Violence) in Congo, and major efforts aimed at promoting the right to healthcare in Burundi.

With increasing attention being given to governmental and political reforms in the region as well as gradual recognition – at least in theory – of the importance of rights-based approaches, the role of civil society in the fight against poverty, the prevention of crime and conflicts with the law, the effectiveness of development aid and the promotion and protection of human rights has been the focus of much interest. The International Bureau for Children's Rights supports civil society organizations in pressuring the relevant authorities to take adequate measures to ensure that the Convention's norms are respected both in law and in practice. Let us hope, however, that the next twenty years will serve to place prevention more at the centre of dialogue, with an emphasis on local initiatives aimed at bringing about positive changes in a world that is worthy of its children.

Contribution

Issues and practices for the reintegration of ex-combatants: Examples from Latin America, Africa and Afghanistan

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1. What are demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration?

The reinsertion of ex-combatants follows disarmament³⁶¹ and is part of a complex process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration—DDR—of persons who have participated in armed conflict. Demobilization is "...the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites

361 Disarmament is defined as: "...the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes". United Nations (2006), *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards* (IDDR), p. 2.

[...]). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion".³⁶² Reinsertion is a stage in demobilization, and it should not be confused with the third phase of DDR which is reintegration, or "the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place at the local level, in communities. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance".³⁶³ DDR is used to demobilize a part of the regular armed forces, and equally for disbanding irregular or informal armed groups. DDR is also pertinent for Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes,³⁶⁴ and for supporting efforts to restore the rule of law.³⁶⁵

2. Who are "ex-combatants"?

A traditional definition of the combatant refers to a person who acts within a conventional military structure or who participates in armed conflicts. Major crises and modern armed conflicts attest to the presence of non-State actors, such as rebel groups, armed gangs or mercenaries, who are also deemed combatants. In practice, the normative and legal process for reintegrating military personnel, and for determining the status of combatants and the beneficiaries of DDR programmes, is defined by peace agreements following a ceasefire between two warring groups. Also, persons who have actively participated in activities not directly linked to combat (carriers, nurses, cooks, messengers, financial backers, etc.), or who have participated on a part-time basis and shared their weapons with other unit members, are also admissible to the reinsertion process.³⁶⁶ Finally, the status of ex-combatants can extend to children who are linked to armed groups;³⁶⁷ to ex-combatants who present disabilities or chronic illnesses; to dependents of the combatant; to persons who have been kidnapped; to youths;³⁶⁸ to members of civil society returning to their country of origin; or to the host communities of principal candidates.³⁶⁹

3. What are the practices and programmes for demobilization and reintegration?

DDR programmes rest on one fundamental principle: the development and provision of social, political, and economic opportunities and skills for ex-combatants, which substitute for ways of life linked to conflict, and which support their reintegration into a peaceful civil society. Eligibility requires candidates to become active participants in the peace process and development of their country.

3.1 Demobilization/reinsertion

After disarmament, candidates generally stay at a cantonment site. In Colombia, for example, the collective demobilization of AUC paramilitaries (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) is divided into five phases: awareness; preparation; concentration; demobilization; verification and the beginning of reinsertion. Designated gathering sites are specified by decree and are active for periods ranging from 15 to 30 days. Candidates are registered and given an identity card. Weapons are handed over and inventoried. Candidates also answer a series of standard questions to evaluate their professional past as well as their preferences and aspirations. Cantonment is not always systematic, as attested by DDR programmes in Afghanistan.³⁷⁰ In this case, the candidate's family and community relationships are deemed sufficient and adequate environments for a sustainable severing of links with the Afghan Military Forces.³⁷¹ The demobilization phase also includes photographing and finger printing.

Reinsertion provides means of subsistence and basic services aimed at reducing the candidate's vulnerability during this transitional phase. Reinsertion is a temporary alternative intended to discourage the candidate from returning to armed conflict. A transitional period between disarmament and reintegration, reinsertion generally lasts between 6 and

362 Ibid.

363 Ibid.

364 Security Sector Reform consists notably of restructuring existing armed forces, creating new unified armed forces, or merging existing forces.

365 United Nations (2006).

366 MDRP, *Reintegration Assistance for Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons for the MDRP*. Working Paper no.1, September 2006.

367 According to the United Nations *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, the recruitment of children into armed forces or armed groups is a serious violation of international human rights. United Nations, *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, adopted on 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990.

368 This category includes individuals aged 13-14 to 18 years. Though not a legal category, this population poses a specific problem because it is unaccounted for in programmes that apply both to children and to adults.

369 United Nations (2006).

370 *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*, 5 December 2001, Bonn, Germany.

371 United Nations, (2006), IDDRS, the case of Afghanistan. Available online at: <http://unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121> [accessed 22 February 2010].

12 months. In 1990, the Organization of American States, with the support of USAID, coordinated the reinsertion of ex-combatants of the Nicaraguan Resistance into their families. Over a 14-month period, food, clothing, kitchen tools and construction materials were distributed to about 100,000 demobilized candidates and their dependents (parents, grand-parents, spouses, siblings, and children under 16).³⁷²

3.2 Reintegration: economic and social dimensions

Economic reintegration aims to develop, or upgrade, the basic capabilities of ex-combatants to help them evolve and be competitive in the job market. Economic reintegration includes four types of assistance programmes:

1) *Support for independent work initiatives*, including money management, micro-credit, assistance for small business and project development (distribution of seeds and work tools), strategic planning for entrepreneurs, guidance.

2) *Vocational training*, notably and most extensively in agriculture, construction, carpentry, mechanical, metal and electrical trades, plumbing, fishing, crafts, hairstyling, and tourism. These occupations take into account local needs and resources, as well as candidates' preferences.³⁷³

3) *Education*, including literacy, numeracy, and the development of critical thinking. In Sierra Leone, where more than one-third of ex-combatants had not been schooled, education was the preferred assistance of 30% of the candidates.³⁷⁴ This module includes financial support and educational materials for students.

4) *Job creation* in such areas as public works is an important source of employment and has the advantage of demonstrating to the population that ex-combatants can be positive agents of change in the community. However, these activities do not develop long-term capabilities and cannot be viewed as a permanent solution.³⁷⁵ In addition to creating new jobs, these efforts also encompass the development of employer incentives for hiring ex-combatants. For example, the Angolan government incorporated 7000 teachers and medical professionals of UNITA into their respective public sector institutions.³⁷⁶ Incentives can also take the form of grants for businesses that hire ex-combatants for at least two years. Undertaking to reimburse 50% of a candidate's salary for one year is another option, as demonstrated in Ethiopia.³⁷⁷ In Colombia, the private-sector *Ethanol Consortium Board* guaranteed the hiring of 1500 demobilized. This is an exceptional example where, in comparison with the majority of cases, the country undertaking a DDR process has a relatively high level of development.³⁷⁸

Social reintegration is effective as soon as the ex-combatant is believed to have found a place within a family, a community, and has built a social network. This is a condition of job security and, as such, is necessary to economic reintegration.³⁷⁹ Many, but not all, candidates maintain links with their family and community during combat. Also, programmes exist that aim to [re]create such links. These may be categorized in four ways:

1) *Community sensitization*, for example in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, communities are prepared for the return of former combatants through radio messages—Radio Okapi—music and theatre productions, discussion forums and meetings. Such actions also promote ex-combatants' potential as positive agents of change. Cultural, political, and religious leaders have a crucial role in these activities.³⁸⁰

372 MDRP, (2006) Annexe A: *Reinsertion Entitlements in Nicaragua*.

373 Koth, M. (2005). In the context of reintegration programmes in Colombia, and without providing detailed information, Markus Koth states that 90% of individuals whom he personally interviewed said that they could not imagine working even one single day in the profession for which they were undergoing training.

374 Ginifer, Jeremy. 2003. "Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. Sierra Leone—Building the Road to Recovery." *Institute for Security Studies*, Monograph no. 80. Available online at: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No80/Chap2.html> [accessed 22 February 2010].

375 MDRP, (2006).

376 Ibid.

377 Colletta, Nat J., Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer. 1996. *Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transitions: The Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda*. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 331, Africa Technical Department Series.

378 Caramés, Albert and Eneko Sanz, (2008). *Analysis of Diarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in the World During 2007*. School for a Culture of Peace, Autonomous University of Barcelona.

379 Colletta et al (1996).

380 United Nations, (2006), IDDRS, the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available online at: <http://unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=25> [accessed 22 February 2010].

2) *Reconciliation* can take many forms such as traditional rites, public acknowledgement of the conflict and acceptance of the punishment imposed by local leaders; purification ceremonies of the body and spirit; promotion of community activities like sports; and cultural and religious events. Associations that support such initiatives provide alternative social and psychological support mechanisms to military structures. The reconciliation process refers to justice in the context of human rights violations. Occasionally, social controls allow for a gradation of justice mechanisms relative to the seriousness of the individual's past actions. The case of Rwanda is one such example. As long as an individual was not an organizer or planner of the genocide, they are eligible for the Gacaca system, the traditional courts of local justice, in which such individuals publicly acknowledge their activities during the genocide. This is an expeditious process whereby the objective is to encourage community reparations and reconciliation.³⁸¹ In Colombia, however, victims' rights organizations believe that certain practices which promote pardon in order to foster peace—*olvido y perdon en pro de la paz*—have been accompanied by unacceptable amnesties.³⁸²

3) *Psychological support* that recognizes war trauma and its effects on ex-combatants is a neglected aspect of reintegration.³⁸³ Nevertheless, evaluating candidates during demobilization and reinsertion phases helps identify those who present psychological distress. Discussion groups in the presence of counsellors are organized as well, and are intended to strengthen the problem-solving capacities of demobilized persons. Women and children affected by war are especially vulnerable populations for whom psychological support is crucial.³⁸⁴ In Angola, an innovative model of intervention and psychosocial assistance for children has been set up whereby such services are delivered by a community based church network that has received prior training. This low-cost approach is a socially and logistically appropriate way of providing *in situ* assistance to youths within their families and respecting local traditions.³⁸⁵

4) *Basic capacities* for living in civil society include everyday customs, political systems, citizenship education, legal knowledge including human rights, and the democratic and electoral functioning of the country. These types of basic capabilities are developed through participation in community, civil, religious, sporting, and cultural life.

4. What are the impacts of demobilization and reintegration?

It is generally acknowledged that DDR programmes are essential for the reinsertion of former combatants. Yet, to this day, some believe that no real and decisive effort has been made to systematically evaluate the successful reintegration of ex-combatants.³⁸⁶ At the macro level, we should recognize that it can be difficult to identify the impact of these programmes, because they are simultaneously delivered within an aggregate of military, social, and economic interventions. At the micro level, that is, in terms of the impact upon individuals, few rigorous studies have examined the factors that might explain why or how some individuals successfully reintegrate and others do not. Also, few studies have examined why or how reinsertion is successful, regardless of whether or not candidates have followed a DDR programme. For example, a unique study of the case in Sierra Leone indicated that severing links between combatants and their army factions did not, in itself, contribute to economic, political, and social reintegration.³⁸⁷ Rather, participation in an abusive unit³⁸⁸ seemed to be the most significant indicator of a difficult reintegration. Also, the most educated and wealthy individuals had a tendency to experience the most difficult political and economic reintegration. The same study revealed that combatants who had a high-level function in the hierarchy were the least trusting of democracy, which is an essential criterion of DDR programmes. Although it admits to methodological limitations and inconclusive results, in the context of Sierra Leone, this study concludes that there is little evidence to support the efficiency of the DDR programme with regard to severing ex-combatants from the structures of armed groups and facilitating their reintegration.

381 On the question of alternative modes of justice in the case of candidates who participate in violence, it is important to note that international law prevails over national jurisdictions, and any person who has participated in serious human rights violations is subject to criminal proceedings before the International Court of Justice.

382 Koth, M., (2005).

383 MDRP, (2006).

384 Notably, this was revealed in a study undertaken in Mozambique: Verhey, Beth. 2001. *Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating*. Africa Region Working Paper Series, World Bank.

385 Verhey, B., (2001); MDRP, (2006).

386 Berdal, Mats. 1996. *Disarmament and demobilization after civil wars: Arms, soldiers and the termination of conflict*. Adelphi paper no. 303.

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. "Demobilization and Reintegration". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 51, no. 4, August 2007: 531-567.

387 Humphreys and Weinstein (2007).

388 This variable refers to three measures: 1) the probability that an individual would be punished by their superiors for the spontaneous use of violence against civilians; 2) was their food seized by force, or obtained according to a contracted agreement?; 3) the evaluation of respondents regarding the actions of the unit and for the benefit of the civil population, including educational and ideological training (Humphrey and Weinstein, 2007).

Finally, ex-combatants who have not participated in DDR programmes tend to reintegrate as successfully as their counterparts who participate in such programmes. Without extrapolating the results of this particular study to other contexts, these results suggest that knowledge of social, political, and economic mechanisms that govern successful reintegration merit further identification and specification. A better balance of research and funding priorities is required, and these should not be guided by issues related to programme planning and implementation, but rather by systematic evaluations and systematic explanations of successful (and/or unsuccessful) reintegration of ex-combatants. In this way, more effective prevention strategies can be established to counter the taking up of arms.

CHAPTER

6

GOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE CORE OF PREVENTION

Good governance at the core of prevention

At the international level there is a consensus that good governance is central to achieving sustainable development and safe, secure societies. Many international organizations have emphasized the importance of **strengthening and reforming institutions**, to ensure access to justice and the rule of law. They have often seen good governance largely in terms of strengthening criminal justice systems, for example, and the reform of state structures, particularly to reduce corruption and aid transparency. The increasing capacity of state structures is only one aspect of good governance. It is also important to **build capacity for governance beyond the institutions of the state**, particularly where they are weak and lack resources and/or legitimacy.

The United Nations 'Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime', have emphasized what has been called the **'steering' role of governments**³⁸⁹ in leading crime prevention partnerships. The guidelines recommend working at all levels and in connection with a variety of actors, especially civil society. In our 2008 edition, we examined the role of institutional and local actors, and the community. This chapter will focus on governance arrangements in relation to crime prevention.

The term governance is increasingly used to talk about governing arrangements (instead of government) in recognition that responsibility and capacity for governing is often situated beyond governmental or public sector bodies. In developed countries the term is frequently used to refer to the **shift from a public sector monopoly** in the provision of security, and the growth of the private security industry,³⁹⁰ and to refer to the involvement of local authorities and civil society in the design and implementation of everyday security measures.

This reflects the recognition of the finite capacity of the public sector to meet the popular demand for security, and a search to involve other sectors in the governance of security, including citizens, through a process of 'responsibilization'.³⁹¹ The public police can no longer be expected to provide omnipresent security.³⁹² The private security sector and other types of private and semi-private civil society arrangements are increasingly involved in the provision of security. Thus governance is a concept which helps to **make sense of new and existing arrangements and acknowledge other actors in security**, both in policy development and in implementation.

1. Defining Good Governance

1.1 An important concept for international organizations

Among international agencies, there is a diversity of emphasis in promoting *good* governance, reflecting their different objectives. This ranges from promoting transparent and honest government, to emphasizing the importance of good governance for socio-economic development and democracy-building.

The **World Bank** defines governance as:

*..the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.*³⁹³

UN-HABITAT has developed a **more comprehensive understanding of governance**, related to urban settlements (see box below):

Urban governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken.

389 Johnston L. and Shearing, C. (2003) *Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice*. Routledge: London.

390 Loader I. (2000) *Plural Policing and Democratic Governance*. Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, 323-345.

Shearing C. and Johnston L. (2003) *Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice*. London, Routledge.

391 Garland D. (2001) *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

392 Crawford A. (1999) *The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships*. Oxford University Press.

393 See definition of governance provided on World Bank website. See also Report of Committee of Experts' Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public administration: ECOSOC E/C. 16/2006/4

It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens.

UN HABITAT's 'Campaign for Good Governance' has also attempted to develop universally relevant **norms of good governance** (see below) that can be operationalized, or translated from principle into practice. These principles of good governance are particularly **applicable to crime prevention**. Inequality of access to resources, and to decision-making processes, helps to contribute to high rates of violence and

crime. They argue that accountable and effective services and capacity for crime prevention at the local level, is not only a matter of equitable governance, but of pursuing greater equality.

Their emphasis on **subsidiarity, efficiency, transparency and accountability** echoes the UN Guidelines' emphasis on the key role of local or municipal authorities in building sustainable strategies for crime prevention, particularly where they have legal and fiscal responsibility and resources.

UN-Habitat Principles of Good Urban Governance³⁹⁴

The Campaign for Good Governance aims to develop universally relevant norms that can be operationalized - that is, translated from principle to practice. The Campaign proposes that good urban governance is characterized by sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency and accountability, civic engagement and citizenship, and security, and that these norms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. These proposed norms are introduced below.

Sustainability in all dimensions of urban development

Cities must balance the social, economic and environmental needs of present and future generations. This should include a clear commitment to urban poverty reduction.

Subsidiarity of authority and resources to the closest appropriate level

Responsibility for service provision should be allocated on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, that is, at the closest appropriate level consistent with efficient and cost-effective delivery of services. This will maximize the potential for inclusion of the citizenry in the process of urban governance. Decentralization and local democracy should improve the responsiveness of policies and initiatives to the priorities and needs of citizens. Cities should be empowered with sufficient resources and autonomy to meet their responsibilities.

Equity of access to decision-making processes and the basic necessities of urban life

The sharing of power leads to equity in the access to and use of resources. Women and men must participate as equals in all urban decision-making, priority-setting and resource allocation processes.

Efficiency in the delivery of public services and in promoting local economic development

Cities must be financially sound and cost-effective in their management of revenue sources and expenditures, the administration and delivery of services, and in the enablement, based on comparative advantage, of government, the private sector and communities to contribute formally or informally to the urban economy.

Transparency and Accountability of decision-makers and all stakeholders.

The accountability of local authorities to their citizens is a fundamental tenet of good governance. Similarly, there should be no place for corruption in cities.

Civic Engagement and Citizenship

People are the principal wealth of cities; they are both the object and the means of sustainable human development. Citizens, especially women, must be empowered to participate effectively in decision-making processes. The civic capital of the poor must be recognized and supported.

Security of individuals and their living environment

Every individual has the inalienable right to life, liberty and the security of person. Insecurity has a disproportionate impact in further marginalising poor communities. Cities must strive to avoid human conflicts and natural disasters by involving all stakeholders in crime and conflict prevention and disaster preparedness. Security also implies freedom from persecution, forced evictions and provides for security of tenure. Cities should also work with social mediation and conflict reduction agencies and encourage the cooperation between enforcement agencies and other social service providers (health, education and housing).

394 UN-Habitat (2004) *Proposed Principles of Good Urban Governance and Possible Interventions*. UN-Habitat: Nairobi.

UNDP highlights the **impact of good governance on development**, and achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and promotes democratic models of governance.

*'Democratic governance is central to the achievement of the MDGs, as it provides the 'enabling environment' for the realization of the MDGs and, in particular, the elimination of poverty. The critical importance of democratic governance in the developing world was highlighted at the Millennium Summit of 2000, where the world's leaders resolved to "spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.'*³⁹⁵

1.2 The Governance of Security in Developing and Post-conflict States

Although the shift in thinking about the provision of security has come mainly from developed countries with relatively strong and established governmental structures and public service provision, researchers in the South and international organizations have noted its relevance for security in developing countries, and weak or failing states.³⁹⁶

State resources in such countries can be extremely limited or non-existent, or undermined by corruption. Other arrangements, both legitimate and illegitimate, are often in place to provide security and other services to fill the gap. **Strengthening governance structures, and building capacity for crime prevention or control, is as much a process of building legitimacy as of increasing resources.** Civil society organizations often have strong legitimacy, but lack resources. Networks of civil society and international organizations provide potential 'nodes' for governance alongside state bodies, or in place of them during periods of transition, where such structures have disintegrated or lack legitimacy.

Apart from its role in crime prevention, UNODC also promotes the importance of good governance for **strengthening institutions to counter organized crime.**

Eg. the Regional Program to Promote the Rule of Law and Human Security in Eastern Africa 2009-11 describes the impact of *'poor governance, insecurity, conflicts, poverty and economic disparities among and within countries of the region'* as *'providing opportunities for transnational organized crime, as is evidenced by the widespread illicit trafficking in drugs, persons,*

*money, arms, wildlife and timber products...National legislative frameworks to fight organized crime, corruption, money-laundering and the financing of terrorism are weak in most countries of the region.'*³⁹⁷

1.3 Nodal Governance

The concept of governance networks, involving clusters of linkages between civil society and the state, and the multiplicity of ways in which the governance of security is structured, is what Shearing and Wood (2000)³⁹⁸ describe as 'nodal governance'.

Nodal Governance *'envisions criminal justice agencies and actors as part of a broader web of governmental and non-governmental institutions involved in the promotion of safety, security and justice'* at local, regional, national, and international levels.³⁹⁹

This understanding of the governance of security allows for an examination of the role, knowledge and capacity of non-governmental actors in civil society (such as voluntary and community groups, private security providers, young people and women) in shaping and producing security. A key element of this emphasis on analyzing the contribution of 'nodes' within networks of governance has been its capacity to describe collaborative partnerships, and participative approaches to the production of security.

This concept is particularly useful for an examination of trends in the development of crime prevention, since it acknowledges the contribution of networks beyond the traditional criminal justice agencies, and activities that were not previously considered crime prevention. It refocuses attention away from the state as the primary deliverer of safety and security.

2. Devolution and Local Coordination for Crime Prevention

As the 2008 International Report⁴⁰⁰ underlined, the involvement of municipalities in crime prevention has continued to increase since the 1980's and in line with the UN Guidelines for the prevention of crime (1995 and 2002).⁴⁰¹ That report also discussed the importance and variety of partnerships in crime

395 See UNDP Democratic Governance Website: <http://www.undp.org/governance/about.htm>

396 Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing (2003) *The Governance of Security in Weak and Failing States*. Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, No. 4 : 331-349 (2003).

Bonora A. and Burton P. (2006) *Post-conflict crime prevention and justice reform*. Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention issue paper no. 2.

397 See website Promoting Good Governance in East Africa: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/promoting-good-governance-in-east-africa.html>

398 Shearing C. and Wood J. (2000) *Reflections on the governance of security: a normative enquiry*. Police Practice, 1, 4: 457-476.

399 Shearing C. and Johnston L. (2003) *Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice*. London, Routledge.

A definition and networks of researchers using this analysis can be found at http://www.asjp.co.za/content/XID53-nodal_security_governance_labs.html

400 Ibid.

401 Shaw, M. (2001) *The Role of Local Government in Community Safety*. ICPC: Montreal.

prevention,⁴⁰² but highlighted the discrepancy between the expectations of municipal actors, and their lack of resources, both financial and legal, to address local concerns about crime.

2.1 Multi-Agency and Multi-Sector Partnership at the National/ Provincial Level

New governance approaches are particularly apparent in the decentralization of crime prevention and the development of partnership approaches, both cross-governmental and multi-sector.

Partnerships between local governing bodies and civil society members have been developed at the municipal level in nearly all cities in a number of countries. They include Germany, (local advisory boards (*Sicherheitsbeirat*)), England and Wales (Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships), New Zealand (crime prevention partnerships), Portugal (Municipal safety councils), Spain (*Juntas locales de seguridad*), Chile (Municipal Public Safety Councils), Sweden, Denmark and Norway (local crime prevention councils), and in some cities in Australia (Safer Cities Partnerships in Victoria, South Australia and Queensland), in Austria (e.g. Einstadt, Schwechat, Puchenu, Wels, Salzburg), Poland (Pila⁴⁰³) and Estonia.

Provincial/regional governments, particularly within federal countries, have also developed strategic partnerships acting as consultative bodies to build relationships across government and with civil society organizations, and to coordinate local level activity. Such partnerships have been developed in Quebec (Canada) (*Conseil consultative québécois en prévention de la criminalité*), Queretaro (Mexico), German Lander (*Kommunale Kriminalprävention*- Baden-Württemberg and Brandenburg; Crime Prevention Councils in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, North Rhine-Westphalia; Rhineland-Palatinate; Schleswig-Holstein), Spain (*Los Consejos Autonómicos de Seguridad Ciudadana*) and South Africa (Durban Kwa Zulu Natal⁴⁰⁴).

These bodies have a particular role in collecting information on which to base local policies, and in establishing working relationships and cross-sector strategies. Some work closely with **city crime observatories** to monitor community safety and fear of crime (eg. in Barcelona, Bogotá, Lausanne, Llobregat, Madrid).

Cities and regions have also developed collaborative networks to coordinate their strategies and resources. The Swiss Commission for Crime Prevention Police deals with issues of crime

prevention and seeks to strengthen cooperation between townships and promote more standardized solutions. Swiss cantons (independent regional governments) have concordats to share responsibility for crime prevention. The Commission provides a useful platform for exchanges between political leaders. The need for specialized prevention exchanges between local authorities has led to the creation of specific structures such as the Forum for the Prevention and Urban Safety in Belgium, and the Forum for Urban Safety in France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. Elsewhere, city networks that exchange experience and knowledge on prevention and safety include the National Association of Municipalities (Germany), *Forum Belge pour la Prévention et la Sécurité Urbaine* (Belgium); *Forum Français pour la sécurité urbaine* (France); and the Urban Safety Commission, Chilean Association of Municipalities (Chile).

2.2 Where powers and resources have been decentralized to municipalities, cities have been able to play a particularly strong role in crime prevention.

Some cities have been given responsibility for local policing and a more explicit role in prevention (eg. cities in Colombia, France, Italy and Ecuador, and the city of Madrid⁴⁰⁵) and/or tax resources to be spent on prevention initiatives developed at the local level (France, Belgium⁴⁰⁶, Chile⁴⁰⁷). See **Contribution** on delivering effective crime prevention by Peter Homel at the end of this Chapter. In France, central government has supported local initiatives through a contract system since 1991: city contracts, local safety contracts and urban social cohesion contracts. (See **Contributions** by **Éric Lenoir**; and by Séverine Germain on City contracts in France, Italy at the end of this Chapter). However, funds can be limited resulting in a reluctance of local authorities and mayors to take on these prevention functions.

A well known example of decentralization has been in Colombia where the national parliament passed legislation giving powers to cities, enabling them to take greater control of the use of their resources and make local bylaws, for example, to control arms and alcohol consumption in public spaces (see Box on Violence Prevention and Urban Governance in Medellin, Colombia).

The increasing role of cities in crime prevention has often taken place in the context of the development of broader urban policies.

402 *Op. cit.*, chapter 10. Also see Benoît DUPONT's contribution, *les partenariats dans la prévention de la délinquance : des outils surévalués et sous-utilisés* », page 235.

403 Safe City Strategy 2006.

404 Implemented a provincial programme of action through a provincial justice crime prevention and security cluster.

405 Autonomy to the municipality in Ecuador under the 1998 constitution has allowed initiatives to respond to safety issues.

406 Localities that meet certain socio-demographic / crime-related criteria can receive funding from the Ministry of Interior for their safety and prevention plans.

407 The Chilean national crime prevention strategy provides for a municipal management support fund to finance action under municipal public safety plans.

City development strategies in particular have provided the context and framework for partnerships and coordination of activities which, although often not termed crime prevention per se, involve partnership approaches and community participation. They include improvements to urban areas and the health, well-being and safety of citizens. Many of these multi-agency strategies have been launched in different countries: *Le Service Politique des Grandes Villes* (Belgium); *Grands Projets Urbains and politique de la ville* (France); the 'Social City' (Germany); Major Cities Policies phase III 2005-2009 and Justice in the Community (Netherlands); Durban and Johannesburg, South Africa⁴⁰⁸; urban renewal approaches in Bogotá; and the work of the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (England and Wales). These strategies are often linked to broader social and economic development goals (e.g. Nairobi's Safer Cities Initiative; and in South Africa and Honduras).

Nevertheless, scale of violence experienced in cities of Latin America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, presents a huge challenge to policies initially designed to prevent crime and violence in European and Western countries.

The success of the violence reduction strategies in Medellin and Bogotá⁴¹¹, Colombia has been attributed to a number of factors including strong leadership, civil society involvement, and governance approaches bringing together multiple actors and sectors to reduce the city's homicide rates.

Some national strategies in developing countries have demonstrated **approaches which both strengthen institutions and build partnerships** with civil society organizations. The Kenya Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Program (2004-2009),⁴¹² for example, included crime prevention and police and law reform, as key policy components of its programme on Public Safety and Security. This included partnerships between a broad range of government security and welfare services, as well as civil society organizations, and the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA). Others have developed crime prevention strategies with a particular focus on the development of capacity amongst civil society organizations (Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association⁴¹³).

In some cases, particularly in countries lacking resources, establishing specific bodies or partnership structures remains uncertain. Many partnerships are formed for specific projects, often between civil society organizations, government bodies and international organizations to undertake work on a national level or on specific policy issues. The Nigeria Drug Abuse Control programme, working with street children and

UN Habitat State of the World's Cities 2008/9: Harmonious Cities

'A society cannot claim to be harmonious if large sections of its population are deprived of basic needs while other sections live in opulence....'

A Harmonious city promotes unity within diversity. Harmony within cities hinges not only on prosperity and its attendant benefits, but on two pillars that make harmony possible: equity and sustainability....'

Today the concept of harmony encapsulates more modern concepts, such as environmental sustainability, equity, gender parity, inclusiveness and good governance....'

Harmony has now become the theoretical foundation for deepening understanding of the social, economic, political and environmental fabric of cities in order to create a more balanced society....'

It recognizes that tolerance fairness, social justice and good governance, all of which are inter-related, are as important to sustainable urban development as physical planning.⁴⁰⁹

The 2008/9 State of the World's Cities report 'Harmonious Cities', in addition to continuing to monitor patterns of growth and contraction in the world's cities, provides information on rates of income inequality within cities. It warns in particular that cities are becoming more unequal in Latin America and Southern Africa with implications for their stability and security (outlined in more detail in Chapter 1). However, it stresses the role that governments have had in driving particular patterns of urban growth, and the key role that mayors and political leaders have played at the local level in reducing and mitigating urban inequality during periods of growth. The report calls for the development of coordinated governance between local, regional and national level governments, particularly in city-regions, to allow more effective management and distribution of resources and infrastructure development beyond municipal boundaries. This emphasis on the key role of urban planning in addressing the challenges of urban expansion (and contraction) are reiterated in their subsequent report, *Planning Sustainable Cities - Global Report on Human Settlements 2009*.⁴¹⁰

408 The Inner City Thekwini Regeneration and Urban Management Programme (iTrump) and JOBURG 2030 developed in close cooperation with South African Police Service and the Gauteng Department of Community Safety. Joburg City Safety Strategy.

409 UN Habitat (2009) The State of the World's Cities 2008/2009: Harmonious Cities. UN Habitat: Nairobi.

410 Web version available on UN Habitat website <http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/getPage.asp?page=bookView&book=2831>

411 Velasquez E. (2008) *Governance of Security in the Light of the Experience of Bogotá*. In International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives. Montreal: ICPC, p: 214-15.

412 See the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector Reform Program Website: <http://www.gjlos.go.ke/>


413 In Kampala taxi drivers were trained in the 1990s to be 'crime preventors'. See ICPC International Report 2008.

commercial sex workers, is an example of such a short-term project-limited partnership.⁴¹⁴ This emphasizes the need for greater attention to the importance of building capacity and government-civil society links to sustain partnership working.

Violence Prevention and Urban Governance in Medellín, Colombia

Parts of Latin America have seen considerable delegation of powers to municipalities, as a result of democratic reform and policies of decentralisation,⁴¹⁵ which has facilitated some of the most sustained examples of successful reductions in violence. They have demonstrated innovation in urban governance, often with key mayoral figures at their helm standing outside mainstream national politics. Cities such as Bogotá and Medellín in Colombia have seen spectacular reductions in homicide rates over the long term through various municipal programmes, involving a mixture of police reform, civil society engagement, conflict resolution, urban regeneration, and social prevention.

Homicide Rates per 100,000 inhabitants. Medellín. 1990 to 2007



Medellín, for example, experienced the highest rate of homicide in the world in 1991 at 381 per 100,000, which although halving over the next 10 years, remained one of the highest rates of homicide globally. A central problem for the city was the control exerted over many areas of the city by armed groups of drug traffickers, paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups and organised territorial protection. As one mayor put it, 'during those years in Medellín there was an absence of the state... and various criminal groups were able to exert territorial control and violence in the majority of areas.'⁴¹⁶ However, between 2002 and 2007 rates in the city fell from 174 to 29 per 100,000, a startling achievement.

Although the various projects and initiatives undertaken in these cities make it impossible to ascribe one reason for these falls, these achievements are characterized by the key role of their mayors in initiating local analysis of violence problems, multi-sector partnerships, and investing in the institutionalisation of urban security policies sustainable over the longer term. They have largely removed security policies from electoral politics, and while still supporting criminal justice agencies, have emphasized the prevention of violence rather than law enforcement.

Mayors in Colombia have been elected since 1988, and in 1991 decentralisation reforms led to new powers for Mayors as chiefs of police with responsibility for public order and *convivencia* (coexistence)⁴¹⁷ in their cities.

414 A Dutch NGO (BAOBAB) undertook work on linkages between drug abuse and broader socio-economic and cultural issues in Lagos, Port Harcourt and Kano in collaboration with the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and UNODC. Based on the findings of and the needs identified through the assessment, the project will develop appropriate interventions for drug abuse prevention among the target groups. Universities, non-governmental organizations and other UN agencies are also to be involved, strengthening the basis for enhanced inter-agency co-operation in the future. At the end of the project, a prevention programme tailored to the specific needs of the target group will be operational in the three cities.

415 Satterthwaite D. (2009) *What Role for Mayors in Good City Governance?* Environment and Urbanization, 21:3-17.

416 Quoted in Acerco Velásquez, H. and Cardona, S. (2009) *Medellín, Bogotá : Del autoritarismo y anarquía a la garantía civilista de los derechos ciudadanos. Mejoría de la seguridad ciudadana* : 5

(Available HTTP: <http://www.convivenciayseguridadciudadana.com/contenido/imagenes/stories/medell%EDn%2C%20bogota%2C%20seguridad.pdf>)

417 Convivencia has overtones of coexistence and tolerance.

Violence Prevention and Urban Governance in Medellín, Colombia

They were given powers to raise revenue. Mayors in Bogota between 1994 and 2000 used these powers to institutionalise their role in security provision through local regulation to control the consumption of alcohol, and the carrying of guns in public spaces. The institutionalization of crime prevention was achieved through the creation of a multi-agency Security Council (based on French models of *contrat de sécurité*), and a long term strategy covering all aspects of the governance of security from prevention to the judicial system.⁴¹⁸ Mayors in Medellín were slower to use their powers to address security, but from 2002 they began to take steps to institutionalise responsibility, echoing the Bogota model, and focussed their attention on areas with the highest rates of violence, controlled by armed groups.

Following negotiation with area leaders, identified through the Peace and Reconciliation programme, *Proyectos Urbanos Integrales* (Integrated Urban Projects) the city undertook large scale investment to provide public services to informal settlements on the mountainsides surrounding the city, particularly transport, education, housing, and green space.⁴¹⁹ These were presented as an investment in the city as a whole, stressing solidarity and the need to reduce inequality and promote opportunity.⁴²⁰ Key to this was the ability of the municipality to work with civil society organizations, whose presence in, and knowledge of their neighbourhoods, as well as their legitimacy within them, had sustained their independence from armed groups in preceding years, gave the local authority a means to establish contact with the communities.

Various examples of successful local security policies demonstrate the importance of building citizens' trust in public institutions, and in promoting their participation in decision-making and in the delivery of services relating to community safety and their quality of life.

3. Building Legitimacy: new (and old) challenges to be faced

As discussed in Chapter 1, recent research and experience suggests that **levels of fear of crime and sense of insecurity can increase when there is a decline in confidence in public bodies**. This applies to all agencies with coercive powers, such as social services, schools using their disciplinary powers, local government and housing authorities with their powers to evict, but especially to agencies such as the police and the judicial system. Police in countries with a recent history of military dictatorship, or ex-colonial or ex-apartheid policing are likely to lack legitimacy with many sectors of the population. Confidence cannot be built by asserting the effectiveness of services. **Legitimacy needs to be built through structures of accountability and the participation of civil society in the governance of security.**

3.1 The legitimacy of penal responses

A key concern among international organizations in recent years has been the effectiveness of criminal justice responses to high rates of violence. In particular a low rate of prosecution of homicide cases undermines public confidence in criminal justice and the rule of law, contributing to a sense of impunity. In Africa, for example, the chances of a murder resulting in a conviction are only around 11% (18% in South Africa) compared to 56% in the US, and 61% in the UK.⁴²¹ Issues of immunity and impunity are particularly stark where homicides involve the murder of women and "honour killings". In some parts of the world police may not investigate when crimes are described as 'crimes of passion'.⁴²² Elsewhere there is concern that the deaths of women have not received attention from the police, as in the case of femicides in cities in Mexico and Central America, or missing Aboriginal women in Canada,⁴²³ which highlights a lack of attention by the police and local authorities in these cases. High levels of corruption and incidents of extrajudicial punishment and killing (see Box on Violence Committed by State Agencies, Chapter 1) obviously exacerbate a lack of confidence and fear of security services, undermining the legitimacy of services and exposing victims to further abuse, without recourse to justice. Victims are often unable to find justice for these abuses.

418 Acerco Velásquez, H. and Cardona, S. (2009) *Medellín, Bogotá : Del autoritarismo y anarquía a la garantía civilista de los derechos ciudadanos. Mejoría de la seguridad ciudadana*. Available HTTP: <http://www.convivenciayseguridadciudadana.com/contenido/images/stories/medell%EDn%2C%20bogota%2C%20seguridad.pdf>

419 UN Habitat and Universidad Alberto Hurtado (2009) *Guía para la Prevención Local: Hacia Políticas de Cohesión Social y Seguridad Ciudadana*. Nairobi: UN Habitat.

420 Dávila, J. (2009) *Being a mayor: the view from four Colombian cities*. *Environment and Urbanization*, 21: 37-56

421 UNODC (2005) *Crime and Development in Africa*. Vienna: UNODC.

422 GCSKSW (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence*. Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women. Geneva; Geneva Declaration Secretariat.

423 UN In-depth Study of All forms of Violence Against Women Report of the Secretary-General (2006).

For this reason, to deal with issues of impunity, international organizations have tended to focus on criminal justice reform to increase effectiveness, and reduce corruption within criminal justice agencies.⁴²⁴

This is in the context of wider democratic reform and deep distrust of law enforcement agencies.⁴²⁵ An emphasis on democratic accountability in Latin America has also been coupled with a focus on human rights. This is echoed in other contexts in which law enforcement bodies have been and/or remain human rights abusers, such as in Brazil, South Africa,⁴²⁶ India⁴²⁷ and Northern Ireland.⁴²⁸

These and other international initiatives have tended to emphasize developing training and accountability structures, although it is questionable how far such measures alone can produce institutional cultural change (see Chapter 8). Transforming policing practice and addressing corruption also needs to address issues of poor resourcing, poor pay and poor conditions of employment. Reform requires major structural and organizational change, adequate resources and good management. (See the **Contribution** by Julie Berg & Elrena van der Spuy on police reform in the African context).

3.2 Community-Police Relations

Establishing community-based policing and building collaborative relationships between agencies providing security to local communities has been central to a number of national strategies worldwide. This includes Poland and the Warsaw Safety Map programme⁴²⁹; the Policing Plan 2006-10⁴³⁰ in Belize⁴³¹, Vision 2020 and Policing for People in Trinidad and Tobago⁴³²; Neighbourhood/Community Policing in the UK⁴³³; *Policía de Proximidad* in Spain; the Sector Policing programme in South Africa, which emphasize strengthening the capacity of the police to enforce and improve public confidence in policing, and rates of reporting, rather than increasing local capacity for crime prevention or more long lasting participation.

The positive involvement of citizens with the police has traditionally been limited to a role as informants, or as victims reporting offences. In many countries citizen patrols have been encouraged as a form of citizen participation in surveillance and deterrence, reducing opportunities for crime (e.g. Neighbourhood Watch UK; Citizens on Patrol, Belize; *Vecinos en Plan Alerta*, Partido de Morón, Buenos Aires, Argentina). As discussed in the contribution by Berg and van der Spuy, citizen patrols can be of concern if they become aligned with extra-legal enforcement.

There is more evidence of the effectiveness of citizen interventions to resolve and prevent violent conflict through conflict mediation approaches (see Chapter 7) than through surveillance and citizen patrols. A more positive development in many countries is the establishment of permanent units/forums for community participation to foster police-community relations and undertake prevention activities (Crime Police Advisory Services Austria; *Community Policing Forums (CPFs)*⁴³⁴, South Africa; *Police Citizen Liaison Committees, Belize*⁴³⁵). Some participatory governance structures have been implemented in a way that promotes the inclusion of young people in decision-making (see Box on Participatory governance in Rosario, Argentina).

In Australia, New Zealand and Canada, improving relationships between indigenous peoples and the police has been supported through collaborative approaches that sensitize police to injustice, issues of colonization, discrimination and social exclusion. Indigenous culture, alongside the promotion of traditional dispute resolution, has been a key focus for crime prevention policy.

Responding to urban unrest has been a particular incentive for the development of projects to rebuild poor relationships between police and local communities, especially young people

424 UNODC and World Bank (2007) *Crime Violence and Development: Trends, Costs and Policy Options for the Caribbean*. Vienna/Washington DC: UNODC/World Bank.

425 Hinton M. and Newburn T. (2009) *Introduction: policing developing democracies*. In Hinton M. and Newburn T. (eds.) *Policing Developing Democracies*. Routledge: Oxford, UK, pp. 1-27.

426 For example South Africa saw a 13 percent increase in the number of deaths as a result of police action in 2008 and an eight percent increase in complaints against police. <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79205>

427 Human Rights Watch (2009) *Broken System: Dysfunction, Abuse and Impunity in the Indian Police*. Human Rights Watch.

428 Marks M. and Goldsmith A. (2006) *The State, the people and democratic policing: the case of South Africa*. in Wood, J. and Dupont, B. (eds.) *Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

429 This programme aimed to identify unsafe areas of the city through meetings with local residents. Alongside statistical information were used to map areas of most insecurity and guide police patrols.

430 The Policing Plan 2006-10 includes chapters on 'prevention patrol' described as re-introducing beat policing to provide visible reassurance policing with local Community Police Booths to reduce fear of crime. <http://www.belizepolice.bz/download/policing-plan-2006-2010.pdf>

431 The Belize Police Department mission statement is "The police and community working in partnership for a safer Belize."

432 Vision 2020: Operational Plan 2007-2010: Promoting Effective Government, Trinidad and Tobago.

433 In the England and Wales, for example, Crime and Disorder Partnerships at the local level are also seen as key to building trust in their communities. A new public confidence target was introduced for the police in early 2009.

434 CPFs are statutory bodies that communicate the priorities and needs of a particular neighbourhood to the police services, evaluate police activities and support the accountability of the SAPS to the local community

http://www.saps.gov.za/saps_profile/strategic_framework/strategic_plan/2005_2010/strategic_plan_2005_2010.pdf

435 Police Citizen Liaison Committees operate in San Ignacio, Corozal, Orange Walk, Punta Gorda, Dangriga, Independence.

and ethno-cultural groups.⁴³⁶ Some of these have emphasized participatory approaches to opening a dialogue (see Box on Social Therapy), and an emphasis on cultural exchange to overcome prejudice and increase understanding between different groups (see Chapter 8).

The Social Therapy Approach

Developed by Charles Rojzman some twenty years ago, the objective of this approach is to change socio-institutional practices to achieve “a profound transformation of modes of living and working together.” It works with the notion of a culture of “constructive conflict” with the goal of restoring social bonds. Using tools and practices originating in psychotherapy to help individuals, groups, or institutions that are in conflict, social therapy aims to re-establish cooperation between actors in a neighbourhood such as residents and local officials. Social therapy differs from social mediation in that it is not a matter of finding a way to resolve a conflict, but rather proposes a framework to prevent the conflict from degenerating into violence.

Two types of intervention have been implemented in different countries around the world:

- ✦ Training police, teachers, and social workers
- ✦ Projects to respond to targeted problems such as violence in schools

This method has recently been implemented in the francophone suburbs of Montreal-North, in Canada, in the wake of riots and conflicts which have divided the police and the population of the neighbourhood.

Sources : <http://www.therapie-sociale.com>
Rojzman, Charles (2008). *Sortir de la violence par le conflit: une thérapie sociale pour apprendre à vivre ensemble*. Paris : La Découverte.

Good governance in crime prevention rests heavily on the legitimacy of public institutions, including the penal system. However, while the public institutional framework remains

central, an increasing number of private institutions are emerging as new players in security. This raises questions concerning the regulation and supervision of their activities.

4. Regulation of the Private Security Sector

4.1 The growth of the private security sector

There has been an enormous growth in the private security sector worldwide, particularly in developing countries. In many countries, the unregulated private security industry far outstrips the regulated and the state security services. In Africa and Latin America concerns have centred on the inequality of security produced by a growth in the use of private security. In 2009 the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala estimated there were around 82,000 private guards, mostly unregulated and all of them armed, compared to an army of 12,000 and 19,000 public police⁴³⁷. There can also be considerable blurring of the lines between state and private security services, with 70 per cent of police in Brazil, for example, reportedly working off duty as private security guards in 2000.⁴³⁸

Developing countries with a growing urban middle class, such as India and China, are also seeing an expansion of the private security industry. In 2008 there were estimated to be 10,000 private security companies in India with 5 million employees.⁴³⁹

Western European countries and North America have also seen new security governance partnerships with the public sector contracting out patrol and investigation services to private security services.⁴⁴⁰

There have been **increasing concerns raised worldwide about standards of practice and the accountability of private security services**. In particular, these have focused on the extent of their use of coercive powers (including use of arms), the screening and training of recruits, lack of criminal liability (particularly in Afghanistan), the blurred lines between state and private policing—for private rather than public interest (particularly in Eastern Europe and China⁴⁴¹), employ-

436 Brodeur J-P., Mulone M., Ocqueteau F, and Sagant V. (2009) *Brève analyse comparée internationale des violences urbaines*. ICPC; Montreal.

437 O'Connor A. (2009) *Poorly paid sentries often turn to crime. Guards in Guatemala: Protection and Threat*. *Washington Post*, 24/04/2009.

438 Prillaman W. C. (2003): *Crime, Democracy and Development in Latin America*. Washington: CSIS.

439 Chakrabarti S. (2008) Private security firms for internal security: An idea whose time has come. *South Asia Monitor*, June 26th. URL: <http://www.southasia-monitor.org/2008/June/news/26wsa1.shtml> (Accessed: 23.07.09)

440 Johnston, L. and Shearing, C. (2003) *Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice*. Routledge: London.

441 Concerns have been particularly raised about the development of quasi-private services in Eastern Europe, such as the State Protection Service (Ukraine) and the Police Protection Department (Georgia), since the disbandment of Soviet style state security services. These are state owned but operate as private security firms, securing contracts (protecting private rather than public interests) and with a monopoly on the provision of services and right to bear arms, and in fixing prices. Police advisors to the European Commission Delegation in Georgia have strongly advised the department to be removed, possibly through privatisation. The Security Service Company in China is similarly state owned/run but contracts out its services. An announcement in 2008 (Ordinance on the Management of Security Service) suggested the state will be taking a more hands-off approach to governance of this service. See Hiscock, D. (2006) 'The Commercialisation of Post-Soviet Private Security' in Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (eds) *Private Actors and Security Governance*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers); Grabosky, P., Zhong, L. Y. (2009) *The Pluralization of Policing and the Rise of Private Policing in China*. (Canberra: ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security).

ment of ex-combatants (without requirements to go through Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs) and corruption and extortion (particularly in Eastern Europe and Japan⁴⁴²).

Nevertheless, where there is limited capacity for local security provision, and where corruption and past brutality have delegitimized state police forces, private security firms may be the only and the preferred option.⁴⁴³ In such circumstances the challenge is to include non-state actors in structures of accountability and regulate standards of practice without undermining their separation from the state.

4.2 National Legislative Regulation of the Private Sector

The management of private security services in many countries (see table) is based on legislation to identify companies and their employees (registration records, issuance of identifica-

tion documents or licenses ...), to regulate the use of weapons, and ensure corporate responsibility (financial accountability, civil, criminal ...). Emphasis is also placed on the appearance of private agents so that they are not confused with public officials. Finally, some inspection bodies to oversee the private security industry have been created (see below).

Some countries simply **regulate firms as businesses** (Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Georgia), with regulations to govern the use of firearms or recruitment, while others have established legislation **specifically regulating the sector** (Private Security Regulatory Act 2001 South Africa - establishing the South African Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority; Private Protection and Detective Activity, Russian Federation 1992⁴⁴⁴; Security Service Business Act 1976, South Korea⁴⁴⁵). France has also established a body to promote good practice and ethical professional guidelines within the security sector (*Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité*).⁴⁴⁶

Legislation Regulating the Private Security Industry⁴⁴⁷

Country	Year	Details
Africa		
South Africa	2001	Private Security Regulatory Act. Created the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
Angola	1992	Law of 31 on Private Security Companies
Burkina Faso	1997	Decree on Private Security Companies
Cameroon	1997	Law on Private Guarding Services
Democratic Republic of Congo	1998	Ordinance on Private Security Companies
Kenya	2004	Private Security Bill
Mauritius	2004	Private Security Services Bill
Mozambique	1990	Decree on Private Security Companies
Namibia	2002	Security Officers and Security Enterprises Act
Nigeria	1986	Private Guard Companies Act
Senegal	2003	Decree on Private Guarding, Surveillance and Cash Transportation Act
Zimbabwe	1978	Private Investigators and Security Guards Act.

442 DCAF (2008) Abstracts of Japanese Legislation Related to Private Security.

Available at http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20JapaneseLaws_0.pdf (Accessed: 22.07.09).

443 Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing (2003) *The Governance of Security in Weak and Failing States*. Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, No. 4 : 331-349 (2003).

444 To be amended January 2010 to include entrance requirements, licensing procedures and criminal liability.

445 Lee C. M. (2008) *A Comparative Study on the Regulation of Private Security in the United States and South Korea*. Journal of Applied Security Research, 3, 2: 157 — 170.

446 All EU member states have specific laws covering private security, CoESS (2004) *Panoramic Overview of Private Security Industry in the 25 Member States of the European Union*. (CoESS) Available at COESS website: <http://www.coess.org/pdf/panorama1.pdf>; <http://www.coess.org/pdf/panorama2.pdf>; <http://www.coess.org/pdf/panorama3.pdf>

See also Born H., Caparini M., Cole E. (2006) *Regulating Private Security Companies in Europe: Status and Prospects*. Geneva: Council of Europe. Available at : <http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/psmc-regulation-database>

447 Largely based on information collected by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces with support from the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Further information available at <http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/psmc-regulation-database>

Eastern Europe		
Russia	1992	Law on Private Protection and Detective Activity in the Russian Federation to be amended 2010
Ukraine	2008 2006	Law on Private Detective Services Law on Private Security Activities
Croatia	2003	Law on Private Security
Hungary	1998	Act on Private Security and Investigation Services
Kosovo	2008	Draft Law on Private Security Companies
Macedonia	1999	Law on Private Security
Moldova	2003	Law on Private Security and Detective Activities
Poland	2001	Law on Private Detective Services
Romania	2003	Law on Private Security and Guarding Services
Slovakia	2005	Law on the Provision of Private Security Services
Slovenia	2003	Law on Private Security Services

South and Central America		
El Salvador	1994	Decree 818 giving the police service powers to 'exercise oversight and supervision over all mechanisms which might emerge from civil society'. ⁴⁴⁸
Mexico	2009	Federal Law on Private Security (<i>Ley Federal de Seguridad Privada</i>). ⁴⁴⁹
Argentina	1999	Ley 12.297- <i>Seguridad Privada en la Provincia</i> ⁴⁵⁰
Brazil	1983	Law put Ministry of Justice in charge of regulating the private security industry, delegated to the federal police, which was underpinned by legislation confirming their role in 1995. ⁴⁵¹
Belize	2002	Private Security and Investigation Services Act. ⁴⁵²
Chile	1981	Law Regulating the Activities of Private Security Guards
Colombia	2002	Decree Regulating Private Security Companies
Costa Rica	2003	Law on Private Security Services
Ecuador	2003	Law on Protection and Private Security Services
Guatemala	2003	Draft Bill on Private Security and Investigation Services
Honduras	1998	Law on National Police and Private Security Services
Panama	1992	Decree on Private Security Companies
Paraguay	2007	Draft Bill on Private Security Services
Peru	2006	Law on Private Security
Uruguay	1999	Decree on Private Security Services
Venezuela	2004	Ministry of Defence Instructions on the Register of Private Security Companies

448 In addition to registration and training (through the National Public Security Academy) requirements this law requires an insurance deposit to cover damages. Call C. T. (2000) *Sustainable Development in Central America: The Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity*. Hamburg: Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde.

449 In addition to registration and training requirements (criminal record and record of conduct in other security organizations) this restricts holding state function while working for a private security firm, and encourages cooperation between private and state security. The State Secretariat of Public Security is the responsible authority with powers to withdraw and renew registration on a National Register of Private Security Companies. Santamaria Andrade, Ernesto Emiliano (2009) *Seguridad Privada, ¿bajo control?* Mexico. *Procedimientos Policiales International: Seguridad Privada*. Entry of 19/04/2009. URL: http://procedimientospolicialessegurprivada.blogspot.com/2009_04_01_archive.html (Accessed: 09/07/09).

450 This law particularly addresses issues around private security intervention in political, trade union or religious conflicts, racial or other profiling and data protection. It also regulates employment requirements, training and cooperation with the police (especially during emergencies/catastrophes).

451 Registration requires citizenship of Brazil and capital financing of R\$110,000. It also requires training through a government approved programme. Lora Cristian and Morales Gabriel (2004) *Argentina sitiada por fuerzas de seguridad privada*. URL: <http://www.rebelion.org/noticias/2004/8/3869.pdf> (Accessed: 09/07/09).

452 Belize has also introduced a register of all private security and investigation organizations and reinforced regulation of the acquisition of firearms for security professionals. Companies are responsible for the way the arms are used, not the individual and arms are registered with the company.

North America		
Canada	2005-2008	New legislation has been introduced since 2008 in: Alberta (Security Services and Investigators Act 2008); British Columbia Security Services Act 2008; Ontario Private Investigators and Security Guards Act 2008; Nova Scotia is in the process of revising the existing Private Investigators and Private Guards Act. Other legislation is also relatively recent: New Brunswick Private Investigators and Security Service Act 2007; Manitoba Private Investigators and Security Guards Act 2005; Quebec Private Security Act 2006.
Asia		
India	2005	Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act).

Requirements for training of private security employees are particularly variable, ranging from one hour in Texas (USA), to 32 hours in France and 300 hours in Poland. More generally, **compliance with this regulation** may be difficult to obtain in countries where government resources are scarce. **Too close a relationship between police and private security agencies limits the capacity for police authorities to regulate the private security sector.** Some existing legislation fails to ensure a sufficient separation between state and private security sectors, or to ensure that regulation is undertaken at an appropriate level, and at a distance from operational collaboration in policing. Even where private security personnel have left the state service, informal links may assist in gaining contracts, contributing to corruption, and securing immunity from enforcement of regulatory standards and from prosecution⁴⁵³. (See **Contribution** by Julie Berg and Elrena van der Spuy for further discussion of private security regulation in Africa).

On the other hand, in many countries in Latin America and in India **strong legislative regulation has been blamed for discouraging registration, and encouraging the expansion of an illegal private security sector** bypassing regulations and the expensive standards they entail.⁴⁵⁴

Differences between national and, in federal states, provincial regulatory standards, and the competitive advantage for security companies registered and operating in jurisdictions with weak regulatory requirements, has resulted in **calls for harmonization** of legislation, from international organizations, federal legislatures and private security associations.

The Council of Europe⁴⁵⁵ and security industry trade associations have particularly lobbied for harmonization of legislation

regulating the private security industry across the EU.⁴⁵⁶ Its potential will be assessed by the European Commission by December 2010 (see box).

Council of Europe Recommendations for Minimum Standards for Private Security Regulation⁴⁵⁷

A number of these recommendations stress the need for **cooperation but separation of state and private sector security functions**.

They outline recommendations for the initial authorization, periodic licensing and regular inspection by public authorities, at the appropriate level, of private security organisations.

They promote minimum standards, in particular, that:

- ♦ Staff wear a uniform different from that of the police
- ♦ Carry identification documents
- ♦ Have adequate training, including:
 - ♦ A basic understanding of criminal law,
 - ♦ Knowledge of surveillance and security techniques
 - ♦ Knowledge of the rights, obligations and responsibilities of staff
 - ♦ Knowledge of the norms of appropriate behaviour towards the public.

They also encourage the industry to adopt its own regulations.

453 Berg J (2007). The Accountability of South Africa's Privat Security Industry. Mechanisms of control and challenges to effective oversight. Newland: Open Society Foundation.

454 Wood J. and Cardia N. (2006) Brazil. In: Jones T. and Newburn T. (eds.) (2006) *Plural Policing: A comparative perspective*. New York: Routledge. Call C. (2000) *Sustainable Development in Central America: The Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity*. Hamburg: Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde.

455 In June 2002 the Council adopted a recommendation that national authorities of member states responsible for the private security sector should cooperate more in the future, particularly around issues of handling information.

456 The 2008 European Private Security Summit released a press release urging for action on regulating the sector EU-wide. CoESS (2008): Press release "Industry calls on Europe to recognize growing role of private security and create an integrated policy framework". Available at: http://www.coess.eu/conf2008/1_PR_CoESS_Private_Security_Summit.pdf (Accessed June 26th 2009)

457 Recommendation No. R (87) 19 on the organization of crime prevention.

There have also been a number of **reforms of regulatory legislation in provinces of federal states**, such as Canada (particularly since 2008)⁴⁵⁸ and Australia (2003-2005),⁴⁵⁹ bringing provinces closer to harmonization, although there remains considerable variation in criteria for registration between provinces. Concerns also remain about the extent to which this new legislation can be enforced.⁴⁶⁰ Some federal states, such as India (since 2005) and, most recently Mexico (2009), have introduced **federal legislation**. In India, however, only seven states had adopted the legislation by December 2008 and around eighty per cent of the industry is estimated to be unregulated.⁴⁶¹

A final trend is seen in the regulation of private security firms and the self-regulation of the private sector and its joint activities with public services. **Partnership arrangements** have been developed to allow exchange of information on crime trends and industry requirements to encourage greater cooperation (e.g. Atlanta Communications Network COMNET; Dallas Law Enforcement and Private Security initiative (LEAPS); Baltimore County Police and Private Security Association; New York Police Department's Area Police Private Security Liaison Program (APPL)), which has assisted in facilitating informal contact and police oversight of private sector activities⁴⁶².

In many other countries where regulation of the private security industry has been weak and where companies have sought greater credibility and legitimacy, there has been a **growth of security sector professional associations**. These can be numerous and have fluctuating membership, but they **promote self-regulation** and have been credited with improving standards, such as through the development of professional codes of conduct. Some have been involved in lobbying their governments for greater state legislative regulation to protect legitimate security firms from competition from unregulated firms (ASIS, USA; Australian Security Industry Association Ltd (ASIAL)⁴⁶³; Security Club, Czech Republic).⁴⁶⁴

In the context of security policies, we should note the progress of integrated approaches to regulating the private sector, combining legal regulation, certification, training and supervision of the private security industry, as well as promoting self-regulation and cooperation with state services. This approach is part of a trend towards strengthening the capacities of other sectors of civil society.

5. Developing the Role of Civil Society in Crime Prevention

5.1 Variety of purposes

In our 2008 report, we outlined some of the ways in which civil society can be involved in crime prevention, one of the key recommendations of the UN Guidelines. Two goals were outlined: public participation in defining local needs, including through local diagnoses of security, and public participation in implementing strategies.

Building capacity for crime prevention within civil society, often in conjunction with international NGOs, has become a recognized aspect of approaches to security sector reform in developing countries or in post-conflict situations. The Trinidad and Tobago Citizen Security Programme, a six-year programme sponsored jointly by the Government and the Inter-American Development Bank, for example, includes support to strengthen NGOs and fund small-scale crime prevention initiatives.⁴⁶⁵ Community-based crime violence prevention programmes in El Salvador have similarly used competitive bidding from small organizations to undertake initiatives in their communities.⁴⁶⁶ In Brazil, PRONASCI is a federal government programme which began in 2007 and includes a major component to strengthen civil society and community-based initiatives.⁴⁶⁷

Where institutions are weak, civil society organizations can play a pivotal role in building crime prevention capacity amongst other smaller community organizations.

458 See eg. Robertson B. (2009) Regulatory update: Private security regs to change in five provinces. *Canadian Security Magazine*, June 2009.

URL: <http://www.canadiansecuritymag.com/News/Regulatory-update-Private-security-regs-to-change-in-five-provinces.html> (Accessed: 15.07.09);

Cukier, W., Quigley, T., Susla, J. (2003) 'Canadian regulation of private security in an international perspective'. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 31: 239 – 265.; Taylor-Butts, A. (2004) Private Security and Public Policing in Canada, *Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics*, Vol. 24, no. 7.

459 See Earle K., Sarre R., Prenzler T. (2007) *Developments in the Australian Security Industry*. *Flinders Journal of Law Reform*, 10 : 403 – 417. See further details of regulation at <http://www.asial.com.au/Legislationandregulationsyoushouldknowabout>

460 Cukier W., Quigley T. Susla J. (2003) *Canadian regulation of private security in an international perspective*. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 31 (2003) 239 – 265.

461 Chakrabarti S. (2008) *Private security firms for internal security: An idea whose time has come*. *South Asia Monitor*, June 26th.

URL: <http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2008/June/news/26wsa1.shtml> (Accessed: 23.07.09)

462 Lee C. M. (2008) *A Comparative Study on the Regulation of Private Security in the United States and South Korea*. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 3:2, 157 — 170.

463 The Australian Security Industry Association has strongly advocated for harmonisation and developed a code for comprehensive licensing. It also works closely with governments through an Independent Advisory Board, which has been involved in negotiating penalties for firms in contravention of regulations. Earle, K., Sarre, R, Prenzler, T. (2007): *Developments in the Australian Security Industry*. *Flinders Journal of Law Reform*, 10, pp. 403 – 417.

464 Ochmannova Petra (2009) *The Regulation of Private Military and Security Services in Czech Republic*. Prague: Priv-War.

465 Inter-American Bank (2007) *Action on Violence Prevention and Promoting Citizen Security: Summary Report*. IDB: Washinton D.C., USA. Web version available at: <http://www.oas.org/csh/english/documents/cp17832e09.doc>

466 Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project in El Salvador, *Boletín Informativo Vol-1 – No.1 – March 2009*.

467 www.mj.gov.br/pronasci

The Crime Prevention Coalition of Nigeria (CPCN), for example, modelled on the Crime Prevention Coalition of America, works with schools, community organizations and law enforcement agencies to promote grass roots crime prevention in Nigeria, particularly through youth diversion and education/training, and working with schools to reduce violence and gang activity. It provides training and information and undertakes awareness-raising campaigns. Similarly, Action for a Safe South Africa attempts to mobilise grass roots action to prevent crime in South Africa.⁴⁶⁸ The involvement of the private sector in crime prevention has also been particularly promoted in South Africa (e.g. Business against Crime)⁴⁶⁹.

In developed countries, civil society organizations are also increasingly recognized as having greater capacity to work with some of the most excluded members of the population.⁴⁷⁰ In the UK, for example, the State's Pupil Referral Units were established to work with children at risk of exclusion, or excluded from school, yet were abandoned in favour of schemes run by a number of charities (The Prince's Trust, Barnardo's, Nacro, Rathbone and Kids Company).

In both developed and developing countries, civil society organisations play a key role in holding local and national governments to account and in influencing debates on policy. Civil society organizations have, for example, played a central role in the promotion of citizen security in Latin America, and

in promoting a human rights perspective in the region.⁴⁷¹ Internationally, civil society organizations have played a central role in promoting children's rights (see **Contribution**: Role of civil society in the promotion of the protection of rights of the child at the end of Chapter 5).

Increasing the capacity of communities to self-govern, to resolve local problems and conflicts, and to engage in local decision-making has also become widely promoted in sustainable crime prevention. Initiatives to increase social capital⁴⁷² and increase capacity for local conflict resolution and problem solving have been a particular feature of urban policy and development approaches, aiming to reduce social exclusion and insecurity. Examples include: *Délégués du Médiateur de la République*, (France)⁴⁷³; Barcelona (Spain) *Projecto Buenos Vecinos*; South Africa National Strategy). The **Contribution** of Brian Payne on 'Community Safety from the Bottom Up: Lessons from Northern Ireland' illustrates how a strong civil society sector has been able to resolve conflicts peacefully and become engaged in wider crime prevention in the long term.

5.2 Participatory Approaches

Decentralization and devolution can provide new opportunities for participation of citizens in decision-making, and in influencing an understanding of local issues and the way in which

Participatory Governance and Budgeting in Rosario, Argentina

The role of elected mayors in Argentina and Brazil has been crucial to the development of local prevention approaches, with a particular emphasis on active citizen participation in local decision-making. Rosario (Argentina), for example, differs substantially from surrounding cities, as it has been run, since democratic reform, by a socialist party pursuing very different social policies to both national and provincial governments. Rosario has the lowest crime rate in the country. Santa Fe, the same province's capital, had a homicide rate four times higher than Rosario in 2007.⁴⁷⁴

The central policy in the city has been to reduce social inequality and is best known for its decentralised approach to participatory governance. With the assistance of Barcelona (Spain), the city was divided in 1996 into six districts, each with a municipal district centre from which local services were run. The city introduced 'participatory budgeting' in these districts, which involved local citizens in decisions about priorities for spending, modeled on the approach used since the early 1990s in Porto Alegre (Brazil).⁴⁷⁵ 30% of the discretionary budget (not committed to capital costs) is distributed equally to the districts to spend according to local priorities.

A key influence in models of *seguridad ciudadana*, is an approach to violence through the lens of conflict, and an openness to conflict mediation and democratic participation approaches, particularly in the management of public space, but also as a means of building an inclusive culture of civility at the city level by channelling conflict within the democratic process.⁴⁷⁶ In essence this works on an assumption that democratic engagement and good governance will reduce violence.

468 See Action for a Safe South Africa website at

http://www.safesouthafrica.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=62:2008-06-10-08-35-27&catid=72:newsflash

469 See Capobianco L. (2005) *Sharpening the Lens: Private Sector Involvement in Crime Prevention*. ICPC: Montreal, for further discussion.

470 ICPC (2008) *Crime prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives*. International Report.

471 González P. (2003) *Seguridad Ciudadana, Cuadernos de seguridad y defensa* 2, Guatemala: FLACSO.

472 Social networks and – often assumed to be – supportive relationships.

473 3338 local access points in disadvantaged neighbourhoods throughout France by the end of 2007.

474 Almansi F. (2009) *Rosario's development: interview with Miguel Lifschitz, Mayor of Rosario, Argentina*. *Environment and Urbanization*, 21:19-57.

475 See World Bank (March 2003) *Case Study 2 - Porto Alegre, Brazil: Participatory Approaches in Budgeting and Public Expenditure Management*. Social Development Notes, World Bank; Washington D.C., USA. web version http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/205481/Porto%20Alegre_English.pdf

476 González, P. (2003) *Seguridad Ciudadana, Cuadernos de seguridad y defensa* 2, Guatemala: FLACSO.

they should be addressed. Many such schemes have been developed with wider aims of urban governance, but including a crime prevention component (e.g. see box on Participatory Governance and Budgeting in Rosario, Argentina).

Public participation can also open the door to, or unwittingly encourage, punitive and exclusionary views.⁴⁷⁷ It is the challenge of participatory crime prevention to reduce tendencies to blame or propose exclusionary approaches, and promote inclusionary approaches able to reinforce democracy and social inclusion. **Developing inclusive and transformatory participatory methods and processes which avoid stigmatizing, blaming and encouraging vigilante punitive responses to crime, is a challenge for practitioners.** This was recognized at a conference on 'Decentralisation, Local Power and Women's Rights: Global Trends in Participation, Representation and Access to Public Services' (November 2008) (see Box).

A number of successful participatory approaches work from the bottom-up. One of the most influential for crime prevention has been the development of women's safety audits, which were initially developed in Toronto Canada, and have been used in a number of Canadian cities, and in France and Belgium from the 1980's through '*femmes et ville*' collectives. These have been adapted to the contexts of African cities involved in the UN HABITAT Safer Cities Programme, used in Poland, Russia, Jamaica, and in England (Making Safer Places Programme 2002-2005), in India (in Mumbai and Delhi), and in Australia (New South Wales) among other places. These involve the identification of safety concerns by local groups of women, enabling

them to propose responses and engage with municipal governments in developing solutions.⁴⁷⁸

Crime prevention that includes, and is initiated by, **indigenous peoples** has also had more sustainable outcomes. There remain ongoing debates; whether participation in decision-making is token or full representation; around assumptions about the transferability of initiatives from other indigenous contexts; as well as debates around collective versus individual rights, particularly in relation to gender equality issues.⁴⁷⁹ There is, however, an increasing move towards strengthening the capacity of indigenous communities, and strengthening leadership, capacity and skills of community members or groups to apply for funds, and manage and evaluate projects so that they are developed by and for indigenous groups.⁴⁸⁰

There has also been an increasing emphasis on the **inclusion of young people's voices in decision-making** at all levels of policy making and implementation. The Child Friendly Cities movement,⁴⁸¹ promoted by UNICEF, and UNESCO's Growing up in Cities Project,⁴⁸² and UN-HABITAT's work on the role of children and youth in urban governance,⁴⁸³ have been particularly influential in this regard, stressing the role of wider society in ensuring the developmental rights of children.⁴⁸⁴ They have stressed the importance of youth participation in ensuring that children's needs and rights are considered and met. UNICEF has produced a guide to youth participation ('UNICEF (2009) 'We've Got Something to Say - Promoting Child and Youth Agency: A Facilitator's Guide' – Manual for programming).⁴⁸⁵

Decentralization, Local Power and Women's Rights: Global Trends in Participation, Representation and Access to Public Services' (November 2008)

This conference organized by the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Government of Mexico, in partnership with a number of UN organizations highlighted the frequent failure of participatory processes to address issues of gender inequality, and their capacity to reinforce structural inequalities by excluding women.

Recommendations were for participatory practice to consider the legal and policy frameworks, traditional practices and social-structural obstacles, including various forms of political violence, limiting women's access to and influence in decentralised spaces of governance.

477 Karn J. (2007) *Narratives Of Neglect: Community, Regeneration and the Governance of Security*. Willan: Cullompton, UK.

478 See for example *Women's Safety Audits: What Works Where?* (2008) Nairobi & Montreal: UN-Habitat & Women in Cities International.

479 Capobianco L. & Shaw M. (2003) *Crime Prevention and Indigenous Communities: Current International Strategies and Programmes*. Montreal, ICPC.

480 Capobianco L. (2006) *Community Safety Partnerships by and with Indigenous People: Trends and Practices Paper*. Montreal, ICPC.

481 Riggio E. (2002) *Child friendly cities: Good governance in the best interests of the child*. Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 14, No. 2: 45-58; See Child Friendly Cities Movement website. http://www.childfriendlycities.org/cgi-bin/cfc/main.sql?file=search_simple_result.sql&lunga=Yes&city=48

482 This UNESCO project enlists the energy, hope and ideals of young people to evaluate their own circumstances, define priorities and create change. It enables the government and advocates to implement participation, the CRC, Habitat Agenda and Agenda 21. See <http://www.unesco.org/most/guic/guicmain.htm> for further details.

483 UN-Habitat (2004) *Youth, Children & Urban Governance*. Policy Dialogue Series No. 2. Nairobi.

484 Bartlett S. (2005) *Integrating Children's Rights into Municipal Action: A Review of Progress and Lessons Learned*. Children's Environment's Research Group.

485 UNICEF (2008) *We've Got Something to Say - Promoting Child and Youth Agency: A Facilitator's Guide – Manual for programming*. UNICEF. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/adolescence/cyguide/files/Weve_Got_Something_To_Say_Facilitators_Guide.pdf

At the local level this can mean community level projects to include young people in crime prevention initiatives. The Peace Squares SulAmerica initiative in Brazil, for example, promotes the participation of young people, and the wider adult community, in transforming public spaces into sites for peaceful coexistence.⁴⁸⁶ Youth participation has also been promoted at the international level through initiatives such as the worldwide Glocal Youth Parliament. Established to create a network of urban youth partnering with local governments and organi-

zations, international institutions and the private sector it aims to include young people's views in the improvement of urban quality of life⁴⁸⁷. UN-HABITAT and ICPC have published the first edition of the *Youth Resource Guide* in 2010, which focuses on youth-led and youth participatory resources⁴⁸⁸. The Guide brings together practical knowledge and initiatives on youth and violence and crime prevention from around the world to promote safer communities.

Good governance is a large concept but a vital aspect of effective crime prevention. It is essential to ensuring that needs are met and resources are available, through diagnosing problems, identifying potential partners, and mobilizing them. Moreover, good governance helps ensure that different points of view (governments and institutions, private sector, community organizations etc. ...) and different components of the community (the public) are all considered.

Good governance also relates to some of the core principles and values of prevention underlying the UN guidelines, including human rights, democracy and inclusion. Reducing crime and improving the quality of life of communities, means taking into account the needs and aspirations of all segments of the population, including the most marginalized.

Good governance and the ability to develop measures or methods that promote good governance vary considerably across countries, but also from one community to another, and over time. There is increasing international attention to the situation in post-conflict countries, in weak or authoritarian states, and low income countries. In such cases state and non-state partnerships for security may be the most feasible, while reconstruction or restoration of peace, and the reduction of corruption and development of trust between the state sector and the population, require a greater focus on supporting and building the capacities of local community resources.

Contribution

Contribution: Delivering effective local crime prevention: why understanding variations in municipal governance arrangements matters

Peter Homel, Australian Institute of Criminology, Australia

For more than a quarter of a century the prevailing logic for local crime prevention has been that since most crime of immediate concern to communities is local (i.e. property crime, antisocial behaviour, vandalism, etc.) then the primary focus for preventive action should also be local. In practice this has meant that those promoting crime prevention action have generally turned to municipal governments as the principal resource for coordinating the delivery of the local preventive responses. This has been based on the assumption that municipal authorities are best placed to understand and reflect the particular needs and problems of their local community and are therefore also best placed to generate and/or deliver the most appropriate prevention interventions for their local communities.

In some countries such as in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, this logic has found its way into nationally mandated legislative measures to support local crime prevention action (e.g. the UK's Crime and Disorder Act 1998). In others countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia, parts of Europe and South America, it has simply been picked up and implemented as a strategy that best suits local circumstances. In those sorts of locations, crime prevention action as a locally organized and delivered initiative simply reflects the fact that the relevant policies and necessary services are more directly within the control of local or regional authorities rather than those at the national level. In other words, how local crime prevention action is organized will be a function of the prevailing local governance arrangements.

The development of local crime prevention action in France in the early 1980s is a good illustration of this. This was the period that led to what became known as the Bonnemaïson model of local crime prevention, an approach that would eventually be emulated in many places around the world. Gilbert Bonnemaïson, a deputy in the French national parliament and mayor of a town

486 See the Website for the Instituto Sou da Paz involved in establishing the project <http://soudapaz.org/en/WhatWeDo.aspx?language=en-US>

487 See the Glocal Youth website - http://www.glocalyouth.org/news/?id=268&id_p=314&lng=en

488 UN-Habitat, ICPC (2010) *Youth Resource Guide. Participate in safer Cities*. Nairobi, Montreal.

near Paris is generally credited with designing the first approach squarely focused on providing a central role for the delivery of crime prevention through local government authorities. The Bonnemaïson approach grew out of the work of a committee he chaired comprising the mayors of major towns and cities from throughout France as well as representatives of key national agencies. The committee's final report⁴⁸⁹ emphasized three themes: solidarity, integration and locality. The Bonnemaïson model stressed that prevention strategies should focus on addressing the problems experienced by disaffected community members (e.g. young people, immigrants, unemployed, etc.) by striving to integrate them in to their local communities thereby reducing the potential risk of them participating in crime⁴⁹⁰

The governance arrangements for the Bonnemaïson model involved an 80-member National Council for the Prevention of Crime chaired by the Prime Minister, Departmental Councils for the Prevention of Crime at the regional level, and at the local level all cities and large towns were encouraged to set up a Local Council for the Prevention of Crime.⁴⁹¹ Local crime prevention activity was organized through the development of detailed local plans that emphasized agency-based prevention involving institutions such as schools, housing authorities and employment and youth support services working together with police and other groups. Crime prevention action itself was funded through a series of contractual arrangements between the national government and the local crime prevention committees that also incorporated the need for close interagency cooperation.

The Bonnemaïson model soon became a prototype, albeit a flexible and malleable one, for local crime prevention action in many other countries across the world. Clear links can be found with specific crime prevention approaches developed over the next decades in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and some other parts of Europe such as Germany and Ireland.⁴⁹² Echoes of this approach can also be found in the crime prevention work of the US Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities and more directly in the National Crime Prevention Council in the USA and through the creation of Local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in the UK and the UK's Crime Reduction Program.⁴⁹³ More recently elements can be found in the new Mexican approach to crime prevention⁴⁹⁴ as well as other countries.

In practice the international experience of crime prevention initiatives that have relied on strong links with and the support of municipal government is extremely varied.⁴⁹⁵ The reasons for this are also varied and quite complex, however one of the key ones is a function of the different powers and responsibilities of different municipal authorities across the world. There are several ways to look at this, but they all point to the need for local crime prevention governance arrangements to adequately reflect the wider social, economic and political context in which they are being implemented.

Municipal governments across the world have different levels of responsibility, power and access to resources. These factors are not just a function of whether the municipality is located in a developed country or a developing one. For example, France, Canada, United States of America, India, Germany, Italy, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia are all examples of nation states that operate under some form of federal system. In other words, these countries have a national government but constitutionally are a confederation of internal states all of which will retain a level of power in relation to human, social and economic factors, including some taxation power. Municipal government in these countries is effectively a third tier of government.

Typically municipal governments within federal countries will have the authority to raise some level of taxes but their capacity and responsibility for service delivery will vary considerably. For example, municipal government in the USA will generally have significant responsibility for police, justice, education, housing and health services, while in a country like Australia responsibility for these services will be the responsibility of the state or second tier of government.

489 Bonnemaïson, Gilbert (1982) *Face à la délinquance: Prévention, répression, solidarité - Rapport au Premier ministre*. Paris: Premier ministre: Documentation française.

490 Crawford A. (1998) *Community Safety Partnerships: Managerialist tensions and threats*. Criminal Justice Matters, 33, 4-5.

491 Sutton A., Cherney A. & White R. (2008) *Crime prevention: principles, perspectives and practices*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

492 Homel P. (2009) *Lessons for Canadian crime prevention from recent international experience*. Institute for the Prevention of Crime Review. Volume 3: 13-39.

493 Homel P., Nutley S., Tilley N. & Webb B. (2004) *Investing to deliver. Reviewing the implementation of the UK Crime Reduction Programme*. Home Office Research Study no. 281. London: Home Office.

494 Mexican Ministry of Public Security (1998) *Neuvo Modelo Policial*. Government of the Republic of Mexico.

495 Hope T. (1995) *Community crime prevention*. In Tonry M and Farrington DP (eds.) *Building a safer society. Strategic approaches to crime prevention*. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press: 21-90 ; Sherman L., Farrington D., Welsh B. & Layton McKenzie D. (2002). *Evidence-based crime prevention*. London: Routledge ; Sutton A., Cherney A. & White R. (2008) *Crime prevention: principles, perspectives and practices*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

The other common model of national government is known as a unitary model. A unitary model is a system of government in which the powers of the separate constituent parts are vested in the national government. Examples of unitary government systems are the United Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Russia. Arguably China is a unitary government system as well, although the complexity of the systems of governance in China mean it is better described as a hybrid of a federal and unitary system. Israel also has its own variation on the unitary government system. Municipal governments also exist as a part of all unitary systems as a second tier of government. However, once again their levels of responsibility, power and access to resources will vary significantly. For example, within the UK local government will provide education but not health services while also being responsible for a wide range of social services. At the same time, police services are also organized on a regional basis with a level of autonomy from central government but without any significant linkage to local government except through designated processes. By contrast, local government in New Zealand, like in Australia, has very little direct responsibility for the provision of significant human or social services and very limited control over any major economic issues.

Understanding how the organization, powers and responsibilities of municipal government varies within different forms of government in different countries across the world is critical to understanding how to go about implementing the appropriate type of crime prevention governance arrangements. It can also help to explain why similar carefully and systematically developed crime prevention action directed at problems in local communities and delivered through municipal governments may be more successful within one national system than it is in another, regardless of the overall level of development within that nation or the resources available for its implementation. It also helps to explain why the original Bonnemaïson model, which arose from a federal system, required such significant adaptation and modification whenever it was transferred to another country with different governance arrangements, or indeed why some attempts to implement the Bonnemaïson model simply failed even when implemented in a federal system, such as in South Australia in the 1990s.⁴⁹⁶

Crime prevention is a sophisticated shared management enterprise. The process for establishing an optimal management arrangement for any shared enterprise is known as governance and the achievement of good governance is a key goal for delivering effective crime prevention programs. Properly placing municipal government into this framework has to be guided by an understanding of what is possible and what is not.

Contribution

Community Safety from the Bottom Up: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Brian Payne, Queens University

We have, in recent years, witnessed a shift in crime-control practices away from the police towards policing and, more broadly, from government to governance.⁴⁹⁷ It is no longer appropriate to assume that the security of public places is the essential responsibility of public authorities.⁴⁹⁸ Central to this shift has been the debate over the role of civil society in the development of local crime and safety politics,⁴⁹⁹ with many crime and reduction partnerships constructed on the premise that, "the mobilisation of local knowledge is fundamental to the construction of just and democratic forms of security governance".⁵⁰⁰ In the United Kingdom this policy has led to community safety being placed at the heart of the place-shaping role of local authorities, albeit, as a 'top-down', managerialized and majoritarian brand of crime and disorder reduction.⁵⁰¹

In Northern Ireland, nearly thirty years of violent conflict has led to a very different relationship between civil society and the state than experienced elsewhere in the UK. During its course, the conflict claimed the lives of over 3,000 people and was fought out between the state – British Army, locally recruited soldiers, the police, courts and prisons – and Republican armed groups, principally the IRA and Loyalist armed groups.⁵⁰² One of the symptoms of the conflict is that Northern Ireland has been less exposed to the globalized erosion of 'community' and has a strong history of proactive civil society and highly mobilized political communi-

496 See also Sutton A, Cherney A & White R (2008). *Crime prevention: principles, perspectives and practices*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

497 Loader, I. (2000) *Plural Policing and Democratic Governance*. *Social and Legal Studies* 9/3, pp323-45.

498 Crawford, A. (2006) *Policing and Security as "Club Goods": The New Enclosures*. In Wood, J. and Dupont, B. (eds.), *Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 111-38.

499 Van Swaaningen R. (2008) *Sweeping the street: civil society and community safety in Rotterdam*. In Shapland J. (ed), *Justice, Community and Civil Society: A contested terrain*. Willan: Cullompton.

500 Johnston L. and Shearing, C. (2003). *The Governance of Security*. London: Routledge. p:140.

501 Hughes G. and Rowe M. (2007) *Neighborhood policing and community safety: Researching the instabilities of the local governance of crime, disorder and security in contemporary UK*. *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 7, pp317-346.

ties.⁵⁰³ During the conflict, the criminal justice system was used as a counter-insurgency measure ensuring that the state justice system came to be viewed as an enemy combatant by large sections of society in Northern Ireland. The resulting "crisis of legitimacy"⁵⁰⁴ created a justice vacuum that was filled for many years by paramilitary policing, and later with the development of Community-based Restorative Justice projects that took ownership of justice by providing non-violent and lawful alternatives to paramilitary punishment attacks.⁵⁰⁵

From the declaration of the Irish Republican Army ceasefire in August 1994 to the onset of power sharing through devolved government, society in Northern Ireland has continued a gradual but remarkable transition from conflict to peace. At the centre of this process have been the measures taken to reform the criminal justice system so that it can be held accountable and acceptable by all sections of society and to encourage community involvement and be responsive to the community's concerns.⁵⁰⁶ One manner in which this has been achieved is through building partnerships between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and community restorative justice. Nurturing a strong relationship with the restorative justice projects provides the police with legitimacy in sections of society that they could not have obtained without these projects, or at least not at the same pace.⁵⁰⁷

Bolstered by this success, the Police and other statutory agencies are targeting the implementation of an effective community safety model to further the process of community reengagement. Although remarkable in their deployment, the community safety structures employed in Northern Ireland are conventional and comprise 'Community Safety Partnerships' made up of local residents, community groups, business owners, representatives of statutory agencies, the police and municipal authority elected members, coordinated by a central government 'Community Safety Unit'. In 2006 a review of community safety by Northern Ireland's Criminal Justice Inspectorate reported encouraging progress for the fledgling safety partnerships.⁵⁰⁸ However, the Inspectorate stressed the need to enable greater community involvement in these community safety partnerships.

The extent to which this recommendation has been heeded was unclear until the publication for consultation of the new plan for the next five years of community safety in Northern Ireland⁵⁰⁹. The second section of this article will examine the ramifications of the consultancy document for the role of community members and will discuss the relevance of the document to community safety procedures on the ground.

Who Owns Community Safety in Northern Ireland?

The publication of the new draft consultation document for the next five years has highlighted misgivings about the ownership and implementation of community safety, and that some of the proposed measures appear to be in conflict with what many hold to be the ethos of community safety:

Firstly, there is concern that the conception of community advocated by the NI Community Safety Unit is overly simplistic as it fails to define the differing characteristics and development of community and voluntary groups in local districts.

Secondly, responsibility for the implementation of the vast majority of community safety initiatives has been placed with statutory and professional organisation. Moreover, there is an excessive reliance on professional organisations for the provision of support including services for victims of crime, offenders, and those who are identified as being at risk.

502 Gormally, B. (2005) *Community Restorative Justice – a new bridge between state and people?* Paper given to the Police Service of Northern Ireland Conference on Human Rights and Restorative Justice, Belfast, 1 March 2005

503 Doak J. and O'Mahony D. (2009) *State, Community, and Transition: Restorative Youth Conferencing in Northern Ireland*. In Knepper P., Doak J., Shapland J. (eds) *Urban Crime Prevention, Surveillance And Restorative Justice* (CRC): 149-164.

504 McEvoy K. and Eriksson A. (2006) *Restorative Justice in Transition: Ownership, Leadership and 'Bottom-up' Human Rights*. In Sullivan D. and Tift L. (eds) *The Handbook of Restorative Justice: Global Perspectives*. Routledge: London. pp 321-336.

505 McEvoy K. and Mika H. (2002) *Restorative Justice and the Critique of Informalism in Northern Ireland*. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 42, pp 534-562.

506 Criminal Justice Review Group (2000) *Review of the Criminal Justice System*. Belfast: HMSO.

507 Eriksson A. (2009) *Justice in Transition, Community restorative justice in Northern Ireland*. Willan; Cullompton.

508 Criminal Justice Inspection (2006) *An Inspection of Community Safety Partnerships*. CJINI. <http://www.cjini.org/CJINI/files/9a9ae0e185-f3c4-4409-a8f9-1cbf089d01e8.pdf>

509 Northern Ireland Office (2008) *Together. Stronger. Safer. Community safety in Northern Ireland: A consultation paper*. is a public consultation document which proposes a new draft five year strategy for community safety in Northern Ireland under three key themes: Creating Safer Neighbourhoods, Focus on Families and Young People, and Building Strong Confident Communities..

This echoes academic commentators' observations of UK government attempts to reassert control over sections of society that were abandoned during the conflict.⁵¹⁰ On the ground, however, there is strong evidence that statutory agencies are becoming increasingly reliant on the access that community safety partnerships provide to previously untapped community resources. The Community Restorative Justice projects are once again at the forefront of this movement, helping to develop policy and promote the benefits of community safety to crucial districts across Northern Ireland. Also heavily involved, are coalitions of resident associations and neighbourhood partnerships. For example, in the West Belfast district a number of community safety partnerships have merged to construct a 'policing and criminal justice working group' and an 'alcohol and drugs sub-group'. These initiatives hold statutory agencies accountable and provide vital support to the police, municipal authorities and housing associations at a time of unprecedented fiscal pressure on resources.

In many communities, Republican groups that have traditionally sought to provide their own brand of community security such as the overtly political Safer Neighbourhood Project are increasingly buying into this concept of community safety, though there remain some within these groups opposed to the police. Safer Neighbourhood community workers target problem areas in their districts and then work closely with police and municipal wardens on the ground with potential benefits for the legitimacy of statutory agencies.

It is apparent that community safety in Northern Ireland speaks to the advantages that can be gained when an organized and motivated civil society is able to take ownership of the issues that matter most in their districts. Much of its success has been because it has been driven from the bottom up.

Contribution

Contractualization in the field of crime prevention in France

Eric Lenoir, *Agence Nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances*

Since the early 1980s, the implementation of crime prevention policies in France has rested on local coordination mechanisms and contract procedures between communities and the State, approaches that have been based on territoriality and partnerships. In tandem with the development of urban policy, this approach, promoted by the State, is closely linked to the process of decentralization and the progressive strengthening of the mayor's leadership role in the prevention of crime within the municipality, as enacted by the law of March 5, 2007.

In addition to municipal councils for crime prevention (CCPD) and contracts for preventive actions, local councils for security and prevention (CLSPD) and local safety contracts (CLS) constitute the coordination mechanisms and contract procedures dedicated to crime prevention.

Presently, there are 415 signed and active local safety contracts, of which 35 are considered 'new generation' (CLS NG). In addition, 500 urban social cohesion contracts (CUCS) cover five themes, including the "citizenship and crime prevention" component, which in principle is already covered by the local safety contract if it is within the same territory.

Urban social cohesion contracts new generation local safety contracts are in effect for a period of three-years. Following safety diagnosis, contracts must propose focused and targeted actions. The contract must specify the evaluation indicators and the objectives, the human, operational, and financial means to be used by partners. Specific responses to individual situations is a contract priority.

Policy guidelines are approved by the interdepartmental crime prevention committee (CIPD) which allocates legal, technical, and financial resources for crime prevention. These policy guidelines reflect departmental prevention plans, providing a frame of reference at the departmental level for its participation in local safety contracts. The initiatives developed through local safety contracts and funded by the *Fonds interministériel de prévention de la délinquance* (FIPD) must be compatible with this framework and must be adapted to each context, as well as to the resources of partners.

510 McEvoy and Eriksson (2006) *Restorative Justice in Transition: Ownership, Leadership and 'Bottom-up' Human Rights*. In Sullivan D. and Tift L. (eds.) *The Handbook of Restorative Justice: Global Perspectives* (Routledge): 321-336.

Even if not all contracts produce the same effects, and if the more flexible formula of local safety and crime prevention councils is sometimes preferred, contractualization is often seen as a guarantor for the initiation of action within an integrated approach to crime prevention, bringing together the various partners (the mayor, the police, the district attorney, as well as the *inspecteur d'Académie*, the President of the general council, organizing agencies, the transportation association...).

Resources allocated by the State consist mainly of those allotted through the national agency for social cohesion and equality of opportunity, and by the (Interministerial Foundation for the Prevention of Crime) *Fonds interministériel de prévention de la délinquance* (FIPD, 37.5 million euros in 2008), which are supplemented by urban development policy credits (16 million euros in 2008) and certain work assistance programmes. These State funds have a leveraging effect in mobilizing partners, beginning with territorial communities. The general principle is co-funding with the amount and nature of funds varying according to the project. For example, social workers in the police stations of Val d'Oise benefit from tripartite funding that comes from the State, Departments, and municipalities. FIPD also provides significant support for the development of videoprotection; installation projects can receive between 20% and 50% of total financing costs, and 100% of the costs if they are associated with public security services.

Through these means, a total 4468 local crime prevention projects were funded in 2008. Primarily undertaken by associations, they also involved a large number of cities and some public and private sector actors.

Projects funded ranged from support for the installation or expansion of video-protection systems backed by communities, to prevention of an educational nature (prevention of family violence, prevention of juvenile delinquency, prevention of recidivism, social mediation, parental support programmes...).

Contractualization also facilitates the local design and delivery of prevention through the co-financing of safety audits, local observatories, professional training, and positions for prevention strategy coordinators who contribute to cooperative and sustainable prevention governance.

The government's crime prevention and victims' assistance plan, adopted on October 2, 2009, suggests a revival of crime prevention that is based on mobilizing local safety and crime prevention councils and the development of territory-based safety and crime prevention strategies that will progressively replace local safety contracts.

Contribution

Challenges for the good governance of security in the Africa context

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The nature of security governance in Africa consists of a diversity of state and non-state, formal and informal entities involved in policing. Policing, in other words, is pluralised. According to Bruce Baker, in many African societies there may exist a range of security providers such as informal organized security, state-sanctioned civil guards, religious police, ethnic and clan militias, commercial security companies and so forth.⁵¹¹ In light of the fact that the state does not monopolize the provision of security, and in fact in some cases are the least preferred provider, there is a need to engage with the problems inherent in both state and non-state systems to make best use of the strengths of these two systems while adhering to good governance principles.⁵¹² Good security governance should not only entail accountable, democratic and effective security, regardless of who is offering it, but also security that is delivered equitably. Thus there is the need to invest in state-building to ensure the state has the capacity to engage with non-state policing, and to draw in and regulate the non-state to contribute meaningfully to security on the continent. What follows is a brief overview of some of the key challenges confronting state and non-state security systems.

State-based security governance: challenges for reform

Political transitions towards democracy have been accompanied by elaborate state-building efforts in Africa. These efforts also trickled down to the institutions of the security sector more broadly and the police more specifically. Project *Police Reform* has brought representatives of the state and civil society together and put local delegates in direct contact with international

511 Baker, B. (2008) *Multi-choice Policing in Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

512 Dupont, B., Grabosky, P. and C. Shearing (2003) 'The Governance of Security in Weak and Failing States', *Criminal Justice*, 3:331-349.

counterparts. Public police agencies in Africa are now expected to embrace the core principles of good governance associated with democratic rule and to align their operational practices accordingly. Policy frameworks such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Justice Sector Reform (JSR), pursued under the tutelage of Western development agencies, provide strategic guidance and an increasingly common frame of reference.

In African conversations on state police reform *accountability* is writ large. All of the state police reform initiatives, which have been undertaken in the region, include a significant component of oversight and accountability – such as improving oversight by parliament, human rights bodies and internal complaints mechanisms responsible for investigating police misconduct and public complaints against the police. However, in most of the countries in the region parliamentary oversight of the police is weak and where mechanisms of oversight are provided for in legislation, these bodies are under-resourced by governments and thus struggle to make significant impact.

The translation of good governance principles into routine police practices has been beset with a wide variety of challenges. Africa's police agencies have long been characterised by institutional neglect. The modernisation of ramshackle police institutions in itself thus represents a huge challenge. Furthermore, the forging of a new institutional culture for policing – in which basic democratic values are protected – confront many obstacles. The existence of political will at the centre to reform the police should not be taken for granted.⁵¹³ Civil society capacity to pursue reform agendas through a process of mobilisation and diplomatic engagement with the state has varied from one national location to another. Transitional contexts further present fluidity in the prospects for state police reform. The eruption of old conflicts, the emergence of new patterns of conflict⁵¹⁴ and the rise in crime more generally, so common a feature of transitional societies, create social contexts within which the difficulties of sustaining reform efforts multiply. In such contexts more punitive and militarized responses to criminality are evoked which may threaten reform endeavours relating to civil liberties and human rights of criminal suspects.

Despite earlier optimism the trajectory of democratization in Africa has turned out to be more uneven and shallow than originally anticipated. Good governance in the provision of security on the part of the central state depends on the wider prospects for institutionalising good governance in society at large and for forging enduring alliances across the frontiers of state, market and civil society.

Challenges for drawing in and regulating non-state security governance

In light of the difficulties in reforming state security agencies, there are likewise challenges for regulating the non-state so that it is democratic, (publicly) accountable and equitable and so can work alongside or in partnership with the state.

A major challenge is the potential for non-state initiatives to be patriarchal, unjust and/or violent such as community groups resorting to instant street justice by assaulting a suspect.⁵¹⁵ The inequitable delivery of security by the market is also problematic, in particular the tendency for private security to cater to elite groups through, for instance, gating practices to protect resource-rich sites, such as the protection of oil-rich areas.⁵¹⁶ This is propounded by the lack or inadequacy of a legal framework for regulating domestic private security in many African countries and the exclusion of non-state (community) security from reform efforts on the continent.⁵¹⁷ There is also a perception that African non-state, informal systems are necessarily “oppressive and simplistic”⁵¹⁸ whereas there is a need to recognise that there are those which are susceptible to reform. For instance, Fourchard points out that the Nigerian state police, in the 1980s, ascribed the term ‘vigilante’ to an “old practice of policing” (a community organisation) even though it had contributed to policing for some time.⁵¹⁹ The term vigilante necessarily connotes negative perceptions whereas these groups may be serving a valuable role in their community.

513 Hills, A. (2007) ‘Police Commissioners, Presidents and the Governance of Security’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(3):403-423.

514 Cawthra, G. and R. Luckham (eds) (2003) *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of the Military and Security Establishment in Transitional Democracies*. London: Zed Books.

515 Baker, op cit.

516 Abrahamsen, R. and M.C. Williams (2005a) *The Globalisation of Private Security Country Report: Nigeria*. Aberystwyth: Department of International Politics, University of Wales.

517 Abrahamsen, R. and M.C. Williams (2005b) *The Globalisation of Private Security Country Report: Sierra Leone*. Aberystwyth: Department of International Politics, University of Wales.

Berg, J. (2005) *Overview of Plural Policing Oversight in Select Southern African Development Community (SADC) Countries*. Unpublished Report, Centre of Criminology, University of Cape Town.

518 Elechi, O. (2006) *Doing Justice Without the State: the Afikpo (Ehugbo) Nigeria Model*. New York: Routledge.

519 Fourchard, L. (2008) ‘A New Name for an Old Practice: Vigilantes in South-Western Nigeria’, *Africa*, 78(1):16-40 at 17.

New conceptual tools are thus needed to resolve the regulatory dilemmas that arise in trying to draw in fluid, complex, fragmented and even “hybrid” systems (involving state and non-state players and qualities).⁵²⁰ Based on the difficulties in holding non-state institutions accountable, there is a need for a diversity of regulatory mechanisms, which are innovative and inclusive. The state has an “irreducible role” to play in the formation of this system yet it should also be recognised that “security can only be maintained by the collective will of the people”.⁵²¹ It is also to acknowledge the empirical reality of policing in Africa that often communities rely heavily on alternatives to the state police since the police are feared, mistrusted and often hated. This ties into the state-building project and the need to engage with the whole of society to re-shape state and non-state policing.

The way forward

How should one conceive of the regulatory systems that are needed in light of the fact that state governance does not lend itself well to Western ideals of state-led security service provision? Bearing in mind the capacity of the state, the fact that it is itself in many respects undergoing reform as well as the fact that there is often considerable influence and overlap between the state and non-state sectors. For instance in Nigeria there are no clear-cut distinctions between private and public as the private security industry is permanently supplemented by a state police unit (Mobile Police) making it “difficult to determine where the public policing ends and private security begins”.⁵²²

In light of this, it has been suggested in academic and policy circles that regulatory challenges be resolved through the development of a multi-layered approach to security and accountability⁵²³ through improving the capacity of the state to engage more effectively with communities. However, it still remains a question of what is wanted and needed at a grass roots level. The answers to which can only be found in deliberations amongst all levels of society.

Contribution

French and Italian cities and the governance of urban safety

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Introduction

In two countries characterized by a centralized police system, France and Italy, a growing investment in security by the municipalities has been observed since the 1980s and 1990s, illustrating the institution of city-state partnerships in these matters (local security contracts in France, security contracts in Italy). An examination of the urban safety policies being developed by cities leads to various questions on the role of the state in providing everyday security. In fact, European states have historically been constituted through a process of establishing the state monopoly on the use of force, claiming responsibility for ensuring the safety of property and people within their territory. The entry of non-state actors into the security sector thus impels us to question the role of the state in what can hereafter be called safety governance—in other words, a mode of security production that brings together various kinds of actors that are no longer exclusively state-based.

The jurisdiction of municipalities in matters of public safety

Alongside the national police forces (Police Nationale and Gendarmerie Nationale in France, and the Carabinieri and Finance Guard in Italy) exist the municipal police, who are under the direct authority of mayors, and whose jurisdiction is less extensive than that of the national police. French and Italian mayors have at their command a municipal police force to enforce the bylaws of their territorial unit (or commune) but possess no hierarchical authority over the national police forces.

520 Abrahamsen and Williams (2005b), op cit.

521 Scheye, E., and A. McLean (2006) ‘Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security in Fragile States.’ Paris: OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, p. 3. Dokubo, C. (2000) ‘An Army for Rent’, Private Military Corporations and Civil Conflicts in Africa: The Case of Sierra Leone’, *Civil Wars*, 3(2): 51-64 at 62.

522 Abrahamsen and Williams (2005a), op cit, p. 13.

523 Scheye and McLean, op cit.

Baker, op cit.

The person in charge of maintaining public order (i.e. security of the state and its institutions) at the local level is the Prefect. He or she is the representative of the state on the departmental territory, in France's case, and the provincial territory in Italy's.⁵²⁴ Within the communal territory, it is the mayor who represents the state and who, in this capacity, is the competent authority in matters of public order. As a representative of the state at the commune level, the mayor also plays a judicial role, whereby he or she must conduct investigations and repress crime. The mayor exercises these roles under the authority of the district attorney, the representative of the parquet (or Public Ministry).⁵²⁵

Since the law of 1884,⁵²⁶ French mayors have had urban and rural policing powers, which they enforce on their commune under the authority of the prefect. A French mayor must enforce the "public order, security, safety and health," responsibilities of the "administrative police." The jurisdictional distinction between administrative and judicial police is that the former have crime prevention duties, whereas the latter are involved in crime repression.⁵²⁷ Italian mayors also possess urban and rural jurisdictional authority, which consists of enacting various bylaws with regard to urban cleanliness, vehicle traffic, and noise-producing activities, among others (Ragonesi, 2002: 95).

The law of April 15, 1999⁵²⁸ governs the French municipal police. First of all, this document assigns them responsibilities in matters of road policing.⁵²⁹ The municipal police are further entitled to record the identity of the offenders in order to issue tickets concerning violations of the municipal traffic by-laws or traffic laws. Finally, the law of 1999 calls for the obligatory signature of a cooperation agreement between the mayor and the prefect, upon notice from the district attorney, involving municipal police forces of more than five officers, those that staff the night shift (whereby the schedule is prescribed by law as 11 p.m. to 6 a.m.),⁵³⁰ and those in which officers are armed. As long as a coordination agreement exists, the municipal police officers may be authorized by the prefect, on justified requests from the mayor, to carry a weapon. Moreover, municipal police also have auxiliary functions of "public safety," including dealing with minor and moderate offences, which can only be carried out in collaboration with the national police forces. The decree 2000-276 of March 24, 2000, relating to the carrying of firearms by municipal police, specifies that these officers can be authorized to carry category four (revolver) and category six (defensive baton, tonfas, teargas) weapons.⁵³¹ The list of arms that French municipal police can carry was, moreover, expanded in July 2004 to include a "less lethal" rubber bullet gun (more commonly known as the "Flash-ball gun")⁵³² and, in September 2008, electroshock weapons (TaserTM).⁵³³

In Italy, the municipal police are involved in all police operations. The framework act of 1986⁵³⁴ accords judicial and auxiliary public safety functions to municipal police, and a law from 1992⁵³⁵ gives them traffic jurisdiction. In their role as judicial police, the municipal police work under the direct authority of the Parquet and have the authority to lead investigations.⁵³⁶ As agents of auxiliary public safety, municipal police can, upon orders from the mayor, obtain authorization from the prefect to act as an agent of public safety, which entitles them to carry a firearm without needing to obtain a license for it. A decree of March 4, 1987 from the Minister of the Interior sets out the rules surrounding the carrying of weapons by municipal police.⁵³⁷ In practice, only the municipal police of small communes do not carry weapons.⁵³⁸

524 The figure of the prefect, an emblem of the centralization of the French state, dates back to the Napoleonic era. Since the 19th century, France has been subdivided into departments and Italy into provinces, each of which is under the authority of a prefect.

525 In France, however, mayors rarely exercise their authority as judicial police.

526 The policing authority of mayors is defined in Article 97 of the law of April 5, 1884, which was restated in Article L2212 of the Code general des collectivités territoriales.

527 In practice, however, the two types of police are not necessarily distinct, as their duties overlap somewhat and may even transform into each other. For example, a body search at the entrance of a stadium falls under the purview of the administrative police (violence prevention) but if a person searched is found to be armed, his arrest constitutes a judicial police operation (arresting someone for a crime).

528 Law 9-291 of April 15, 1999 concerning municipal police.

529 The decree No. 2000-277 of March 24, 2000 lists the types of tickets that can be issued for violations of traffic laws.

530 Excepting the stationary guards of communal buildings and surveillance at ceremonies and celebrations organized by the Commune.

531 A 2002 enquiry by the Centre National de la Fonction Publique Territoriale estimated that 41% of municipal police were armed (6% with category four arms, 21% with category six arms and 13% with both). Study of a poll of municipal police of the CNFPT conducted January 1, 2002 (cited in Malochet, 2005: 61).

532 Decree No.2004-687 of July 6, 2004, amending Decree No. 2000-276 of March 24, 2000.

533 Decree No. 2008-993 of September 22, 2008, amending Decree No. 2000-276 of March 24, 2000 and setting out the modalities of enforcing Article L412-51 of the Code des Communes pertaining to the arming of municipal police officers.

534 Framework act No.65 of March 7, 1986, relating to the status of municipal police.

535 Article 12 of the legislative Decree 285 of April 30, 1992.

536 The municipal police are judicial police officers and their superiors are Officers of judicial police (Article 57 of the Italian penal code).

537 Decree No.145 of 1987 of the Minister of the Interior. This decree sets forth the types of arms (semi-automatic pistols or revolvers), the number of available weapons in the various police forces, and the access modalities to the firing range for training). For instance, the Italian municipal police have pistols but not tonfas.

538 Senate of the Republic of France, *Les polices municipales*, comparative legal study No. 38, May 1998.

The development of contractualization and governance of urban safety

The municipalities' role in the governance of urban safety has grown with the process of the contractualization of prevention and safety policies that has been established over the last two decades. These contractual policies reflect the creation of "partnerships" between local associations or groups and the state, which join forces to prevent and fight crime.

In France, these contractual policies have their roots in the "delinquency prevention" policy that issued from the eyrefitte Report of 1977 and the Bonnemaïson Report of 1982, which bestowed upon the mayor the responsibility of oversight of partnership authorities: the Communal Councils on the Prevention of Crime. From 1992 onwards, the territorialization of safety policy led to new contractual instruments aimed at improving the inter-organizational functioning of state services and integrating them locally by bringing them closer to the population. These various forms of contracts, the latest of which is the local security contract (Contrat Local de Sécurité, CLS), favour a reinforcement of the repressive services to the detriment of socio-educational players.

Crime prevention and security territorialization policies coexisted during the 1990s until integration initiatives were introduced. In 2002, the French government launched a new security policy aimed at improving integration between "prevention" and "safety." A July 17, 2002 decree instituted the Local Councils for Security and Prevention (Conseils locaux de Sécurité et de Prévention de la délinquance, or CLSPD), intended to manage the local security contracts (CLS) by replacing the Municipal Committees for Crime Prevention (CCPD), whereas a letter dated December 4, 2006, concerning the development of a new generation of local security contracts was aimed at improving integration of the existing instruments in order to give a "new impetus to the prevention of crime."

In Italy, the history of contractualization does not reach as far back as France's and is characterized by a three-way relational system between municipalities, regions, and the state. The security contracts signed between mayor and prefect, first and foremost, have the goals of coordinating the municipal police and the national police forces and of improving intelligence received by the mayor. In May 2003, the Italian Ministry of the Interior counted 208 such contracts across the entire territory. According to our estimations, in 2003, more than 18 million Italians (less than one third of the population) resided in a zone covered by a security contract. In France, data from the Ministry of the Interior counted 867 CLSPDs created by September 1, 2005, 783 of which were already operational. For the record, the 1999 CLS report counted 290 signed CLSs and 439 others in the process of being drafted, which represented over 31 million citizens affected (51% of the population).

Furthermore, eleven regional safety laws exist, which have the common goal of establishing a partnership between the region and State services and to create a budget to fund projects for crime prevention and the safety of local territorial units (provinces and communes) and associations (Braghero & Izzi, 2004). The regions are also in the process of signing urban safety program agreements with the State. Currently numbering six, these agreements notably provide for: the development of scientific research on identified problems; project funding; reinforcement of joint training programs between state police, municipal police and carabinieri;⁵³⁸ and the improvement of coordination among the various bodies (state police, Carabinieri, the Finance Guard and municipal police).

Conclusion

During the 1980's and 1990's, French and Italian municipalities revived the jurisdiction over urban safety they had possessed since the 19th century. This "return" of the cities to a sphere monopolized by the state means innovation in organizational layout and policy content.

On the one hand, municipalities create departments specifically in charge of urban safety. These new departments are most often structured along functional lines: at the heart of the department, one unit is in charge of relations with socio-educational stakeholders, while another works with the National Police (Germain, 2008). Thus, municipalities act as the key player articulating prevention and safety within their territory.

⁵³⁸ With the exception of regions having special status and independent provinces, the regions play a role of harmonizing the organization and operation of local police on their territory (organization of municipal police agencies, professional training of officers, etc.) since the parent act of 1986.

On the other hand, reinvesting in urban safety by the French and Italian municipalities consisted in enacting new measures. Urban Mediation Officers, highway video surveillance, anti-disturbance municipal bylaws (e.g. dealing with alcohol consumption on highways or aggressive begging) are the main policy innovations found in France and Italy. Therefore, the return of municipalities to urban safety proved to be a powerful instrument of change in policy content.

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CHAPTER

SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL APPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION



Social and educational approaches to crime prevention

Social and educational approaches to crime prevention form part of the broader notion of crime prevention through social development. They are concerned with strengthening the capacities of individuals, families, or groups to live healthy, productive and pro-social lives, and reduce their chances of being victimized or becoming involved in offending. They include a wide range of practices, and are often targeted towards families, children and young people, since these are the age groups most at risk⁵⁴⁰, and when interventions can have the most impact. They further aim to build a young person's social and basic skills for life, promote positive development, improve educational attainment, and increase prospects for employment.

Crime prevention through social development, or social crime prevention, is defined in the 2002 UN Guidelines as including approaches which “promote the well-being of people and encourage pro-social behaviour through social, economic, health and educational measures, with a particular emphasis on children and youth, and focus on the risk and protective factors associated with crime and victimization.” (Para.6a). This includes what have been termed ‘developmental approaches’, which work closely with children and families growing up, and have a specific focus on reducing risk factors and building resilience during a child’s development.⁵⁴¹

The 2002 Guidelines define community-based approaches (crime prevention at the local level) as those that aim to “change local conditions that influence offending, victimization and insecurity caused by crime, by leveraging initiatives, expertise and commitment of community members”

Social and educational approaches are also distinguished from situational crime prevention (see the introduction to the Report), because they attempt to address some of the indirect root causes of crime over the long-term, rather than reduce more direct opportunities for crime or produce short-term impacts.

The 2002 Guidelines identify the “prevention of recidivism” as a fourth approach to prevention “aimed at preventing recidivism by assisting offenders to reintegrate socially and implementing other preventive mechanisms (reintegration program)”. Some of the interventions which form part of this approach also include socio-educational approaches, whether directed towards individuals at high-risk or those already in the justice system.

Thus the distinctions between these overall approaches are not always so clear cut nor evident in practice, and most inte-

grated prevention strategies include several types of prevention approaches. They should not be seen as in competition, but rather as complementary approaches.⁵⁴²

Some observers in the North (see Bill Dixon’s contribution in Chapter 5) have argued that social and educational approaches to prevention run the risk of criminalizing social policy, and potentially stigmatizing groups who are targeted for intervention. They have been seen as occupying ‘an awkward space’ between criminal justice and social and urban policy.⁵⁴³ In many Northern and donor countries there has been a shift away from universal welfare approaches to welfare provision, which is increasingly conceived as conditional, based on the identification of need or risk. Targeting those ‘at risk’ of involvement in crime, or already in contact with the criminal justice system may be seen as easier to justify or accomplish than dealing with broader conditions in neighbourhoods, or working with populations or families. There has been significant concern over many years that targeted approaches may widen the net of criminal justice systems, particularly by pulling more young people into the system.

Emerging in particular in the USA and UK, targeted risk management approaches, which are based on the notion of reducing risks of future criminal involvement, have had a tendency to emphasize individual psychological and cognitive deficiencies, rather than consider the impacts of environmental or economic and social (structural) barriers on people’s behaviour. Nevertheless, there is now some evidence of greater flexibility in risk management approaches, and some trends in practice that shift away from an over-emphasis on individual risk factors and re-emphasize the importance of social bonds and structural issues.

540 See 2008 ICPC International Report young people (15 to 24 years old) as those most likely to commit to crime and be victimized.

541 Tony M. and Farrington D. (1995) *Strategic approaches to crime prevention*. In Tony M. and Farrington D. (eds.) *Building a Safer Society. Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 19*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

542 For further discussion of this issue see the Handbook on the United Nations Crime Prevention Guidelines : Making them Work (2010). UNODC & ICPC. Vienna: UNODC.

543 Crawford A. (2009) *The Preventive Turn in Europe*. In Crawford A. (ed.) *Crime prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective*. Willan: Cullompton.

It seems useful to focus on social and educational approaches partly because they are reflected in prevention practices promoted by international organizations, and because their effectiveness has often been demonstrated. They form part of many integrated approaches which take into account not only individuals and families, but also the environment and the community. They are also increasingly more participatory in their ability to mobilize local people and neighbourhoods or schools.

1. International support for social and educational crime prevention

1.1 International organizations emphasize social and educational approaches

International standards for social and educational prevention have been established by the *UN Guidelines on the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency 1990*⁵⁴⁴, the *Guidelines for the Prevention of Urban Crime 1995*⁵⁴⁵ and the subsequent *Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime 2002*.⁵⁴⁶ **These emphasize more inclusive means to prevent crime and respond to criminality than those which rely on enforcement or punitive responses.** Upholding the rights of young people, reducing risk and building resilience (protective factors),⁵⁴⁷ drawing on society's informal social control mechanisms, and participatory approaches, are all advocated, rather than relying solely on formal systems of control.⁵⁴⁸

The following fundamental principles are included in the Riyadh Guidelines:⁵⁴⁹

- The prevention of juvenile delinquency is an essential part of crime prevention in society.
- Society must ensure the harmonious development of youth and encourage their participation.

- Prevention programmes should include a focus on the well-being of youth from their early childhood.

Further, they emphasize the socialization of young people through the family, peer groups, the community, school and at work, and the importance of developing programmes adapted to youth at risk.

While crime prevention is not limited to young people, the UN Guidelines, and international organizations, place **particular emphasis on initiatives for young people** largely because most offenders tend to be young, and because evidence of 'what works' in crime prevention has suggested early intervention and youth diversion projects have been successful in the North.⁵⁵⁰ They have also advocated conflict transformation approaches, through such processes as mediation, negotiation and the upholding of human rights.

The World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, the Council of Europe and OECD,⁵⁵¹ have all advocated a child-centered, public health approach to violence prevention, promoting societies in which children are able to develop their potential in healthy and socially productive ways. WHO also advocates for social and educational measures to prevent violence against women and promote equality, including working with men and boys to change attitudes on the use of violence.⁵⁵² UNESCO has particularly advocated for 'violence prevention through schools', an approach that sees the school as a microcosm of society and children as potential advocates for conflict mediation in their communities.⁵⁵³ These all draw on a children's rights approach, rooted in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the policies and practices promoted by the Riyadh Guidelines and other regional conventions on children's rights.⁵⁵⁴ Echoing this child-centered policy, UN-HABITAT has stressed the need for youth inclusion and participation in social and community development, rather than presenting them as a 'problem', in recognition of their rights and their role in sustainable economic development.⁵⁵⁵

544 'The Riyadh Guidelines', General Assembly resolution 45/112, Annex.

545 ECOSOC resolution 1995/9, Annex .

546 Resolution 2002/13, Annex.

547 This is particularly emphasized by UN Habitat. UN Habitat (2007) *Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security* (UN Habitat: Nairobi).

548 Redo, S. (2008) *Six United Nations guiding principles to make crime prevention work*. In Coester M. and Marks E. (eds.) *International Perspectives of Crime Prevention: Contributions from the 1st Annual International Forum*. Forum Verlag Godesberg.

549 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines) See: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/juvenile.htm>

550 Sherman L., Gottfredson D., MacKenzie D., Eck J., Reuter P. and Bushway S. (1997) *Preventing Crime: What works, What doesn't, What's Promising*. Department of Justice; Washington DC. US.

551 eg. WHO (2004) *Preventing Violence : A guide to Implementing the Recommendations of the World Report on Violence and Health*. WHO : Geneva ; Pinheiro P. S. (2006) *World Report on Violence Against Children*. UN: Geneva ; WHO (2008) *Preventing violence and reducing its impact: How development agencies can help* (WHO)

552 Harvey A., Garcia-Moreno C. and Butchart A. (2007) *Primary prevention of intimate-partner violence and sexual violence: Background paper for WHO expert meeting May 2–3* (WHO).

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553 UNESCO (2004) *Making the Case for Violence Prevention through Schools*.

554 For example, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1999, the African Union Youth Charter 2006 and the Commonwealth Plan for Action for Youth Empowerment 2007-15.

555 UN-Habitat (2007) *Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security*. UN Habitat: Nairobi.

As noted in ICPC's International Report 2008, there is often a disparity between the emphasis at the international level on inclusive, participative, social, educational and public health approaches to crime prevention, and actual policy and practice at the national level, which can be punitive and exclusionary. Beyond this disparity, socio-educational approaches vary according to the level of wealth of a country.

1.2 These approaches must be adapted to national and local contexts

An important issue for those working in the South is the applicability of crime prevention measures developed in resource-rich countries in the North.⁵⁵⁶ It is increasingly recognized that **innovation and adaptation, rather than replication**, of Northern initiatives is essential, if they are to tackle the problems faced in developing contexts, the resources available, and the capacity of the local state or civil society.

International organizations in particular have stressed the scale of the challenges presented for developing countries. Young populations, rapid socio-economic changes, lack of education and/or sufficiently good quality and relevant training, inequality of opportunity, poverty and social exclusion, rapid urbanization and globalization, have all contributed to high rates of offending among young people, and on a scale beyond that experienced in the North.⁵⁵⁷ For Sub-Saharan Africa, the youthfulness of the population and the number of child-headed families⁵⁵⁸ present particular challenges for policy making.

This **need for adaptation is crucial** not only where policy and practice is being translated from North-South-North, but also between countries in the North or in the South. It is important to recognize that much depends on the implementation and adaptation to local conditions and priorities.

The range of interventions which can be included under the heading of social and educational crime prevention is clearly quite large. It may include both general or universal programmes, or those targeted specifically to individuals or areas, long-term programmes or shorter one-time events such as education or training programmes, and it may be family, community or school or institution-based.

2. A continued emphasis on targeting youth and families

2.1 Early Intervention Approaches

The initial Perry pre-school programme (Detroit, USA), which began in the 1970s, provided 60 African American 3-5 year olds with high quality nursery education and family support visits. Their development over the next 20 years was compared to a control group who did not receive such support, of whom 50% were arrested at least once, compared to only 30% of those who received support. The programme demonstrated that if given sufficient family and educational support, economically and socially marginalized families were likely to benefit. The results have been supported by a number of longitudinal studies of the development of cohorts of children and young people, especially in North America and Europe, which study the characteristics of families and individuals who are most likely to be at risk.

Many early-intervention schemes have subsequently been developed in other countries (e.g. Nurse Family Partnerships in the US, the Netherlands⁵⁵⁹ and the UK⁵⁶⁰; the Healthy Families programme in the USA, Canada; Switzerland; Germany and the Czech Republic⁵⁶¹).

Although the results have tended to be good in terms of child development, and donor organizations have promoted the targeting of pre-school education and parenting skills training to families 'at risk' in developing countries to reduce violence,⁵⁶² the transferability of these models to contexts beyond developed countries, is open to debate. Moreover, their potential to stigmatize those targeted as 'at risk', particularly female single parents, is of concern.

Debates around delivery of early intervention schemes that target families 'at risk' have tended to focus on the ethics of compulsory support and the problems of engaging families that may have had negative experiences of child welfare services in the past.

556 Pelsler E. (2002) *Crime Prevention Partnerships: Lessons from Practice*. Institute for Security Studies; Pretoria ; Shaw M. (2009) *International Models of Crime Prevention*. In Crawford A. (ed.) *Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective*. Willan: Cullompton.

Holtmann B. (2008) *Presentation at AFSSA Convention, 25-28 August*. Online at www.safesouthafrica.org.za

557 Background Paper for Workshop 3, 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Shaw & Travers, (Ed.) (2007) Montreal: ICPC; UN-Habitat (2004) *Urban Youth at Risk in Africa: A Focus on the Most Vulnerable Groups*. Nairobi; and for Workshop C, 12th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Salvador Brazil April 2010. www.unodc.org

558 Around 122,000 children live in child-headed households in South Africa, making them particularly vulnerable to discrimination, ostracism, social exclusion, and sexual exploitation. (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

559 Every opportunity for every child-youth and family programme 2007-2011

560 Pilot schemes were extended to 20 sites in 2008 <http://www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/parents/healthledsupport/>

561 Crime Prevention Strategy 2008-11.

562 The World Bank, for example, recommended that the Dominican Republic target its resources to provide pre-school education and parenting skills through the *Fondo de Educación Inicial* (MOE), *Educación pre-escolar* (MOE) and the introduction of home-visiting, in part funded by the reduction of school breakfasts to the poorest children. See Annex: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTHAITI/Resources/CaribbeanC&VAnnexes.pdf>

The successful adaptation of early intervention schemes to work with 'hard to reach' groups have emphasised the **need for collaborative and participatory approaches** to working with families, rather than coercive ones.⁵⁶³ In developed contexts there have also been attempts to adapt delivery to take account of particular cultural contexts or histories of discrimination from mainstream society and services (see Box Healthy Families programme, Yukon: Adapting to an Aboriginal Context).

Healthy Families programme, Yukon (Canada): Adapting to an Aboriginal Context

The Healthy Families programme in the Yukon targets families of indigenous children from 0-6 years. It was adapted from a US model of intensive family home visits, recognizing that many families had higher needs than those for whom the programme had originally been developed. The programme also adapted the model to include culturally appropriate components, such as the inclusion of extended family, understanding of cultural preferences, and delivering programme materials verbally. The design of the programme also emphasised the need for sensitivity about privacy concerns, in recognition of the communities' poor past experiences with child welfare authorities. All the support workers in the project were First Nation's women, well known and active in the community, which was considered key to building trusting relationships. Evaluators described the work of support workers as flexible, working with the family, and allowing the family to determine their readiness to move ahead in the relationship, rather than being directive.

In developing countries and countries in transition, the emphasis is rather on the rights of children⁵⁶⁴. The adaptation of child protection approaches to working with children 'at risk', particularly street children and their families, has expanded in Africa and Latin America. Such projects tend to look beyond intervention with individuals and families, to the role of the wider community in protecting and promoting children's rights. They often incorporate measures to raise awareness of children's rights within the wider community, as well as work with families to address their issues. Importantly some also incorporate measures such as access to micro-credit, to begin to address social and economic problems (see Box on the *Programme National d'Action Éducative en Milieu Ouvert*, Burkino Faso (2003-8)).

Programme National d'Action Éducative en Milieu Ouvert, Burkino Faso (2003-2008): Adapting a Child Protection Approach to Promoting Children's Rights

Burkino Faso has implemented a child protection model adapted from the French AEMO programme. Over a five year period (2003-8), it has targeted children at risk, especially street children, young offenders and young people from deprived families. The aims of the project are to encourage families to take responsibility for the care of children; inform the public about the situation of children in difficulty and the dangers to street children, and their role in child protection. It also aims to strengthen services for young victims of abuse, child labourers, and poor families. Activities include educational events and home visits, access to micro-credit and school bursaries, and public campaigns. The results of the evaluation are due in 2010.

2.2 Working with Families

There has also been an increase in social and educational interventions to **strengthen family ties with one another and with their wider community**. Such programmes aim to increase the 'social capital' of families and their resilience to change and insecurity. The UK Sure Start programme, inspired by the Head Start programme in the US, for example, aimed to deliver socio-educational support to families of children under four on a community-wide basis. It works in deprived neighbourhoods to avoid stigmatization, and emphasizes partnership with parents, and building social capital. Following a national pilot programme, the scheme is expected to be extended through 3,500 Sure Start children's centres providing integrated services by 2010⁵⁶⁵.

Some programmes are beginning to respond to the **damaging effects of institutional care** on children and young people, with an emphasis on keeping families together as far as possible. A number of countries in Europe have introduced intensive support for children at risk and their families, to prevent care proceedings resulting in the removal of children into institutional or foster care (eg. *Aide en Milieu Ouvert*, Belgium, *Sozialpädagogische Familienhilfe*, Germany, and *Action Éducative en Milieu Ouvert* (AEMO), France⁵⁶⁶; Child Safety Orders, UK; Intensive Family Support schemes, UK⁵⁶⁷).

563 See ICPC (2008) International Report.

564 In the 2008 International Report, we likewise stressed the differences concerning school safety among wealthy countries - who were concerned primarily with bullying and other countries were principally concerned with access to education.

565 *Sure Start Children's Centres Website* accessed 27/9/09

566 These measures provide intensive socio-educational support in an open environment.

567 Intensive Family Support schemes were aimed at families who were either homeless or at risk of becoming homeless because of their anti social behaviour. Families are either accommodated in a specialist residential scheme or are offered a support worker. Work with families usually lasted between nine and 12 months. Although participation is usually voluntary these families are often under threat of eviction if they do not participate. These interventions are part of the package of possible civil law coercive interventions in response to 'anti-social behaviour', including anti-social behaviour orders, curfew orders and eviction. <http://www.communities.gov.uk/youthhomelessness/wideneeds/antisocialbehavior/comprehensiveresponse/casestudy7/>

An evaluation of the AEMO programme in France, for example, had found it to be too focused on individuals, and the programme now works more closely with families in dealing with their wider problems.⁵⁶⁸ In Switzerland, a new penal measure in 2008 gave courts the power to provide 'assistance personnelle' to young people and their families where needed, and without parental consent⁵⁶⁹. 'Educatours' provide compulsory intensive intervention and support to children who would otherwise be at risk of being taken into state care. The decision to impose assistance is to be based on the child's circumstances, rather than the nature of their offence. *Educatours* will aim to assist the young person in school, employment or training and job preparation. They may also work with the parents on communication, and the 'regles de vie' in the family (moral values). This support may be accompanied by a sanction such as community service (unpaid work) or a citizenship course. Similar schemes have been in place in Scandinavian countries for many years.

While an emphasis on building the resilience of families is a positive trend, early intervention programmes for children identified as 'at risk', that focus on parenting skills and individual and family risk factors, have been widely criticized for failing to address the structural and social problems that families face, such as racial discrimination, poor housing conditions or low income, effectively blaming failing families. This observation has led to changing practices towards a more communal approach, which is discussed in Section 3 of this chapter.

2.3 Engaging Young People through Sports and Cultural Activities

Sports, cultural and learning have long been incorporated into prevention strategies. Internationally, organizations such as UNESCO, UNODC and UN-HABITAT have all supported such initiatives in recent years. The use of youth sports and leisure activities in prevention has a long history, and one that has at times been criticized or dismissed as ineffective or of limited long-term value for preventing offending. Much of the criticism stems from the failure to evaluate programmes, and simple assumptions that 'playing basketball at midnight' will somehow keep young people out of trouble. A recent review of sports

and leisure activity in the UK, found that most councils and local agencies have commissioned sport and leisure activities targeted to at risk groups, rather than providing universal activities.⁵⁷⁰ The review stressed the need for coordinated long-term national and local funding of such activities in areas of high deprivation, and for young people to be consulted in the planning of activities to ensure that they are accessible and relevant, as well as attention to evaluation (only 27% of the schemes could be evaluated).

Beyond their objective of diverting youth from the temptation of committing a crime, sports and cultural activities are seen to encourage self expression and esteem, life skills and social skills, and education, as well as providing diversionary activities to reduce opportunities for offending, or exposure to risks of offending. Examples included programmes developed by local authorities or services, which aim to reduce the risk of street gang recruitment *Projet Les Couleurs de la Justice, Montreal, Canada*⁵⁷¹. In Brazil, young people have themselves set up innovative initiatives, such as the *AfroReggae Cultural Group, Brazil*. This group seeks to improve relations between police and young people in disadvantaged areas, teaching the police about reggae, drumming, break dancing and graffiti art. The results have been positive, and have led this group to work in partnerships with other countries such as Haiti and the UK to develop similar projects (eg. *AfroReggae Partnership, UK*).⁵⁷² There is considerable diversity in the aims and provision of sports and cultural projects. In some cases in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe there has been a tendency to offer them universally (e.g. Kick project Berlin⁵⁷³; Polish Youth Strategy (2003-13)⁵⁷⁴; South Africa⁵⁷⁵; The Youth Build Program in Tobago⁵⁷⁶). This is partly in recognition of the lack of basic services and facilities for young people in many cities. More often, projects in Europe and North America have been targeted at 'at risk' children, either those living in poorly resourced areas (Boundless Adventures, Canada; Cool Kids Take Off Berlin⁵⁷⁷; 'Splash' program, UK), or on the basis of contact with law enforcement, or other indications of problematic behaviour such as truancy and drug use (e.g. Police Athletic League, Belize).

568 Breugnot P. and Durnin, P. (2001) *L'AEMO, objet de recherche en émergence – analyse de 25 rapports*. In Chrétien and Durning (eds.). *L'AEMO en recherche: état des connaissances, état des questions* (collection Points D'appui; France).

569 http://www.wise.net/press/otherwise_vol3_en.pdf

570 Audit Commission (2009) *Tired of Hanging Around: Using sport and leisure activities to prevent anti-social behavior by young people*. Audit Commission; London, UK.

571 This project is funded under the National Crime Prevention Strategy in collaboration with the Public Security Ministry, Quebec. It particularly aims to prevent young people becoming involved in street gangs.

572 See the Afro Reggae Website <http://www.favelarising.com/about-afroreggae.html> and Favela to the World website for further details. <http://www.favelatotheworld.org/>

573 In cooperation with Sport Youth Berlin and Senate Minister of the Interior and Sports combining sports and 'socio-educational methods' The program is voluntary and open to all.

574 includes activities for young people to promote social inclusion.

575 National Urban Renewal Strategy includes youth programs promoting role models education and skills development and sport.

576 This provides classes to young people to develop employment skills, in areas such as customer service, anger management, creative expression, sexual and reproductive health, literacy and numeracy. It has been explicitly developed as a crime prevention programme.

577 An early prevention project for 12-14 year old boys at risk, combining adventure and counselling.

Many countries have launched programs to **keep youth engaged after school**. This time of day is identified as particularly critical when young people are left to themselves, sometimes in the street without supervision and guidance of adults. Some projects in Latin America, in particular Brazil, have promoted activities after school and the opening of school facilities at weekends, to reduce youth violence in the schools and surrounding community. Participating schools in *Abrindo Espaços - Opening Spaces Recife and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)* saw an average 30% reduction in violent behaviour in their areas.⁵⁷⁸

Similarly, the programme “Open Schools” of the Presidency of the Republic of Guatemala⁵⁷⁹, coordinated by the Council of Social Cohesion (CSC), was created with the aim of providing a development tool for young children living in areas with high levels of violence. Schools are open in the evenings and weekends for recreational activities, personal development and training. This model was inspired by experiences in many Latin American countries including Chile and Argentina.

2.4 Intervention with marginalized youth

The use of **outreach approaches** has a long history in relation to young people. Projects which aim to support young people through difficult transitions, or those who may no longer be in education or work, have often used ‘unattached’ or outreach workers. In many North American and European countries, outreach approaches have been used as a way of managing unsupervised children and young people in public spaces, or targeting children not attending school. Youth Contact Officers in Vienna, for example, were introduced in 1984 to work with youth in trouble, and to act as link workers fulfilling a number of roles and working closely with the Crime Police Advisory Service. A recent evaluation of **street outreach** programmes in the US, which formed part of a series of comprehensive gang control strategies, makes a number of recommendations for their successful use (NCCD, 2009)⁵⁸⁰. Street outreach workers, often recruited from the communities in which they work, or themselves former gang members, are especially effective in working with marginalized youth mistrustful of authorities.

A related development has been in projects to provide young people with support through a **volunteer mentor**, whose role it is to model pro-social behaviour, support the young person to make decisions, support them in interactions with services, and in participating with social and educational activities. Such projects, many modeled on the US Big Brothers Big Sisters initiative which has been extensively replicated and evaluated there, now exist in developed and developing countries, such as the UK,⁵⁸¹ South Africa (Urban Renewal strategy), and Trinidad and Tobago (The Retiree Adolescent Partnership Program). Other projects work alongside measures to ensure greater compliance with sentences. Such approaches have shown some success in supporting young people and reducing offending where they involve committed and trained volunteers.⁵⁸² Other projects combine training and the development of social and mediation skills, in preparation for work (Grandes Frères, Switzerland).⁵⁸³

A number of practices focus on a more comprehensive approach around the care and reintegration of street children. In Eldorado (in Sao Paulo, Brasil), the *Associação de Apoio a Criança em Risco (ACER)* (Children at Risk Foundation⁵⁸⁴), for example, shifted from working directly with street children, to responsive and developmental work to prevent migration to the streets. They used an educational approach aimed at developing children’s cognitive, emotional and social communication skills, to break the cycle of intergenerational family dysfunction, reduce the prevalence of violence in the community, and strengthen young people’s ability to form meaningful social relationships. Similar projects with street children have been established in Ecuador and in Mexico, through Juconi⁵⁸⁵, winning the 2008 UNICEF prize for best practice.

3. Targeted measures mobilizing communities

Beyond measures targeted at individuals or groups of people, it is necessary to take into account the local context (or neighbourhood), and the available resources. Poor living conditions in a neighborhood can significantly increase the risk of crime. In the USA, the Pittsburgh Youth Study, for example, concluded that the key risk factor for youth offending is the socio-economic status of particular neighbourhoods.⁵⁸⁶

578 Waiselfisz J. and Maciel M. (2003) *Revertendoi violencias, semeando futures: Avaliação de Impacto do Programa Abrindo Espaços no Rio de Janeiro e em Pernambuco*. UNESCO, Brasília.

579 See : www.esuelasabiertas.org/. See : Sagant, Valérie (2009) *Prévention de la violence au Guatemala : Rapport de mission du Centre international pour la prévention de la criminalité, réalisé pour le compte de l’Open Society Institute et de la Fondation SOROS Guatemala*. Avec la collaboration d’Esteban Benavides. Montréal: CIPC.

580 *Developing a successful street outreach program : recommendations and lessons learned*. (2009). Oakland CA : National Council for Crime & Delinquency.

581 Newburn T. and Shiner M. (2005) *Dealing with Disaffection: Young People, Mentoring and Social Inclusion*, Willan; Cullompton.

582 Ibid.

583 This scheme recruits unemployed young people for 6 months, to gain interpersonal skills, training in mediation and a certificate to help them on entry to the job market.

584 Kortschak, A. (2003) ‘ACERs work in Brazil’ cited in Wernham, M. (2004) *Street children and Juvenile Justice: prevention strategies* (Salamanca Spain).

585 <http://www.juconi.org.mx/english/>

586 Wikström P-O and Loeber R. (2000) *Do disadvantaged neighbourhoods cause well adjusted children to become adolescent delinquents?* Criminology, vol. 38, no. 4:11090-1142.

Juconi, an Eco-Systemic Approach

The approach is described as 'eco-systemic', coordinating work with parents, siblings, teachers, neighbours, employers, etc., to secure and sustain the transition from exclusion to inclusion. The families are contacted through an outreach 'educator'. After establishing a trusting relationship, they are invited to participate in the JUCONI programme in which each child and family receives personalized, intensive support. This approach is geared towards ensuring success in academic achievement, positive social relationships, economic opportunities and in creating capacity for positive, violence free communication and a family unit capable of protecting all its members.

Young people with some of the lowest *individual* risk factors of fended more frequently if they were living in the most deprived neighbourhoods. Such research suggests the need for greater attention to structural factors and wider community effects.

3.1 Conflict Mediation and Urban Citizenship

Environmental factors can influence the quality of relationships between people and their ability to peacefully resolve their daily conflicts. In the 2008 Report, we discussed the development of social mediation approaches (See Chapter 9). Social mediation is not only a means of reducing violence, but also a means of building the social capital of communities, and empowering people to participate in the governance of their area at the local level. In certain projects, social mediation has been a way of reducing conflict between cultural groups, as well as resolving other community and neighbour disputes. Examples include Femmes Relais,⁵⁸⁷ in France, and the Southwark Mediation Centre Hate Crime project, in London, UK.⁵⁸⁸ A similar project in the Chilean municipality of Independencia has been developed in response to local demands for assistance in improving relationships between residents and new migrants in the region.⁵⁸⁹

Many school-based prevention programmes have focused on creating safe environments in **schools**. Projects such as Change from Within in Jamaica, for example, emphasize the leadership and mentoring role of teachers as models of non-violent behaviour and facilitators of cultural change within the school.⁵⁹⁰

In Latin America and Africa, a number of programmes aim to build resilience and prevent violence in schools, and treat the school as a microcosm of wider society and its propensity for violence. This includes a number of projects supported by UNICEF. Such interventions focus on **building capacity for conflict resolution**, often in conjunction with **citizenship programmes** (e.g. Brazil *Paz nas Escolas*⁵⁹¹; Colombia - *Competencias Ciudadanas*⁵⁹²; Nicaragua- *Educacion para la vida*) and children's rights awareness (Tegucigalpa, Honduras - *Seguridad, justicia y convivencia*⁵⁹³ ; Community Peace Workers, South Africa⁵⁹⁴).

The "*stages de citoyenneté*" (citizenship training programmes) implemented in France (see box below) are offered as an alternative to criminal sanctions and aim to develop the respect and consciousness of the rules of conduct in society.

Building capacity for conflict resolution is now widely used in Europe and Australia⁵⁹⁵ as a means to address bullying in schools, and, less commonly, wider violence beyond the school gates (eg. VISTA⁵⁹⁶; Germany 'We take care of ourselves' program; Spain- *Observatorio estatal de la convivencia escolar y la prevencion de conflictos*; Austria- Viennese Social Competence Training⁵⁹⁷).

Several initiatives **promote a culture of peace** outside the school. Community Peace Workers in South Africa were introduced in 1997 as part of the Conflict Management Programme, working with young people to build conflict resolution skills and mediate conflict in their communities, and to gain employment.⁵⁹⁸

587 ICPC (2008) International Compendium of Crime Prevention Practices to inspire action across the world, ICPC; Montreal.

588 See Southwark Mediation Website : www.southwarkmediation.uk.com

589 Macuer T. and Arias P. (2009) *La Mediación Comunitaria en Chile*. FLACSO: Chile.

590 Cited in UNODC (2008) *Handbook on planning and action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean Regions*, UNODC; Vienna.

591 Implemented in 2000, the program trains and informs teachers in school conflict resolution, human rights, ethics and citizenship building and projects to prevent violence in schools. <http://www.acer.diadema.com.br/>

592 National policy to involve schools to promote civic behavior and democratic *convivencia* to reduce and prevent school violence.

593 The program was piloted in 35 schools in the capital, Tegucigalpa, in deprived areas with problems of gang (*pandillas*) violence and recruitment. Because many children work and to increase capacity classes were held in shifts, the latest shift having the most problems.

<http://www.education.lu.se/el-programmea-de-asdi/7000-alumnos-han-recibido-formaci-n-atraves-d>

594 These workers operate in Nyanga Western Cape, Soshanguve and Khayelitsha to prevent crime and support youth development in low income areas. They are supported by German technical cooperation and the Department for Safety and Security. The project aims to provide young people with the skills to identify and mediate conflicts in the community. They receive training in mediation and leadership skills and provide foot patrols.

595 Morrison B. (2007) *Restoring Safe School Communities: A Whole School Response to Bullying, Violence and Alienation*. Federation Press: Australia.

596 Vista: A Resource For Practitioners And Policy Makers And All Those Working With Children And Young People Affected By School Violence.

597 Program run since 2001 designed for disadvantaged 15-19 yr olds considered at risk and implemented at schools different Germany and Austria.

598 ICPC (2006) *Community Safety Workers: An Exploratory Study of Some Emerging Crime Prevention Occupations*, ICPC; Montreal.

Report on three years of programme as alternative to penal sanctions, France

In 2006, *Le Comité Interministériel des Villes*, developed a three-year programme for community rehabilitation (*stage de citoyenneté*), as an alternative to penal sanctions. This programme, imposed by legal decision, was conducted in six high urban density departments with the following goals:

- Encourage delinquents to consider the consequences of the acts they committed;
- Remind them of the values of the French republic in regards to tolerance and respect of the individual;
- Increase awareness of the responsibilities which come with life in society as well as civil and penal responsibilities

Among the topics included were: law, justice, citizenship, principles of the Republic, health, reparations of damage. Subjects more often discussed were those related to integration, career plans or discrimination and the prevention of violence against women.

An evaluation of the programme was undertaken in 2009: 2000 individuals participated in the programme which represents 35% of those potentially eligible for this type of judicial alternative; 86% were male and 54% were between the ages 18 and 25; 22% were convicted for theft, 20% for assault, 17% for violence, etc.

A participant satisfaction survey was carried, as part of the programme's overall evaluation: 82% were satisfied with the topics discussed, 88% with the discussion, 93% with the moderators; 56% claimed to be satisfied with the cost of the programme, which required payments of 140 to 230 Euros per participant (as opposed to a real cost of 350 to 500 Euros per participant).

While the evaluation did not cover reconviction rates of the participants, the social workers attested to improved behavior; 44% of participants said they no longer wanted to breach the law, 81% of first-time offenders and 54% of repeat offenders claim to have understood the meaning of the punishment. Participants were classed in a typology in terms of their motivation during the programme, on four levels:

- 30% "actors": Open to the messages, positive in that the programme seemed educational;
- 30% "docile": Comply with instructions, seem to be open to the messages;
- 20% "oppositional": long heavy history of offending etc., occasional violent reactions, incomprehension.
- 20% "neutral": Indifference, apparent lack of sensitivity to message or content.

From a judicial point of view, the programme completes the full range of judicial interventions.

The recruitment and training of volunteer community peace workers forms part of the Brazilian National Public Security and Citizenship Program (PRONASCI). Some 11,000 people (primarily women) have been recruited and trained to mediate conflict situations in high violence favelas since 2007.⁵⁹⁹ The Peace Management Initiative in Kingston, Jamaica (established in 2002) has also worked with over 50 communities combining mediation, between and within communities to reduce violence, with welfare and development work.⁶⁰⁰

Increasing access to local justice has been an important goal of mediation in Chile⁶⁰¹. This centrally sponsored development has stressed the professional accreditation of mediators. A similar emphasis on professional accreditation is a feature of Community Mediation Centres in Trinidad and Tobago. The legitimacy

of mediators in such projects rests on their professionalism and legal training, rather than their connections with the local community or local experience.

In the USA, mediation has been a key component of recent initiatives in communities experiencing high rates of gang and gun-related violence, and is seen as an important way to strengthen informal social control. Mediators, or 'violence interrupters', may be local community leaders or ex-offenders, both of whom are able to intervene to prevent the escalation of violence, especially retaliatory shootings between gangs. Maintaining the independence of mediators from the police, in order to ensure their legitimacy as negotiators, rather than police informers, while working with the police, has proved difficult.⁶⁰² The overall success of the Chicago Ceasefire

599 Frayssinet F. (2009) *Brazil: Women 'Peace Workers' in the Favelas*. Interpress: 04.07.2009. Service website accessed 1/10/09.

600 UNODC (2008) *Handbook on planning and action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean Regions*, UNODC; Vienna.

601 Macuer T. and Arias P. (2009) *La Mediación Comunitaria en Chile*, FLACSO: Chile.

602 Skogan W. G., Hartnett S. M., Bump N. and Dubois J. (2008) *Ceasefire Evaluation Report : Executive Summary*, Institute for Policy Research : Northwestern University.

Project for Violence Prevention is having an increasing influence on violence prevention projects in the USA, including its replication in Baltimore's Safe Streets Program (see box).

Chicago Ceasefire and Baltimore Safe Streets Projects

The Chicago Ceasefire Project works with community organizations and focuses on street level outreach using 'violence interrupters' intervening in conflicts, or potential conflicts, and promoting alternatives to violence. Importantly these workers are not required to report information to the police, although they work with local police, which ensure that they are not perceived as informers. It also uses public education campaigns alongside conflict mediation to change community norms about gun violence. The project places a strong emphasis on increasing informal social control within the community, and the involvement of businesses, faith leaders and residents in addressing violence. The US Department of Justice Evaluation notes a 41%-73% decrease in shootings in Ceasefire zones and a 100% reduction in retaliation murders in five of the eight neighbourhoods.⁶⁰³

The Baltimore project places ex-offenders in the community to mediate disputes and work with high risk young people. In 2008 East Baltimore, where Safe Streets has been implemented, saw some of the lowest statistics for shootings in several years.⁶⁰⁴

3.2 Interventions at the community level

Social and educational measures often take into account the characteristics and resources of a neighbourhood or community, but also tend to be integrated into broader strategies of prevention. Measures to increase community capacity and improve the physical environment can be developed alongside, and complement, socio-educational approaches, and provide a more comprehensive approach to crime prevention at the municipal and regional level.⁶⁰⁵

Furthermore, a number of interventions at the community level use social and education prevention components. Projects in South Africa⁶⁰⁶ and El Salvador⁶⁰⁷, have been developed as a means of reducing violence and gang involvement, and working to improve urban life. A very effective comprehensive project in the city of Belo Horizonte in *Minas Gerais*, Brazil, is *Fica Vivo* (Stay Alive). Modeled on the Boston Gun Project in the US, it was adapted to the Brazilian context. Six *favelas* with the highest rates of violence were identified, and police and justice strategic groups established, alongside community mobilization groups. They used a problem-oriented approach, targeting young people, and provided a combination of social support, education, leisure and sports programmes, workshops and job training. Homicide and assault rates fell by 50% in the first five months of the implementation in 2002.⁶⁰⁸ The success of the programme has been attributed in part to its integrated approach, and to the involvement and participation of community members, as well as the close partnership between state and city policy makers, the police, and academic researchers.

Other projects have used a combination of leisure activities, personal support and assistance in attending school or finding work. The Young Apprentice Scheme run by *Mata Escura* and *Calabetão* Association of Parochial Communities (*Acopamec*) in the poorest *favelas* in Salvador (Brazil) provides support from 0-24 years of age.⁶⁰⁹ Educators work with young people and their families in their homes for a year through play, sports and leisure activities, prior to their introduction to the education centre. Local community representatives are also invited to take part in forums to foster community involvement in the work developed by the association.

603 Skogan W. G., Hartnett S. M., Bump N. and Dubois J. (2008) *Ceasefire Evaluation Report : Executive Summary*, Institute for Policy Research : Northwestern University.

604 Justin Fenton (2009) *Safe Streets outreach worker wounded at cookout*. *The Baltimore Sun*: 29.07.2009.

605 Shaw M. (2009) *International Models of Crime Prevention*. In Crawford, A. (ed.) *Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective*, ICPC; Montreal.

606 The Proudly Manenberg project, in Western Cape, South Africa which begun in 2005, does not target the gang behaviour of gang members living in the municipality directly, but works instead to strengthen the capacity of the community, provide alternatives for gang members, including employment options, and build partnerships with local police, local government, schools and the private sector.

607 The Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project in El Salvador⁶⁰⁴ has been established in five cities in collaboration with local multi-sector partnerships, local NGOs and private sector organizations, and works with young people and community leaders. The project, which has not yet been evaluated, stresses the need for detailed epidemiological analysis of the problems faced in the five cities, using surveys, crime mapping and crime and other statistics. Initiatives include improving sports infrastructures in schools, training for work and business, the creation of an Arts and Cultural Centre, conflict resolution training for community leaders, regeneration of parks and leisure infrastructure, and individual counselling.

608 Beato Filho, C., Reis Souza, R., Ottoni, M., Figueiredo, M. and Silveira, A. '*Stay Alive*' Program: simple actions, effective results. Web version accessed 30/9/09.

609 Boueri A. (2008) *From pre-school to the job market*, Good Practices Comunidad Segura. 02.01.2008.

In conclusion, these examples clearly reflect the interest in combining a variety of prevention approaches. Successful initiatives rely heavily on the ability to work in partnerships in coordination with other sectors. Partnerships require a balance, in which each side must respect the other's ethics and framework, and their different modes of intervention. The active participation of those 'targeted' by interventions is another component that seems important for successful project outcomes. Finally, the local environment and living conditions, particularly in disadvantaged areas, and the consequences of poor relationships between different actors, such as young people and the police (See chapters 1 and 6), all need to be taken into account in developing social and educational approaches.

As this chapter has suggested, achieving a balance in programme development which avoids too great an emphasis on blaming individuals or alienating communities already excluded from mainstream society, is not easy. Beyond the issues of child development, global prevention strategies based on the UN guidelines, and implemented at the local level are more comprehensive in that they look beyond the individual, school or family, recognize the rights of children, and address broader societal, community, environmental and structural factors. Not only do such approaches go beyond the limitations of individual approaches, they draw on the wider array of resources for violence prevention, and help build capacity and resilience against crime and victimization more generally.

CHAPTER



TRAINING, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Training, Professional Development and Capacity Building for Crime Prevention

As stressed in the ICPC International Report 2008, the need for greater provision of education and training in crime prevention (in addition to criminal justice, human rights and discrimination issues) is urgent and has been recognized internationally.⁶¹⁰ Crime prevention as defined in this report is a relatively new discipline and, therefore, requires training and development to help formalize and standardize methods and approaches.

While there is a broad consensus on the need for training and to build crime prevention capacity, the terms themselves need to be clarified, especially since there are different distinctions across languages. Training – in the sense in which it is used in this chapter - can be defined as a form of **education** which entails teaching academic/research knowledge, and/or a technical speciality through courses which result in an academic qualification or professional certification. Thus **training** suggests acquisition of practical skills and knowledge relating to a specific professional practice. This may be undertaken prior to or while in employment or performing a role.

Professional Development incorporates a number of activities which put training and knowledge into practice, under conditions which provide guidance and support. A variety of methods can be used, such as coaching or mentoring. This includes keeping up-to-date with current developments in practice, and exchange of experiences with practitioners involved in similar work in other places. The lines between training and professional development can be blurred.

Capacity building or capacity development are terms used somewhat vaguely in a variety of contexts. On the whole they refer to a wider range of activities to help organizations, communities, or groups develop the necessary skills to achieve certain goals. There have been recent international attempts to clarify what is meant by capacity building. The term capacity development is often preferred, to emphasize the importance of national ownership and priorities for development.⁶¹¹ This chapter outlines trends in the current provision and delivery

of specialist crime prevention education, training and capacity building, and aims to help policy makers and stakeholders develop and implement an action plan concerning prevention and safety.

The 2002 Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime 2002 dedicate a section to training and capacity building, and urge governments among other things to provide professional development and develop certification and professional qualifications, and promote the capacity of communities. Furthermore, as part of international action, ECOSOC has called on organizations and donor countries to:

*'provide financial and technical assistance, including capacity building and training, to developing countries and countries with economies in transition, communities and other relevant organizations for the implementation of effective crime prevention and community safety strategies at the regional, national and local levels. In that context, special attention should be given to research and action on crime prevention through social development.'*⁶¹²

Other resolutions have focused on:

- The need for **human rights training for those engaged in urban crime prevention** (Guidelines For Cooperation And Technical Assistance In The Field Of Urban Crime Prevention⁶¹³)
- The need for **gender sensitivity training** for police, and education for police promoting justice and equality for women (Declaration On The Elimination Of Violence Against Women⁶¹⁴)

610 See Shaw M. (2008) *Why crime prevention is an essential component of international training and technical assistance: the experience of the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime*. in Aroma, K. and Redo, S. (eds.) *For the Rule of Law: Criminal Justice Teaching and Training Across the World* (UNODC/HEUNI) ; Coester, M., Marhs, E. & Meyer, A. (Ed.) (2008) *Qualification in Crime Prevention. Status Report from various European Countries*. Forum verlag Mumchegladback : Godesberg.

611 See UNDG (2009) *United Nations Development System: A Collective Approach to Supporting Capacity Development* (UNDG; New York, USA) available at: <http://www.undg.org/docs/8948/Capacity-Development-UNDG-August-2009.pdf>

612 ECOSOC resolution 2006/20 (27 July 2006) Article 29 p 301; As mentioned in Chapter 5, the development of knowledge of proven and promising approaches was also stressed.

613 These guidelines specifically call on 'competent authorities at all levels [to] be constantly mindful and promote the fundamental principles of human rights; encourage and implement appropriate training; organize exchanges of knowledge; and, evaluate regularly the effectiveness of the strategy implemented. Article 5 a-d p 286.

614 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women: Article 12a-c p 336-7
See: <http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28symbol%29/a.res.48.104.en>

→ **The need for special instruction for police officers** (The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules⁶¹⁵), **teachers and other adults and students** (Riyadh Guidelines⁶¹⁶) **who deal with, or are primarily engaged in, the prevention of youth crime.**⁶¹⁷ The Riyadh Guidelines particularly stress the need for 'specialized prevention programmes and educational materials, curricula, approaches and tools' to be developed to sensitize teachers and other adults and students to the 'problems, needs and perceptions of young persons, particularly those underprivileged, disadvantaged, ethnic or other minority and low-income groups.'⁶¹⁸

Responding to the needs of practitioners, professional training in prevention appears to have developed faster than formal university courses, where crime prevention often forms only one component of a broad degree course. To meet the needs of practitioners in implementing prevention strategies and programmes, however, training methods have begun to proliferate and diversify.

1. The growth of education and training in crime prevention

1.1. More specialized University programmes

While the inclusion of crime prevention in mainstream academic law, criminal justice, criminology or urban studies courses, for example, is still somewhat limited, some specialist crime prevention programmes have been developed by universities and colleges, in recognition of the need for a more targeted provision, and the following sections draw on a review of relevant courses identified.

Universities in Latin America have played a key role in developing concepts and education for urban crime prevention, particularly through '*Seguridad Ciudadana*' courses, in Chile⁶¹⁹, Argentina⁶²⁰, Colombia⁶²¹ Peru⁶²² and Venezuela⁶²³, which are aimed at a broad range of crime prevention actors. The University of Chile *Comunidad y Prevención* Programme has organized regular events to build capacity for crime prevention in the region, in collaboration with the government and international NGOs.⁶²⁴ Similarly, some courses developed in Guatemala,⁶²⁵ Mexico,⁶²⁶ Costa Rica⁶²⁷ and Venezuela⁶²⁸, although not conceived in these terms, have an emphasis on crime prevention and citizen participation. The influence of these approaches may be seen in the national provision of training courses in public safety for local committees and public safety committees (local, provincial and regional) by the *Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana* in Perú. Universities have also been involved in the development of courses in violence prevention.⁶²⁹

615 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules) - Adopted by General Assembly resolution 40/33 of 29 November 1985, Article 12.1 p 61. See: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/beijingrules.pdf>

616 See Box in Chapter 7 for details.

617 UN Habitat's Safer Cities Programme, is establishing a series of regional training centres in Africa on crime prevention. The first of these in Kwa Zulu Natal, South Africa, will focus on youth crime prevention issues.

618 General assembly resolution GA/45/112 (1990).

619 The *Centro de Estudios en Seguridad Ciudadana, Universidad de Chile*, provides diplomas in: prevention and public safety in public policy; Young people in conflict with the law: prevention and intervention; Prevention of crime at the local level; intervention in treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of young offenders. These are aimed at local administration boards, boards of community action, researchers, community leaders, police and students; The University of Chile also offers a Diploma in the Prevention of Crime through Environmental Design with certification from the CPTED Association; The *Universidad Alberto Hurtado* runs the Programa de Seguridad Urbana with a Diploma in Citizen Security, course in community mediation, on school violence prevention and a Diploma in Public Policy and Local Management for the prevention of drug consumption and trafficking. The *Universidad Central* also offers a course in *Seguridad Ciudadana*

620 *Licenciatura en Seguridad Ciudadana, Universidad Nacional de Lanus, Argentina*, provided for professionals in the field of citizen security; The *Universidad de la Fraternidad de Agrupaciones Santo Tomás de Aquino*, the offers courses in Citizen Security for Lawyers. The *Instituto de Ciencias de la Seguridad de la universidad CAECE* particularly promotes the notion of human security in its courses.

621 *Universidad del Rosario, Diplome Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana* for those working in the municipalities of the region of Cesar, justice authorities, NGOs, civil society organizations, trade associations, private sector and practitioners.; *Fundación Universitaria Luis Amigó*, Diploma in Tools for Security and Coexistence (*Convivencia*) aimed at local administrative boards, boards of community action, community leaders, community police, other students.

622 *Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP)* Degree in urban and community safety. This course aims to prepare students in designing, implementing and evaluating public policies and citizen security with a strong emphasis on prevention of crime and violence, and on criminal justice reform.

623 *Universidad José Antonio Páez, Venezuela, Ciudadanía, Control Democrático de la Gestión Pública y Participación Ciudadanía.*

624 The program is supported by the Open Society Foundation and events such as the *Curso Internacional de Capacitación en Prevención Comunitaria del Delito para Profesionales Jóvenes de América Latina* in Queretaro in 2008 was supported by the Government of Queretaro.

625 *Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala* Diploma in Public Safety, Integration and Democracy. This is aimed at members of community development committees, youth organizations, civil society and officials.

626 *Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa*, Masters in Public Security and Citizen Participation; *Instituto Mexicano de Prevención del Delito e Investigación Penitenciaria*, Masters in Crime Prevention and Prison systems. The course aims to provide knowledge for those involved in the development of criminal justice policy, with an emphasis on preventing anti-social behavior and rehabilitation of offenders; *Universidad Iberoamericana* Degree in Security and Public space which emphasizes the role of the design and construction of safe cities and interventions in public spaces; *Instituto Zacatecano de Estudios Universitarios Izeu*, offers a degree in Security and Prevention of Crime.

627 *Universidad para la Cooperación Internacional Maestría Latinoamericana en Criminología con mención en Seguridad Humana* See website www.uci.ac.cr/envios/2009/MCDH/Pantalla-MCSH2.htm

628 *Universidad José Antonio Páez*. Course in Citizen participation and social control.

629 In Colombia the *Instituto de Investigación y Desarrollo en Prevención de Violencia y Promoción de la Convivencia Social*, CISALVA at De Valle University initially coordinated pilot injury surveillance systems in Colombia. León University offers public health and injury-prevention training courses in Nicaragua.

A number of universities have developed **postgraduate courses** with a specific focus on crime prevention and community safety in the UK⁶³⁰, Australia⁶³¹, New Zealand,⁶³² and France⁶³³. The Centre for Public Policy in the Czech Republic organizes training for social service providers in the area of crime prevention and social inclusion of youth.

Particularly in North America, dominant criminological and 'police science' approaches have tended to exclude social and community crime prevention approaches from their curricula. Although universities in some of the more prosperous countries in Africa have been influential in the development of training and in capacity building in local communities in their region (e.g. Cape Town University, South Africa), there is generally a lack of crime prevention training available on the African continent.

1.2 The gradual creation of a "professional culture of prevention"

Among all the courses identified - apart from police training programmes which outnumber all others - it would appear that some are quite specialized, with a narrow focus on technical aspects of crime prevention such as crime mapping, CPTED, or situational approaches. Other courses take a **broad approach, better reflecting the UN Guidelines and ICPC approach of crime prevention, incorporating community based prevention and crime prevention through social development** (see definitions in the Introduction).

On the whole, most programmes include elements on **theoretical explanations for crime, measuring crime and victimization and understanding statistics, research methods in evaluation, as well as implementation issues**. The emphasis in many courses is on **quantitative approaches** including the use of institutional data and victimization surveys, rather than **qualitative approaches** such as interviews and focus groups, although practitioners benefit from knowledge derived from both types of sources.

A number of courses give time to the kinds of implementation issues already emphasized which are specific to crime prevention: partnerships, working at the local level, and the

mobilization of actors. Several courses emphasize participatory approaches as important ways to respond to the challenges posed by **partnership approaches and working with communities** (e.g. Cape Breton, University of Chile, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Universidad José Antonio Páez, Venezuela). Courses covering social and community-based crime prevention explore the **role of other sectors and community actors** in crime prevention, such as teachers, social workers and civil society groups. Most courses focus on the urban rather than the rural environment, and particularly in Latin America, on **local level implementation** (e.g. University of Chile). Excluding police training programmes, only one course among those we have identified explicitly explored the **role of the police in crime prevention**, though some courses assume the police are the main actors in crime prevention.

A small number of courses include **practical issues concerned with the management of projects, organizations and resources** (e.g. Portsmouth; Beccaria).

In terms of the issues covered, none of the courses appeared to focus on the important topic of **gender** in crime prevention, though some may be incorporating discussion on gender differences within modules on victimization. Similarly, none of the courses appear to explore **corruption and governance**, except in relation to accountability and partnership working, and only one course specifically included the **prevention of white collar crime and its regulation** (e.g. Cataluña). Few included **measures to alleviate poverty, discrimination and social exclusion** as part of crime prevention.

Many courses look at **issues affecting young people**, but less often their **role as actors in prevention**. Two courses explicitly focused on organized crime (including a specialist course on prevention of transnational organized crime, Wollongong University Australia) and **drug trafficking and consumption** (e.g. *Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú*). Two courses had a strong emphasis on **conflict mediation/resolution approaches** (Alberto Hurtado, Chile; *Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú*). Universities in Latin America⁶³⁴, and South Africa⁶³⁵ have undertaken capacity building for conflict resolution at the local level.

630 Nottingham Trent University, UK MSc in Crime Reduction; University of the West of England postgraduate certificate/diploma and MA in Community Safety and Crime Prevention; University College London, Jill Dando Institute, Postgraduate Certificate/ Diploma in Crime Prevention and Community Safety and a Diploma in the Prevention and Detection of Crime (only covering situational approaches); University of Leicester MSc in Community Safety; University of Portsmouth Masters in Criminology and Community Safety; The Open University, MSc Community Safety.

631 A specialist Masters course in Transnational Crime Prevention has been developed (2009) by the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention at the University of Wollongong, Australia.

632 Te Awatea Violence Research Centre, University of Canterbury (New Zealand) offers a community resource offering information, research and education for professionals, practitioners, communities and groups interested in violence reduction and crime prevention.

633 Université de Paris (France) *Diplôme Universitaire en Prévention de la délinquance et des conduites à risques*. This course focuses on social problems in urban areas - poverty, cultural integration, disaffected youth, development and socialization of children, public policy around prevention, including international comparison, actors in crime prevention, analysis of good practice and evaluation.

634 *Universidad Alberto Hurtado* (Chile) offers training for community mediators in the poor areas of Santiago, providing knowledge of national and international experience and promoting the importance of mediation and the role of mediators in resolving conflict and reducing violence and drug trafficking activity in the area.

635 Cape Town University was also a key partner in the development of the Zwelethemba model of Peace Committees in South Africa.

Three courses discuss **comparative analysis of good practice** and are usually **aimed at a broad audience, beyond traditional criminal justice personnel**.

Only one course appears to explicitly explore the **relevance of human rights to crime prevention. Ethical and normative issues** around crime prevention generally did not appear to be given a central place in courses, although some may build discussions into particular themes, which through a brief review it was not possible to assess. The issue of human rights is, however, widely discussed in the context of specialized training for the police.

1.3 Training for the Police

A central element of crime prevention training and capacity development involves the development of professional cultures that respect and build a culture of equality and human rights.⁶³⁶ Although human rights appears to be a neglected aspect of crime prevention education and training, it has been a component of training for criminal justice professionals including the police for some time.

Building a culture of human rights within the police, and rebuilding relationships with citizens where human rights abuses have taken place, has been central to training initiatives in, for example, Northern Ireland, parts of Africa and throughout much of Latin America. Courses are provided through police training academies, by non-governmental organizations (e.g. Viva Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil⁶³⁷; *Associação Juvenil Angolana para os Direitos Humanos and Associação Paz e Democracia*, Angola) and through bi-lateral technical assistance. The US government has, for example, worked with John Jay College of Criminal Justice to provide human rights training to police, through understandings of human dignity, in Central and South America and in El Salvador, (2006), Bangkok, Thailand (1999), Budapest, Hungary and Botswana (2001) and parts of the Caribbean. (see Box)⁶³⁸

Initiatives that address problems of discriminatory policing, particularly racial profiling, have focused on sensitizing police to the issues and experiences of communities disproportionately stopped and searched by the police (eg. In Canada, the UK and US) (see **Contribution** on UK Police Diversity Training). Increasingly this emphasis on 'equality and diversity' is shifting and broadening in scope to become training on

human rights. Beyond the struggle against racial profiling, some police departments, like that of the City of Montreal, offer training for police relations with communities to increase their knowledge and understanding of the diverse population that they serve⁶³⁹.

John Jay College's Human Dignity/Human Rights and Police Course has been adapted, following specific needs assessment and curriculum development. It uses student-centred teaching and learning approaches, such as role play, simulations, case studies and structured exercises, to encourage full participation of students.

In particular the course promotes self-awareness and empathy, to help participants think about the impact of their behaviour as authority figures, and on other participants on the course, and the cumulative social impact of behaviours and decisions that undermine human dignity. This also challenges 'us and them' tendencies and encourages officers to think about the reasons why particular groups may become social outcasts, and reaffirm their position as protectors of the most vulnerable. The course also stresses the impact of individual decisions and institutional processes, encouraging officers to question institutional cultures and its impact on officers, as well as the public. Developing a strategy to promote human dignity and cultural change is one of the course activities, with an explicit emphasis on implementing the 'UN codes of conduct for law enforcement officials'.

The impact of training in building institutional change is not always easy to measure (see **Contribution** by Michael Rowe on Police Diversity Training in Britain), and there is often a lack of attention to evaluation or the establishment of clear performance indicators. The importance of paying attention to the management and delivery of programmes on human rights issues, and of ensuring strong management support, is very evident; fulfilling 'training quotas' is not sufficient.

There have been some direct outcomes of human rights training, such as the **development of a Human Dignity Institute** within the Dominican National Police. Jamaica and

636 Shaw, M. (2008) *Why crime prevention is an essential component of international training and technical assistance: the experience of the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime*, in Aroma, K. and Redo, S. (eds.) *For the Rule of Law: Criminal Justice Teaching and Training Across the World* (UNODC/HEUNI).

637 Viva Rio has provided a course in 'Perfecting the Practice of Citizen/Community Policing' (*Perfeccionamento de la Práctica Policial Ciudadana*) for military police since 2002. The course aims to improve the quality of policing with a focus on prevention of crime and violence, to appreciate the role of the community in policing, and develop professional ethics and respect for the law. The course involves the use of everyday case studies of military policing to spark debate, aid understanding and assimilation of concepts and acquisition of new knowledge and techniques.

638 Solis C. (2008) *Human Dignity/ Human Rights and the Police: Training that Manifests Rule of Law Operations*, in Aroma, K. and Redo, S. (eds.) *For the Rule of Law: Criminal Justice Teaching and Training Across the World* (UNODC/ HEUNI).

639 Prince J., Bruneau S., Sagant V. (2009) *Relations avec la communauté au Service de police de la Ville de Montréal : Analyse des documents de la direction du SPVM et des entretiens menés auprès de partenaires externe*. Montréal : CIPC.

Honduras have also **incorporated a human rights course into the police academy curriculum.**

Introducing human rights perspectives into capacity building for prevention is especially important when addressing issues affecting groups which have been marginalized, experience discrimination, or are over-represented in the criminal justice system, such as ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples. As suggested in Chapter 1, the quality of relations between police and the population can have a significant impact on everyday security in communities

2. Tools and resources

2.1 Training and online resources

Face-to-face teaching is undoubtedly the best approach to education, offering opportunities for discussion and learning through group work and active application of learned skills and knowledge. However, it is also an expensive way of providing training and requires considerable local resources and expertise. For this reason, and with technological changes, increasing attention is now being paid at the international level to the development of on-line resources, as access to the internet expands in developing, as well as developed countries.⁶⁴⁰

The provision of web-based e-learning, computer-based tools for training, and the development of online tools has been promoted by UNODC, and was discussed at the 12th Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2010. While some

handbooks and training materials are available online, there are fewer computer-based training tools available.⁶⁴¹ The *Virtual Forum against Cyber Crime* developed by the Korean Institute of Criminology provides a model of e-learning and an online professional development forum.⁶⁴² ICPC has developed a specialized course in partnership with METROPOLIS, designed for local stakeholders, on the different steps for implementing a local strategy for public safety and crime prevention.⁶⁴³

A small number of universities have developed distance learning courses in crime prevention aimed at a broad range of professionals engaged in the field. In the UK, most specialized courses offer the possibility of distance learning, such as the University of the West of England; The Open University, Leicester University and Portsmouth University.⁶⁴⁴ In Canada, Cape Breton University offers a distance learning course on crime prevention through social development.⁶⁴⁵ Other examples include courses in Chile (Universidad de Chile⁶⁴⁶), Spain (Universidad de Cataluña⁶⁴⁷) and until September 2009 in Australia.⁶⁴⁸ UNDP in collaboration with the European Commission, the Catalan Cooperation Agency and the Open University of Cataluña have run a Virtual School (*Escuela Virtual Para America Latina y el Caribe*) since 2005, with the aim of building a professional network of specialists in development and democratic governance, including on issues around violence prevention.⁶⁴⁹ In Brazil, distance learning via the Internet has been developed on a large scale for the police and other security actors (see box).

640 Discussions of innovative teaching methods and the use of new media have taken place at international conferences in Austria (World Wide Web, November 2007; ACUNS, December 2008), Germany (Academic Council on the UN, June 2008), Slovenia (Second World International Studies Conference August 2008) and the UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2009), all stressing the need for enhanced United Nations criminal justice studies and web-based resources.

641 On going to print other CBT materials developed by UNODC relate to Drug Trafficking, Human Trafficking Anti-Money-Laundering and Intelligence Awareness.

642 <http://www.kic.re.kr/english/index.asp>

643 <http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org>

644 Most specialist courses in the UK are offered with the option of distance learning.

645 The Certificate in Crime Prevention (Distance) at Cape Breton University focuses on Crime Prevention through Social Development (CPSD). It is aimed at practitioners working in crime prevention. The certificate is delivered at a distance via online chat and through bulletin board discussion formats. The course covers: the theory and practice of CPSD; 'selected topics in communications' (particularly focusing on communication between offenders and agencies, between agencies and talking across different cultures); 'Social Development Through Social Service' (focusing on child development and the role of child and family services, schools and communities in promoting child development); 'virtual intervention (proposing responses to a specific case) and 'career-related research' (to propose a crime prevention plan and institution to coordinate it).

646 *Diplomado de Extensión: Previó del Delito a Nivel Local (Modalidad a Distancia)* - Diploma in the Prevention of Crime at the Local Level (June – December 2009). The course is directed at practitioners and civil servants across Latin America. It is run in collaboration between the *Centro de Estudios en Seguridad Ciudadana* and the *Instituto de Asuntos Públicos* at the *Universidad de Chile*, with the support of the Open Society Foundation Institute. The course forms part of a program to build capacity to design and implement programs of citizen security across the region and conduct research to increase knowledge in this area. (see website www.comunidadprevencion.org). The course focuses on improving students understanding of statistics, their use in analyzing problems and in creating policies and interventions at the local level, as well as applying concepts and practical tools to launch action in partnership with communities, improve the management of local security and propose lines of evaluation relevant to social and community crime and violence prevention. Courses are as follows: Measuring crime and violence in Latin America: Interpretation of Statistical data for use in Intervention: Coproduction of security at the local level: Associations and coalitions: Introduction to evaluation of social crime and violence prevention projects. The diploma is delivered via the internet through a virtual platform with access to the teaching team and to relevant information for the course.

647 Postgraduate program in *Gestión de Seguridad Ciudadana* forming part of a number of postgraduate courses in urban management.

648 Griffith University: Graduate Certificate in Crime and Violence Prevention. This course included elements on white collar crime and regulation and changing criminal behaviour.

649 <http://www.escuelapnud.org/public/index.php>

More than 200 000 staff trained per year in Brazil

In 2005, the Secretariat of Public Security (SENASP) of the Federal Ministry of Justice of Brazil created the National Network for Distance Education (Rede Nacional de Educação a Distância). RENAED is a “virtual school” with the goal of providing access to professional public safety programmes and specialized training throughout Brazil.

This network includes 270 distance training centers in 27 areas in major cities. Over 200,000 students participate in three training courses organized each year. These courses are aimed at civil police officers, military and federal, firefighters, municipal guards, and prison officers.

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<http://portal.mj.gov.br/data/Pages/MJE9CFF814ITEMIDD9B26EB2E3CD49B79C0F613598BB5209PTBRIE.htm>

<http://senaspead.ip.tv/>

There are a limited number of **online resources** for crime prevention and criminal justice educators, such as the *Policing (all round) the World* web-site (see Box). The Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS) hosts the *Journal of Criminal Justice Education*, and a portal for researchers and teachers to exchange practice, and access resources for teaching criminal justice. A compendium of innovative teaching techniques in criminal justice education has been posted on the websites of ACUNS and the UN Studies Association.⁶⁵⁰

The **International and Comparative Criminal Justice Network** held its first colloquium in the UK in June 2008 and is establishing an online network hosted by Leeds University. Various specialized organizations, including ICPC have online practice guides and other educational tools.

Policing (all round) the World⁶⁵¹

Policing all around the world, developed by Ruhr University Bochum (Germany) and the University of Cape Town (South Africa) is an internet accessible series of lectures (in English) from twelve countries, based in Germany (Bochum University). This provides ‘talking head video’ lectures, power point slides and associated articles and discussion forums on different ways in which society is policed, how police forces are structured and trained. As of March 2009 the project consisted of two teaching modules to be used in classroom settings (with internet access) or for distance learning. Students can exchange views and have discussions with the lecturer at arranged times via e-learning software ‘Blackboard’.

On-line education and training has the potential to widen the reach of specialist knowledge, and build capacity for crime prevention in areas where there is a gap in provision. There remains, however, a dearth of on-line material tailored specifically to developing, transitional countries and high violence contexts. There is considerable potential for South-South cooperation in the development of such knowledge, experience and education, building on developments in Latin and Central America, South Africa and the Caribbean.

2.2. Technical and Educational Tools

A number of crime prevention toolkits have been **developed by international organizations** to provide practical guidance to practitioners and policy makers. They provide background information, and outline practical steps and models of effective approaches and practice. They are valuable resources especially at the local level, for technical assistance and more generally for the promotion of crime prevention approaches.

A number of guides have been developed by international agencies, and reflect the priorities of those agencies. The World Health Organization, for example, has produced guides on assessing the impact of violence and on developing strategies to prevent it.⁶⁵² The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) published a guide in 2009 on combating violence against women, with a strong preventive approach.⁶⁵³ OSCE also released a guide on good practices in building police-public partnerships in 2008.⁶⁵⁴

One publication stem from South-South collaboration is the UNODC (2009) *Handbook on planning and action for Crime Prevention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean Regions* (UNODC; Vienna).

650 UNODC also offers a Legal library of all rules and regulations of Member states relevant to UNODC. ICPC is developing an online resource of policy and practice internationally which will be available to ICPC member states. The International Victimology site also provides online resources on international regional and national instruments.

651 <http://connect.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/dggkv/>. Open to the public examples can be found at http://www.sipr.ac.uk/events/Outputs_Conference2008.php

652 See, for example, Butchard, A. Borwn, D., Khanh-Huynh, A., Corso, P. Florquin, N. and Muggah, R (2008) Preventing violence and reducing its impact: How development agencies can help (WHO).

653 OSCE (2009) *Bringing Security Home: Combating Violence against Women in the OSCE Region* (OSCE).

654 OSCE (2008) *Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships*. See website http://www.osce.org/publications/spmu/2008/06/31851_1166_en.pdf

A number of manuals on the development of crime observatories have made an important contribution to crime prevention, with their emphasis on local data and analysis to inform prevention strategies.⁶⁵⁵

UH-HABITAT is developing a number of practical guides for municipalities, drawing on its experience over the past twelve years of working with mayors in African cities and other regions. In 2007 it published the first municipal toolkit focusing on local-level strategies.⁶⁵⁶

A number of **civil society organizations have produced toolkits and guides** in Latin America to promote prevention approaches in the region.⁶⁵⁷

Nationally and at sub-regional or provincial levels, tools help to compensate for gaps in training, by assisting practitioners in implementing prevention strategies.⁶⁵⁸ This includes tools to support some of the 'new' professions in crime prevention discussed in our earlier 2008 report.⁶⁵⁹

Some toolkits and guides focus primarily on policies and methodologies, while others are more concerned with implementation stages.⁶⁶⁰ A number serve to **raise awareness amongst particular professional groups**, beyond criminal justice or crime prevention professions. This includes guides on the development of strategies to prevent **violence in schools**,⁶⁶¹ **women's safety**,⁶⁶² the **design of public spaces** to prevent crime,⁶⁶³ or the **management of public events**.⁶⁶⁴

Training and evaluation resources on **social mediation and conflict resolution** have also been produced.⁶⁶⁵ France introduced a *Charter* for social mediation, as a guide to codes of practice in 2001,⁶⁶⁶ and has published a number of guides on evaluation and training in the field.⁶⁶⁷ A number of **guides to evaluation** of local safety projects and strategies have been developed⁶⁶⁸ (and see Chapters 9 & 10).

Tools to promote participatory approaches to prevention are less common, although there is an increasing range on women's safety audits.⁶⁶⁹

3. Innovative methods

In addition to access to teaching, training resources and tools, practitioners and policy-makers need to be able to exchange experience and knowledge with others, both as a key component for building capacity, and for further professional development. Establishing professional networks of support and expertise is important in crime prevention where its development and implementation is recent. For those developing initiatives and practice in developing and transitional contexts, in particular, networks to exchange experience and support at the local level are key, and may can assist in securing policy-level support and resources for innovation. Internationally there is a need to facilitate intra- and inter-regional exchange of experience.

655 Eg: Methodological Guide for the Implementation of Municipal Violence Observatories (World Bank). See also IACPV/PAHO/CISALVA (2008) *Basic Methodological Guide for the Implementation of Violence Prevention and other Lessons Observatories*.

656 *Making Cities Safer from Crime – A Toolkit*. (2007). Safer Cities Programme. Nairobi: UN-HABITAT.

657 For example: *Un Modelo de Seguridad Preventiva en Guatemala*, IEPADES, Guatemala; *El ABC de la Seguridad and Guía Práctica para los comités distritales de Seguridad Ciudadana*, IDL/ Centro de Promoción Social para la Seguridad Ciudadana, Perú

658 Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (2003) *Local Crime Prevention Tool Kit*. CSIR, South Africa Correa et al (2009) *Guía para Prevenção do Crime e da Violência*. Ministry of Justice, Brazil ; *Comunidad y Seguridad: una guía para la prevención a nivel local*, CESC, Chile.

659 See ICPC 2008 International Report, Chapter 9.

660 *Construcción de capacidades locales para la prevención del delito y la violencia*, CESC, Chile

661 *Guide de Prévention et D'Intervention Contre La Violence Envers le Personnel de L'Éducation Centrale des syndicats du Québec* www.csq.qc.net; (2006) *Réagir face aux violences en milieu scolaire: Guide Pratique*, Ministry of Education, France.

Ptovin P. and Hébert M. (2003) *Violence en milieu scolaire: quelques outils de soutien à l'intervention*, University of Quebec at Trois Rivières ; (2000) *Taxage: Passeport du crime; guide d'animation*. Society of criminology of Quebec, Canada.

662 CAFSU (2001) *Sécurité des femmes: de la dépendance à l'autonomie*, CAFSU, Canada. www.cafsu.qc.ca

663 *Guide des études de sûreté et de sécurité publique dans les opération d'urbanisme, d'aménagement et de construction, Direction générale de l'urbanisme, de l'habitat et de la construction (DGUHC) ; Direction générale de la police nationale ; Délégation interministérielle à la ville et au développement social urbain*; Zahm, D. (2007) *Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Problem-Solving*, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, US Department of Justice, USA.

664 *La Prévention de la violence dans le football, Direction générale de la politique de sécurité et de prévention* www.ibz.fgov.be

665 *Femmes Relais* (2008) *A practical guide to training social mediators at a distance*. Available on the *Femmes Relais* Website <http://www.relais-femmes.qc.ca/publication/2008-06-developper-une-formation-a-distance>; *La médiation sociale – une démarche de proximité au service de la cohésion sociale et de la tranquillité publique / Clés pour la mise en oeuvre et la professionnalisation*, France Available at: <http://www.ville.gouv.fr/pdf/editions/mediation-sociale.pdf>

666 *Délégation interministérielle à la ville* (2001) *Charte De Référence De La Médiation Sociale*. Available at: http://i.ville.gouv.fr/divbib/doc/charte_mediationsociale.pdf

667 See also the Association for Conflict Resolution <http://www.acrnet.org/> (USA) and MEDIARCOM (European Mediation Association) http://www.mediarcom.com/conteudos/SystemPages/page.asp?art_id=16

668 *Guide Méthodologique Pour Un Diagnostic Local De Sécurité*, Service Public Fédéral Intérieur, Belgique; Vervaeke G. Goethals J., Doutrelepon R. (2005) *Diagnostic de sécurité : Trousse à l'intention des collectivités locales*, Institut national de santé publique du Québec ; *Évaluation des contrats de sécurité et de prévention*, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven et Université de Liège (2008) *Observation locale et politique de la ville: Notre stratégie et guide méthodologique* Délégation interministérielle à la ville.

669 See the website of *Women in Cities International* for more information on existing guides, and for a review see Lambrick, M. et Travers, K. (2008). *Women's Safety Audits: What Works And Where?* : http://www.femmesetvilles.org/english/downloads_en/downloads_en.htm#auditevaluationpdf

3.1 Supranational Training

Several international initiatives have recently been developed to help create a common prevention 'culture'. The European Union has been active in promoting the **development of international crime prevention training**. The Council for Crime Prevention of Lower Saxony, for example, established the Beccaria Project, to promote 'quality management in crime prevention' in collaboration with other **European partner countries** and with support from the EU.⁶⁷⁰ **Training in crime prevention forms one of its aims**. The Centre provides basic skills training in planning, implementing and monitoring crime prevention projects, and tools, for crime prevention professionals. It aims to increasingly standardize the training and education curricula for European crime prevention. An advanced (in-service) Master's programme has also been developed. This course provides a model for a prevention course based on the UN guidelines.⁶⁷¹ The European Forum for Urban Safety (EFUS) is working to establish a European Masters Programme in Urban Security with many other European university centres (see Box).

Other programmes are offered by specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations, such as safety seminars for young urban professionals in Latin America, which are organized in different countries in the region by the Centro de Estudios en Seguridad Ciudadana (CESC) at the University of Chile.

3.2 Peer to peer learning and training

While online training has generated considerable positive expectations, and is strongly supported by international organizations, there is still an important place for face-to-face interaction. This enables stakeholders to network, to share innovative and successful and less successful techniques and practices, based in their local context. Professional networks of regional and local stakeholders, mentoring, online exchange of practices and regional discussion forums all help to promote international, national and local professional development.

For example, for ongoing professional development **mentoring or coaching** arrangements offer a valuable way in which skills can be shared within and between organizations, and build understanding between them. This approach has been used to provide technical assistance in relation to money laundering, for example. Other initiatives involve the techniques of "learning organizations" and "communities of practice" (see the **Contribution** by Marc Parent at the end of chapter), enabling different service sectors to engage in discussions on their practical experiences and ways of working in a confidential and non-hierarchical manner.

Erasmus project "Towards a European Master in Urban Safety"

This project is directed to the leaders in charge of crime prevention and security in European countries. It brings "a transversal approach to crime prevention and knowledge across several academic disciplines". Noting the lack of training programmes available in Europe at this level, the European Forum for Urban Safety has developed a project for a master's programme in urban security, in collaboration with the University of Toulouse 1 (France), the University of Maribor (Slovenia), the University of Liège (Belgium), the Open University of Catalonia (Spain) and the Technical University of Berlin (Germany).

Designed to respond to the need for professionalization of stakeholders in crime prevention, the project "aims to create a training content which is inclusive and interdisciplinary, making use of insights gained from disciplines such as criminology, political science, law, geography, sociology and others, and which draws on research as well as practical experiences."

Reference: <http://www.fesu.org/index.php?id=30264&L=0>

In conclusion, although there is increasing recognition of the need for specialist training and related skills in crime prevention, there remains a lack of such specialist training in many parts of the world. Much of the existing training tends to be restricted to and focus on the police, and does not reflect the wider role of governments and of other actors in prevention.

670 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Czech Republic, UK, Italy, Slovenia

671 Quality Standards in Crime Prevention (2009). A one year practice-orientated Masters including modules on criminology, crime prevention, project management, implementation issues. www.eucpn.org

There is a particular need for training and tools to build practical skills in partnership development and participatory approaches, and to integrate issues of human rights. There is a need for graduate and postgraduate crime prevention courses in developed and developing countries to develop a comprehensive curriculum which reflects international norms and standards. Those in developed countries should also include comparative perspectives which learn from practice in developing countries.

International organizations have highlighted the promise of on-line computer-based training for the dissemination of training materials and knowledge exchange, and the number of initiatives is expanding. However, there is a continuing need for face-to-face meetings at the local level to allow practitioners to build networks, exchange practice and develop innovative approaches to crime and violence in their local context. Professional networks of regional and local practitioners, mentoring, regional on-line exchange of practice and forums for discussion, as well as access to developments in practice and research, all provide means by which exchange of good practice and professional development can be promoted at international, national and local levels. There remains a clear role in technical assistance and training for training of trainers at the local level, to act as providers and 'nodes' for knowledge exchange and dissemination, and on emerging practice and research.

Contribution

Police diversity training in Britain: lessons and limitations

Michael Rowe, Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand

Equality and diversity training for police services in the UK has been transformed, as with much else in policing, by recommendations made in the 1999 Macpherson Inquiry report into the racist murder in London in 1993 of a young black man, Stephen Lawrence. The Macpherson Inquiry report has shaped much of the policing agenda of the last decade or so and has led to innovations in terms of aspects of policing from victim liaison to crime scene investigation, the management of crime inquiries and the engagement of the community in policing matters.⁶⁷² While the Report has engendered change in many aspects of policing the impact that this has had in terms of improving police relations with minority ethnic communities has been unclear, contradictory and difficult to identify in a broader context in which policing has been transformed by new security imperatives relating, inter alia, to street crime and terrorism which are widely held to have had deleterious effects on police relations with some minority ethnic communities.

There was certainly no lack of action in terms of the police service response to the training agenda initiated by the Macpherson Inquiry. Individual police services, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Home Office, police authorities, universities, management consultants, and training providers have collectively delivered a host of programmes to officers and civilian staff of all ranks. The logistical and financial implications of these provisions have been considerable. In the immediate aftermath of the Inquiry report, the London Metropolitan Police Service provided a one- or two-day course for 35,000 officers and staff between October 1999 and December 2002. The direct costs of this training were £3.4M with further opportunity costs of £10.7M (Metropolitan Police, 2005, pers. comm.). As with most aspects of policing in England and Wales, these provisions have varied from service to service in terms of content and structure. In keeping with the more general trend in police training in the twenty-first century responsibility for the development of diversity training is devolved to local services required to operate according to central guidelines. Inevitably this means that what follows is based upon general observations about police diversity training, which might not apply to every programme developed in all services.

Perhaps the most prominent finding of the Macpherson Inquiry was that the police service was 'institutionally racist' and a key feature of subsequent training has been to encourage officers to develop reflexive practice on the role that police have in community relations. This approach mirrors broader training strategies intended to develop officers as 'self-directed learners' engaged in professional development. However, several evaluations of recent police training on community and race relations have noted that efforts to address institutional racism in such programmes have often foundered.⁶⁷³

672 Rowe M. (2007) *Policing Beyond Macpherson*, Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

673 Metropolitan Police (undated) *Interim Report: Evaluation of the Diversity Training Programme*, Croydon Borough, London: Metropolitan Police ; Institute for Employment Studies (2003) *A Review of Community and Race Relations Training in the Metropolitan Police Service*, Brighton: Institute for Employment Studies ; Rowe M. and Garland J. (2003) *Have You Been Diversified Yet? Developments in Police Community and Race Relations Training in England and Wales*, *Policing and Society*, 13 (4): 399-411.

Research has often found high-levels of officer and civilian staff cynicism about mandatory training programmes perceived to be politically-driven rather than a legitimate response to emerging police problems.⁶⁷² Relatedly, the need for training to address emotive topics relating to personal values, attitudes and beliefs has meant that introducing the concept of institutional racism into programmes has often caused controversy. In a context where training staff are required to deliver large numbers of courses in a short period of time, it is clear that there has been a tendency to avoid prolonged discussion of the issue of institutional racism, even though this was a key component of post-Macpherson reform.

While concerns continue about the content of equality and diversity training, attention has increasingly turned to problems associated with the poor management of programmes. As the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) argued:⁶⁷⁵

'... race equality training requires skilled management effectively to support its delivery. There is a real potential for 'backlash', particularly amongst some white officers, and the delivery of race equality training remains far more 'politicised' and sensitive than the delivery of other types of training. Unless the police service is prepared systematically to address these issues, then learning and development on race and diversity issues will continue to be limited.

Despite these cautions, several studies have argued that just a lack of management support has inhibited progress on CRR training,⁶⁷⁶ with the impression gained that senior managers might be more concerned with fulfilling certain 'quota' obligations (in terms of the numbers of staff trained) rather than devising internal monitoring systems to ensure that lessons learned from the training are carried forward into the workplace on an everyday basis. HMIC⁶⁷⁷ found a number of issues that were 'detrimental to the training's effectiveness and efficiency', including a lack of clarity and direction in the overall training strategy within the service; that staff appraisals did not support CRR training; that inadequate supervision undermined the training's overall messages; and that trainers themselves are not selected or indeed managed properly.

HMIC also found that there was a lack of consistent and robust evaluation of diversity training courses, a theme that has recurred consistently in the post-Macpherson era in the provision of training more generally.⁶⁷⁸ Tamkin et al.,⁶⁷⁹ in their examination of the delivery of CRR training in the MPS, found not only that 'very little local evaluation' was being conducted but also that 'key performance indicators [had] not been identified and data not collected on a regular basis'. Such a lack of systematic monitoring and evaluative work can have a number of detrimental effects upon the success of CRR training, including the continuation of poor training practice; a lack of analysis of learning outcomes, and a lack of understanding of how any new ideas were being transferred into workplace behaviour. Also, thorough evaluation can help to refine courses so that the skills developed by trainees can have a genuine impact upon the police's relationship with local minority ethnic groups. A lack of robust management and strategic thinking on the implementation of diversity training can lead to the impression that these programmes are merely rolled out when the subject is 'flavour of the month', perhaps precipitated by a 'signal event' such as the Lawrence Inquiry, but there is little in place to sustain such training or implement it on a systematic basis over a long period. Instead diversity training often seems to exist on its own, as a 'stand alone' exercise that is often not followed up in staff appraisals or by refresher courses.⁶⁸⁰

The recent experience of police diversity training in Britain suggests, then, that legitimate concerns about content and syllabus must not preclude consideration of difficult questions about the management and delivery of programmes. Even more challenging concerns need to be addressed about the extent to which training can – in and of itself – provide the means to address the broader institutional dynamics of racism, the imbalance in power relations between the police and marginalized communities, and the structural causes that contribute toward that marginalization. Enhanced or reformulated training programmes might not provide solutions to deeply-seated structural organizational problems. While there has been some progress in terms of responding to the Lawrence Report recommendations on police training, there has been less consideration of the overall impact that programmes can be expected to have on police work in general or on police relations with the minority communities in particular.

674 *Ibid.*

675 Commission for Racial Equality (2005) *A Formal Investigation of the Police Service in England and Wales*, London: Commission for Racial Equality, p. 95

676 see, for example, Loveday B. (2000) *Must Do Better: The State of Race Relations* in A. Marlow and B. Loveday (eds) *After Macpherson: Policing After the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry*, Lyme Regis: Russell House Publishing.

677 HMIC (2003) *Diversity Matters*, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, London: Home Office, p. 28

678 *Ibid.*; HMIC (2005) *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training*, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, London: Home Office.

679 Tamkin P., Pollard E., Djan Tackey N., Strebler M. and Hooker H. (2003) *A Review of Community and Race Relations (CRR) Training in the Metropolitan Police Force*, Brighton: Institute for Employment Studies, p.48.

680 Docking M. and Tuffin R. (2005) *Racist Incidents: Progress Since the Lawrence Inquiry*, London: Home Office. Online Report 42/05.

Contribution

Communities of Practice

Marc Parent, *Service de police de la Ville de Montréal*

A rapidly changing environment

Like all police organizations, the *Service de police de la ville de Montréal* (SPVM) is changing rapidly. In order to adapt to this continuous change, the development of SPVM (the first major municipal police service in Quebec, and the second largest police-force in Canada [SPVM, 2008]) uses an increasingly complex knowledge base, building on accumulated experiences and rapidly developing expertise. Large scale retirement has resulted in a younger workforce and a significant loss of expertise, while there is a growing demand for an increasingly complex range of services for a challenging and diverse population. This means that SPVM employees must be able to acquire and use knowledge about policing if they are to remain at the cutting edge of their field. Over the years, to successfully fulfill their public safety mandate, SPVM employees need to acquire and share knowledge within the organization, to develop and build internal expertise.

SPVM, a learning organization

Management of organizational knowledge and learning is a vast field of study but there has been little research into its application for policing. The idea of developing a 'community of practice' was motivated by this desire to study the development of institutional learning for policing. The model was developed with a conscious view to its strategic importance for SPVM, and aimed to develop better models of effective institutional learning.

The context of the development of the community of practice at SPVM was, therefore, the desire to build a knowledge management strategy to support the police in its public safety mandate, particularly with regard to the use of force.

Appropriate and ethical use of force: a policy issue

The appropriate and ethical use of force is a central concern for SPVM. Police agents are regularly required to use an array of complex and standardised techniques that range from verbal notice to, in rare instances, recourse to a firearm. When Québec police officers take their oath at *École Nationale de police du Québec* (ENPQ), they will have received some of the most reputable police training in the world, particularly in the use of force. However, skills that are not used, or used infrequently, diminish over time. Maintaining a high level of competence in the use of force is an important concern for police officers, who also need to share their experiences and ideas, and foster each other's abilities, in meeting the everyday challenges of policing. The project 'Community of Practice and Coaching on the Appropriate Use of Force' (*Communauté de pratique et de coaching en usage judicieux de la force*) (CdPCUJF) addresses these concerns through the development of a professional support network working to reduce the erosion of skills in the use of force.

A community of practice and coaching within the police on the appropriate use of force: an innovation

The development and implementation of CdPCUJF began in the summer of 2005. This collaborative and innovative initiative fosters institutional learning and increases the speed, quality, and influence of learning, whether at individual, collective (in teams), or organizational levels. CdPCUJF is essential in responding to the legislative and social challenges for SPVM, and is a locale for socialization that contributes to critical thinking, knowledge transfer and renewal throughout the police force.

The pilot CdPCUJF had six coaches at its inception. Successful outcomes led to its expansion throughout the force in the autumn of 2005 and to date the network brings together more than 100 police officers (patrol and investigative) who have taken on the role of coaches in the use-of-force in their operational units.

Coaches provide a series of structured activities to build networks, exchange practice (e.g. through role play) and develop critical thinking, to cultivate a climate of trust, authenticity, honesty and cooperation. The model aims to develop a peer learning community built around issues of the use-of-force. It supports multiple approaches to learning: through successes and failures; the optimal use of best practice and the talents of each participant; the development of policies and action plans, and support and encouragement of individual learning.

Flexible networks in which information and knowledge is freely exchanged, allows members to build on the experiences, knowledge, and skills of each police officer. Coaches plan, lead, and adapt their activities to their respective units, in line with formal standards on the use of force. Each coach adjusts the pace and content of activities to the needs of officers in their unit, as they arise, in response to events and observation of the group. Maintaining policing skills and knowledge also fosters active learning by developing critical thinking about day-to-day policing practice.

Coaches also exchange ideas, experiences and successes between them. Communities of practice provide a dynamic coaching network, which assists development of policing practice by cultivating a shared repertoire of experience, and the transfer of knowledge and skills.

Team Make-up

The SPVM community of practice is composed of 100 unit coaches, of which around ten are "assistant coaches" who provide peer support for other coaches. The community is comprised of a management team including the sponsor, an assistant to the sponsor (regional inspector), a member of the executive committee, a unit commander, a policy development consultant, and a specialist coach in use of force. The latter is the only full-time team member whose function is to lead and advise coaches on use-of-force issues. Service level agreements between units provide occasional additional support to the management team from other parts of SPVM.

The community of practice uses communication technology (e.g. e-mail, intranet, telephone), and occasional face-to-face meetings between members and the management team to build collaborative networks. Activities are driven by both the management team and by members' initiatives. The management team is responsible for the dissemination of knowledge and for encouraging exchange between members. Emerging coaching practices are also disseminated throughout the network, which in turn supports coaches locally.

Evaluating the CdPCUJF

The coaching network and community of practice is now established across all operational units and is subject to ongoing evaluation by a consultant. This research has followed the development of the community and made recommendations to the management team throughout, allowing monitoring of progress.

The evaluation has suggested that the structure and culture of SPVM did not favour the development of the network but the alignment of policy, process and information strategies made it possible to overcome organizational obstacles and build successful collaboration. Studying the knowledge management processes used by CdPCUJF has contributed to understanding the promotion of institutional learning through socialization, and the impact of management practice. Managers in the community of practice have had a leveraging effect because they act as vehicles of organizational learning for SPVM. The community of practice exemplifies a form of adaptive learning, as the organization modifies action strategies and paradigms in response to realities on the ground. Equally, it is characterised by a form of cognitive learning, as SPVM values and norms are called into question, also allowing officers to question the wider institutional structure and organizational culture. Lastly participation in CdPCUJF has encouraged wider institutional learning outcomes, contributing significantly to understanding of the application of knowledge management and organizational learning to policing.

Entrenched hierarchical organizational structures, procedures, and a culture of obedience privileges operational and strategic conformity. However, the evaluation of CdPCUJF suggested that the collective approach fostered by the community of practice contributed to overcoming some of these structural and cultural organizational barriers. In doing so it contributed to a spirit of solidarity and a critical approach to practice. The network stimulated socialization processes leading to wider institutional learning. While academic research into knowledge management and collective learning approaches in hierarchical institutions is still limited, CdPCUJF suggests some promising avenues for research and development of tools for organizational innovation in these contexts. Like all public institutions experiencing intense organizational change, police services are a rich and inspiring field of study. Sometimes inflexible in character, such organizations possess unsuspected, even under-estimated, transformational capabilities which deserve more in-depth study.

During the past three years, CdPCUJF will have contributed to the professional development of police officers with regard to the use of force, while also developing a culture of responsibility and awareness of issues around the use of force, particularly in terms of ethics and individual, and collective, accountability.

The team

Unit coaches: CdpCUJF Group leaders

Nathalie Gravel, Processual and strategic consultant

Sylvain St-Amour, Instructor, use of force: expert coach

Marc Parent, A/D: Project initiator

CHAPTER 9

**A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF
EVALUATION IN PREVENTION**

A brief overview of evaluation in prevention

In the 2008 International Report, we discussed the increasing emphasis on knowledge-based and evidence-based public policies in crime prevention⁶⁸¹. We also noted that the evaluation of prevention programmes and strategies was an increasing requirement internationally. In this 2010 Report, we examine in greater detail **why and how prevention is evaluated**.

Evaluating crime prevention practice has become as important for international donors and organizations who provide funding as it is for local and national governments. Evaluation practice is now more widespread, as more and more governments emphasize the need to assess the effectiveness and efficacy of programmes implemented, and to provide accountability for public funds. These trends bear witness to the growing recognition of the importance of evaluation in the field of crime prevention and community safety. As with all public policy, but particularly social policy, assessing the implementation and outcome of interventions presents numerous difficulties, including technical ones, such as how to be sure that measured outcomes are the result of particular interventions, or strategic ones, such as how to interpret and use evaluation findings.

Chapter 9 presents a brief overview of issues in the evaluation of crime prevention. It introduces readers to the main trends in the field, and to some definitions of key terminology.

The evaluation of crime prevention practice poses **numerous challenges**. The success of prevention programmes is often measured in terms of the absence of criminality, even though it can be difficult to prove that events did not take place as a result of an intervention. In addition to this classic problem, crime prevention strategies often include a variety of different interventions. Examination of the implementation and outcomes of any strategy or programme requires a wide range of factors and measures to be taken into account which considerably complicates the exercise. Rarely can a single measure adequately evaluate the multiple inputs and outcomes. A causal link between community safety outcomes and implementation of a policy or practice is also difficult to demonstrate in a field where interactions between different public policies play an important role. For example, criminal justice, health, social, educational, or environmental policies can all affect an intervention. Similarly, the wider socio-economic context will affect outcomes, while the skills and effectiveness of those responsible for implementing programmes play a significant role in those outcomes.

The **term evaluation** needs to be carefully defined and distinguished from related terms, such as monitoring or performance management. For the purposes of this report we examine the practice of evaluation as used by those on the ground, while respecting as far as possible the international standards established by the United Nations (see below). Based in part on the Beccaria Programme's⁶⁸² work, we define evaluation as : *"the systematic and rigorous application of recognized methodology to objectively assess the process and outcome of an intervention policy. An evaluation aims to assess a programme's efficiency and effectiveness, and its impact and sustainability"*⁶⁸³.

Thus evaluation is a distinct practice which accompanies a programme or strategy. In establishing local crime prevention strategies or interventions, for example, evaluation forms a distinct aspect which needs to be built in from the beginning, and depends in part on the quality of the initial information and data gathered through the safety auditing process and subsequent monitoring of the project. The evaluation of the implementation and the outcomes of a strategy or programme helps establish the degree to which it meets its aims and objectives.

Pressure to undertake the systematic evaluation of public policies has increased in recent years for two main reasons. Firstly, there has been a widespread withdrawal from state provision of social programmes in a number of countries in the 1980s and 1990s, with such programmes being increasingly subjected to evaluation in the rationalization of public expenditures. Secondly, large-scale financial scandals such as that concerning the firm *Enron* have reinforced the demand for greater scrutiny and accountability of organizations subsidized by governments, a situation which affects many of those engaged in prevention activity. Evaluation has, therefore, been established as a priority at all levels of jurisdiction.

681 ICPC, 2008, *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and perspectives*, Montréal: ICPC.

682 Beccaria Program, *Quality Management in Crime Prevention*. See: www.beccaria.de

683 ICPC, 2008, *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and perspectives*, Montréal: ICPC. Page 250.

1. The creation of international standards

1.1 The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG)

The evaluation of programmes, practices and policies was considered sufficiently important for the UN to establish the *Inter-Agency Working Group on Evaluation* (IAWG) in 1984, with a mandate to promote the evaluation of UN programmes. For fifteen years this consisted of an informal group drawn from the evaluation departments of UN offices who met annually. In 2000, a review of IAWG suggested the need for “a more proactive function with specific deliverables that could be used by the UN system in their evaluation work”⁶⁸⁴.

These recommendations led to the **relaunch of IAWG in 2003 as the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG)**. In 2005, UNEG published two guides on the rules and norms for evaluation⁶⁸⁵, and specifies its orientations in relation to the reform and evaluation of the United Nations, the practice of evaluation itself, (improvement of practices, methods, norms, and standards), and its professionalization.

UNEG has compiled a list of eight essential criteria for the conduct of a good evaluation⁶⁸⁶: (1) Transparency of evaluation processes; (2) Expertise; (3) Independence; (4) Impartiality of evaluators ; (5) Intentionality, that is, in terms of the use of the evaluation results, which requires precise planning for each phase, in alignment with future decisions; (6) “Evaluability”, that is, the importance of establishing prior to the evaluation, that the programme has the necessary measurable indicators; (7) quality of the evaluation and (8) Follow-up of evaluation recommendations. These general criteria are viewed as the fundamental characteristics of all evaluation. Without referring explicitly to this list, many guides and recommendations on evaluation in the field of crime prevention have reached similar conclusions.

While the breadth of the UNEG mandate goes well beyond crime prevention, it is nevertheless applicable to all the agencies concerned. The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and UN-HABITAT are all members of UNEG, and as such, have committed to respecting and promoting the UNEG norms and standards in evaluation.

1.2 Main Recommendations of International Organizations

Other international organizations have also set up internal policies on evaluation. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank, for example, have undertaken evaluation activities for the past 30 years, and they share common understandings and approaches to evaluation. In 1999, IDB created the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE), and around the same period, the World Bank created the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)⁶⁸⁷. At both IDB and the World Bank, evaluations must serve two aims: “to contribute an objective basis for assessing results, [and] to provide accountability in the achievement of development objectives”⁶⁸⁸. Evaluation should both measure the effectiveness of implemented programmes, and provide a means of ensuring accountability. Both these international institutions also emphasize the need for evaluators to have some degree of independence to ensure the integrity and quality of their work. In the case of IDB, for example, its Office of Evaluation and Oversight reports directly to the Board of Executive Directors, to remove it from pressure from the implementation departments and other conflicts of interest, in accordance with the criteria established by the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Bank (ECG).

Generally, evaluation practices of international organizations have been developed and structured to respond to the classical management demands of identifying good practice, and improving existing practice on the ground. Moreover, the evaluators have access to training and tools to help them improve their skills.

2. Increasing requirement for systematic evaluation at the national level

2.1 The Evaluation of Public Policies has become a Priority

Evaluation practice has developed in the context of a managerial approach to public policy. The 1970s and 1980s were a turning point in the development of managerialism, especially in North America and the United Kingdom, with an emphasis on efficiency in public administration⁶⁸⁹.

684 UN Evaluation Group. See : <http://www.uneval.org/about/index.jsp?ret=true>

685 UNEG (2005a). *Standards of Evaluation in the UN System*. UNEG. (2005b). *Norms of Evaluation in the UN System*. Both Documents are available at: http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsp?doc_cat_source_id=4 The main recommendations address the following themes : Transparency, Expertise, Independence, Impartiality, Evaluability, Quality of the Evaluation, Follow-up to Evaluation.

686 UNEG, 2005b, op. cit.

687 Grasso Patrick C., Wasty Sulaiman S. & Weaving Rachel V. (Eds) (2003). *World Bank Operations Evaluation Department: The first 30 years*. Washington D.C. World Bank. See: [http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/5c22e38fcca5c9e285256d1f0071dc19/\\$FILE/OED_30yrs.pdf](http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/5c22e38fcca5c9e285256d1f0071dc19/$FILE/OED_30yrs.pdf) (Retrieved 23/09/2009).

688 World Bank, 2009. IEG – *Evaluation for better results*. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOED/Resources/iege_brochure.pdf, consulted 23 September 2009.

689 Laforge, Denis & Godin, Richard, 2001. *Vers un nouveau profil de cadre en management public*. Observatoire de l'administration publique, ENAP, Telescope, vol.8, n°3. See : <http://www.enap.ca/OBSERVATOIRE/docs/Telescope/Volumes6-11/2001-juin-vol8num3.pdf>, consulted 16 January 2009.

The welfare state, and a social welfare approach to dealing with issues such as crime, was under challenge from some quarters as being unjust and ineffective⁶⁹⁰. A managerialist approach implied freedom from ideological bias, and policy which was guided by objective evidence, through “evidence-based government”⁶⁹¹. This required the relative success of crime and criminal justice policies⁶⁹² to be measured through rigorous (quantitative) experimental methods, providing scientific evidence to their efficacy. This New Public Management (NPM) approach has since been adopted in a number of other countries. For example, in France, the *loi d’orientation des lois de finances* (LOLF), which came into effect in 2006, promoted the monitoring of the performance of public policies⁶⁹³. In England and Wales, evidence-based policy programmes (EBPP) have been a central aspect of crime prevention policy since 1998 with the passage of the Crime and Disorder Act⁶⁹⁴. Where this approach has been adopted administrations are asked to define “performance objectives” and measurable indicators necessary for the application of quantitative methods of evaluation. Similarly, the costs of each public policy, including the salaries of civil servants, is now more systematically assessed.

Thus, at the national level in many countries, the growth of a managerialist culture has resulted in a focus on **performance management**, and **evidence-based policy** (EBD)⁶⁹⁵. The first to respond to the growing obligation of public administrators to be accountable, the second to the need for policy development to be guided by empirical data.

Some academics have questioned whether these indicate real change in the philosophy of public management, pointing out that the State has always demonstrated rationality in its decision-making, and that it reflects rather “a transformation in the explicit use of knowledge by decision-makers, managers and practitioners”⁶⁹⁶.

Starting from the mid 90’s, many scientific groups have been created, including the American Evaluation Society, the United Kingdom Evaluation Society, the European Evaluation Society and the Australian Evaluation Society, followed by the first international review on the topic of evaluation, the International Evaluation Journal. Since then, such organizations have multiplied, and sometimes with a regional or national dimension (for example, the African Evaluation Society). However, there are no associations specifically dedicated to the question of crime prevention.

2.2 How widespread is the use of evaluation?

The current use of evaluation in crime prevention varies from one country to another. For the purposes of this report, responses to the 2006 United Nations survey on States’ implementation of the UN guidelines on crime prevention were examined. Responses from 42 countries⁶⁹⁷ - particularly question 15 to 19⁶⁹⁸ - provided some information on evaluation practice as well as our own studies on 9 other countries⁶⁹⁹.

690 Garland, David, 2001. *The culture of control: Crime and social order on contemporary society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

691 This had been advocated since the 1960s by academics such as Donald Campbell. Campbell, Donald T., 1969. *Reforms as experiments*. American Psychologist, 24. Pp. 409-429.

692 The notion of actuarial justice was developed in the 1970’s, in the United States. See Harcourt, B. (2007). *Against prediction: Profiling, policing and punishing in an actuarial age*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

693 See Ocueteau, Frédéric, 2008. *La sécurité publique à l’épreuve de la LOLF, L’exemple de la DDSP de Seine et Marne et de la CSP de Coulommiers 2006-2007*. CERSA-CNRS.

694 See the Home Office Crime Reduction Programme: <http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

695 Jacob, Steve, 2009. *Smothering Debate, or the Reinvention of Rational State: Evaluation and Evidence*. PerfEval: Université Laval. http://www.pol.ulaval.ca/Perfeval/upload/2009__criminologie_translation._02112009_113835.pdf [consulted 11 February 2010].

696 Ibid. see also Nutley S. M., Walter I. & Davies H. T. O., 2003. *From knowing to doing: A framework for understanding the evidence-into-practice agenda*. Evaluation, 10, 4, 440-462.

697 Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Island, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius Islands, Mexico, Moldova, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Syria, Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Swaziland, United Arab Emirates United States.

698 Questions relating to evaluation were numbers 15-19 below (note that Q.17 (e), Q.18 (a), (b), (c), (d) and Q.19 were particularly relevant):

15. In your country, have there been systematic attempts to assess the costs of crime and crime control measures, including crime prevention measures?

16. In your country, is the use of knowledge-based crime prevention strategies, policies or programmes facilitated by:

(a) Supporting the generation and utilization of useful information and data?

(b) Supporting the sharing of useful information and data?

(c) Promoting the application of useful information and data to reduce repeat victimization, persistent offending and high crime areas?

17. In your country, do the crime prevention policies, strategies or programmes promote a planning process that includes:

(a) A systematic analysis of crime problems, their causes and risk factors and consequences, in particular at the local level?

(b) A plan that draws on the most appropriate approaches and adapts interventions to the specific local problems and local context?

(c) An implementation plan to deliver efficient, effective and sustainable interventions?

(d) Monitoring and evaluation?

18. In your country, do the crime prevention policies, strategies or programmes include:

(a) Undertaking evaluation to test rigorously what works?

(b) Undertaking cost-benefit analyses?

(c) Assessing reduction in crime, victimization and fear of crime?

(d) Assessing outcomes and unintended consequences?

19. Has an evaluation of components or specific activities of your country’s national crime prevention policy or strategy been undertaken?

699 Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Croatia, India, Macedonia, Morocco, Singapore and Tunisia.

These two sources of information suggest that of the countries surveyed:

- 21.5% (11 of 51 countries) did not undertake evaluation of crime prevention programmes;
- 27.5% (14 of 51 countries) performed partial evaluations — with respondents stressing these were not systematic across their country, or that they lacked capacity;
- 45% (23 of 51 countries) systematically undertook evaluation;
- Information was missing for three countries.

Although these figures are encouraging, since they attest to efforts to evaluate prevention programmes in nearly three-quarters of the countries surveyed, only 55% of countries (28 of 51) gave positive answers to the question: “*In your country, do crime prevention policies, strategies or programmes include: Undertaking evaluation to test rigorously what works?*”⁷⁰⁰. This decreases to 49% (25 of 51) when countries are asked if they conduct rigorous impact evaluations (assessing outcomes and unintended consequences)⁷⁰¹.

However, responses to the UN survey do not demonstrate common understandings of evaluation amongst respondents. Syria, for example, confirmed that it undertook evaluation of crime prevention policies, but describes it as performed through periodic meetings between police personnel. It is not possible to know how far this activity meets the standards for evaluation established by UNEG (see above).

Equally, countries’ responses reflect their stated policies on evaluation, but it is not possible to assess how far they are implemented. Even when a country undertakes systematic evaluation of public prevention programmes, implementation can be impeded by a number of factors such as high costs, inadequate planning, and multiple partners with competing demands, or changes in government priorities. A 2002 Australian study, for example⁷⁰², found that 33% of crime prevention projects had been systematically evaluated, 12% partially evaluated, and 12% not evaluated. No information was available for the remaining 43%. Given that Australia has one of the most established traditions of evaluation, these findings provide some idea of the work still remaining to be accomplished in this field.

The geographic distribution of the collected data illustrates on one hand that, more or less all high income countries practice prevention, and on the other that the culture of evaluation has become embedded in a number of other countries, including Chile, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Belarus, Estonia, Poland, and Hungary.

Beyond the different levels of evaluation practice in the surveyed countries, the reasons invoked by governments to promote evaluation differ between countries and within the same country as well.

3. The aims of evaluation better clarified in prevention practices

The demonstration of the effectiveness of crime prevention and community safety policies is often used to argue for a more balanced approach to responding to crime. In a context where insecurity - by nature difficult to define - heavily influences public policy debates, prevention policy evaluation is often seen as introducing an element of rationality into the debate.

The evolution of crime prevention evaluation has been spurred by a number of factors. In the 2008 International Report, it was noted that there was an increasing expectation that evaluation should provide knowledge about successful outcomes in prevention (“what works”) as well as analysis that explains success or failure (“how does it work”). As suggested by Dennis Rosenbaum, more than 20 years ago, “[there is] a compelling need to open up the black box...and test the many presumed causal links in our theoretical models. We are past the point of wanting to report that crime prevention does or does not work, and now are interested in specifying the conditions under which particular outcomes are observed”⁷⁰³.

Other researchers, such as Philippe Robert have pointed to the importance of distinguishing between the need to establish a rationale for a policy⁷⁰⁴, the needs of practitioners for tools to support the implementation process, and the benefits which evaluation brings in enriching discussion about the objectives of prevention policies. Tim Hope has highlighted differences in the aims of evaluation depending on its intended use⁷⁰⁵. For some academics, scientific and rigorous evaluation is considered an indispensable tool for societal advancement. Among policy makers, the aims of evaluation are likely to be threefold: **accountability**, providing greater transparency; **technical**, to find out “what works”; and **validation**, to demonstrate why a project works, and why one programme is better than another. **In practice, evaluation does not always meet the needs or expectations of all crime prevention stakeholders, and can lead to conflict around the conduct of research and the interpretation of results.**

700 Question 18 (a), see above.

701 “In your country, do the crime prevention policies, strategies or programmes include: Assessing outcomes and unintended consequences?” Question 18.d.

702 Jeffries, S., Payne, J., & Smith, R., G., 2002, *Preventing Crime in Australia 1990-2002: A Selected Register of Crime Prevention Projects*. Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra. This study reviewed 110 crime prevention programmes implemented in Australia between 1990 and 2002.

703 Cited in Pawson, Ray & Tilley, Nick, 1997, *Realistic evaluation*, Sage Publications, London, p.11.

704 Robert, Philippe, 2003, The evaluation of prevention policies, *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice*, 11, 1, 114-130.

705 Hope, Tim (2008) *Evaluation of safety and crime prevention policies, England and Wales*, Draft paper of a presentation at the Workshop on Evaluation of safety and crime prevention policies held by CRIMPREV in Bologna, 10-12 July 2008.

These arguments are not necessarily mutually exclusive approaches, but are often competing since evaluations are performed by, and with, numerous individuals whose objectives vary. The researcher undertaking an evaluation aims to maintain high methodological standards which will meet the expectations of academic peers when published. Practitioners will see an opportunity to demonstrate that their programme merits further implementation and resources. Policy makers are likely to be motivated by political pressures to show conclusive and positive or negative outcomes to guide future programme decisions⁷⁰⁶.

Since motivations and justifications for evaluation vary widely, evaluation practice shows equally divergent objectives.

3.1 Evaluation responds primarily to financial or managerial expectations

As suggested above, for governments and international organizations, evaluation responds to the managerial need for **accountability**, in demonstrating the value of a policy or strategy. Secondly, evaluation is also used to guide **resource allocation and the implementation of national policies**. The renewal of funding for programmes and projects often depends on analysis of the outcomes achieved.

The legitimate aim of using research to guide spending can sometimes produce damaging side effects, however, such as the resistance of community safety actors to participate fully in the evaluation process⁷⁰⁷, or unhealthy competition between projects⁷⁰⁸.

In many instances, evaluation aims to verify that practitioners have implemented the programme or policy as intended. Equally, evaluation can also be used to measure conformity with international norms, as was the case, for example, in the evaluation of the national initiative to counter money laundering in Canada⁷⁰⁹.

3.2 Evaluation aims to improve prevention practice

Over the past 30 years policy-makers and practitioners have tried to develop and tailor techniques and evaluation methods to help improve crime prevention practice.

In some instances, the aims of prevention programmes have been too broad and vague to allow precise evaluation. Broad overall objectives to “improve services”⁷¹⁰, or “evaluate the implementation of a programme”⁷¹¹, or “assess the value of implemented measures” are not sufficient⁷¹².

Many evaluations give priority to establishing whether the target group of an intervention has been reached.

This is a common objective of many substance abuse programmes⁷¹³, or those which aim to provide services for socially excluded groups, for example. Often this responds to assuring that public funds — allocated to psycho-social, educational or health interventions, or for the distribution of financial aid — are reaching those for whom they were intended.

Because of the innovative nature of much prevention practice, evaluation often involves **collecting new data** on problems identified by local actors, or which have not been closely studied. For example, the evaluation of an innovative school mediation programme in Quebec was designed to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of school violence, and perpetrators, victims, and witnesses⁷¹⁴.

The creation of **new community safety occupations or professions** has been a feature of crime prevention in recent years, as discussed in the previous International Report (Chapter 9) and their **evaluation has been undertaken more systematically** than has tended to be the case with earlier prevention programmes⁷¹⁵.

706 Brodeur (1998) *L'évaluation des programmes d'intervention sécuritaire*, dans Ferret J. & Ocquetau F. (eds.), *Évaluer la police de proximité? Problèmes, concepts, méthodes*, Paris, IHESI, La Documentation Française, Pp. 13-21.

707 See: Savagnac J., Lelandais I., Sagant V. (2007) *Nuisances publiques liées aux drogues et à la prostitution : Manuel pratique pour l'action locale*. Centre International pour la Prévention de la Criminalité. CICP, Montréal, 254 pages. Pages 161-162 ; Gray S. (2006) *Evaluation Practices of Crime Prevention Projects : Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland*. International Center for the Prevention of Crime. ICPC, Montreal.

708 DIV (2009). *Analyse du volet prévention des contrats urbains de cohésion sociale*. Paris : Délégation Interministérielle des Villes.

709 EKOS (2004) *Year Five Evaluation of the National Initiatives to Combat Money Laundering and Interim Evaluation of Measures to Combat Terrorist Financing*, Final Report.. Toronto : EKOS Research Associates.

710 Horber-Papazian, K., Favre, N., & Schaller, R. (2003) *Évaluation de la campagne LAOLA : Prévention dans les clubs sportifs*. Institut de hautes études en administration publique (IDHEAP), sur mandat de l'Office fédéral de la santé publique. Available at : www.bag.admin.ch/evaluation/index.html

711 Services fédéraux des affaires scientifiques, techniques et culturelles (S.S.T.C.). (2001) *Évaluation des maisons d'accueil socio-sanitaire pour usagers de drogues : Rapport de synthèse global*. Retrieved from <http://www.belspo.be/belspo/home/pers/soceco/MASS%20rapport%20final.pdf>

712 Van Neste, C., Lemonne, A., & T. Van Camp. (2005) *Recherche relative à l'évaluation des dispositifs mis en place à l'égard des victimes*. Institut National de Criminologie et de Criminologie. Available at: www.just.fgov.be.

713 For example, Obradovic, I. (2006). *Enquête sur les personnes accueillies en «consultation cannabis» en 2005, St-Denis* : OFDT (Observatoire français des drogues et des toxicomanies). Available at: www.ofdt.fr

714 Turcotte, D., Lamonde, G. & Lindsay, J. (2002) *La prévention de la violence à l'école primaire par la promotion des comportements pacifiques : évaluation du programme Les ambassadeurs et ambassadrices de la paix*. Montréal : Centre de recherche interdisciplinaire sur la violence familiale et la violence faite aux femmes (CRI-VIFF).

715 Smeets, S. & Hendrickx, T. (2002) *Les «nouveaux acteurs locaux de la sécurité» : Évaluation des contrats de sécurité des régions bruxelloise et wallonne*. Ministère de l'Intérieur, convention de recherche avec l'École des sciences criminologiques, Université Libre de Bruxelles; DIV (2009) *Évaluation du dispositif relatif à la création de postes d'intervenants sociaux en commissariat de police et groupements de gendarmerie*, Paris : FORIS; Singer, Lawrence (2004) *Community Support Officer (Detention Power) Pilot : Evaluation results*, London : Home Office.

This has included collecting information on attitudes and experiences, and identifying needs for ongoing occupational support, recruitment, training, working conditions, and the harmonization with existing services.

Social workers in the police force

In 2006 France decided to extend the integration of social workers into the police force. In 2008, the *Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel des villes* undertook a programme evaluation. It was found that 70% of incidents involving social workers were matters of domestic dispute (40% of which were spousal disputes)*. The conclusions of this evaluation are as follows:

- For clients, the programme allows for a quicker and more comprehensive response, the social worker constituting a point of entry to social services (shelters, charities, child protection services, general social services, etc.);
- For social services, the programme increases detection of domestic violence, reduces the time needed to neutralize a situation and to assess it;
- For the police, the presence of social workers constitutes support in encouraging victims to pursue legal recourse, and improves relations between the police and social workers;
- For social workers, the programme represents an opportunity to apply their skills in a specific setting. The positions created have yet to be sustained financially and culturally, and work conditions remain to be improved.

*Sample from 73 questionnaires, follow-up with 18 qualitative interviews (13 in a police zone, 5 in an office of the peace).

References: SG-CIV (2008) *Les intervenants sociaux en commissariat et gendarmerie. Guide pratique (Social workers in the police force. Practical guide)*. Les éditions de la DIV, Repères. 99 pages.

Another contemporary feature of crime prevention is working in **multi-agency partnerships**, which has required some creative and innovative approaches to evaluation, to take account of the range of factors affecting the quality, characteristics and constraints of meetings between partners, and wider collaboration.

The range and evolution of crime prevention practice has created a dual impetus in evaluation: as with any public policy, it is subject to rigorous accountability; while as new approaches

emerge, there is need to improve knowledge about the problems identified and barriers to project implementation that may not be amenable to strictly scientific approaches.

4. What to evaluate?

Evaluation in crime prevention, therefore, takes many forms and tries to answer a variety of questions. It is used to assess strategies or policies as a whole, or specific practices and programmes, whether in whole or in part.

4.1 Evaluating strategies, programmes, or practices?

Many publically available evaluations in crime prevention focus on the overall results of a programme. These can be found, for example, through the websites of organizations that actively promote the evaluation of programmes, such as the National Centre for the Prevention of Crime in Canada, or the Norwegian National Council for Crime Prevention. **Governments also publish evaluations of individual projects, or aspects of a programme.** For example, there have been many evaluations of the overall impacts of Community Support Officers in the United Kingdom, as well as specific studies of aspects of their work⁷¹⁶. On the whole, however, many evaluations are not made publically available. This includes small scale studies with managerial objectives which are internally evaluated, and which do not have significant investment from policy-makers. Evaluations of entire programmes tend to constitute the majority of those published by governments, although it is possible that a significant number remain unpublished, because of controversial or inconclusive results, or because the evaluation did not meet methodological requirements.

At the national level, evaluating prevention programmes is difficult to accomplish as initiatives may be widely dispersed and implemented in various way. Rather than evaluating the overall impact of all components of a strategy, some evaluations examine a sample of similar projects, to identify common elements which might explain their results. Such **cluster evaluations** are less costly than full-scale evaluation, but valuable in identifying the components contributing to programme success or failure.

In an Australian review of evaluation options for crime prevention, for example, Homel and Morgan⁷¹⁷ have suggested that it is not necessary for national governments to undertake extensive high-level evaluation of every project in a programme, which is both difficult and very costly. Rather they suggest that the overall delivery, appropriateness, efficiency and impact of a programme can be evaluated, supplemented by more detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of individual projects and how

716 Singer, Lawrence (2004) op.cit.

717 Homel, Peter & Morgan, Anthony (2008). *Evaluation of crime prevention: pathways for Australia and Asia*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.

they have functioned, and evaluation of clustered groups of projects to examine the effectiveness of specific types of intervention in specific contexts. More generally, they suggest that it is important for practitioners to undertake **performance measurement** – a process which may be seen as less ‘threatening’ and technical, and more logical in helping to guide practice to meet project objectives, and with the development of clear performance monitoring indicators: ‘Evaluation feeds into high-level decisions about the choice and design of policies and programmes, while performance management is used mainly for day-to-day management and accountability’⁷¹⁸. Thus the choice of one method or another for evaluating a crime prevention programme should be made on the basis of the programme’s characteristics and on the questions which need to be answered.

More broadly, literature reviews of programme evaluations may provide policy makers with a national or international perspective on what appear to be effective programme directions. A report commissioned by the Canadian National Crime Prevention Centre, for example, on the social reintegration of offenders, drew on data from a large number of programmes worldwide to show that the most effective — measured in terms of reductions in reoffending rates — were those which had continuity in offender case management and close coordination between the justice, health, and social service sectors, community organizations and the offender’s family⁷¹⁹.

Despite the problems inherent in evaluation, many governments have evaluated their national prevention strategies. This includes, for example, the UK’s *Crime Reduction Programme (2005)*⁷²⁰; Finland’s National Crime Prevention Programme⁷²¹; Chile’s *Política Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana (PNSC)* and *Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (ENSP)*⁷²²; Japan’s Action Plan to Create a Crime Resistant Society; *Australia’s National Community Crime Prevention* programme⁷²³, and in France, the prevention and safety component of urban social cohesion contracts⁷²⁴. Such evaluations have variously focused on **aspects of the im-**

plementation of those strategies; relations between stakeholders; the application of national standards and policies by local actors; the quality of local monitoring and evaluation; the quality of local partnerships; community mobilization; and the use of resources. Other evaluations have explored the **impact of a national strategy on the level of crime** in municipalities. Chapter 10 discusses some of the methodological barriers to the evaluation of national crime prevention strategies in more detail.

4.2 Evaluating process or impact?

Evaluation is complicated by the variety of technical terms which are often used, such as “process”, “impact”, “efficiency”, “effectiveness”, “results” or “outcomes”, understandings of which can vary in different contexts and languages.

A commonly used typology is that developed by Rossi et al.,⁷²⁵ who describe **five dimensions of evaluation**: programme needs; programme design (the theoretical basis of the programme, and its capacity to address research questions); implementation issues; quality of services delivered (evaluation of practice); programme outcomes (to what extent does the programme meet its aims); and programme efficiency (using cost-benefits analysis). These dimensions are not mutually exclusive and it is often recommended that programme evaluation combines all of them to obtain the most thorough assessment of programme quality⁷²⁶.

Evaluating effectiveness largely examines whether planned measures were implemented well. The term efficacy usually refers to a programme’s capacity to attain its stated objectives. These two aims broadly reflect those of process and impact evaluations respectively.

One important distinction is that between process and impact evaluation, both of which are commonly used in crime prevention⁷²⁷. **Process evaluations**⁷²⁸ explore all aspects of programme implementation, sometimes referred to

718 Idib.

719 Griffiths C. T., Dandurand Y. & Murdoch D. (2007) *The social reintegration of offenders and crime prevention*. Ottawa: National Crime Prevention Centre.

720 Homel, Peter, Nutley, Sandra, Webb, Barry & Tilley N. (2004) *Investing to deliver: Reviewing the implementation of the UK Crime Reduction Programme*, London: Home Office.

721 Savolainen J. (2005) *The Effects of the National Crime Prevention Programme in Finland: A municipal-level analysis*, Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology, 47th Research Seminar, Available at http://www.nsfk.org/upload/files/seminarreports/researchsem_no47.pdf, Retrieved on march 28th 2009.

722 FLACSO-CHILE y División de Seguridad Pública del Ministerio del Interior: *Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad Pública “Evaluación Intermedia de la Política Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana”*. Santiago, Chile 2008. Retrieved June 4th 2009 at: http://issuu.com/flacso.chile/docs/evaluacion_intermedia

723 This evaluation has not been published.

724 DIV (2009) *Analyse du volet prévention des contrats urbains de cohésion social*. Paris : Délégation Interministérielle des Villes.

725 Rossi, P. H., Lipsey, M. W., & Freeman, H. E. (2004). *Evaluation: A systematic approach* (7th Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

726 See : NCPC(2005) *Fonds pour la recherche et le développement des connaissances, Lignes directrices relatives aux rapports d’évaluation des projets*. Ottawa: Public Safety Canada

727 Gray, S. (2006) *Evaluation practices of crime prevention projects: Examples from Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland*. Montréal: International Center for the Prevention of Crime.

728 ICPC identifies three types of evaluations. **Evaluation of process** evaluates the pertinence of the methodology used (pertinence in elaboration of the project, in the implementation and in tools developed). **Evaluation of impact** allows for the evaluation of the program’s long-term effects on its environment. This type of evaluation allows for the identification of any advance in progress made from a strategic point of view. **Evaluation of results** acts to validate the presence of immediate tangible results.

See: Savagnac J., Lelandais I., Sagant V. (2007) *Nuisances publiques liées aux drogues et à la prostitution : Manuel pratique pour l’action locale*. ICPC, Montréal, 254 pages. Pages 161-162.

as implementation evaluation, or effectiveness evaluation⁷²⁹. These evaluations examine how far the procedures implemented conform to those initially intended and, what explains any discrepancies. Process evaluations are also used to understand how a programme functions, the dynamics that underpin its success or failure, although without necessarily measuring its outcomes, which is the remit of impact evaluation.

Process evaluations form a significant part of the comprehensive range of evaluation studies available on the websites of the Canadian National Crime Prevention Centre, the Home Office in England and Wales, or Australia's National Community Crime Prevention Programme (NCCPP). They are relatively easily to undertake, and they focus on important elements of prevention practice: partnerships, methodology and multi-agency approaches.

Process evaluations help to establish how well the programme was implemented, and are essential in ensuring that disappointing results are not falsely attributed to implementation problems⁷³⁰. Process evaluations can avoid assumptions of programme failure when negative outcomes are the result of faulty implementation. For example, evaluation of the Minimum Income Allocation system (RMI) in France, in the department of Meurthe et Moselle, which was established to support the most socially excluded, showed that in one area⁷³¹ social workers' perceptions of employability had influenced implementation. Those perceived as the least employable, received fewer services than those with better chances of success. This contradicted the objective of decreasing social inequality, and potentially exacerbated the problem.

In addition to controlling for the implementation of a programme, **process evaluations enhance understanding of how a programme functions**. Not only determining whether or not a programme 'works', process evaluations demonstrate why/how it works by exploring the nature of prevention practice.

Impact evaluation, by contrast, is concerned with measuring the extent to which an initiative resulted in intended outcomes, and any unintended outcomes. This type of evaluation focuses on the overall effects and outcomes (impact) of a programme,

analyzing changes resulting from the crime prevention intervention.

While this type of evaluation addresses core questions of success or failure, in practice attempts to assess impacts often suffer from lack of clarity about programme aims and expected outcomes. The expected outcomes of prevention strategies or interventions are often expressed rather vaguely in terms of a "reduction in crime and/or insecurity". A number of evaluations underline this problem as one of the significant limitations in outcome evaluation.

Analysis of responses to the 2006 UN questionnaire on crime prevention and ICPC's commissioned studies, suggests that around 60% of the countries included (29 of 51) undertake impact evaluations. As illustrated in the following chapter, guides and handbooks on crime prevention evaluation, consistently reference these two types of evaluation, and they are both seen as valuable. The *Guidelines for project evaluation reports* prepared by NCPC, Canada⁷³², for example, recommends that all crime prevention evaluations should examine both process or implementation, and impact.

In Europe, the recent collaborative European CRIMPREV⁷³³ project highlighted **national differences** in approach to evaluation⁷³⁴. Some countries, such as France, appear to privilege process evaluation, whereas others, such as the United Kingdom, put more emphasis on evaluation of impact and cost-effectiveness⁷³⁵.

In addition to measuring anticipated outcomes, impact evaluations have the capacity to contribute to evidence-based knowledge when unexpected consequences and beneficial or harmful effects are examined. The most common example of unintended consequences relates to the measurement of the **displacement of offending** to areas surrounding the area of intervention. For example, following the installation of video-surveillance cameras in Montreal, Canada, the research measured changes in offending not only in the immediate area under surveillance, but also in surrounding areas to assess whether the project had merely displaced rather than reduced offending⁷³⁶.

729 It is also possible to add to this category design evaluations, which we have discussed earlier, as well as management evaluations which aim to provide tools for programme managers by informing them on the impact of their past decisions. ; cf. Gray, S. (2006) *Evaluation practices of crime prevention projects: Examples from Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland*, Montreal: ICPC.

730 ARCS (2007) *Reducing offending: A critical review of the international research evidence, Final report, submitted to the Northern Ireland Office*. Cambridge, ARCS (UK) Ltd.

731 Boulayoune A. & Kaiser K. (1999) *Le dispositif de revenu minimum d'insertion dans le département de Meurthe et Moselle : Évaluation du dispositif de lutte contre le durcissement du chômage*, Laboratoire de sociologie du travail et de l'environnement social (LASTES), Groupe de recherche sur l'éducation et l'emploi.

732 NCPC (2005) *Lignes directrices relatives aux rapports d'évaluation des projets*, Ottawa : Public Safety Canada.

733 See : <http://www.crimprev.eu/germ/index.php?id=4>

734 Wuyekens, Anne (2008) *De « what works » en « bonnes pratiques »*, *Y a-t-il un bon usage du pragmatisme anglo-saxon?*, Draft paper of a presentation at the Workshop on Evaluation of safety and crime prevention policies held by CRIMPREV in Bologna, 10-12 July 2008.

735 Hope (2008) op.cit.

736 Carli, V. (2008) *Assessing CCTV as an effective safety and management tool for crime-solving, prevention and reduction*. Montréal: ICPC.

Examples of outputs and outcomes

Output	Outcome
Visible policing in CBD increased by 50%	Reduction of mugging by 20-30% Reduction of fear of crime
Car guards operational	More diverse users of CBD for shopping, working, using and providing services, etc.
Security locks fitted on 100% of houses in <i>defined area by date</i>	A 10-20% reduction in burglary in <i>defined area</i>
Domestic violence leaflets distributed to all households by August 2000	Victims of spouse abuse are more prepared to report incidents to SAPS

Source: CSIR (2000). Pretoria: National Crime Prevention Centre Department of Safety and Security. Page 70.

Similarly the use of specialized brigades such as SWAT in the United Kingdom, or Anti-Crime Brigades (BAC) in France, can have unintended consequences of increasing tensions between police services and the population in a given neighbourhood. In 2008, ICPC published a comparative study on urban riots⁷³⁷, on the impact of specialized police units, in Montreal, Quebec, France and Los Angeles (United States)⁷³⁸.

The terms discussed in this chapter are based on a review of the literature and a number of ICPC studies. They represent ideal categories that are not necessarily clearly distinguished from one another, particularly because terminology varies from country to country.

4.3 Evaluating the cost benefits of crime prevention

A final type of evaluation is concerned with the **efficiency of interventions, in terms of calculating the costs and benefits** of an intervention. Cost benefit analysis takes account of all the inputs into a programme, its outputs and impacts, and any imputed savings from other actions flowing from a reduction in offending. Cost-benefit analysis is not always easily applied to prevention, since the costs of crime are difficult to reduce to a monetary value (e.g. it is difficult to measure the cost value of reductions in quality of life). While economic arguments alone are not sufficient to underpin prevention policy, they can help to demonstrate the economic benefits of prevention compared with the often heavy cost of criminal justice interventions.

Of the countries that responded to the UN questionnaire or were included in ICPC reviews, only 29% (18 of 46) reported cost-benefits analysis of their crime prevention programmes and policies, although 57% of the countries said they used

outcome and impact evaluation (in the UN questionnaire both types of evaluation are under the same section), and 68% measure the reduction of crime rates and/or victimization. Among the impact evaluation studies examined by ICPC in 2006⁷³⁹ none included cost benefit analysis.

5. Using the findings of evaluation

5.1 Wider dissemination of evaluation findings

There would appear to be a greater willingness on the part of governments and researchers to disseminate evaluation findings and share knowledge about practices than in the past. Common to all the evaluation guides reviewed is the recommendation to establish, from the outset of a project, a clear and flexible communications strategy to encourage discussion about the progress of a project and its monitoring and evaluation⁷⁴⁰.

Similarly, at the international level, the policy of the IDB *Office of Evaluation and Oversight*, is "to make information available to the public unless there is a compelling reason for confidentiality"⁷⁴¹. In some cases countries involved in project evaluation are not willing for the results to be made publically available. This illustrates some of the tensions between the need to be transparent about project evaluation findings, and the need for international organizations such as IDB to maintain good relations with governments and stakeholders.

737 Brodeur JP., Mulone M., Ocqueteau F., Sagant V. (2008). *Brève analyse comparée internationale des violences urbaines*. Montreal : ICPC. 47 pages.

738 *Ibid.* Pp. 15-23

739 Gray S. (2006) *Evaluation Practices of Crime Prevention Projects : Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland*. International Centre for the Prevention of Crime. ICPC, Montreal.

740 See above.

741 www.iadb.org/ove/, retrieved on 8 September 2009.

Many national organizations promote the evaluations they conduct through publication on their websites. The NCPC in Canada, the *Australian Institute of Criminology*, the *Home Office* and *Crime Reduction Unit* in the United Kingdom, the *Comité Interministériel des Villes* (CIV) in France, and *Brå* in Sweden are all good examples⁷⁴². The subsequent interpretation of results is however limited, because it can be difficult to assess the true basis of conclusions presented by evaluators. Detecting methodological or ideological biases usually requires a close reading of a report in its entirety⁷⁴³.

At national and local levels this is also an issue, when governments prefer to restrict findings for internal use, or where there are problems with the findings themselves. Practitioners and policy-makers may find a negative evaluation of a project difficult to accept and publish. (For this reason evaluation guides recommend that practitioners be involved in the evaluation from its inception). In other cases, governments may view programme evaluations as internal documents valuable in themselves for rethinking policies. For example, in Chile the initial evaluation of the national *Programa Comuna Segura* (PCS) was not published⁷⁴⁴. Following some initial process evaluation, changes were made to the programme during its first years of implementation. It was eventually replaced, following a change of government, by the *Planes Comunales de Seguridad Pública*, a strategy based on accountability and empowerment of municipal authorities, the results of which have been publically disseminated⁷⁴⁵.

In some cases failure to disseminate findings may be due to lack of capacity to analyse and draw conclusions from a range of studies. A review of the evaluation of drug and alcohol abuse prevention programmes in the Caribbean⁷⁴⁶, for example, showed that of some 30 evaluations performed over two years, only 7 were published. The author suggests that although, "[i]t is obvious that we do not lack the capacity to carry out fieldwork and collect data...we lack sufficient capacity to interpret and report the results of these studies"⁷⁴⁷.

5.2. Interpreting evaluation findings

The connections between evaluation and policy-making are not always direct. Given the methodological issues inherent in the process, which can make it difficult to provide definitive statements about the effectiveness of a policy, results may be interpreted differently. One example relates to the *Reducing Burglary Initiative* (RBI) in England and Wales. This initiative had been piloted and replicated a number of times⁷⁴⁸ with positive results, strengthening confidence in the use of this largely situational approach to burglary reduction⁷⁴⁹. Subsequently, when the approach was tried in a number of new sites, further analysis of project findings by external evaluators found that a decrease in burglaries could only be attributed to the project in 6 out of 20 sites⁷⁵⁰. The *Home Office*, which had instigated the overall initiative as part of its *Crime Reduction Programme* summarized the overall findings on burglary reduction as successful⁷⁵¹.

In other instances, evaluation results are ignored by practitioners and decision-makers. This can result in **programmes continuing despite their proven ineffectiveness**. One such example is the *Drug Abuse Resistance Education* (DARE) programme delivered by police officers, aiming to preventing drug and alcohol abuse in schools by teaching young people to "say no to drugs". According to Dennis Rosenbaum⁷⁵², it has been the most popular drug prevention programme in schools in the United States, receiving 200 million dollars annually and reaching 26 million school children. DARE is advocated worldwide, and more than 50 countries have implemented the programme. However, evaluation has clearly demonstrated its ineffectiveness⁷⁵³. Children and youth who participate in the programme are no more inclined to "say no to drugs" than children who do not participate.

742 These sites are: NCPC, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/cp/ncpc-pubs-fra.aspx>; AIC, www.aic.gov.au; Crime Reduction Unit, <http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/>; CIV, <http://www.ville.gouv.fr/>; Brå, www.bra.se.

743 Hope Tim (2004). *Pretend it works: Evidence and governance of community safety in the evaluation of the Reducing Burglary Initiative*. *Criminal Justice*, 4, 3, 287-308.

744 Lunecke, Alejandra & Guajardo Garcia, Carlos (2009) *Política de Prevención des delito en Chile: Del Programa Comuna Segura – Compromiso 100 a los Planes Comunales de Seguridad Pública*, Report commissioned by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, Montréal, Canada.

745 Lunecke, Alejandra & Guajardo Garcia, Carlos (2009) *Política de Prevención des delito en Chile : Del Programa Comuna Segura – Compromiso 100 a los Planes Comunales de Seguridad Pública*, Report commissioned by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, Montréal, Canada.

746 http://www.cicad.oas.org/oid/NEW/en/Caribbean/2007/Report_Observatories_Grenada2007.pdf.

747 http://www.cicad.oas.org/oid/NEW/en/Caribbean/2007/Report_Observatories_Grenada2007.pdf.

748 See for example, Kodz J. & Pease K. (2003) *Reducing Burglary Initiative: Early findings on burglary reduction*. Home Office Research Findings 204. London: Home Office.

749 Barchecheat, Olivier (2006). *La prévention des cambriolages résidentiels : quelques enseignements tirés d'une approche comparée*. Montréal: CIPC. Page 25.

750 Hope Tim (2004) *Pretend it works: Evidence and governance of community safety in the evaluation of the Reducing Burglary Initiative*. *Criminal Justice*, 4, 3, 287-308.

751 Home Office (2005). *Reducing Burglary Initiative: an analysis of costs, benefits and cost effectiveness*. See: <http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/burglary/burglary73.htm>

752 Rosenbaum Dennis P. 2007. Just say no to D.A.R.E. *Criminology and Public Policy*, 6, 4, 815-824.

753 Blais Étienne & Cusson Maurice, 2007. Les évaluations de l'efficacité des interventions policières : Résultats des synthèses systématiques.

In M. Cusson, B. Dupont & F. Lemieux (eds.), *Un traité de sécurité intérieure*. Montréal: Hurtubise, 115-129.

Despite this negative evaluation, the programme has continued to be supported by governments and police services. The widespread introduction of video surveillance (CCTV), particularly in the United Kingdom, but also in countries such as Canada, and France, has also been undertaken in spite of evalua-

tions demonstrating limited impact, particularly in enclosed locations⁷⁵⁴. Evaluation evidence can also be ignored when decisions are taken to **terminate positively evaluated programmes**.

While the method used to evaluate a programme has consequences on the outcomes, the practice of evaluation also has an impact on evaluated practices. Imposing new standards of evaluation influences activities developed by practitioners, where "good" performance is often essential for the extension (or promotion) of a programme.

This review suggests that there is still a gap between the objectives of much evaluation, and the extent to which it is achievable. Evaluation remains the 'neglected child' of prevention for a number of reasons: it is often considered too costly, and there would appear to be difficulties in overcoming methodological problems specific to crime prevention and community safety. These elements are discussed further in the following chapter.

754 Leman-Langlois, Stéphane, 2008. The Local Impact of Police CCTV on the Social Construction of Security, In S. Leman-Langlois (Ed.), *Technocrime: Technology, Crime and Social Control*, Chapter Three, 27-45.

755 Hope Tim, 2005, Pretend it doesn't work: The 'anti-social' bias in the Maryland Scientific Method scale. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 11, 275-296.

CHAPTER 10

EVALUATION METHODS IN CRIME PREVENTION

Evaluation methods in crime prevention

There are methodological challenges in any evaluation, but especially in evaluating crime prevention. In designing the evaluation of crime prevention programmes, a number of factors need to be taken account of and which influence the form it takes. This includes the type of programme or practice being evaluated; time and budget constraints; the types of research questions to be answered; and who will be conducting the research. Most current debate focuses less on *whether* evaluation is needed, than on the *methods* to be used to conduct evaluation⁷⁵⁶.

Debates on evaluation methods have tended to be dominated by proponents of experimental approaches which claim scientific rigour. However, alternative methods of evaluation have also been developed which respond rather better to practitioners' needs, and to the variety of prevention practices, and a plurality of approaches is now more widely used and accepted. Evaluation of crime prevention appears also to be of greatest value when it is incorporated in a programme from its inception, and is supported by techniques and tools to audit, review and monitor programme development and implementation.

1. Dominance of experimental approaches despite alternatives

1.1 The Development of Experimental Evaluation Methods

Research conducted by the psychologist Donald Campbell in the United States in the 1960s⁷⁵⁷ laid the foundation for the development of a rigorous evaluation approach, which has since been further diversified and developed by the work of others. Campbell played a key role in developing the idea of the "**experimental society**", a society in which social policies, and decisions about what works and what doesn't, would be determined using scientific methods⁷⁵⁸. This precursor to "evidence-based policy" has had a significant influence on criminal justice and crime prevention.

In the 1970's the link between evidence-based research and criminal justice policy was strengthened by the political recep-

tiveness to the unequivocal (and controversial) statement by Robert Martinson in 1974, that on the basis of a review of existing rehabilitation programmes in the United States, "nothing works"⁷⁵⁹. Interest among researchers in evaluating the impact of crime prevention programmes, coupled with pressure on policy-makers to make evidence-based decisions, gave further impetus to evaluation practice.

Martinson's pessimism in the ability of programmes to reduce offending was subsequently challenged, but not before many social and community crime prevention programmes were cut, and greater attention given by policy makers and researchers to situational approaches. Systematic reviews of evaluation results, and the development of techniques such as meta-analysis have helped to demonstrate that some programmes have worked in some contexts. This helped to shift the focus to the importance of more clearly understanding what was working, where, and why. In 1996, the United States Congress commissioned a systematic assessment of crime prevention programmes. Subsequently known as the "Sherman Report", the review "*Preventing Crime: What works, what doesn't and what's promising*", marked a turning point in interest in crime prevention policy and its evaluation⁷⁶⁰.

The "experimental" methods advocated by Campbell have continued to influence crime prevention evaluation in many high income countries to this day. This includes the work of the Campbell Collaboration, an international network of researchers, established in 1999, who are committed to the use of experimental methods of evaluation to assess outcomes, and the application of "meta-analysis" to compare outcomes across a wide range of projects⁷⁶¹.

756 cf. Pawson & Tilley, 2001 ; Connell et al., 1995 ; Fetterman, 2007 and Liddle, M. 2008.

757 1963 and 1979 for main references

758 See Liddle, Mark (2008) 'Reviewing the effectiveness of community safety policy and practice – An overview of current debates and their background' in ICPC, *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives*, Montréal, International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, pp. 165-169.

759 Martinson, Robert (1974). 'What works: Questions and answers about prison reform'. *The Public Interest*, Spring, pp. 22-57.

760 Sherman Lawrence W., Gottfredson Denise, MacKenzie Doris, Eck John, Reuter Peter & Bushway John (1996) *Preventing crime: What works, what doesn't, what's promising.*, A report to the United States Congress, prepared by the University of Maryland for the National Institute of Justice. Available at : <http://www.ncjrs.gov/works/wholedoc.htm>, Retrieved on September 23rd 2009.

761 See: www.campbellcollaboration.org; Welsh, Brandon (2007) *Evidence-based crime prevention: Scientific basis, trends, results and implications*. Ottawa : National Centre for the Prevention of Crime.

This model applies classical scientific methods, as used in the physical sciences, with random allocation to experimental groups (receiving the intervention) and control groups (who do not receive any intervention). This allows systematic comparisons to be made between the two groups. When it is not possible to select a control group randomly, the two groups are matched on a number of factors, which is referred to as "quasi-experimental" methodology⁷⁶².

Comparisons are also made between a range of factors examined before and after the intervention (pre-test and post-test, sometimes similarly referred to as quasi-experimental), which provides indications of any changes after the intervention, enabling the impact of the intervention to be measured.

Therefore, for proponents of experimental methods, the development of a rigorous evaluation methodology is not solely about providing tools to conduct "good evaluation"; the methodology is seen as ensuring the generation of objective information on the impact of interventions. One of the most frequently cited tools used for such experimental evaluation is the Scientific Methods Scale (SMS), a 5-point scale which rates the strength of the methodology used in an evaluation. The SMS establishes standards of evidence which will allow the measurement of impact to be made, with project design components ranked from 1 (weakest) to 5 (highest). The Sherman Report, for example, used SMS standards for its evaluation of crime prevention projects in the U.S.⁷⁶³ The Campbell Collaboration similarly uses these standards, as do government researchers in a number of European countries such as the UK.

1.2 Critiques and Alternatives

The experimental or quasi-experimental approach to evaluation in crime prevention has been the subject of two main types of criticism: the first questioning the application of scientific methods to social science policy-making; the second questioning some of the methodological assumptions underlying the approach.

The first type of criticism accepts the need for the evaluation of policy issues, but questions its status in setting governmental

priorities, such as, for example, responding to violence against women or preventing school violence. Decisions about dealing with such policy concerns rarely depend exclusively on research evidence. As Tilley has argued⁷⁶⁴, policy interventions about these kinds of issues are primarily moral and political, and cannot be determined solely on the basis of whether programmes have been deemed to be effective. Equally, politically popular responses to events and issues often contradict research evidence.

Secondly, the interpretation of the results of experimental research has also been challenged. Pawson and Tilley among others, for example, has questioned the efficacy of the methods promoted by Campbell⁷⁶⁵. An often cited example is that of the evaluation of a mandatory arrest project in the United States which claimed to reduce the rate of repeat victimization in cases of domestic violence⁷⁶⁶. The study in Minneapolis in 1984, used experimental methods, and suggested that mandatory arrests significantly decreased the number of repeat complaints when compared to control groups. The effect was seen as so strong that it led to an expansion of policies of mandatory arrest across the country. (In 1984, 10% of U.S. cities with populations over 100,000 had such policies; by 1986, this had risen to 43%, and by 1988, to 90%). However, the evaluation of six further sites produced equivocal results: three areas had higher repeat victimization rates following mandatory arrest than those using alternative strategies. In the view of Pawson and Tilley, this example illustrated the fallibility of experimental methods in policy making, and suggested that over-confidence in their use could be counter-productive.

An alternative approach proposed by Pawson and Tilley is 'realistic evaluation', which they describe as follows: "Whereas the question which was asked in traditional experimentation was 'Does this work?' or 'What works?', the question asked by us in realistic evaluation is 'What works for whom in what circumstances?'"⁷⁶⁷. **One of the main challenges for experimental methods is seen as the absence of explanatory theory.** When something is found to work, or not work, or to work partially, the reasons why the intervention was (in)effective remain unexamined. In this regard, Pawson and Tilley agree with proponents of theory-driven evaluation⁷⁶⁸.

762 See: www.campbellcollaboration.org

763 Sherman Lawrence W., Gottfredson Denise, MacKenzie Doris, Eck John, Reuter Peter & Bushway John (1996) *Preventing crime: What works, what doesn't, what's promising*. A report to the United States Congress, prepared by the University of Maryland for the National Institute of Justice. Available at: <http://www.ncjrs.gov/works/wholedoc.htm>, Retrieved on September 23 2009.

764 Tilley N. (2001) *Evaluation and evidence-led crime reduction policy and practice*, in Mathews R. and Pitts J. (eds.), *Crime, Disorder and Community Safety*. London: Routledge. Pp.81-97.

765 Pawson Ray & Tilley Nick (1997) *Realistic Evaluation*. London: Sage Publications; Liddle, Mark 2008 in ICPC's International Report op. cit.

766 Tilley N. (2000) *Realistic Evaluation: An Overview*, Presented at the Founding Conference of the Danish Evaluation Society, September 2000, <http://www.danskevalueringsselskab.dk/pdf/Nick%20Tilley.pdf>, Retrieved march 28th 2009.

767 Tilley N. (2000) *Realistic Evaluation: An Overview*. Presented at the Founding Conference of the Danish Evaluation Society, September 2000, p.4, <http://www.danskevalueringsselskab.dk/pdf/Nick%20Tilley.pdf>, Retrieved march 28th 2009.

768 Connell J., Kubisch A., Schorr L. and Weiss C (1995) *New approaches to evaluating community initiatives*. New York: The Aspen Institute; Weiss C. (1995) *Nothing as practical as a good theory: Exploring theory-based evaluation for comprehensive community initiatives for children and families*, in Connell J., Kubisch A., Schorr L. and Weiss C. (eds.), *New approaches to evaluating community initiatives*. New York: The Aspen Institute; ARCS (2007) *Reducing offending: A critical review of the international research evidence, Final report, submitted to the Northern Ireland Office*. Cambridge: ARCS (UK) Ltd

Other critics challenge the capacity of experimental approaches to adequately evaluate complex prevention programmes⁷⁶⁹. **Community crime prevention initiatives which involve a variety of partners and interventions are difficult to reconcile with experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation designs.** To a large extent experimental approaches cannot disentangle the multiple inputs and outcomes of such programmes to examine which component produced a positive effect, or whether the positive effect was linked to interaction with other programme components, or functioned independently. Its usefulness is limited by an absence of explanatory theory. In a review of the evaluation of 'Comprehensive Community Initiatives' (CCI), for example, Barchechat and Sansfaçon highlighted these inherent problems in evaluating complex projects, arguing instead in favour of an alternative approach that built in strong theoretical models⁷⁷⁰.

Other **"pragmatic" approaches** have limited evaluation to one or a few programme objectives, according to specific needs. An example of this approach is the evaluation of the Community Support Officers (CSO) programme by the Home Office in England and Wales⁷⁷¹. CSOs were new civilian community safety professionals, introduced under the Police Reform Act 2002, who worked alongside the police, but with limited powers and minimal training. They had the power to detain people for up to 30 minutes until the police arrived, but this raised a number of concerns. In response, the Home Office undertook a limited evaluation of the use of detention powers by CSOs in six police force areas, rather than evaluating the wider effects of their introduction:⁷⁷² "The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the practicality and utility of CSOs possessing the power to detain individuals"⁷⁷³.

"Participatory approaches" to evaluation, sometimes called collaborative or empowerment evaluation, contrast strongly with experimental models⁷⁷⁴. Empowerment evaluation has been defined as "[a]n evaluation approach that aims to increase the probability of achieving programme success by (1) providing programme stakeholders with tools for assessing the planning, implementation, and self-evaluation of their programme, and (2) mainstreaming evaluation as part of the planning and management of the programme/organization"⁷⁷⁵. **While the experimental model favours researcher objectivity and external evaluation, proponents of empowerment evaluation attempt to increase the capacity of practitioners to themselves measure and**

Evaluation of the Impact of Community Safety Forums - Example of an Empowering and Participative Approach (South Africa)

Community Safety Forums (CSFs) are a reflection of the principles of the South African National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996). Their aim is to facilitate the implementation of multi-agency crime prevention initiatives at the local level through the active participation of primary stakeholders and role players.

6 CSFs were evaluated in 2002. The evaluation used an empowering approach during its research process in an attempt to encourage participation of stakeholders. They were asked to participate by giving their input at workshops during two stages of the study: the development of [evaluation] indicators stage and the planning and feedback stage.

According to the research team, stakeholders were included in the evaluation because crime prevention inevitably involves partnerships. Furthermore, the team believed that stakeholders must be engaged in order to ensure that their perspectives are understood, and that the evaluation addresses elements of their organization they consider to be of importance.

During the indicator development workshop, stakeholders were encouraged to discuss with the research team what they believed the objectives and mission of CSFs are. Through these discussions, measurable goals were established which would serve as baseline indicators during the evaluation.

The planning and feedback workshop took place towards the end of the evaluation. Its purpose was to give participants the chance to review the research report draft and provide recommendations or concerns they had pertaining to the report. Their feedbacks were later included in the final report. Some of the issues that were raised included: the uncertainty of the roles and responsibilities of CSFs, communities and local governments, the lack of a monitoring and evaluation framework by the CSFs and the possibility of rendering the forums independent.

Source: CSIR (2002) Evaluation of the impact of the community safety forum.

769 Hollister R. & Hill J. (1995) *Problems in the evaluation of community-wide initiatives*. Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper # 70, A Paper prepared for the Roundtable on Comprehensive Community Initiatives, April, 1995, <http://www.russellsage.org/publications/workingpapers/Problems%20in%20the%20Evaluation%20of%20Community-Wide%20Initiatives/document>, Retrieved February 26th 2009.

770 Barchechat, Olivier & Sansfaçon, Daniel (2003) *Évaluer la prévention: Éléments pour une approche alternative*. Montréal : International Centre for the Prevention of Crime.

771 Singer L. (2004) *Community Support Officer (detention power) pilot: Evaluation results*. London : Home Office.

772 This more comprehensive evaluation was conducted by external researchers.

773 Singer L. (2004) *Community Support Officer (detention power) pilot: Evaluation results*. London, Home Office. Page. 1.

774 Fetterman D. & Wandersman A. (2007) *Empowerment evaluation: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow*, American Journal of Evaluation, 28, 2,

775 Fetterman D. (2007) *Empowerment evaluation: Principles in practice*, <http://wwwstatic.kern.org/gems/region4/DavidFettermanPresentation.pdf>, Retrieved March 18th 2009.

evaluate the progress of a project, playing an advisory rather than an expert role.

This participatory approach is a form of action research, since the objective is to contribute to institutional change by building practitioners' capacity to evaluate their own practice, and to build knowledge by creating data relevant and unique to those most directly involved (the practitioners and user groups). The example of the Community Safety Forum (p.175) illustrates one use of such an approach, but one which also raised issues about the need for greater rigour in monitoring and evaluating a programme.

This overview illustrates the current diversity of approaches to evaluation in crime prevention. The choice of methodology depends on a number of factors: research questions, available indicators and data, type of evaluation methodology etc. As Jean-Paul Brodeur has pointed out⁷⁷⁶, researchers are not always able to apply the most rigorous methods for a number of reasons, including lack of funds, time constraints, or because the necessary data is unavailable. Furthermore, in relation to research on policing for example, very little evaluation research meets the demands of experimental designs. This potentially excludes many projects and programmes which do not conform to experimental research standards from systematic reviews of police practices. Brodeur proposes instead a series of procedures that take account of "valid" considerations, even if strict methodological criteria cannot be met. He advocates for **limited evaluation** which partially responds to methodological precepts and contributes to knowledge.

It is important to underline that evaluation that judges the impact of projects on the basis of very restricted criteria can exclude valuable knowledge. Tim Hope, for example, has argued that the report by Sherman et al.,⁷⁷⁷ which used the Statistical Methods Scale to select programmes for examination excluded all those complex prevention initiatives involving a range of interventions⁷⁷⁸. A more flexible approach to evaluation has more recently been suggested by the Canadian National Crime Prevention Centre. They differentiate between systematic, quasi-systematic, and non-systematic evaluations, the results of which are seen as characterizing 'model', 'promising' or 'innovative' programmes respectively⁷⁷⁹. In the latter cases, while research design and methodology do not meet strict methodological requirements, the programmes are seen as promising or innovative.

1.3 External or internal evaluation

Traditionally, as has been suggested above, academic researchers who promote experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation have stressed the importance of evaluation being conducted by people not involved in a project or programme's implementation. Such external evaluation is seen as ensuring **independence and objectivity**, with the evaluators being immune to potential pressures from practitioners and other stakeholders. Thus there is the dual benefit of bringing objectivity and scientific rigour to the assessment, and of providing access to expertise which may be additional to that available within the project.

The perceived benefits of scientific rigour are illustrated in a guidance note issued by the Australian government: "[i]f you engage an external evaluation consultant your evaluation report is more likely to be seen by the funding body and other agencies as a more objective measure of success than an evaluation managed by the implementing agency"⁷⁸⁰.

Other academic commentators have pointed to the increasing use of internal evaluators. In Belgium, for example, Smeets has suggested that while in the 1990s evaluation in crime prevention was largely conducted externally; more recently internal evaluators have been used to assess the implementation of safety contracts.

It is not possible to assess the extent to which external evaluation is used worldwide, since authorship in many published studies is not always evident. Similarly, it is likely that many internal evaluations are not as routinely published or disseminated as external ones. Often policy-makers and practitioners favour internal evaluation. The arguments around the choice between external and internal evaluation often depend on practical issues such as the availability of qualified external experts, costs and time requirements, flexibility, etc.

In certain contexts, the internal evaluator will more easily **obtain the cooperation of field practitioners** working within the same organization. For example, mobilizing a community in favour of the evaluation appeared to be particularly useful in the case of crime prevention projects in Aboriginal communities⁷⁸¹, where generally vulnerable individuals can be mistrustful of research efforts⁷⁸².

776 Brodeur Jean-Paul (2003) *À la recherche d'une évaluation « pauvre »*. Criminologie, 36, 1, 9-30.

777 Sherman Lawrence W., Gottfredson Denise, MacKenzie Doris, Eck John, Reuter Peter & Bushway John (1996). *Preventing crime: What works, what doesn't, what's promising*. A report to the United States Congress, prepared by the University of Maryland for the National Institute of Justice. Available at: <http://www.ncjrs.gov/works/wholedoc.htm>, Retrieved September 23rd 2009.

778 Hope Tim (2005). *Pretend it doesn't work: The 'anti-social' bias in the Maryland Scientific Method scale*. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 11. Pp 275-296.

779 NCPC (2008). *Promising and model crime prevention programs*. Ottawa: Public Safety Canada.

780 NCCPP, External and/or internal evaluation: Deciding what works best for your organisation: National Community Crime Prevention Programme, Tip sheet 3, available at: [http://www.crimeprevention.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/\(93C446DBC14FB8146219B06F1D49FA6B\)~Tip+Sheet+3.pdf/\\$file/Tip+Sheet+3.pdf](http://www.crimeprevention.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(93C446DBC14FB8146219B06F1D49FA6B)~Tip+Sheet+3.pdf/$file/Tip+Sheet+3.pdf), consulted 15 April 2009.

781 May 2008 NCPC seminar in Yellowknife, "Evaluation crime prevention in Aboriginal Communities".

782 See also Taylor A., Nelson G. & Jansen R. (2003) *Safe and Sound: Final evaluation report*. Centre for research and education in human services.

2. A growing number of evaluation guides

As with public policy more generally, the systematic evaluation of crime prevention programmes is relatively recent. For this reason funders, particularly international organizations and national governments, have favoured the development of guides and handbooks to support project and evaluation practitioners, especially at the local level, and promote evaluation which reflects good standards of practice.

A review of some of the existing crime prevention evaluation guides which are available on-line provides some indication of the kinds of issues they cover⁷⁸³. Eleven guides were reviewed by ICPC, 9 produced by national governments (or other governmental structures), 1 by UNEG, and 1 by ICPC⁷⁸⁴. Most were aimed at all potential evaluators, while some target a specific audience, such as community groups engaged in social development prevention initiatives (e.g. "Evaluating Crime Prevention through Social Development Projects: Handbook for Community Groups" published by NCPC, Canada).

Both **process evaluation, and impact evaluation**, are promoted in these guides, although the definition of these terms can vary. Only the South African guide limited its discussion to impact evaluation. Cost-benefit analysis is frequently cited, usually as part of impact evaluation, often using experimental and quasi-experimental approaches. Some handbooks refer to other approaches, such as action and participatory research and evaluation. There is generally less attention given to problems of implementation, and none addressed the issue of the definition of appropriate outcome measures for crime prevention which reflect the diversity of approaches common in community interventions.

Methods to be used are rarely explained in these guides. When they are, experimental or quasi-experimental methods are dominant and collaborative or action research approaches rarely mentioned. For example, UNODC's guide (which is inspired largely by the works of the Urban Institute in the United States, outlines three methods: experimental (comparison between two randomly assigned groups); quasi-experimental (comparison between two statistically matched groups); and non-experimental (e.g. pre- and post-test comparison). This echoes classic positivist visions of evaluation. However, some guides propose alternative models, such as the Australian *Pathways to Prevention* (see Ross Homel and Kate Freiberg contribution at the end of the chapter). The 5 I's framework developed by Paul Ekblom (see box) prioritizes the involvement of practitioners and their know-how.

The 5Is: Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement and Impact

Developed by Paul Ekblom, the 5Is is an evaluation framework commonly used by the European Crime Prevention Network. The 5Is refer to 5 different steps which correspond to the different stages of the elaboration, implementation and evaluation of crime prevention programmes.

- ↳ Intelligence
- ↳ Intervention
- ↳ Implementation
- ↳ Involvement
- ↳ Impact

They allow for the participation of practitioners, and the valorization of their expertise and innovation. The 5Is aim to promote the transfer and exchange of knowledge in prevention based on experience and on evidence.

See : Ekblom, P (2004). Le Cadre des 5 I dans Bruston, P et Haroune, A (éds.) Réseau européen de prévention de la criminalité: (REPC) Description et échange de bonnes pratiques. Paris: Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville.

While evaluation needs to be adapted to particular programmes, these guides offer general practical advice. They stress that indicators will depend on research questions and decisions about selection of evaluators may depend on the type of evaluation and human and budgetary resources allocated to the evaluation. The UNODC guide states, for example, that process evaluation lends itself well to internal evaluation, but more complex cost-benefits analysis often requires the help of outside experts. **Few guides directly address problems of implementation.** If budgetary considerations are raised it is in the context of advising on the need to anticipate evaluation costs within programme budgets, without further details of how the budget might influence design issues, and how research questions will impact on methods and costs. UNODC stresses that new programmes might not be able to justify spending on expensive evaluation at the outset, while programmes that have already been positively evaluated in previous impact evaluations might require process evaluation.

783 The review was restricted to guides and handbooks that dealt specifically with crime prevention. Many other valuable evaluation guides exist but do not deal specifically with that topic. The review was also limited by language, and therefore guides produced by the governments in Sweden and the Netherlands were not included.

784 At the request of the Belgian government in collaboration the cities of Bordeaux (France), Liège (Belgium), and Montréal (Canada).

All guides reviewed emphasized the following principles:

- **Evaluation needs to be considered prior to project implementation:** defining the budget and the evaluation plan makes it possible to begin collecting data at the outset of the project;
- **Research questions need to be clearly defined:** if questions are unclear, the indicators and methods chosen will be inadequate, which will hinder the evaluation process;
- **A need for multiple approaches:** greater diversity of indicators, methods, and a variety of information sources, will enhance the validity of programme assessment.

3. Indicators of impact remain weak

Regardless of the model chosen, all evaluations begin with a definition of research questions that will govern the indicators used to measure whether programme aims have been met. The evaluability of a programme or policy—one of the norms of UNEG—depends on the development of robust indicators of impact. Point 7.2. of the UNEG on the norms to be applied to evaluation states that evaluability, “consists of verifying if there is clarity in aims of the research, sufficiently measurable indicators, reliable information sources and no major hindrance to impartial evaluation.”⁷⁸⁵ Indicators of impact are key to evaluation, without which they may not be able to conduct an evaluation of impact.

3.1 Limitations of indicators frequently used

Another trend in crime prevention evaluation, which reflects the acceptance of more plural and flexible approaches, is the movement away from measuring outcome or impact only in terms of changes in crime and victimization levels.

While important, official crime data has well-known limitations:

- The crime rate measures police activity more than the incidence of crime. An improvement of public confidence in the police can increase the number of offences reported, increasing recorded crime rates.
- Victimization surveys create a better picture of incidence, but they can be limited geographically and do not provide causal information.

- Fear of crime is often measured through surveys which multiple and highly variable factors fail to take account of (such as the impact of the media, personal experiences, etc.). Moreover, fear of crime may not only reflect fear of crime but can be an expression of wider sources of insecurity such as job security.

The most promising crime prevention initiatives, as suggested in the introduction, do not limit their aims to reducing crime rates, but rather, they adopt a more integrated comprehensive approach addressing wider issues around crime and public health, job security, and the use of public space. Evaluating the success of such programmes cannot be limited to measuring reductions in crime and victimization rates, or in fear of crime, but must take into account a larger number of variables and indicators. The dominance of these limited outcome measures reflects a tendency to rely on data that is already available (official statistics and victimization surveys), reducing the need to collect new data, which is time consuming and costly.

3.2 Designing new indicators

In reviewing studies of the effectiveness of drug enforcement, Willis and Homel⁷⁸⁶ have proposed the development of new outcome measures. They argue that analysis of the impact of drug enforcement has too often relied solely on arrest rates, and the volume and number of seizures. While such measures are important, “they are not particularly useful in demonstrating the broader impacts of law enforcement work, such as explaining changes in levels of community safety and well-being”⁷⁸⁷.

They propose a new model with four objectives: reducing crime related to drug use and drug trafficking; improving public health; improving public services; and reducing organised crime. Policies to counter drug use and drug trafficking should also reflect these aims. The authors suggest a number of additional outcome measures, such as the number of drug-related deaths, the number of HIV/AIDS-related infections, and the number of persons who feel affected by the problem in a community. These would be in addition to police and customs service statistics on arrests and seizures. They identify (Australian) sources of information for each of these measures. Thus broadening the range of measures provides a more comprehensive means of assessing the impact of drug policies, because together they provide measures of not only the impact on crime rates, but also of the quality of life of communities. This example well illustrates the value of clearly defined programme objectives and outcome measures to guide evaluation.

785 UNEG, 29 April 2005. Norms for Evaluation in the UN System. New York: United Nations. Available online at:

http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/5433_12967_2262_UNEG_Norms_for_Evaluation.pdf [consulted 11 February 2010].

786 Willis, Katie & Homel, Peter. (2008) *Measuring the performance of drug law enforcement*, Policing, 2, 3. Pp 311-321.

787 Willis, Katie & Homel, Peter. (2008) *Measuring the performance of drug law enforcement*, Policing, 2, 3, p.311.

The diversification of the range of information assessed in evaluation was also stressed at the second International Meeting of Crime Trend Observatories in Chile (see below). Organizations such as the Urban Institute in the United States have developed wider policy-indicators and information gathering techniques which provide a further example of the potential for more comprehensive outcome evaluation (see box on p. 181).

The *National Neighborhood Indicators Partnership (NNIP)*, established in 1995, aimed, "to help develop and implement neighbourhood information systems in different urban centers around the nation (...). The projects provide policymakers with access to uniform and practical neighbourhood-level information that they can use to support positive change and policy development. Moreover, this information can be used to improve the state of depressed urban neighborhoods and communities"⁷⁸⁸. Now established in 32 US cities⁷⁸⁹ with community partners, this project brings together standardized local data. For example in the Cleveland NNIP, 99 measurements derived from not less than 30 indicators across 18 different data sources

were identified as community building "long-term outcome indicators"⁷⁹⁰. Crime prevention is included alongside health, education, employment, and public services in general. To collect this data, NNIP needed to overcome institutional resistance to information sharing, which required it to be locally integrated. NNIP does not produce analysis of the data collected, but rather makes it freely available to researchers, decision-makers, and practitioners for analysis.

The project was made possible, in part, by the development of information technology, and this kind of initiative, which encompasses local and national interests within an urban development framework, is perhaps a good indicator of the potential for future crime prevention evaluation. In view of increasing pressures to evaluate public policies, and the need for more reliable, diverse, and standardized data, it is possible that similar approaches may become more widespread.

Evaluation of emerging practices such as social mediation have shown innovation in defining indicators and expected outcomes in this field (see box below).

How to evaluate the impact of social mediation?

Following the 2007 colloquium in France on *l'Utilité de la médiation sociale: Convaincre et démontrer*⁷⁹¹(The Usefulness of Social mediation: convince and demonstrate) the *Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel des villes* published a guide in 2009 on impact evaluation in social mediation⁷⁹². This methodological guide, intended for all stakeholders interested in evaluating the social impact of social mediation, demonstrates the value of this protocol. It suggests a methodology reflecting different roles in social mediation, around three fundamental points:

- ↳ How to undertake an impact evaluation of social mediation (needs, strategies, resources, etc.);
- ↳ How to organize an evaluation in terms of tools to implement (selection of criteria and indicators to be measured, recognition of context, etc.) from an operational point of view (managing tasks, planning, etc.);
- ↳ How to present results to target groups and promote them for public policy development.

The evaluation uses five indicators: social cohesion, innovation and teaching, public peacefulness, economic contribution, recognition. Each indicator is composed of five or six criteria. To cite a few examples:

- ↳ Criterion "improvement in social relations" (component of indicator social cohesion). In December 2006, five organizations were evaluated in France⁷⁹³: 46% of persons surveyed agreed that social mediation helps improve social relations;
- ↳ Criterion "reduction in conflict" (component of indicator public peacefulness). A reduction in conflict of 90% after social mediation;
- ↳ Criterion "public expense linked to vandalism" (component of indicator economic contribution). It seems that social mediation reduce public expense by 60% to 75%;
- ↳ Criterion "participants feel respected" (component of indicator recognition). 24% of residents judged that social mediation helped develop a sense of being respected.

For further details: <http://www.ville.gouv.fr>

788 Brown, Timothy (2008) *The National Neighborhood Indicators Partnership: Creating Positive Change for Depressed Neighborhoods*. Geography & Public Safety, 1, 3. Washington: U.S. Department of Justice. Page 11.

789 Information as of 16 October 2009, on the Urban Institute website: http://www2.urban.org/nnip/loc_list.html. Cities are: Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Camden, Chattanooga, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, Des Moines, Dallas, Denver, Grand Rapids, Hartford, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Louisville, Memphis, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Nashville, New Haven, New Orleans, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Providence, Sacramento, St. Louis, Seattle and Washington.

790 Kingsley Thomas G. (1998) *Neighborhoods indicators: Taking advantage of the new potential*. Washington: The Urban Institute. Available online at: <http://www2.urban.org/nnip/pdf/kingsle1.pdf> [consulted 11 February 2010].

791 Colloquium December 12, 2007 « *L'utilité de la médiation sociale : convaincre et démontrer* » (The usefulness of social mediation: convince and demonstrate), Angoulême.

792 SG-CIV (2009) *Guide d'évaluation de l'utilité sociale de la médiation sociale. Guide méthodologique* Éditions du CIV, Cahiers pratiques. 171 pages. Available at : <http://www.ville.gouv.fr/spip.php?article455000000>

793 Evaluations executed by France Médiation at Marseille, Lille, Chalons-sur-Saône, Angoulême and Niort.

4. Transferability of evaluated programmes

4.1 Accounting for context

While quantitative indicators of performance or the impact of a project are useful tools in managing and evaluating crime prevention programmes, they are not a substitute for more detailed contextual analysis. As suggested by Tilley, indicators alone “do not directly measure quality of performance” and “do not and cannot be used to evaluate the outcome-effectiveness of individual projects. What produces the precise outcome effects of any particular initiative will often be highly complex and will require very detailed analysis”.⁷⁹⁴

To build a contextually rich analysis, **qualitative research** can contribute to a better understanding of prevention effects and the interaction between different actors. For example, the quality of police-community partnerships cannot be measured only in terms of the number, frequency, or duration of meetings. Interviews with police officers and community partners are also needed to measure their perceptions of the quality of relationships. The use of qualitative material enriches evaluation⁷⁹⁵.

The way that crime rates change in an intervention area cannot be explained without broader contextual analysis. The general conclusion on the decrease in crime in New York in the 1990s⁷⁹⁶, for example, emphasized that declining crime rates were not attributable to city “zero tolerance” policies, because crime rates were declining prior to their inception and were mirrored in other U.S. cities which had not introduced that approach.

Thus there is no single ‘miracle’ indicator which can be used to measure the impact of crime prevention initiatives. Each evaluation must take into account the programme’s character and the context in which it takes place. A diverse range of carefully selected indicators is needed. Evaluation also depends on the quality of the auditing and monitoring tools developed.

4.2 The necessary monitoring tools

The evaluation of crime prevention programmes relies heavily on access to data. Two problems are frequently encountered. Firstly, if the evaluation is not planned at the outset of the development and implementation of the programme, the information necessary to measure progress and outcomes is likely to be insufficient. The second relates to willingness to share data across jurisdictional boundaries.

In relation to the first problem, it was not possible to measure the impact of Finland’s National Crime Prevention Strategy, for example, since there was a lack of the necessary statistics prior to implementation of the strategy. Similarly, it would appear that the outcome evaluation of the New South Wales *Crime Prevention Division* in Australia could not be completed due to lack of the necessary data⁷⁹⁷. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, an evaluation of their “counter radicalization and religious extremism strategy”⁷⁹⁸ began with the establishment of base-line measures against which any changes could be compared. This provided robust outcome measures, guided by clear research questions and indicators, ensuring that impact could be measured.

One of the tools which are becoming increasingly used in prevention to aid programme evaluation are observatories or monitoring centres. They respond to some of the problems of the limitations of official statistics, debates about the measurement of crime, and problems of a lack of comparable and longitudinal data. A number of **crime trend observatories have now been created at the local, national, and international level, concerned with general crime problems, or more specific issues such as drugs.** In a survey conducted in 2009, ICPC identified 17 organizations worldwide that met our definition of a crime observatory (see box). These institutions produce regular data, using consistent and recognised methods. They provide access to longitudinal data which is reliable and rigorously produced, facilitating comparative analysis. ICPC’s review of existing observatories highlights the ways in which they can help equip decision-makers with valuable information to inform policy decisions on policing, criminal justice and specific crime prevention issues. For example, in Central America, the Observatorio Centroamericano Sobre Violencia (OCAVI) has created 31 indicators to measure all forms of violence⁷⁹⁹.

794 Tilley N., (1999) *Thinking about crime prevention performance indicators*. Crime Detection & Prevention Series Paper 57, Police Research Group. London : Home Office.

795 Ocqueteau (2008). *La sécurité publique à l’épreuve de la LOLF, L’exemple de la DDSP de Seine et Marne et de la CSP de Coulommiers 2006-2007*. CERSA-CNRS, Paris.

796 A. Blumstein, J. Wallmen (Ed.) (2000). *The Crime Drop in America*. NY: Cambridge University Press

797 Anderson Jessica & Homel Peter (2005). *Reviewing the New South Wales local crime prevention planning process*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.

798 *Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007 – 2011*.

See: http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/E9353925-A523-41C6-94F1-643EACF826CC/0/minbiz007_actieplanukv3.pdf

799 Separated in five categories: risk factors; everyday crime; organized crime; insecurity and victimization; and public and private institutional responses.

These indicators bring together information from eg. the police, victimization surveys, Ministries of Transport (road accidents), Education (school drop-outs), Family (children and youths under 18 in state care); international organizations, such as UNPD or IDB (for data on national and regional socio-economic inequalities); and other observatories (e.g. drug observatory data on early drug use).

Crime observatories around the world: an ICPC survey

Within the framework of the Second International Meeting on Crime Observatories, held in Chile March 19-20, 2009, ICPC surveyed observatories worldwide which have an increasingly important role in crime prevention. A total of 102 organisations completed the on-line questionnaire available. Among these, 17 organizations met the following three criteria: (1) systematic data collection within a defined time frame and a specified territory, and using a rigorous methodology for the collection and presentation of data; (2) undertaking analysis and interpretation of the data collected; (3) disseminating the findings to the public.

10 out of 17 observatories were government organizations, or associated with governments; particularly in Latin America (10 out of 17) and one third were interested in comparing crime issues internationally; 94% of the observatories used six different sources of data, though largely from central government and the police (16/17); Only a minority (one third) mapped their data geographically.

During discussion at the 2009 Second International Meeting on Crime Observatories, two important future requirements for evaluation were identified: **greater diversification of information sources** to reflect the complexity of crime causation; and the **contextualization of crime data**.

Diversification of information sources helps support a better understanding of interactions and to validate explanatory theories underpinning prevention programmes.

5. Transfer and replication of evaluated programmes

For policy makers, a further important benefit of well-implemented and evaluated projects is that they allow for further testing and replication of prevention ideas, with the transfer and scaling-up of promising programmes to other sites or regions.

One valuable example of the scaling-up of programmes comes from the United States, where an initial programme in one city has been transferred and replicated in other cities, and finally developed into a national programme over a period of some years. At each stage, the very careful collaboration between evaluators and practitioners has provided solid evidence, not just of the effectiveness of the approach in terms of meeting the objectives of the programme, but also through the careful process assessment, highlighting what were the key characteristics and components of the programme which have led to its successful implementation and replication. The initial project was *Operation Ceasefire*, which was successfully implemented in the City of Boston in the early 1990's, to counter gun-related violence among young men.

The project became the basis of a much wider initiative supported by the Federal Department of Justice, the *Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI)*, which tested the programme's transferability (and adaptation) to other U.S. cities, primarily those with high rates of gun violence. An evaluation of the 10 cities which implemented SACSI was published in 2005⁸⁰⁰. This concluded that the "transfer" of Operation Ceasefire had been largely successful, with some variations in levels of success in different cities in reducing violence. The findings of this project have in turn now informed the development of a more rigorously implemented and evaluated national project, *Project Safe Neighbourhoods*⁸⁰¹.

However, "transferability" is not automatic, and projects need to be adapted to local contexts and capacities. As has been discussed above, while a programme may be evaluated as effective at one site, at one time, it may not produce the same results elsewhere. An evaluation of the *Communities That Care (CTC)* approach in England and Wales highlighted the importance of local context differences in its relative success⁸⁰². The evaluation explored its implementation and impact in three pilot sites, where distinct models were developed in each⁸⁰³. In the first, there was no prior partnership with the community, and implementation of the CTC programme was particularly difficult. In the second, the programme built on established relationships and a series of small programmes which had been developed in the community, while in the third site, there already existed a solid community development programme which made the implementation of the *Communities That Care* initiative much easier to establish and run. The report explained the variation in the success of programmes in terms of "**community readiness**", which helped to contribute to better outcomes.

800 Roehl Jan, Rosenbaum Dennis P., Costello Sandra K., Coldren James R., Schuck Amie M., Kunard Laura & Forde David R. (2006) *Strategic approaches to community safety initiatives (SACSI) in 10 U.S. cities: The building blocks for project safe neighbourhoods*. Research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.

801 *Paving the Way for Project Safe Neighbourhoods: SACSI in 10 US Cities*. National Institute of Justice Research Brief, April 2008; McGarrell, E.F. et al., (2009) *Project Safe Neighbourhood- A Neighbourhood Program to Reduce Gun Crime. Final Project Report*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.

802 Crow I., France A., Hacking S. and Hart M. (2004). *Does Communities that Care Work?: An evaluation of a community-based risk prevention programme in three neighbourhoods*. The Homestead: Joseph Rowntree Foundation

803 *Ibid*. Page 64.

In conclusion, it is important to underline the importance of the methodological process in crime prevention evaluation. The dominance of experimental methods akin to those used in the natural sciences, has to some extent given way to a more flexible and plural understanding. Experimental approaches have been criticized for their inability to respond to the kinds of complex multi-sector and community-based programmes which are characteristic of contemporary prevention. They have tended to privilege evaluations of single interventions, ignoring the benefits and challenges of integrated community-based approaches, or those which attempt to change institutional cultures⁷⁵⁵. The use of more flexible approaches such as action and participatory research, the use of qualitative as well as quantitative data, and of a broader range of indicators of change beyond crime or victimization alone, is now more widespread. Thus the use of a range of evaluation methods, multiple sources of data and outcome measures, and the engagement of stakeholders, all appear to be crucial to assessing the impact and effectiveness of prevention policies, and informing future decision-making.

The analysis of the different methods of evaluation in crime prevention practices and strategies demonstrates that evaluation cannot be designed and implemented independently of the context in which a project takes place, the problem concerned, the kinds of information required, or the capacities and resources available. Using a combination of approaches to prevention evaluation does not necessarily mean that the results will lack scientific rigour. This can provide both practitioners and policy makers with the tools to assess options and adapt policy and practice. Participatory approaches can help community stakeholders and clients, apart from project implementers, understand the role of evaluation and encourage openness to findings. The use of a variety of types of evaluation, including such participatory approaches, responds to the range of complex and comprehensive initiatives now widely used in crime prevention and community safety. It also responds to the need for informing public policy and practitioners, and is better suited to adapt to society's expectations of safety and security than strictly scientific approaches alone.

Contribution

Pathways to Prevention: A Holistic Model for Developmental Crime Prevention in Socially Disadvantaged Areas

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Developmental prevention involves 'getting in early' before crime or serious behavioural problems emerge or become entrenched, modifying social arrangements through the organized provision of resources to individuals, families, schools or communities. The aim is usually expressed in terms of reducing risk factors for crime and strengthening protective factors that promote prosocial behaviours, such risk and protective factors being identified from a range of longitudinal studies. Intervention methods that have been proven to be effective in high quality experiments, such as parent training programs or home visits by health professionals to teenage mothers, are especially prized within this paradigm.

Pathways to Prevention is a program of systematic intervention and research on developmental prevention that began in 1997 with a grant from the Australian Government to Professor Homel and other members of the Developmental Crime Prevention Consortium to review the international evidence on the effectiveness of this approach and to assess its policy implications for Australia. The report, **published through the National Crime Prevention Program in the Federal Attorney General's Department in 1999, has had a major influence in Australia and overseas on policies in such diverse fields as mental health, substance abuse, juvenile crime, child protection, and special education (Homel et al., 1999). One reason for this wide influence is the report's broad developmental focus and its emphasis on embedding developmental principles within a holistic model of practice suited to the complexities of socially disadvantaged and multicultural communities.**

Based on the 1999 report, the Pathways to Prevention Project has evolved as a comprehensive service offered through a partnership between national community service agency Mission Australia, local schools and Griffith University, in several ethnically diverse and socially disadvantaged Brisbane suburbs. It is not government funded, or operated by government agencies (with the exception of local schools as participants). In 1998-99 the rate of juvenile court appearances of adolescents resident in the area per 1000 10-16 year olds was 158, nearly 8 times the Brisbane metropolitan area rate of 20. This was one reason why this area was

selected for this experimental research-practice partnership, but other statistics such as income and unemployment levels that identified the area as socially vulnerable were also influential. Although Pathways could be viewed as a targeted intervention because it is located in a disadvantaged area, within that area it has operated within a universal prevention framework through its presence in the community and in the seven state primary schools in the area. It was designed from the outset as a demonstration project, with a view to influencing social policies and the practices of government and non-government agencies.

Pathways aims to increase opportunities for people from disadvantaged groups to improve their wellbeing and to gain access to societal resources, thus promoting social inclusion. These aims are achieved:

- by strengthening developmental systems
- through the provision of resources
- in a holistic fashion
- early in developmental pathways, before problems emerge or become entrenched.

Participation and outcomes

In early 2009 there were 3757 children on the Pathways database, 2072 of whom were enrolled in one of the seven participating schools in 2008. A total of 441 children had been involved directly or indirectly through their families in the family support program (21.3% of enrolled children), and 599 families had been entered on the Pathways database of participants by late 2008. Participation in Pathways, which is always entirely voluntary, is associated with a range of positive outcomes, including:

- Reduced levels of difficult child behaviour
- Increased preschool language skills
- Improved Grade 1 school performance
- Higher ratings of school readiness
- Higher levels of involvement in children's learning, reduced isolation among participating families, and better links to support services
- Greater confidence in parenting role among participants of family-based programs
- Greater involvement of parents in the school
- A growing perception by schools of Pathways community workers as key contributors in the school and their cultural communities.

Importantly, evaluation using a matched pairs quasi-experimental design has shown that the combination of enriched preschool programmes in concert with family support produced better outcomes than either on its own (Freiberg et al., 2005; Homel et al., 2006). **Economic analysis also shows that Pathways is cost-effective in comparison with Education Department remedial programs (Manning et al., 2006). Data collection is currently being extended to follow-up a cohort of children (and their families) who were involved in Pathways as preschoolers in 2002 and 2003, and are about to move into high school.**

Model of practice

Within its universal focus, the Pathways model emphasises comprehensive and integrated practice that supports development in a holistic way. Its overriding goal is to create a *pathway to wellbeing* for all local children as they transit through successive life phases, from conception to youth. This approach stands in sharp contrast to single-focus programs that address specific risk factors by delivering defined content within a defined timetable (e.g., parenting courses for managing children's behaviour). However, Pathways does incorporate many such programs within its wider mosaic of resources, while adapting them where necessary to local circumstances. These focused programs constitute some of the resources offered within a comprehensive range of support for children and their families. These support efforts are coordinated as far as possible to form cohesive networks that promote young people's wellbeing in all areas of their development (social, emotional, cognitive, physical, spiritual). Development is understood as a complex and multi-faceted process that is influenced by a range of contexts and systems (e.g., families, schools, neighbourhoods, ethnic and spiritual communities), and by the relations between them.

As suggested by its name, the Pathways model for promoting children's wellbeing is organised around the concept of a *developmental pathway*, which refers to the way sequences of events, experiences and opportunities over time contribute to changes both within and around the child. This means that the framework for providing services must not

only enhance the processes that bring about change *within individuals*, but also understand and enhance the changes taking place in their *environments*. Program activities are carefully constructed to enhance the environments of individuals in ways that create the possibility of better developmental outcomes. Within the Pathways model:

1. The central goal of interventions is better outcomes for children and their families, now and across the life course.
2. Interventions in one context (e.g., the home) interact with, complement, and support interventions in other contexts (e.g., school).
3. **Relationships, trust and cooperation between staff and clients are valued equally with evidence on what works.**
4. Better individual outcomes are achieved by enriching all relevant developmental settings. Child-oriented programs are integrated with family support initiatives and programs introduced through appropriate systems such as schools, childcare and family health centres, or community groups.
5. Intervention effects are enhanced by focusing on life transitions (such as birth and starting school or high school) when people are both vulnerable and receptive to help.
6. A continuum of age-appropriate programs and resources is used to enhance developmental pathways over time.
7. Integrated practice is achieved through concerted efforts to build collaborative working partnerships between organisations, institutions and systems relevant to child and family wellbeing.

The emphasis on integrated practice, particularly interventions in one context interacting with, complementing, and supporting interventions in other contexts (Point 2 above), is fundamental to the Pathways model.

Achievements and impact

In summary, Pathways is a model of practice in disadvantaged areas that is:

- Research-based and practice-informed
- Flexible, comprehensive, and persevering
- Effective
- Cost-effective
- Sustainable
- Replicable, and
- Can be brought to scale.

Pathways shared first prize in the 2004 National Crime and Violence Prevention Awards, and in April 2004 the Prime Minister announced a new multi-million dollar program, *Communities for Children*, that is strongly influenced by the learnings from *Pathways* (for example, a Pathways video was used at the launch of *Communities for Children* to illustrate how the new program would operate). On December 7, 2006, the Prime Minister also launched a report on the first five years of the project at Parliament House. The Queensland and other state governments have frequently referred to Pathways in developing their early years policies, and the Queensland Government is currently using Pathways to guide the design of Learning for Life Centres (or Parent-Children Centres) in four of the seven schools in the Pathways region. Mission Australia is in the process of replicating the Pathways model in six other disadvantaged areas throughout Australia, with a view to extending it more widely. The Federal Government's Social Inclusion Advisory Board and Department of Families, Housing, Communities and Indigenous Affairs are also currently referring to the model and the Pathways research as a guide to how to work more effectively in disadvantaged communities.

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The terminology used in the field of crime prevention and community safety confronts several linguistic difficulties, not just between languages, but also within them. Certain terminology is not always universally used even within the same country..

A

anti-social behaviour

comportement anti-social
incivilities incivilités
or nuisances (BEL)
or irritants (QC)

molestias públicas

Anti-social behaviour is a term frequently used in the United Kingdom and in Latin America. In the United Kingdom, it is defined in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, as behaviour “that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself; behaviour which causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more people who are not in the same household as the perpetrator”⁸⁰⁴. It includes graffiti, destruction of public property, public gathering of individuals seen as menacing, abusive or intimidating language, excessive noise, littering, drunken behaviour, drug dealing, and other behaviour perceived as having a negative influence on the quality of life and livelihood of certain areas. Elsewhere, we use the terms “incivilities”, “irritants” or “nuisances” to refer to a set of behaviours and situations which are not illegal per se, but which go against normally accepted rules of civil society; these may lead to increased fear of crime among residents and other users of public space⁸⁰⁵. This category also encompasses other behaviours cited above. Depending on the country, the term “nuisance” is often used. It is used in particular, in Belgium, without negative connotations, to designate the inconvenience felt by users and residents of public spaces⁸⁰⁶.

C

civil society

société civile

sociedad civil

Civil society refers to citizens or citizen groups working outside government and its formal institutions. It includes those working to promote and defend their interests, such as union and management organisations (“social partners”), professional associations, charitable organisations, non-governmental organizations, and organizations involved in local and community life, including faith-based groups⁸⁰⁷. The concept is traditionally seen as separate from public and government institutions, and the private sector. However, in the context of this report, we have included the private sector, notably business groups, and especially those working with local populations.

coexistence

coexistencia

convivencia (ciudadana)

This notion, common in Latin America, refers to all the components related to the quality of life of a community, and “living together”, in the sense of peaceful and harmonious cohabitating.

804 (UK) Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37), art. 1 al. 1 lit. a.

805 See eg. Skogan Wesley G. (1999), *Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder, and Fear*, in Langworthy R. L. (Ed.), *Measuring What Matters*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice / Office of Community Oriented Policing Service, pp. 37-53; Roché Sébastien (1996), *La société incivile*. Paris : Seuil.

806 See eg. Roché Sébastien (1999); Savignac Julie, Lelandais Isabelle, Sagant Valérie (2007).

807 Commission of the European Communities (2001), *European Governance : A White Paper*, Brussels, COM(2001) 428 final (25.07.2001)

community

communauté
or **collectivité**

comunidad

There are many definitions of community, and for the purposes of this report we use the UN Guidelines definition of “community” to designate “the participation of civil society in local affairs”⁸⁰⁸. The Guidelines infer that civil society is a generic concept, as expressed in § 16: “the active participation of communities and **other segments of civil society** [emphasis added] is an essential part of effective crime prevention.” “Collectivité” and “community” are two terms, used more or less synonymously in this report, to include not only residents, but also community organizations, local businesses, as well as various local branches of government.

community mediation

médiation sociale
médiation communautaire
médiation de quartier
médiation citoyenne

mediación comunitaria

In the present report, community mediation refers to forms of dispute resolution between opposed parties in a community. It is usually conducted by a non-judicial authority, and may have several objectives, including resolving conflicts and disputes, mending social ties and increasing citizen empowerment and social controls.

community policing (USA, CA, AUS)

police communautaire (QC)
or **police de proximité (FR, BEL, CH...)**

policía de proximidad
policía comunitaria

There are many definitions of community policing, but generally it refers to a policing model which focuses on working with and engaging the community and community structures in a partnership approach to identify, respond to, and solve crime and disorder problems that affect the local neighbourhood.

community safety

sécurité quotidienne

seguridad cotidiana
or **seguridad comunitaria**

Community safety is a broader concept than “crime prevention”. It refers to the sense of well-being and the quality of life of a community or neighbourhood. It also suggests the collective nature of creating a safe community. It requires policing structures to be consultative and inclusive than might otherwise be the case.

crime prevention

prévention de la criminalité (du crime)
or **prévention de la délinquance (FR)**

prevención de la criminalidad
(del crimen)
prevención del delito
prevención de la delincuencia

We use the term as defined in § 3 of the UN Guidelines: crime prevention “comprises strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes⁸⁰⁹.”

E

evaluation

évaluation

evaluación

Evaluation refers to the systematic and rigorous application of recognized methodology to objectively assess the process and outcome of an intervention or policy. An evaluation aims to assess a programme’s efficiency and effectiveness, and its impact and sustainability⁸¹⁰.

Process evaluation examines how a programme was implemented, and whether it operated as intended. It examines the kinds of procedures developed, the activities undertaken and the coverage of the programme. Outcome or impact evaluation helps to determine whether the programme achieved the objectives it was intended to meet. This may include any unintended consequences, both positive or negative (eg. the displacement of crime to another place).

808 ECOSOC (2002a), § 5

809 ECOSOC (2002a).

810 See the Glossary of the Beccaria Programm, Quality Management in Crime Prevention [<http://www.beccaria.de/nano.cms/en/Glossary/Page/2/>].

G

governance**Gouvernance****Gobernabilidad**

Governance is a term widely used and with multiple definitions, depending on the field of activity. Overall, it refers to the range of processes and people involved in decision-making. In relation to crime prevention and community safety, it is usually used to refer to the range of multi-sector, cooperative and participative approaches to decision-making, which include both government and civil society actors, and to the distribution of powers and responsibilities. It also refers to the transparency and accountability of decision-making.

I

indicator**indicateur****indicador**

A set of qualitative or quantitative measures about a phenomenon or action. Indicators are often expressed in terms of a target (figures) in order to assess the scope of the results of a policy initiative or programme⁸¹¹.

indigenous people
or **aboriginal people** (CA, AUS)

peuples autochtones
peuples aborigènes

pueblos indígenas
pueblos aborígenes

There is no generally accepted definition of "indigenous peoples." A commonly accepted definition is: "...those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems"⁸¹².

intelligence-led policing

Policing strategy model based on knowledge and intelligence, the goal of which is to precisely identify potential problems and threats and to streamline the use of resources, which may be concentrated around "hot points" (hot spots policing), and on the development of crime analyses tools. The term "intelligence" refers to selected information which is assessed and analysed in terms of its usefulness for prevention and the resolution of criminal problems⁸¹³.

J

judicial mediation**médiation pénale****mediación penal**

In the present report, judicial mediation refers to mediation which is authorized by the judicial process, and involves offenders or those charged with offences, and their alleged victims. As with other types of mediation (e.g. civil and commercial mediation), the process is supervised and validated by the judicial authorities. The principal objective is to bring about some form of reparation for the harm done. If an offender is sentenced to imprisonment, mediation (or some other form of reparative justice) may form a condition of sentence to aid the victim and assist the offender with reinsertion in the community.

811 UNODC, UNICEF (2007); Tilley Nick (1995), Thinking about Crime Prevention Performance Indicators. Crime Detection & Prevention Series, Paper 57, Police Research Group, Home Office.

812 Martínez Cobo José (1986), Study of the problem of discrimination against Indigenous Populations, E/CN.4/ sub 2/1986/87 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7Add.1-4; UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2004), World's Indigenous Peoples to Meet at United Nations 10-21 May, New York: United Nations. <http://www.un.org/hr/indigenousforum/press1.html>].

813 Ratcliffe Jerry H. (2003).

K

knowledge-based prevention *prévention fondée sur la connaissance* **prevención basada en conocimiento**

The development of prevention strategies based on reliable information and scientific evidence about the targeted issues, rather than relying on other considerations, including political persuasion. This approach requires the use of large data-sets and specific tools and processes, such as safety audits, surveys (e.g. victimization surveys), or observatories. It also includes an evidence-based (or evidence-led) approach, which integrates the results of rigorous evaluations⁸¹⁴.

L

locally-based crime prevention
or **community-based**
crime prevention *prévention communautaire*
prévention du crime à l'échelon local *prevención del delito basada*
(a nivel local)
prevención de la delincuencia
(a nivel local)
prevención comunitaria del delito

This approach aims to “change the conditions in neighbourhoods that influence offending, victimization and the insecurity that results from crime by building on the initiatives, expertise and commitment of community members⁸¹⁵.”

M

mediation *médiation* *mediación*

Mediation refers to a process of building and restoring the social fabric of society, by managing conflicts in everyday life. It is usually undertaken by a neutral and independent third-party, who acts as communicator between individuals or institutions, to help them to improve relationships, or to solve conflicts.

migrant *migrant* *inmigrante*

No legal or generic definition exists for the term “migrant” in international law, except for specific categories such as “migrant workers” which is defined in the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the International Labor Organisation (Conventions n° 97 and 143).

However, reference is frequently made to an operational definition, in accordance with which, the following categories of persons are considered to be “migrants”:

- a) any individuals who are outside of the territory or state in which they hold nationality or citizenship, but who do not receive legal protection from this state, and are living within the territory of another state;
- b) persons who are not entitled to any general judicial regime inherent to the categories of refugee, permanent resident, naturalized citizen, or any other status granted by the host state;
- c) persons who are not entitled to any general legal protection of their fundamental rights by virtue of diplomatic agreement, visa, or other agreement.

The advantage to this definition is that it does not bear any bias in terms of the motivations that influenced the migrant to leave his own country. The categories therefore include persons who have fled from their state of origin, especially for reasons of political persecution, conflict or economic difficulty as well as persons who have left their country by choice or personal convenience⁸¹⁶.

814 Welsh Brandon C. (2007a).

815 ECOSOC (2002a), § 6 lit. b.

816 ECOSOC (2000), Specific groups and individuals: migrant workers. Human rights of migrants: report of the Special Rapporteur Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1999/44 of the UN Human Rights Commission in its 56th Session. Geneva, UN. E/CN.4/2000/82.

N

neighbourhood policing

Neighbourhood policing is a policing strategy similar to community policing. It is a key component of policing in England and Wales and elsewhere. It aims to provide a visible police force that is accountable to community members, expressing local solidarity and citizen-focused, in order to meet a community's needs.

P

partnership
or **local coalition**

partenariat
coalition

alianza
coalición
asociación (de actores locales)

Partnership refers to a process of working jointly together to develop prevention strategies. This usually includes authorities and institutions directly involved in prevention, along with other state services, non government organizations, and especially, local citizens and the private sector. Thus municipal authorities, police, justice and education institutions, public or semi public services, such as public transport companies, social housing organizations, local resident associations, and neighbourhood businesses and commercial outlets that play an important economic role in the community, may all be involved⁸¹⁷.

prevention of recidivism

prévention de la récidive

prevención de la reincidencia

This approach aims to “prevent recidivism by assisting in the social reintegration of offenders”. This may include programmes in institutions, or reintegration programmes on release from custody⁸¹⁸.

problem-oriented policing

police orientée vers
la résolution de problèmes

policía orientada a la
resolución de problemas

A policing strategy model that focuses on the identification and analysis of crime problems specific to a given sector. It seeks to resolve them through the joint involvement of the community and police services⁸¹⁹. The notion is that police should not address crimes one by one, but seek to group them together and address their underlying cause(s). Problem-oriented policing represents a shift from community-oriented policing, with the notion that the police are better positioned to analyse and respond to crime than the community⁸²⁰.

protective factors

facteurs de protection

factores de protección

A series of internationally recognized and research-based factors that help to protect children and young people, in particular, from crime and victimisation (e.g. having a strong and cohesive family; not dropping out of school etc.). They help to reduce the impact of any negative events, or help individuals avoid or resist the temptation to break the law. They may also work to reduce the chances that people will enter on a path likely to lead to breaches of the law. Protective factors also help build alternate life-choices⁸²¹.

817 Marcus M., Vanderschueren F., en colaboración con Buffat J.P. y Lunecke A. (2004), p. 269. See eg. ECOSOC (2002a), § 9, § 17 lit. d et § 19.

818 ECOSOC (2002a), § 6 lit. d.

819 Goldstein Herman (1979).

820 Brodeur Jean-Paul (2008).

821 See for example (Australia) Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department (1999), p. 48.

R

reparative justice
or **restorative justice**

justice réparatrice
justice restauratrice

justicia restitutiva
justicia restaurativa

The UN Economic and Social Council defines restorative justice as “a concept that recognizes that a crime often affects not only the futures of victims and communities, but also those of the offenders involved. It seeks to restore all of the interests of all of the parties affected by a crime, to the extent possible using the active and voluntary involvement of the offenders, the victims and the communities⁸²².” Restorative processes include a range of approaches such as mediation, conciliation, family group conferencing and sentencing circles⁸²³. The aim is to reach an agreement which restores some kind of equilibrium for victims and offenders, by meeting individual and collective needs and responsibilities of the parties, and the reintegration of the victim and the offender⁸²⁴. The agreement may include a sentence of reparation, restitution or community service. The facilitator’s role is to act in a fair and impartial manner, with the participation of the parties in a restorative process⁸²⁵.

resident
or **inhabitant**
or **citizens**

résidents (QC)
habitants (FR, BEL, CH)
citoyens

residente
habitantes
ciudadanos (la ciudadanía)

These terms refer to people living within a given neighbourhood or area, or individuals who frequent the same places or use a service, and in the widest sense, to users of public space⁸²⁶.

risk factors

facteurs de risque

factores de riesgo

A series of internationally recognized and research-based factors found to increase the chances that a child or young person will become involved in offending or victimization. They include a range of individual (eg. very early aggressive behaviour; dropping out of school), family (low parental functioning or violence) and environmental characteristics (e.g. poor housing and environment), or services provision (eg. poor schooling, lack of access to social services).

S

situational crime prevention

prevention prévention situationnelle
or **prévention des situations criminogènes**

prevención de situaciones
propicias al delito
prevención situacional

This approach aims to “prevent the occurrence of crimes by reducing opportunities, increasing the risks of being apprehended and minimizing benefits, including through environmental design, and by providing assistance and information to potential and actual victims⁸²⁷.”

social crime prevention or
prevention through
social development

prévention sociale de la criminalité
or **prévention par le développement social**

prevención social del delito

This approach aims to “promote the well-being of people and encourage pro-social behaviour through social, economic, health and educational measures, with a particular emphasis on children and youth, and focus on the risk and protective factors associated with crime and victimization⁸²⁸.”

822 ECOSOC (2002b).

823 Economic and social Council Resolution 2002/12, § 2.

824 Economic and social Council Resolution 2002/12, § 3.

825 Economic and Social Council Resolution 2002/12, § 5.

826 The terms *résidant* and *résident* (in French) are homonyms to design inhabitants. However, the former refers to an individual living in an area, whereas the latter refers to a “person established in a country other than its native country.” See: Le petit Robert 1 (2002), Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française. Paris : Le Robert.

827 ECOSOC (2002a), § 6 lit. c et § 26.

828 ECOSOC (2002a), § 6 lit. a et § 25.

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The **United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI)** was created by the United Nations and the Government of Japan with the goal of promoting criminal justice systems and mutual cooperation in Asia and the Pacific Region. This promotion takes the form of training courses and seminars for people working in crime prevention and criminal justice administration both in Japan and abroad, as well as the research and study of crime prevention and the treatment of offenders⁸²⁹.

The **United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)** was founded in 1967 to support crime prevention and criminal justice initiatives. It engages in applied research, training, technical cooperation and information activities. In terms of its dissemination activities, UNICRI issues publications, maintains a documentation center and maintains contacts with professionals and experts worldwide⁸³⁰.

The American **National Institute of Justice (NIJ)** has been mandated to "advance scientific research, development, and evaluation to enhance the administration of justice and public safety" since its founding in 1968. It implements that mandate through the creation of relevant knowledge and tools, the dissemination of relevant and reliable information, and by ensuring professionalism and integrity in its research and programs. The NIJ work concentrates in many areas, such as crime control and prevention, justice systems and offender behavior and violence and victimization. It also contributes to the domains of field testing of promising programs and international crime control⁸³¹.

The **International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (ISISC)** is a non profit organization founded in 1972 is engaged in human rights research, training, technical assistance, publication and advocacy. ISISC focuses in particular on Arab and Muslim countries and has produced several publications on human rights, international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and post conflict justice⁸³².

The **Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC)** has been a contributor of criminological research since 1973; it conducts, publishes and disseminates research, as well as organizes conferences and seminars. Its work on the extent, nature and prevention of crime in Australia also helps to inform government policy⁸³³.

El Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas para la Prevención del Delito y el Tratamiento del Delincuente (ILANUD) was founded in 1975 by the United Nations and the government of Costa Rica. ILANUD has signed agreements with several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Like the other regional organizations in the network, ILANUD provides resources, training and technical assistance; it also organizes expert meetings on topics of prevention and criminal justice⁸³⁴.

Founded in 1980, the **Naif Arab Academy for Security Sciences (NAASS)** is an academic institution that promotes research on security issues, offers postgraduate programs, and organizes training courses that contribute to the prevention and control of crime in the Arab countries⁸³⁵.

The **European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI)** was established in 1981 in an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Finland. The institute encourages the exchange of information on crime prevention amongst European countries. Its activities parallel those of its fellow network members and include arranging meetings, carrying out research and providing technical assistance⁸³⁶.

The **Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law** (f. 1984) is an academic institution that strives to promote human rights and humanitarian law by means of research, academic education, dissemination and institutional development. It also possesses an international focus; the Institute offers training and capacity building programmes in Sweden and abroad and maintains links with

829 <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages/History.htm>

830 <http://www.unicri.it/>

831 <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/about.htm>

832 <http://www.isisc.org/PagesHome.asp?Menu=1>

833 <http://www.aic.gov.au/institute/>

834 <http://www.ilanud.or.cr/acerca.html>

835 <http://www.naass.edu.sa/>

836 <http://www.heuni.fi/12441.htm>

several academic institutions as well as international organisations, non-governmental organisations and government institutions worldwide⁸³⁷.

The **Korean Institute of Criminal Justice Policy (KICJP)** was established in 1989 and its mission is to assist policy formulation through its analysis of crime trends, causes and countermeasures. Its activities include research, education and the promotion of international exchange⁸³⁸.

The **United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI)** was created in 1989 and its membership is open to all Member States of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The institute supports the active cooperation of governments, academic institutions and experts involved in crime prevention activities in the African region in the context of wider development concerns⁸³⁹.

The **International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR & CJP)** in Vancouver, Canada, is a joint initiative of the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University and the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law with the support of Canadian government as well as the province of British Columbia. Since its establishment in 1991, the Centre has contributed to the priorities of Canada and the United Nations in the field of criminal law and criminal justice and strives to improve the quality of justice through reform of criminal law, policy, and practice around the world. The primary role of the Centre is to provide advice, information, research and proposals for policy development and legislation. The Centre fulfills this role in part through offering education, training and technical assistance⁸⁴⁰.

The **International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice programme (ISPAC)** was created in 1991 in order to direct professional and scientific information in the shape of technical assistance, training and education, research, monitoring and evaluation to the United Nations on numerous topics such as the status of women, the environment and transnational crime. It has a broad focus on knowledge sharing and the exchange of information related to crime prevention and criminal justice. Membership in ISPAC is extended to all organizations with expertise in crime prevention and criminal justice and with an interest in participating in the Council's work⁸⁴¹.

The **Institute for Security Studies (ISS)** is a regional research institute started in 1991 and operates across sub-

Saharan Africa. Its work focuses on a broad definition of human security, including personal and community security and its activities include an expert workshop series, assisting policy development and monitoring policy implementation⁸⁴².

In 1994, the **International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)** was created to become an international forum for national governments, local authorities, public agencies, specialized institutions, and non-government organizations to exchange experience, consider emerging knowledge, and improve policies and programs in crime prevention and community safety. Its activities include monitoring global developments, providing assistance to members and facilitating expert interaction, as well as contributing to public knowledge of crime prevention and community safety. The ICPC also promotes the implementation of best practices and tools to enhance community safety⁸⁴³.

In 2007, the **Basel Institute on Governance - (International Center for Asset Recovery)** joined the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network (PNI) and remains its latest member. The Basel Institute is an independent non-profit think tank dedicated to research, policy development, consulting and capacity development in the areas of corporate, public and global governance. Created in 2006, the International Center for Asset Recovery (ICAR) of the Basel Institute assists developing countries in building capacities and setting up necessary procedures and institutions to more effectively make use of international legal assistance in criminal matters for the purpose of recovering stolen assets.

837 <http://www.nwi.lu.se/institute/aboutrwi.shtml>

838 <http://www.kicjp.re.kr/english/index.asp>

839 <http://www.unafri.or.ug/about/index.html>

840 <http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/>

841 <http://www.ispac-italy.org/about.php>

842 http://www.iss.org.za/index.php?link_id=1&link_type=13&tmpl_id=3

843 http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/menu_item.php?code=mission

Questionnaire for Municipalities developed by ICPC

This short questionnaire (5 key question topics) is being used by ICPC (www.crime-prevention-intl.org) to build a picture internationally of measures being undertaken at the municipal level to prevent crime and promote community/urban safety. The information collected will contribute to international reports on crime prevention trends and innovative local approaches to crime prevention and community safety.

We value your assistance in building a unique picture of developments in this emerging field. The questions are designed to allow professionals in many contexts to answer. If the information you have is greater than space allows please include supporting documentation in your response. We may contact you for further information once we receive your response.

If you prefer to complete this questionnaire electronically a copy of the questionnaire can be found at:

<http://www.esurveyspro.com/Survey.aspx?id=0b2eff60-8434-456f-b788-f2ef8b1b789f>

password : cipc

Contact Details⁸⁴⁴

Name: _____

Function: _____

Address: _____

Phone: _____

E-mail: _____

Fax: _____

Website: _____

Details of the Municipality

Country: _____

Name of the city/borough/district : _____

Number of inhabitants in the municipality : _____

Q.1 Municipal Crime Prevention/ Community Safety Strategies⁸⁴⁵

1.1. Does your municipality have a crime prevention or community safety strategy/policy?

NO, Go to question 2.8

YES: What date was this implemented (dd/mm/yyyy)? _____

How long a period of time does this strategy cover (in years)? _____

⁸⁴⁴ These contact details are solely for the purpose of contacting you to check information, should we need to. These details will not be used in any report.

⁸⁴⁵ Strategy is taken to mean an overall plan for the municipality over a period of time (usually years) which includes policies and programmes of action to be taken in relation to the strategy.

1.2. What issues are covered by this municipal strategy/policy?

Please tick as appropriate.

- Theft from commercial premises
- Theft from residential premises
- Victimization of the elderly
- Youth victimization
- Armed violence
- Domestic violence
- Youth offending
- Vandalism – public damage
- Road safety
- Safety on public transport
- Women’s safety in public places
- Safety at sporting and public events
- Safety in schools and colleges
- Corruption
- Drugs
- Alcohol
- Hate crime and racially-motivated crime

- Street gangs
- Homelessness, street youth
- Panhandling/begging
- Prostitution, sex trade
- Child abuse
- Human trafficking
- Fear of crime, feeling of insecurity
- Community safety
- Antisocial behavior
- Other (please specify):

1.3. What types of preventive measures are carried out in the context of this strategy/policy? Please tick as appropriate.

- Program to sensitize
- Social crime prevention
- Situational crime prevention
- Other (please specify):

1.4 Is there a committee, body or department in your municipality that is responsible (or has lead responsibility) for implementing this strategy/policy?

- NO
- YES (principal tasks) :

1.5 What is the approximate total budget allocated to the implementation of the above strategy/policy in your municipality?⁸⁴⁶ (Please provide in your national currency)

1.6 What is the principal source of funding to implement the strategy or policy?

- Municipal budget
- Private foundation
- Other (please specify):
- Higher government level
- International donor

⁸⁴⁶ If there is no budget allocated please indicate this with a zero

1.7 Are there additional municipal strategies or policies relating to crime prevention/community safety issues in addition to this strategy or policy (but developed separately)?

NO

YES (please specify):

Q. 2 Conduct of Municipal Safety Audits⁸⁴⁷

2.1 For all or any of these strategies or policies, have you undertaken a detailed analysis of the specific issues for your municipality?

NO, Go to question 2.8

YES

2.2 What was the theme of the audit?

2.3 When it was undertaken?

Before strategy development

After strategy development

During strategy development

In what year?

2.4 How was the audit carried out? Please tick as appropriate.

Compilation of police data

Compilation of judicial data

Victimization and/or population surveys

Self-report questionnaires

Data from health services

Data from social services

Private enterprise data

Transportation services data

Other (please specify):

2.5 Who undertook this audit? Please tick as appropriate.

Municipal department

Independent consultant

University (please specify) :

Other (please specify):

2.6 The results of this audit were presented...

Internally

Externally **and** internally

2.7 Have you made use of any crime mapping systems (i.e. ESRI, MapInfo)?

NO

YES (please specify the issue being addressed) :

⁸⁴⁷ A Municipal Safety Audit is used to make an accurate assessment of the problems and challenges in a given community in order to develop the most appropriate strategies for improving public safety.

2.8 Does your city have a crime observatory⁸⁴⁸ (or monitoring centre) related to crime prevention and social problems?

NO

YES (please provide contact information) :

The name of the observatory/monitoring centre :

Address :

Website :

Key contact

(and role) :

Q. 3 Q. 3 Processes to Consult with Communities and Civil Society⁸⁴⁹

3.1 Do you have structures or processes to consult with communities and/or civil society organizations on policies/strategies on crime prevention, community safety or urban safety/development?

NO

YES (what are these consultations for?):

3.2 Do communities and/or civil society organizations actively take part in policies/strategies of crime prevention?

NO

YES (In what way?):

Q. 4 Q. 4 Evaluation of prevention initiatives

4.1 Have you evaluated any of your municipal crime prevention/community safety policies?

NO, go to question 4.7

YES go to question 4.2

IF YES

4.2 What type of evaluation was undertaken? Please tick as appropriate.

Process/implementation evaluation

Impact evaluation

Cost-benefit calculations

Other (please specify):

848 Crime observatory or monitoring centre refers to specific ongoing research undertaken by the municipality to monitor crime trends and patterns, For the purposes of developing more effective policy to address current issues and identify emerging problems.

849 Civil Society includes for profit and non-profit-making organizations and citizen associations. Communities can refer to people living in a specific area or groups with a common identity or interests.

4.3 Who conducted the evaluation? Please tick as appropriate.

- Municipal services
 - Another administrative authority
 - A research centre
 - A university
 - Other (please specify)
-

4.4 Have you disseminated the results of your evaluation(s)?

- NO
 - YES
-

4.5 If yes, how? Please tick as appropriate.

- Internal website
 - External website
 - Email alerts
 - Conference/events for practitioners
 - Alerted professional networks of practitioners
 - Other (please specify):
-
-

4.6 Who do these results concern? Please tick as appropriate.

- Internal personnel
 - Practitioners
 - Political powers
 - Researchers
 - Key Contacts
 - Public
 - Other (please specify):
-
-

To feed our database, we would like to request access to published and unpublished evaluations (or evaluation factors) relating to crime prevention, security policies or programs implemented under these policies.

IF NO

4.7 Why? Please tick as appropriate.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of funds | <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of technical resources |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of expertise | <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of time |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not part of services' culture | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) |
-
-

Q. 5 Future Plans

5.1 Do you plan to continue to develop your crime prevention and community safety policy(ies) or strategy(ies) in the long term?

NO

YES (How? Please provide details) :

5.2 In your municipality, what are the factors that could influence future developments in crime prevention policies/strategies?

- Lack of financial/material resources
- Lack of human resources
- Lack of training
- Institutional resistance
- Difficulties in partnering with the local administration
- Interest group and pressure group influence
- Difficulties in partnering at the regional/national level
- Difficulties in partnering with NGOs
- Difficulties in partnering with the private sector
- Difficulties in partnering with civil society/community/citizens
- Other (please specify) :

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please send or email the completed questionnaire to:

International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
465 rue Saint-Jean, suite 803
Montréal (Québec), Canada
H2Y 2R6
Phone: +1.514.288.6731 ext. 229
Fax: +1.514.288.8763
Email: jprince@crime-prevention-intl.org

Analytical Framework on public policies and practices in crime prevention and community safety developed by ICPC

I. Background: Main bodies/institutions, approaches and policies

1. Main bodies at all levels *(Please note if this applies and describe briefly)*

- 1.1 Relevant authorities dealing with crime prevention policies or strategies (ministry, department, national body or centre responsible for enforcing national crime prevention programmes...):
- 1.2 Authorities responsible for ongoing monitoring and implementation of crime prevention policies and/or strategies:
- 1.3 Comments on coordination between different bodies in charge of policies and/or strategies for crime prevention:

2 Approaches to crime prevention *(Please note if this applies and describe briefly)*

- 2.1 Social crime prevention?
- 2.2 Crime prevention at the local level?
- 2.3 Situational crime prevention?
- 2.4 Prevention of recidivism?
- 2.5 Other approaches?

3 Policies (strategies, action plans) and campaigns on crime prevention *(Please note if this applies and describe briefly)*

- 3.1 At the national level
 - 3.1.1 National Strategy on Crime Prevention?
 - 3.1.2 National Action Plan for priority crimes or delinquent behaviour?
- 3.2 At the regional level
 - 3.2.1 Regional Action Plan for crime prevention?
 - 3.2.2 Regional Action Plan for priority crime or delinquent behaviour?
- 3.3 At the local level
 - 3.3.1 Local initiatives for crime prevention

4 Policies in relation to crime prevention (eg. Urban renewal, Family Violence, Community Development, etc) *(Please note if this applies)*

- 4.1 At the national level?
- 4.2 At the regional level?
- 4.3 At the local level?

II. Legal and regulatory framework?

Please list the legal documents (laws, regulations) outlining crime prevention policies

III. Crime prevention tools

Please note if this applies and describe briefly:

1. Use of a safety audit?

1.1 If so, what are the measures used to implement the audit in an action plan?

2. Observatory focusing on safety / crime?

3. Tools for mapping or analysing crime and victimization data?

4. Guides, manuals, toolkits, e-learning modules, compendia of prevention practices that can be used in crime prevention or supporting capacity building efforts in crime prevention?

IV. Evaluation

1. In your country, is there a requirement or process of evaluation on crime prevention policies and/or practices?

If this applies:

1.1 What type of assessment is conducted?

1.2 What method(s) is (are) preferred?

1.3 On what data is the assessment based (institutional data from different departments, derived from victimization surveys, self-report surveys, etc.)?

1.4 Who are the evaluators?

1.5 What is their background, their skills?

1.6 What is their level of autonomy, independence?

1.7 What are the main sources of funding for the evaluation process?

1.8 Examples of replication?

1.9 Have there been any cost benefit analysis completed on investments in crime prevention in your country? If so, where can we obtain a copy of their findings?

2. Are the evaluation findings disseminated?

If this applies:

2.1 In which areas/spaces (at state level; industry associations, scientists, media and/or...)?

2.2 What has been the outcome(s)/use(s)?

V. Indicators

- 1. Does your country have indicators: of safety?
of sustainable development?**

If this applies

- 1.1 What are the indicators?
- 1.2 Who initiated these indicators?

VI. Involvement of other actors in crime prevention and community safety.

Please note if this applies and describe briefly:

- 1. Role of the police in crime prevention?**
- 2. Role of the private sector in crime prevention (eg. businesses, private security, public-private partnerships)?**
- 3. Role of civil society in crime prevention (eg. non-governmental organisations, citizens)?**
- 4. Role of correctional services in crime prevention?**
- 5. Role of the media in crime prevention?**
- 6. Does your country have research institutes, central bodies, exchange networks on crime prevention?**

VII. Development of skills in crime prevention. Please note if this applies and describe briefly:

- 1. In your country, are there programmes, training and/or professionals working on crime prevention?**
- 2. If so, are there specific institutions which provide such training?**
- 3. What are the criteria for validation and professional accreditation?**

VIII. Budget allocated for crime prevention

1. Are there government funds specifically dedicated to crime prevention? If yes, please provide the approximate amount in the currency of your country.
2. Is there financial assistance for the development of community-level crime prevention initiatives? If yes, please provide the approximate amount in the currency of your country.
3. In your country, who is responsible for administering and managing the budget allocated to crime prevention?

IX. Crime prevention practices

Please list good or promising crime prevention practices (types of intervention) with youth, women, schools and other public spaces in your country

X. Priority in terms of crime prevention

What are the main issues in crime prevention that are a priority for your representatives?

Please check the relevant fields:

Priority ?

Yes No

Corruption, accountability and ethics of institutions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Migration, immigration and social exclusion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Youth crime and victimization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Women's Safety, Family Violence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Drugs (and alcohol)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Homelessness	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Prostitution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(Youth) Gangs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Local impact from transnational organized crime	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Small arms and the trafficking of guns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Human trafficking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental crimes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cyber crime and problems related to the management of "virtual" public spaces	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Others:		

XI. Major challenges

What are the main challenges that your country is facing in implementing crime prevention strategies/initiatives?

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